Mapping the Contours of ‘Everyday Security’: Time, Space and Emotion

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Abstract

This article develops a conceptual framework that prompts new lines of enquiry and questions for security researchers. We advance the notion of ‘everyday security’ which encompasses both the lived experiences of security processes and the related practices that people engage in to govern their own safety. Our analysis proceeds from a critical appraisal of several dominant themes within current security research, and how ‘everyday security’ addresses key limitations therein. Everyday experiences and quotidian practices of security are then explored along three key dimensions; temporality, spatial scale and affect/emotion. We conclude by arguing that the study of everyday security provides an invaluable critical vantage-point from which to reinvigorate security studies and expose the differential impacts of both insecurity and securitisation.

Keywords


Introduction

In recent years some acute questions have been raised about the future prospects for critical security studies (e.g. Neocleous 2008; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2010; Nunes 2012; Schuilenburg 2015). Perhaps the most damning assessment comes from Neocleous and Rigakos (2011) who in an edited collection entitled Anti-Security have counselled a move away from conventional critical approaches to security and indeed the abandonment of the concept of security itself. For the anti-security collective, contemporary scholarship on security has reached an ‘analytical blockage’ in that critiques of security are now easily bracketed within fairly narrow pathways. Further, even the most robustly critical approaches ‘succumb to the idea that security is a fundamental human need’ and thus only serve to ‘reinforce the security policies of the managerial state’ (Neocleous and Rigakos 2011: 8). In this article, we identify a number of constructive ways forward for security research that need make no such philosophical or normative claims about the primacy of security, or of what ‘good’ versus ‘bad’ security looks like. These, we suggest, need not fall prey to the limitations in extant security studies and will help expose the everyday realities and consequences of security processes, governing practices and allied social interactions.
Despite considerable differences in their subject-matter and conceptual approach, contemporary research in international relations, criminology and socio-legal studies now exhibits two of the most fruitful ways of studying security advanced to date. The first of these focuses upon how security is talked about, understood, conceptualised and articulated by political and other authorities (e.g. Waever 1995; Valverde 2011a). The second focuses instead upon detailed analyses of the particular strategies, practices and techniques that are set out to govern that which has been characterised as a security problem (e.g. Bigo 2006; Lakoff 2006). Following the general trajectory of these two lines of approach, we echo the view that philosophical questions about what security is or is not are perhaps less instructive at this point than questions about how security is understood, articulated and experienced by various actors, and how these processes are linked to the crafting and implementation of specific practices assembled in the name of security (cf. Zedner 2009; Molotch 2012).

In this article, we contend that much can be gained by exploring how practices of security governance are experienced by different people and groups ‘on the ground’ so to speak, and how they are implicated in, forged through and find expression via quotidian aspects of social life. To do so, we focus attention on what we refer to as ‘security experiences’; the lived realities of practical security measures, including the diverse ways in which programmes, strategies and techniques for governing security are experienced, taken up, resisted, and even augmented by different individuals and groups within society. As we will demonstrate shortly, such an approach also inevitably draws attention to the everyday security practices that people engage in on their own; those which can be found beyond the formal, official processes of national governments and other political authorities.

Our arguments are structured as follows. We begin with an analysis of some of the predominant themes within critical security work, drawing upon major lines of research within international relations, political science, criminology, human rights and socio-legal studies. Our purpose is not to survey the entirety of these fields, but rather to highlight the value and importance of deploying a notion of the ‘everyday’ in the context of security, and to contextualize our claims about what studying security in everyday life can contribute to broader understandings of security processes. Building from this analysis, we advance the concept of ‘everyday security’ and outline the parameters of what we intend by this, as well as the various uses it will have in advancing future scholarship. This includes drawing attention to both (i) the ways in which security projects are experienced, and (ii) how individuals and groups deploy certain practices to govern what they understand and interpret as their own security. Building upon this framework, we propose a series of interrelated lines of enquiry that foreground people’s security experiences and expectations, as well as the practical things that they do to manage their own safety. We then consider what we see as three pivotal dimensions of ‘everyday security’; its temporal, spatial and emotional features. Each of these is explored to highlight their interconnectedness within the realm of the ‘everyday’, and to reveal new possibilities and pathways for security scholarship. We conclude by suggesting that a detailed study of ‘everyday security’ has important
practical and analytical value. It provides a crucial vantage point from which to expose differences in vulnerabilities and insecurities, explore the choices and perceptions that inform the things people do to govern their own safety, and re-engage a rather different politics of security.

