Hornsby, Jennifer (1997) The presidential address: truth: the identity theory. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 97 , pp. 1-24. ISSN 1467-9264.
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I want to promote what I shall call (unoriginally, and for the sake of its having a name ) ‘the identity theory of truth’. I suggest that other accounts put forward as theories of truth are genuine rivals to it, but are unacceptable. A certain conception of thinkables belongs with the identity theory’s conception of truth. I introduce these conceptions in Part I, by reference to John McDowell’s Mind and World; and I show why they have a place in an identity theory, which I introduce by reference to Frege. In Part II, I elaborate on the conception of thinkables, with a view to demonstrating that the identity theory’s conception of truth is defensible. Part III is concerned with the theory’s relation to some recent work on the concept of truth: I hope to show that the identity theorist not only has a defensible conception of truth, but also, in the present state of play, has appropriate ambitions.
|Additional Information:||Reprinted in The nature of truth: classic and contemporary perspectives, edited by Michael Lynch, pp 663-681. MIT Press, 2001. ISBN 0 262 12239 1|
|School or Research Centre:||Birkbeck Schools and Research Centres > School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy > Philosophy|
|Date Deposited:||11 May 2005|
|Last Modified:||17 Apr 2013 12:32|
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