
Usage Guidelines:
Please refer to usage guidelines at contact lib-eprints@bbk.ac.uk. or alternatively
Terrorist Transgressions: Exploring the Gendered Representations of the Terrorist

Sue Malvern & Gabriel Koureas

Abstract: «Terroristische Grenzüberschreitungen: Vergeschlechtlichte Repräsentationen des Terroristen entdecken». The primary aim of the Terrorist Transgressions network which is presented here was to analyse the myths inscribed in images of the terrorist and identify how agency is attributed to representation through invocations and inversions of gender stereotypes. Although terrorism, its contexts, histories and forms, has been the focus of intense academic activity in recent years, especially in the fields of politics and international relations, cultural representations of the terrorist have received less attention. While the terrorist is predominantly aligned with masculinity, women have been active in terrorist organizations since the late nineteenth century. Particularly since the 1980s, women have perpetrated suicidal terrorist attacks, including suicide bombing, where the body becomes a weapon. Such attacks have confounded constructions of femininity and masculinity, with profound implications for the gendering of violence and horror. The network established that there is a shift away from analyses of cultural representations of the Red Army Faction, which have dominated the literature since the 1980s. New work has emerged examining representations of the terrorist and gender, including investigations of material from the 1970s, recently made available in archives. There also has been a shift in terms of military discourses around the figure of the enemy or terrorist insurgent in relation to visualizing the invisible enemy. Emerging work on colonial insurgencies contributed to a historical understanding of such debates.

Keywords: Terrorist, visuality, feminism, masculinity, gender.

1. Introduction

The network on Terrorist transgressions: Gendered representations of the terrorist in contemporary culture¹ aimed to analyse how myths of the terrorist

¹ Sue Malvern, Department of Art, University of Reading, RG6 6AH England; s.b.malvern@reading.ac.uk.
Gabriel Koureas, Department of History of Art, Birkbeck College, University of London, Malet Street, London, WC1E 7HX, England; g.koureas@bbk.ac.uk.

This essay is a revised version of the introduction to Terrorist Transgressions: gender and the visual culture of the terrorist, [London 2014]. The edited book with ten essays by academics from the UK, Germany, Switzerland and the USA, originated in a series of workshops.
are circulated in visual culture, literature and mass media with particular emphasis on issues of gender in understanding the visual economies of such representations. The network convened four workshops titled *Avant-gardes, terrorists and gender*, *the invisible enemy*, co-convened with Sandhurst Royal Military Academy; *Cultural representations of the Terrorist*; and *Violence, horror and gender* bringing together scholars from the UK, Europe especially Germany and Switzerland, and the USA. Through these events new research emerged that examined the representations of the terrorist and gender, including investigations of material from the 1970s, recently made available in archives as well as a shift in term of military discourses around the figure of the enemy or terrorist insurgent in relation to visualizing the invisible enemy. Emerging work on colonial insurgencies contributed to a historical understanding of such debates.

### 2. The Terrorist in Military Debates

In 2006 the US Army released its first counterinsurgency manual for twenty years. *Field Manual 3-24* (FM 3-24) was in part a response to the failure of the 2003 Iraq invasion to secure stability in the region and a recognition of the limitations of *shock and awe* tactics. It also followed the shame of disclosures about abuses carried out by the US Army at Abu Ghraib prison and attempted...
to project a more humanitarian image of US military interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. Declaring that cultural knowledge was an essential component in military occupation, the manual also established what Derek Gregory (2008, 8-23) terms a rudimentary “hermeneutics of counterinsurgency” when it stated that “American ideas of what is normal or rational are not universal” (U.S. Army 2006, 1-80, 1-15). Its opening chapter was headed with an epigraph attributed to a Special Forces Officer in Iraq: “Counterinsurgency is not just thinking man’s warfare – it is the graduate level of war” (U.S. Army 2006, 1-1).