The Importance of Security Experiences

One of our foundational arguments is that while much has been said about security discourses and techniques, far less has been said of the ways in which practical security measures are experienced, felt and managed by individuals and groups. In the field of ‘securitisation studies’ in international relations, analyses tend to focus upon the ‘speech acts’ that define a particular issue as a security concern (like organised crime, terrorism, hunger or illegal migration), the implications of these ‘securitising moves’, and the political struggles over what to securitise or ‘de-securitise’ and how (Waever 1995; Buzan, et al. 1998). While such work usefully highlights the ways in which certain issues come to be characterized and addressed as ‘security problems’, it tends to pay less attention to the measures or practices that result from such securitisations. Indeed, as Bigo and others have persuasively argued, in focusing upon specific (and often dramatic) speech acts, securitisation scholars tend to miss the everyday ‘micro-practices’ of security, and end up underestimating the unease and ambiguity which often surrounds security discourse (Bigo 2006; Huysmans 2006). Such micro-practices are themselves often the site of political struggle, and expose the manner in which people, groups and institutions jostle with each other in less spectacular and less visible ways that are both important and consequential. Likewise, the security measures that result from securitisation processes will themselves be received, experienced and interpreted in certain ways, often engendering struggle and resistance. This often takes a more hidden or obscured form than that which surrounds the often dramatic construction of a particular issue as an urgent security problem for public policy.

Security measures in practice – the screening systems at airports, the CCTV networks in urban city-centres, the visible police presence in public parks, and so forth - will always have certain (often differentiated) impacts upon people and groups. In fact, this is precisely what they are designed to do. Asking questions therefore about the everyday lived experiences of security – and not just how projects are ‘implemented’ on the ground, but how they are felt, lived through, sensed and borne by individuals and groups – is vital for understanding security governance writ large. Yet such questions have been largely absent from contemporary security research. Put another way, foregrounding questions about lived experiences provides us with another piece of the security puzzle - one which engenders new and fruitful lines of research and is also theoretically and conceptually salient for how we understand broader security processes. Furthermore, foregrounding lived experiences provides not only insights into security’s messy everyday world, but also allows us an important critical vantage-point from which to expose differences and inequalities in how security is experienced by different individuals and groups within populations and across the globe. That is, the
more mundane dimensions of security have fundamental social implications, and may conflict with (rather than support or augment) collectively generated notions of safety rooted in tacit and mutual mechanisms of informal social control (Jacobs 1961). From this perspective, a detailed empirical investigation of security practices through the prism of the ‘everyday’ enables rather than constrains new forms of political critique.

**Thinking Through the ‘Everyday’**

The notion of ‘everyday life’ is rooted in well-established sociological and criminological literatures (Douglas 1970; Adler et al. 1987). It has been used both as an umbrella term to encompass a particular branch of sociology, and as a way of pointing to the rules, positions, languages and performances that are the decisive formative mechanisms in shaping everyday life (Kalekin-Fishman 2013). While the ‘sociology of everyday life’ is a diverse field – both theoretically and empirically – it is often associated with an approach that seeks to tie the ‘struggles’ of everyday life into macro-structural forces and dynamics. In this sense, the ‘everyday’ has been a longstanding focus within criminology (Goffman 1959), notably with regard to the effects and impacts of victimisation, harm and fear of crime as aspects of lived experiences. Pioneering studies by Stanko (1985; 1990), Gordon (1988) and Genn (1988), for example, have highlighted the routine and gendered nature of everyday violence and domestic abuse, which have quotidian effects on both women and children. Others have extended this frame to the intimacies of danger and fear in diverse settings and among different social groups (Moran 2002; Pain and Smith 2008; Lee and Farrall 2009). Feminist criminologists and victimologists (Walklate 1989; Pain 2012) have been at the forefront of much of this work, making clear the ways in which women across the world experience violence and the threat of violence on an ongoing basis, engendered by patriarchal relations of power (i.e. Radford and Russell 1992; Spalek 2002).

