Hornsby, Jennifer (2005) Truth without truthmaking entities. In: Beebee, H. and Dodd, J. (eds.) Truthmakers: the contemporary debate. Mind Association Occasional Series. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 34-48. ISBN 0199283567.Full text not available from this repository.
This replies to the arguments of Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra who claims that the intuitions that have inspired theories of truthmaking cannot be accommodated without commitment to truth-making entities. It makes a suggestion about why we should be apt to think of truth as grounded (and thus of ‘truthmaking’) even if there are no entities which make propositions true. There are two different agenda of the advocates of truthmakers: sometimes their project is to conduct a specifically ontological enquiry of a wide-ranging sort; sometimes to aid our understanding of truth. Rodriguez-Pereyra’s manner of defending a truthmaker principle makes connections with both projects. The objections here are intended to rebound on projects of both sorts.
|Item Type:||Book Section|
|Additional Information:||Full text no longer available here, on request from the publisher.|
|Keyword(s) / Subject(s):||truth, truthmaking, correspondence theory, facts, states of affairs|
|School or Research Centre:||Birkbeck Schools and Research Centres > School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy > Philosophy|
|Depositing User:||Jennifer Hornsby|
|Date Deposited:||21 Sep 2005|
|Last Modified:||17 Apr 2013 12:13|
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