Accordingly, FM 3-24 was peppered with cultural references including T. E. Lawrence’s role in orchestrating the Arab Revolt in the First World War and his 1917 “27 Articles”, annotated in the bibliography in the manner of an undergraduate reading list: “Much of the best of Seven Pillars of Wisdom in easily digestible bullet points” (U.S. Army 2006, Annotated Bibliography, 2). Patrick Porter counts 88 mentions of “culture” and 90 of “cultural” in the manual’s 282 pages (Porter 2007, 48). It also flags up its academic credentials particularly citing anthropology, sociology and political science; after the manual was downloaded two million times within two months of being posted on the internet, the University of Chicago Press published an edition with a new introduction by Sarah Sewall, director of the Carr Center for Human Rights Policy at Harvard. She claimed the manual aimed to allay American popular anxieties about the ethics and costs of American actions in Iraq for a nation that was attempting to heal wounds caused by its failings and abuses in combat, comparable to domestic unease about the Vietnam War. Given that it was widely assumed that the US lost the Vietnam War because popular support for the conflict had collapsed, RM3-24 was as important for securing consent for the US’s continuing engagements in the Middle East as it was for revising military doctrine (U.S. Army 2006, xxii).

The 1990s had been dominated by what is sometimes termed the “Revolution in Military Affairs”, or RMA, when the advent of new information technologies generated the means to conduct war at a distance and gave rise to terms such as “surgical strikes”, “smart bombs”, “drones” and “network-centric warfare”. New technologies detached the deployment of weaponry from their violent and destructive effects. When Sarah Sewall subtitled her introduction to FM 3-24 “A radical field manual” she was echoing a claim made by numerous military advisers and commentators that the cultural turn in warfare was a counter-revolution in military affairs. FM 3-24 was a culture-centric complement to the RMA and it also provoked protest against a new militarization of the humanities, for example, The Counter-Counterinsurgency Manual edited by the Network of Concerned Anthropologists (2009).
3. The Historiography of the Visual Culture of the Terrorist

Culture-centric warfare was also described as armed social work, a term coined by David Kilcullen, senior adviser to General Petraeus, commander of the coalition forces in Iraq. Kilcullen devised an update to T. E. Lawrence titled “Twenty-eight articles, the fundamentals of company-level counterinsurgency” addressed to the junior officer preparing for deployment by reading classic texts in counterinsurgency by British and French colonial experts including Lawrence and watching *Black Hawk Down* and *The Battle of Algiers*. Gregory terms the cultural turn in late modern warfare a “military disposit” or “a heterogeneous assemblage of discourses and objects, practices and powers distributed across different but networked sites” (Gregory 2008). If RM 3-24 represents a revisionist strategy for military affairs then its cultural turn is belated compared to the revisions in academic disciplines in the humanities it seeks to recruit. Culture-centric warfare however is distinguished by its dependence on visuality. RM 3-24 addresses a crisis in the legitimacy of military intervention which culture-centric warfare aims to remedy. As Nicolas Mirzoeff puts it legitimacy must be made literally and metaphorically visible. Legitimacy is projected particularly through a militarization of visualized media. Mirzoeff exemplifies this by citing the widespread distribution of video footage and photographs of Saddam Hussein’s medical examination after his discovery and capture by USA troops. Such images were a means to visualize a counterinsurgency strategy described in the field manual in medicalized terms: “With good intelligence, counterinsurgents are like surgeons cutting out cancerous tissue while keeping other vital organs intact” (U.S. Army 2006, paragraph 1-126). For Mirzoeff the obscene counterpart to this imagery was the illicit camera phone footage of Hussein’s execution demonstrating that the former dictator had been reduced to bare life (Mirzoeff 2009, 1739).