More recently, there has been considerable criminological and policy attention given to the ways in which local social order is corroded by the cumulative and persistent effects of low-level incivilities and anti-social behaviour (Innes 2004; Crawford 2009). Yet rarely have connections with the wider purview of security studies been explicit. More broadly, whilst there is a rich criminological and feminist tradition of studying the routine and everyday nature of victimisation, transgression, crime and deviance - from the boardroom suites to the back streets - as well as the emotional dynamics and sensibilities that crime and harm evoke, the links with ‘everyday security’ have been tenuous. The way in which we seek to deploy the ‘everyday’ here serves therefore, in part, as a strategic corrective to some of the shortcomings in contemporary security studies, as well as a means of spotlighting the more mundane, routine and quotidian dimensions of security processes. First, security scholarship has been dominated by a tendency to link security processes to the state, national interests and sovereign identity. This state-centric orientation has blinded much critical analysis to the governing capacities and roles of diverse non-state actors, both as security providers and producers of insecurity. The way in which contemporary security problems are
increasingly seen as being transcendent of national territories and public and private space (e.g. European Commission 2010), has reinforced claims about the limited ability of states – on their own - to control flows of insecurity and respond adequately to risks. At the same time, the perceived interconnectedness of security threats has also led to a blurring of the distinctions between ‘internal’ and ‘external’ security, and the roles and jurisdictions of the traditional institutions established to ensure them (Dean 2007). Consequently, both the production and mitigation of new security risks are seen as lying beyond the control of traditional nation-states, such that the governance of security can no longer be placed solely within the jurisdiction of national governments. Whilst the role of non-state institutions and actors (like private military companies; e.g. Avant 2005) has garnered increasing attention, and substantial criminological interest has centred on the private sector’s place and role in the provision of policing and security governance (Jones and Newburn 1998; Johnston and Shearing 2003; Hutchinson and O’Connor 2005; O’Reilly 2015), there remains a clear emphasis within security studies upon national political authorities and public bodies. Emphasising the ‘everyday’, conversely, directs attention to the ways in which security projects – whether enacted by states or private agents and other non-state groupings - affect how people live, how they come to understand and engage with the security practices that impact upon their lives. It reveals the pivotal role played by civil society organisations and ordinary citizens in security processes. Second, the ‘everyday’ acts as an important counter to a prevailing emphasis upon the ‘spectacular’ and the ‘exceptional’, which cast a long shadow over security research (and indeed criminology more broadly). Major events and the official responses to them, such as 9/11, 7/7, and more recently the Edward Snowden leaks, are paradigmatic examples that have consumed security analyses. Linked to this, critical security studies have been preoccupied by subsequent connections with, and departures from, ‘normal politics’. As securitisation scholars have made clear, framing something as a ‘security’ issue allows things that might ordinarily be politically untenable to become not only thinkable but widely acceptable, including the introduction of extraordinary or exceptional new legislative powers or measures (Buzan et al. 1998; McDonald 2008). Thus viewed, the process of securitisation takes certain issues beyond the established ‘rules of the game’ and frames them as being so exceptional, so potentially catastrophic, that they must be treated above and beyond normal democratic politics. Within the realm of emergency or ‘exceptional’ politics, problems can then be dealt with far more swiftly and without the impediments associated with customary (democratic) rules and procedures. Yet while such work has been vitally important in both illuminating and helping us understand such processes, there has nevertheless been a tendency to give prominence to actors with formal powers to ‘securitise’ at the expense of other actors who are too often conceived as passive recipients or bystanders to such moves. As a result, less attention has been accorded to the ways in which lay sensibilities and informal processes might influence, propel or work against such tendencies.
Relatedly, the everyday also serves as a counterfoil to the ‘tyranny of the epochal’ that all too frequently pervades the social sciences, as evidenced in a typical preoccupation with radical discontinuity, disruption and transformation at the expense of persistence, micro-change and accumulation in the everydayness of the (long-term) shape of history (Corfield 2007). Too often such ‘epochalism’ makes ‘change appear the inevitable outcome of abstract non-locatable impulses and imperatives… rather than the result of specific (and traceable) political choices’ (du Gay 2003: 670) that build upon each other in incremental ways. Emphasising the ‘everyday’ therefore provides a more nuanced and inclusive understanding of security, which demands more attention be given to how the less prominent and less powerful – in both institutional and non-institutional settings – might ‘augment’ or ‘resist security’ in various ways.

