Hornsby, Jennifer (2016) Intending, knowing how, infinitives. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1), pp. 1-17. ISSN 0045-5091.
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Abstract
Intellectualists tell us that a person who knows how to do something therein knows a proposition. Along with others, they may say that a person who intends to do something intends a proposition. I argue against them. I do so by way of considering ‘know how ——’ and ‘intend ——’ together. When the two are considered together, a realistic conception of human agency can inform the understanding of some infinitives: the argument need not turn on what semanticists have had to say about (what they call) ‘the subjects of infinitival clauses’.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis, available online at the link above |
| Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | Intention, knowledge how, intellectualism, infinitives, de se |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Jen Hornsby |
| Date Deposited: | 05 Feb 2016 11:59 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:21 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/14238 |
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