In 1994 W. J. T. Mitchell described a transformation in the arts and humanities as “the pictorial turn” or the emergence of a generalized anxiety about visual representation which discomforted intellectual enquiry. The pictorial turn followed up Richard Rorty’s claim for new forms of critical reflection in the arts and humanities known as the linguistic turn. Writing in the aftermath of the First Gulf War 1990-91, which was a paradigm for a conflict conducted under the emerging conditions of the RMA, Mitchell named this pictorial turn

---

as an ancient fear of images, including iconoclasm, idolatry and iconophilia, coming into play with new visual technologies in video, digital reproduction and a nascent internet that appeared to grant unprecedented power to the visual image. Textuality or visual competence in reading the image was unable to explain this new power (Mitchell 1994, 11-13, 15). More recently Mitchell has warned against fetishizing the pictorial turn and argues for a dialectical concept of visual culture which needs to explore not the social construction of the visual field but “the visual construction of the social field” (Mitchell 2002, 171). Subsequently David Campbell picked up Mitchell’s observations to argue that visual economies might be more productively examined as performative. He describes the performativity of visual economies as a mechanism for examining how “the visual field is both made possible by and productive of relations of power” (Campbell 2007, 361). Such visual economies describe the strategic role of visuality in modern war and they demonstrate the visual performance of the social world (Gregory 2013). Following from the above Charlotte Klonk argues that although there is an assumed agreement on the importance of images in modern asymmetrical warfare, not only is their absence from the numerous publications on terrorism striking but any meaningful analysis of such images is also lacking. If we are to break the spiral of escalating violence according to Klonk we need to understand the logic of terror as effected through images. When it comes to images used in terror acts it is often important that we look carefully and sometimes imperative that we refuse to see. The refusal, however, is always a highly informed decision that applies to a certain category of images only – those image acts in which people are debased, tortured and killed as means to a manipulative end. In order to make this decision we do need to understand the circumstances of their production and circulation (Klonk 2014).

4. The Spectacle of the Terrorist

Insurgencies operate in situations where the distribution of power between the insurgent and the authorities is unequal, and consequently insurgents frequently use acts of terror. The boundaries between definitions of the terrorist and the insurgent are imprecise and in particular contexts the terms may be interchangeable. Terrorist is notoriously difficult to define and the literature on terrorism reflects anxieties and ambiguities about its boundaries (see for example Ferber 2008; Chaliand and Blin 2007; Laqueur 1996; Brison 2002; Blain 2009; Puar 2007). Modern discourses of the terrorist date from 1945, coinciding with the period of decolonization (Edwards 2014). Discourses about the terrorist were given greater urgency after 2001 following attacks on America, London, Madrid and elsewhere. The horror experienced in Western societies was the appearance of a new sense of the vulnerability of the body politic, and
therefore of the modern self with its direct dependency on security and property. The terrorist has been constructed as the epitome of transgression against economic resources and moral, physical and political boundaries. As Jameson put it “the image of the terrorist [...] is one of the privileged forms in which an ahistorical society imagines radical social change”, displacing older images of criminals, revolutionaries and even the veteran (Jameson 1984, 203).

Although terrorism and its contexts, histories and forms, has been the focus of intense academic activity in recent years, especially in the fields of politics and international relations (IR), cultural representations of the terrorist have received less attention. Yet terrorism is dependent on spectacle and the topic is subject to forceful exposure in popular media. Moreover, dissident organizations produce images of the terrorist, for example as martyr, hero or avenger. Agencies, including national authorities, involved in combating terrorism, need to visualize the terrorist in order to give identity to the threat. As well as neglecting the question of cultural representations, in general, literature on the terrorist is also blind to the question of gender, or more precisely it assumes a masculine subject. This blindness or indifference to gender also permeates the literature on visuality and war cited above by Mitchell, Mirzoeff, Gregory, and others.

5. Terrorist Masculinities

Terrorist acts are seen as threatening Western masculinities because they are the ultimate manifestations of hypermasculinity, a willingness to give up one’s life in an act of powerful violence, to serve a perceived greater goal. As a result, in counterterrorist strategies the body of the male terrorist needs to be made invisible, discredited and de-masculinized. In Northern Ireland, hypermasculine figures in balaclavas pointing guns are painted on nationalist houses; in the UK press the face and body of Abu Hamza Al-Masri, called the The Hook, is made the emblem of terror’s ugliness in contrast to the normative appearance of terror’s victims; Osama Bin Laden has been demonized in popular culture as effeminate and sexually depraved. Gender theorist Judith Butler argues that gender is produced as a ritualized repetition of conventions, and this ritual is socially compelled in part by the force of compulsory heterosexuality. Just as Campbell and others have described visuality as performative, gender identity also depends on performative acts that give the “illusion of naturalness” (Butler 1995, 31). Indeed, this illusion is used to establish what sociologist R. W. Connell calls “hegemonic masculinity”, and is expressed within a web of power relations that are in a continual state of flux and transformation (Connell 1995; see also Roper and Tosh 1991; Brod and Kaufman 1994).