Fourth, talking about and indeed governing security are not, after all, matters only for ‘high politics’ – security is not a subject that only experts, professionals, policy-makers and government officials debate and try to do something about. The ‘everyday’ asks us to consider the more mundane, ordinary routines and day-to-day discussions and practices that people engage in to help manage their own safety. Indeed, it is in part through such everyday security processes that ordinary people foster security for themselves and for others while striving to live with insecurity. The everyday therefore draws our gaze away from more spectacular and visible discursive formations, political rhetoric, and illocutionary ‘speech acts’ (Wæver 1995), and instead underlines the lived experiences, routine practices and mundane behaviours of individuals and groups within distinct and specific contexts, as well as the values, beliefs, perspectives and expectations that inform them (Crawford 2014). Such an approach will in turn require us to attend to the empirical study of what Blumer (1969) has called the ‘obdurate’ empirical world, through grounded empirical analyses that acknowledge and indeed foreground the contested and messy nature of social relationships and practices.

This is in turn linked to a fifth benefit of focusing on the everyday, in that it centres and foregrounds gender relations and marginalized groups (notably those typically disregarded by public discourse and powerful interests). Traditional security studies in politics and international relations have rightly have been criticised for paying insufficient attention to the views and experiences of both minority groups and women (Hansen 2000). For some critical feminist scholars, the notion of ‘human security’ has therefore been a useful vehicle through which to incorporate a greater emphasis upon both gender inequalities and the experiences of women (Nussbaum 2005; Robinson 2011), as well as the uneven distribution of vulnerability and insecurity among minority groups. However, as Newman (this issue) and others (Marhia 2013) have argued, ‘human security’ remains a problematic, somewhat vague and analytically weak concept. The everyday, by contrast, has already been closely associated with feminist scholarship and with the deprivation and differential experiences of migrants for example (Safi 2010). For Lefebvre (1984: 73), everyday life ‘weighs heaviest on women… They are the subjects of everyday life and its victims’ (see Cook and Jones 2007). Similarly, Johnson and Lloyd (2004) have argued that throughout history the ‘housewife’ has been ‘sentenced to everyday life’, with the home as the crucible of a mundane and
removed existence. Added to this, criminological scholarship has exposed the ways in which ‘home’ for many is far from the safe sanctuary that it is often assumed to be in contrast to the uncertainties of public space. Rather criminologists have documented the myriad of ways in which women’s experience of home has been one of confinement, exploitation and exclusion. Likewise Pain (2012) evocatively captures the ways in which fear works as a form of ‘everyday terrorism’ in domestic abuse. Yet while we applaud the emphasis upon the everyday here, such juxtapositions imply a rather negative view of the quotidian as something that must be escaped or transcended. In line with Johansson and Vinthagen (2014), we suggest that there are ‘heroic’ and indeed significant dimensions of everyday life that are invested with acts of resistance and subversion (Gordon 1988). Indeed, as some have suggested, such resistance is pivotally important as ‘no one escapes the reach of the quotidian’ (Felski 1999: 16). Rather, the everyday highlights for security researchers the normal, regularised and prevailing nature of insecurity for some people in particular environments, while also forcing us to consider the shared and potentially progressive dimensions of the ‘mundane’ and the ‘routine’.

Finally, emphasising the everyday places the interactions and the relations between people - and between people and things - centre stage. It signposts the importance of individuals and groups in person-to-person, person-to-group and group-to-group interactions, and stresses the situational and contextual aspects of security practices. In so doing, it helps to accentuate the mundane rather than the spectacular, the routine rather than the exceptional. And yet, such research also allows for (everyday) inconsistencies, unintended consequences, struggles and resistances. To this point, critical scholars have tended to view security processes as being overly deterministic, unilinear and totalising in their effects, with more muted consideration for unintended consequences, resistance and struggle. Less regard has been given to how security is produced, managed and fashioned by individuals and groups in ways that are enabling and productive rather than simply constraining (Crawford 2014).