Writing in relation to the French colonial wars of independence, Franz Fanon demonstrated the ways in which political resistance was founded upon a reconstruction of masculinism and a restructuring of gender relations (Fanon
2001 [1963]). Such restructuring has grave consequences for post-colonial and post-conflict nationalisms in countries that adopt masculinist discourses to restore what is perceived as a damaged masculinity and a loss of national honour, as well as to promote extreme political ideas. However restructuring masculinities also offers possibilities of reconciliation. As Graham Dawson argues masculinities in Northern Ireland underwent a re-assessment following the end of the Troubles. This involved re-negotiating the gendered identities of the terrorist and the soldier hero which were internalized, negotiated and often contested in the formation of subjectivities during the conflict. For Dawson, these identities have an afterlife in the internal world of the psyche for both ex-combatants and for victims and survivors of violence (Dawson 2014).

While masculinities are fluid and variable, definitions of terrorism are equally malleable. Common principles nevertheless frame terrorism’s politics as pre-mediated, directed at civilians, and committed by non-governmental agencies or organizations. The goal of terrorism is regarded as inspiring fear and, most importantly, terror precedes both rational calculation and emotion (Chaliand and Blin 2007). However, as Stephen Morton has argued, this focus on the emotional and aesthetic connotation of terror is to the “detriment of the geopolitical context of its production”. Most importantly, for Morton, the relativist argument that “one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter”, ignores the fundamental point that terrorism is the ground upon which political sovereignty and freedom was and is defined in colonial history and in the present (Morton 2007, 36-42).

Gendered representations of the terrorist date, according to Sylvia Schraut, from the French Revolution. Schraut demonstrates how political violence is seen as transgressing accepted political and gender roles but most importantly, how even those who speak in favour of the terrorist usually follow the same gender conventions. Using terms such as heroes and martyrs both those who support and those who oppose the terrorist borrow their terms from a long Christian tradition. The images of the hero/heroine and the martyr carry with them a historical legacy dating especially from an early modern tradition of gender concepts. As a result, according to Schraut, representations of the terrorist oscillate between gender-role transgressing and gender-role stabilizing because approval of politically motivated violence can only be formulated with reference to the representations and terms that accompany traditional gender perspectives (Schraut 2014).

Issues of gender and terrorism are also closely linked with ideas of progress and civilization. Judith Butler has argued that hegemonic conceptions of progress are defined over and against a pre-modern temporality produced for the purposes of self-legitimation. Furthermore, progressive politics relies on a conception of freedom that emerges through time and establishes a set of cultural norms. Debates around issues of terrorism and masculinity during the colonial wars of independence, and more recently the War on Terror, rely on
such ideas of progress (Butler 2008, 1-6). Butler is referring to the images of torture that circulated from the Abu Ghraib prison in order to show the relationship between the hypermasculinity of the US army and those of the tortured populations of Iraqi prisoners. Sociologist Suki Ali argues that the signs of the barbarian become tools of the civilized, and the masculinities that are imagined are formed through conventional understandings of the “orientalised other” in debates on terrorism (Ali 2008, 37).

Alex Adams follows this argument through two case studies, the representations of torture on television (Fox TV’s channel 24) and literature – The Centurions (Lartéguy 1961) – as a successful strategy for reasserting dominant codes of masculinity as white (colonial) heterosexuality coded through domesticity, the family unit, and inviolable white women, and therefore for defusing the threat of terrorism. Forms of masculinity constructed within counterterrorist campaigns function as a guarantor of this privileged heterosexuality. Just as Schraut has demonstrated the persistence of Christian symbols in representations of the terrorist, one of the myths that Adams discusses is how superior men are shown to suffer torture well which depends on appropriating tropes from the tradition of religious martyrdom. The counterterrorist agent, when shown heroically enduring torture, establishes a superior masculinity to non-Western subjects through his ability to resist the dehumanizing power of torture (Adams 2014).

The representation of the terrorist is often associated with issues of spectacle, visibility and invisibility as Mitchell investigated in his “war of images” where images play a role in the perpetuation and cloning of terror (Mitchell 2011). However, as Andreas Behnke argues, his viewpoint is limited to making terrorism an object of visualizations. A systematic analysis of visuality from within terrorism remains underdeveloped. Behnke’s in-depth iconographical analysis of Anders Behring Breivik’s self-promoting images demonstrates how his carefully orchestrated self-fashioning becomes the clo(w)ning of terror. Breivik’s self-images reveal the infinite possibilities that visuality can offer to both terrorist and counterterrorist campaigns for performing terror and more importantly for performing gender (Behnke 2014).

Commissioned by the Imperial War Museum, London (IWM), Ben Langlands and Nikki Bell’s art installation, entitled The House of Osama bin Laden (2003), is instructive in relation to the visibility of images in the war on terror and how terrorist transgressions can be made invisible. During 2002 the artists went to Afghanistan recording visits to, among other places, a murder trial in the Supreme Court of Kabul, the site of the statues of Buddha at Bamyan that were destroyed by the Taliban and, according to the IWM website, “after a long and dangerous journey, the former home of Osama bin Laden at Darurtah where he lived for a brief period in the late 1990s” (Imperial War Museum). The images of the house are striking: empty rooms in semi-derelict houses, with some traces
of the recent passing of human life. In both cases the body of the terrorist remains invisible, haunting the empty spaces with absent masculinity.

The capture and death of Osama Bin Laden during a raid of his house in Pakistan presented some striking counter-visual representations which Klonk argues, originated from the decision of USA President Barack Obama not to allow the publication of post-mortem images of Osama Bin Laden (Klonk 2014). The President justified his decision by arguing that graphic images of someone who was shot in the head could be used as propaganda tools or as incitement to further violence. Significantly, the President stated: “We don’t trot out this stuff as trophies” (President Obama 2011). Instead, the photographs and videos that the media were allowed to circulate were those of the empty house where Bin Laden was killed. Images demonstrated the force of the attack, with the walls of the house blown out, and the furniture and evidence of daily life scattered throughout the rooms. One photograph, however, captured the invisible terrorist through the eyes of the US administration: Peter Souza’s official photograph of President Obama with his staff watching “Operation Neptune Spear” on-screen in the White House Situation Room, 1 May 2011. Whatever Obama and his colleagues were witnessing could not be seen by the audience of the photograph. Perhaps, those images will never be seen. Instead, the facial expressions, contractions and bodily postures of the US administration and military advisers acted as a mirror for the viewer. In a room full of men and just two women, it is the Secretary of State, Hilary Clinton, who appears distressed, bringing her hand to her mouth as though silencing a scream. This silent scream appears like a haunting scream for the terrorist rendered invisible through the President’s decision not to publish the images. Interestingly, in the photograph President Obama appears small and withdrawn in the left corner, yet also surrounded by military men who signify the hegemony of American military masculinities over that of the first black American President. Thus the image also encapsulates an important instance of competing masculinities in American racial politics. The President ordered the attack, finally avenging 9/11 by killing Osama Bin Laden, which reinforced his masculinity within the United States during a period when his own image and popularity were deteriorating. However, the President was not presented as the main protagonist of the event. His masculinity needed to be contained, represented by his position in the corner of the image. Centre stage, however, was the military administration that executed the operation, appearing to reassert its authority and masculinity as the most important army in the world.