Even though the ‘everyday’ has at times been treated as a residue left over after specialised, spectacular and monumental activities have been removed (Lefebvre 1984), here we deploy the notion in a more constructive way to highlight at least three crucial facets of ‘everyday security’ - its temporal, spatial and emotive/affective dimensions. The ‘lived experience of everyday life’, as Burkitt notes:

‘is rich, complex and multidimensional: it is an experience of diverse and differentially produced and articulated forms, each combining time and space in a unique way... What binds these relations into a formation are not institutionalized spaces and codified sets of rules, but human emotions such as loyalty, mutual needs, and interests’. (2004: 222)

So too are the lived experiences and expectations of everyday security. That is, it is not just securitisation processes and security projects themselves which have temporal, spatial and emotive features; everyday security too – in terms of both the way in which security practices are experienced, as well as everyday routine practices of security - are
inflected with time, space and emotion. In articulating these three dimensions of everyday security - and how we might go about developing research questions and themes to investigate them - we suggest that a focus on such issues affords a number of distinct possibilities for the future of security research. Yet, in what follows, it is neither our intention to romanticise nor afford supremacy to the everyday as some kind of ‘natural’, ‘authentic’ or exclusive sphere, but rather to use ‘everyday security’ as a strategic conceptual space that raises new questions and generates new research challenges for critical security scholars.

**Conceptualizing ‘Everyday Security’**

By ‘everyday security’ we refer to two broad and interrelated issues. First, the lived experiences of individuals and groups who interact with security measures and practices. By this we intend the manner in which security projects and measures are interpreted, felt, understood, adapted to and resisted by different individuals and groups, as well as people’s own perceptions and understandings of such measures. Formal security projects by government bodies and official security providers – to the extent that they seek to affect (or secure) the everyday - will always be embedded within (and in turn, at least in part constituted by) tacit forms of informal local order, social inequalities, routine habits and procedures, and the mundane practices and habits of ordinary people. Hence, there is a clear need to understand empirically the relationship(s) between security projects and extant social practices and relationships. How those formal projects play out in the social world will be informed, subverted or redirected by the activities, practices and (re)workings of ordinary people. That is, a security project in one setting (say, universal CCTV coverage, visible patrols and the installation of ‘panic buttons’ throughout Holland Park in Kensington, London) might have very different effects than the same project in another setting or space (say in a local park in Newham, East London).

This is in turn closely related to a second dimension of everyday security: the more mundane and quotidian practices and habits that are understood or characterised by people and groups as being ‘about security’, and which are crafted and carried out on a regular (everyday) basis; namely the production of ‘security from below’. This would include the numerous rituals, routines, and practices that people engage in which they themselves understand and characterise as being about (their own and others’) security, such as installing home security systems or instilling certain habits in their children (such as avoiding certain places after dark). As Molotch (2012: 217) has argued, security often ‘comes from the assemblage of artifacts, habits, and procedures which mostly are already there’. People’s everyday security practices inform and align with, but also depart from, formal security projects. Contrary to the assumptions of some securitization scholars, the security-related ‘speech acts’ evoked by people in their everyday encounters do not, by necessity, hold a fixed or essentialized meaning of security as ‘exceptionality’ that summons forth a confrontational logic of reactive emergency measures in which enemies and threats are inscribed. Rather these are more
frequently contested, dynamic and reflexive. As research on perceptions of security among Emergency Shelter workers in Canada has evinced, ‘what security looks and feels like to one person is quite different from what it is to others’ (Ranasinghe 2012: 91). In turn, this impacts upon how people talk about and govern themselves and those close to them on a daily basis.

Furthermore, our approach and programme for research are given shape by how these two dimensions of everyday security are related to one another. In other words, security experiences and quotidian security practices are not distinct but interconnected in important ways. That is, we are also attuned to the ways in which people’s ‘spaces of experience’ are linked to their ‘horizons of expectation’ (Koselleck 2004). Feeling secure demands not only the absence of direct harms in the moment but also assurances that the conditions underpinning our security will persist into the future. As such, the security-related ‘wishes and desires, cares and rational analysis, receptive display and curiosity: all enter into expectation and constitute it’ (Koselleck 2004: 259). The mutually conditioned relationship between experience and expectation means that the accumulation of experience demands retroactive expectation. Put another way, people share certain experiences of security and these experiences are in turn related to and informed by their expectations, hopes and fears about the future (both in the past and present). As we will demonstrate in the following section, such experiences and expectations are important for understanding how people and groups respond to and interpret – but also enact their own - security practices.