In contrast to the President and to military masculinities, the depiction of Hilary Clinton – often regarded as a tough, masculinized woman – had to be played down. The gesture of shock she displays not only emphasizes the enormity of what is taking place on the screen, but also re-feminizes her image. Hence, this mass-distributed image orchestrates and performs both masculinities and femininities and, most indicatively, demonstrates their embodied gen-
der performance through the invisible body of Osama Bin Laden, which was secreted away to be buried in the ocean, thus sealing its invisibility forever.

6. Women and Terrorism

Women have also always been active members of organizations classed as terrorist. If the term terrorist is problematic, then the term woman compounds the problem of definition. For Dorit Naaman writing about Palestinian women suicide bombers both terms represent “ideological expectations of performance” (Naaman 2007). When women commit acts of violence, for instance murder, discourse is paralyzed. Belinda Morrissey investigated a set of case studies of women tried for murder and argued that female killers were only permitted their humanity if they could be represented as politically neutral and as victims (Morrissey 2003, 16). Women who commit acts of political violence are therefore paradoxical figures and cannot be accommodated to discourses about terrorism. Women terrorists are repeatedly discounted, assumed to lack agency or to be incapable of making political choices. They are described as acting from personal motives, to be hysterics or to be the dupes of their male lovers. For Robin Morgan, terrorist violence is inevitably patriarchal. She describes female members of the American Symbionese Liberation Front, famous for their kidnapping of the heiress Patty Hearst, as the “addicts of men who functioned as conductors of violence between men” (Morgan 1989, 189). Dominique Grisard argues that generation also plays an important role in understanding the representation of female terrorists. By concentrating on the German Red Army Faction (RAF) she demonstrates that popular understanding of the Faction as a generation in revolt served to depict Meinhof, Ensslin and Mohnhaupt as neither unique nor novel but as part of a long history of violent women thus deflecting analysis away from the specific circumstances of 1970s West Germany. Female terrorists were simultaneously given a history and written out of history (Grisard 2014). Sue Malvern investigates this historically in order to argue for the double effect of being a female terrorist. She states that if terrorism is a transgressive act and terrorists transgress, then women involved in terrorism commit a double act of transgression, by also transgressing assumptions about gender. Women’s violence, because it contradicts the norms of gendered behavior, is then perceived as more excessive than men’s, as a threat to masculinity and it is frequently sexualized (Malvern 2014).

The fear of women is repeatedly named as a fear of the female power to give life and to take it. The feminine is aligned with abjection because the permeability of the female body blurs the boundaries between self and other (Morrissey 2003, 2). The feminine abject produces myths of evil and dangerous women. Violent women are transformed into monsters expelled from society and compared to mythical monstrous women such as Medea. The psychoanalyst Karen
Horney is often cited for her text “the dread of woman” from 1932. She lists, among others, as examples of male fear of women, Ulysses’ fear of the siren, the Sphinx who demands the forfeit of male lives, Kali dancing on the corpses of slain men, Samson robbed of his strength by Delilah, Judith’s beheading of Holofernes, Salome and the head of John the Baptist. Men attempt to free themselves from their dread of women by objectifying their fear. She writes: “It is not”, he says “that I dread her; it is that she herself is malignant, capable of any crime, a beast of prey, a vampire, a witch, insatiable in her desires. She is the very personification of what is sinister” (Horney 1932, 349).