Mainstream securitisation theory, as Stritzel (2007: 366) has noted, suffers from both insufficient consideration of this ‘situatedness of speech acts’ and a ‘too static conceptualization of the speech act event in general’. Rather, everyday security talk and everyday security practices are ‘an always (situated and iterative) process of generating meaning’ (ibid. emphasis in original) that depend in part upon the perspectives and experiences of relevant actors. In everyday situations and mundane contexts, specific rationales and differing practices of security are much more malleable and varying than the quite rigid dynamics implied by studies of formal, official and spectacular securitisations. For example, for some Muslim women, wearing the hijab is, for them, simultaneously a security practice – in that they derive security from and through their Muslim identity – and, at the same time, something which can significantly increase their vulnerability to harm, insult or attack (Tara-Chand 2015). For these women, the specifics of judgements about what or what not to wear (and indeed how to wear it) on a daily basis become deeply implicated with security concerns. This reflects the minutiae and complex detail of the experiences of living with insecurity and the day-to-day negotiation of personal safety. In this context, security practices become the ordinary rather than the exceptional or extra-ordinary.

The notion of everyday security therefore recognises the shared reality of the mundane: ‘Everyday life... does not only describe the lives of ordinary people, but recognises that every life contains an element of the ordinary’ (Felski 1999: 16). As such, the everyday highlights the normal, regularised and prevailing nature of insecurity for some people in particular environments. Moreover, everyday security has an informal and taken-for-
granted quality; one that is sensed before being consciously articulated and which names an ambiguous configuration of the social that may not yet have fully emerged. Feelings and thoughts are interconnected through ‘the routine acts of conducting one’s day-to-day existence without making it an object of conscious attention’ (Felski, 1999: 27). In this sense, everyday security constitutes a form of what James C. Scott (1990: 200) termed ‘infrapolitics’ - that which informs the formal world of political discourses but does so in a way that is often hidden, denied or left unacknowledged. Infrapolitics is performed, acted out and recreated in sites far removed from governmental authorities and those wielding formal power. As such, the infrapolitical is something which is largely invisible in official politics but which provides rudimentary forms of political life. Accordingly, ‘infrapolitics may be thought of as the elementary—in the sense of foundational—form of politics. It is the building block for the more elaborate institutionalized political action that could not exist without it’ (Scott 1990: 201). Its recognition provides an invitation to investigate the links and antagonisms between politics and everyday life experiences and practices. Despite the association of everydayness with continuity, this need not be conservatively rooted in tradition, but rather can be fluid, ambivalent and open to new possibilities. For, as Harrison contends; ‘in the everyday enactment of the world there is always immanent potential for new possibilities of life’ (2000: 498). Yet as feminists have shown, it is in the politics of everyday life that power dynamics and patriarchal norms are forged and reproduced, often imperceptibly and pervasively over time.

Clearly, the empirical questions raised by such an approach are diverse. For example, how do different people and groups experience – feel, interpret, and respond to – different security projects and measures? What demographic, experiential and personal factors might be relevant to these experiences? In what ways are different security measures open to interpretation, transformation and even resistance? How are specific measures felt and borne differently by different people and groups? How do authorized security measures influence and inform the ways in which people practice their own security? Furthermore, to what extent and in what situations do people engage in their own ‘real world’ securitisations (Stritzel 2007)? That is, what issues, problems or possibilities are securitised in everyday life by ordinary people and groups, and how are these processes and their outcomes different from official securitisations? To explore some of these issues further the following sections examine three of the interrelated dimensions of everyday security: time, space and emotion.

**Time and Temporality**

The importance of time and temporality is often ignored in security scholarship. For Valverde (2014), temporality is crucial to all security projects, albeit in different ways. Indeed the very notion of the ‘everyday’ is perhaps above all a temporal term (Crang 2001). It conveys repetition; not simply referring to the singular, exceptional or unique but also to that which occurs ‘day after day’. As such, the everyday, implies a multiplicity of temporalities, some incidental, some routine, some rare, some shared, some
personal, some notable and some distinctly mundane. For some security practices, time is a ‘built-in scale’ that is inherent to a particular measure. In other cases, the temporal scale of a security measure is contingent upon how it is used. For Valverde (2011a: 13), at least two questions therefore need to be asked about the temporality of security projects. First, what kind of temporality is evident within each instance (whether built-in or presupposed)? Second, do all the security measures that are part of a particular project or assemblage of practices work in harmony with regard to temporal scale, or are there conflicts? While these are vital questions for researchers, we would add to this that, first, security practices have both immediate implications as well as longer-term consequences, and, second, that the temporal dimensions of security experiences are just as important as those associated with formal security projects. That security measures have both short-term implications and longer-term consequences has by now been well established by securitisation scholars. This suggests too however that there is an evident temporality in terms of how such measures will be and are experienced. The suspension of normal codes of procedure and recourse to ‘emergency measures’ – be it extraordinary rendition or extra-judicial hearings for example - may provide temporary relief in the present, but also frequently have ramifications that reverberate well into the future. In essence, security measures deployed today can breed future insecurities and grievances, prompting vicious circles and malign feedback loops across time. The imposition of security measures, particularly where these are ostensibly targeted at specific populations either directly or through differential implementation – whether these be the Republican community in Northern Ireland during the ‘troubles’ or the more recent covert surveillance of the Muslim community1 – can be experienced as harmful, illegitimate and productive of other fears and concerns. This alerts us to the possible future risks associated with governing security in the present, the future effects that security projects deployed today can have, and in particular, the capacity for current security practices to produce harmful social consequences down the road.