Carolina Caycedo’s series of drawings *Criminal Women* (2001-ongoing) portrays women who are criminals or who have been criminalized in stark graphic images on paper culled from photographs in popular media including newspapers, magazines, books and the net. The drawings, which are like a taxonomy of deviancy, are classified in five groups: Political Matters, Organized Crime and Common Delinquency, Out of this Century, Sexual Kicks and Killers. Grouped together the series offers contradictory readings. On the one hand they resemble police posters of ‘most wanted criminals’; on the other they look like assemblages of venerated heroines such as the groupings of photographs of Hollywood film stars in the foyers of cinemas or the portraits of distinguished company employees in the reception areas of corporations. Depicted in simple and clear lines with marker pens and coloured pencils, the images are instantly legible. Some portraits are drawn from mug-shots, for example Mary Cotton (Out of this Century), Britain’s first serial killer, or Judias Buenoano, an American con-woman executed in 1998 with her prison number: “Broward Correctional Institution Pembroke Pines, Fla 160663” (Organized Crime and Common Delinquency). Others are taken from idealized self-portraits, such as Leila Khaled, member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and famous for hijacking airlines in the 1960s and 70s (Political Matters). The viewer is provided with a key to identify individuals alongside a brief description of their acts. The portraits are often annotated with names and sometimes with hand-written descriptive details, for example: “Jihadist/Mujahid Suicide Bomber – British 7/7 bomb widow” (Samantha Lewthwaite; Political Matters); “Gu Kalai = suspended death sentence for murder of British business man. Her appearance in court raised suspicions about a body double” (Killers); “SUSAN SMITH: murdered her two sons”. Sandra Avila Beltrán, a Mexican drug dealer is portrayed in a drawing from a police photograph with marks indicating height on the wall behind her and annotated “SANDRA AVILA BELTRAN La Reina del Pacífico Reina de Reinas del Cartel de Sinaloa. the more beautiful the rose, the sharper the thorns” (Organized Crime and Common Delinquency). All are single figures except one, a collective portrait of Pussy Riot, M. Alyokhina, N. Tolokonnikova and Y. Samutsevich (Political Matters). The series does not discriminate between women involved in acts of self-determination to challenge legal and
political systems such as British Suffragettes and Dianne Pretty “terminally ill, wants her husband to assist her in her suicide” (Political Matters) or women who have been convicted of crimes such as murder. All the portraits, including one of a masked Loyalist Ulster Freedom Fighter, emphasize the women’s eyes as seeing subjects. The section “Political Matters” includes women who would be classed as terrorists, such as Sara Jane Olsen, member of the Symbionese Liberation Front or Ulrike Meinhof, member of the German Red Army Faction, but this section also includes right-wing women such as the Bosnian politician Biljana Placsic, sentenced for genocide alongside feminist heroines such as militant Suffragettes. The artist describes the series as an exorcism of her own darkest feelings and perversions, acknowledging her own and the viewer’s fascination with monstrously evil women. The listing and display of an extensive catalogue of women vilified for criminal acts, for deviance and rebelliousness stretching back to the Greek mythological figure, Medea, also enables the viewer to identify with the women and to grant them agency, a feminist resistance to patriarchal constructions of these women as monsters.

6. Conclusion

We have argued here for considering the terrorist, gender and the visual field as performative categories that are imbricated together in intricate ways. Sherif Waked’s video, Chic-Point: Fashion for Israeli Checkpoints (2007) might be emblematic of these arguments. Chic-Point: Fashion for Israeli Checkpoints is a seven-minute video where attractive male models on a catwalk approach the camera and demonstrate clothes with openings that reveal the torso especially the midriff or garments with zips and fastenings allowing clothes to be quickly removed to expose the body. The last section is a series of black and white stills taken at Israeli checkpoints showing Palestinian men lifting their clothes or stripping to demonstrate to Israeli soldiers that they are not carrying weapons. Gil Hochberg argues that the video shows how the practices of searching and stripping Palestinian men in order to protect Israeli citizens also “produce the Palestinian body both as a symbol of imminent danger (the terrorist) and as the object of complete subjugation lacking any political agency (the occupied)” (Hochberg 2010, 578). The video exposes Israeli checkpoints as sites for the performance of power that creates the terrorist suspect as a pretext for stripping the bodies of Palestinian men. But the way the video first recruits the spectator to view the male models performing their desirability and seductiveness and then places the spectator in the position of the soldier surveilling Palestinian men also exposes the perverse sexual charge in the encounter at the border crossing where Israeli soldiers “check out” the Palestinian subject (Hochberg 2010, 580). In that sense, Waked’s video also exemplifies Jameson’s point that the terrorist is a figure both feared and desired by the social order which produces it.
References