Further, security projects may have an incremental and accumulated acculturation and normalising effect, whereby, over time the exception becomes the norm in an undefined ‘state of exception’ (Agamben 2005) or ‘permanent state of emergency’ (Bigo 2010). As trust and legitimacy are seen as core ingredients in shared experiences of security, security projects will seek to generate commitments to compliance and voluntary cooperation from the public. In this endeavour, judgements about the legitimacy of security apparatuses and measures – in terms of both people and systems – will be crucial to whether and why people obey the law and comply with decisions (Tyler 2006). Hence, the urgency which often accompanies security projects - if experienced as illegitimate - can lead to non-cooperative attitudes, non-compliance and even resistance and protest. The question is less whether this is a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ thing in

1 Associated with aspects of the British Government’s counter-terrorism Prevent agenda and more specifically with policing strategies such as Operation Champion in Muslim areas of Birmingham (Lewis 2010).
itself, but how this common urgency of security projects is experienced, and what sorts of responses and practices it evokes.

Indeed time is as important to individual and group experiences of security measures as it is of their form and function. For instance, there is a clear temporal dimension to the passport seizure mechanisms that have been authorised by the recent Counter Terrorism and Security Act 2015, which provide an immediate travel ban as well as time for authorities to investigate whether someone is involved in terrorism related activity (and whether longer term disruptive measures are necessary). Those subject to immediate travel bans will experience this temporality in certain ways, and not necessarily in a proportionate manner. It has long been recognised that objective calendar time (in hours, days, weeks) is not the same as time as it is perceived and experienced by individuals - what Bergson (1910) called ‘duration’. For humans, time can speed up or slow down; that is, our perception of time is variable and not always in rhythm with our watches. Further, time is social, plural and contested, in that perceptions of time are actively produced by and through various social practices (Crawford 2015). In the context of prison sentences, Armstrong and Weaver (2013; Armstrong 2014) have found that the experience of ‘penal time’ contradicts in almost every way the conventional assumptions about proportionate sentences; that is, shorter sentences actually felt longer than long ones for those who had done both. Long and short sentences do not have the same ‘time feel’. As this suggests, questions about the ways in which people’s experiences of security measures are shaped by time and temporality are also vital for understanding security processes writ large.

It is often claimed that for people to feel secure requires not only a perception of the absence of immediate or direct harms, but also a reasonable confidence that the conditions assuring their safety will continue into the foreseeable future. Correspondingly, projects of security seek to offer assurances about the future and generate expectations that people can count on. Hence, security practices embed a future orientation that implies and evokes temporality. Yet in our own perceptions of insecurity and risk, we draw upon our past experiences, our beliefs and perceptions of the nature of certain threats, and the extent to which the imposition of such risks is ‘voluntary’ or imposed (Maras 2013). That is, we are more confident about, and expect less to be done to manage, risks that we take on voluntarily. Conversely, we demand more be done to secure us against ‘imposed’ risks of a terrorist attack on planes, trains and buses. In other words, how individual and collective perceptions of (future) risks relate to our expectations of protection has significant consequences.

Space and Spatial Scales

Enforcement officers at ports can initially seize travel documents for a period of up to 14 days, which can then be extended to 30 days with appropriate judicial approval.
Social life unfolds within a framework of time and space, in that space is irrecoverably bound up with the temporal constitution of society and visa versa. For Koselleck, the notion of ‘spaces of experience’ captures the distinctly spatial dimensions inherent in experiences in that they are contained, contextualised and rendered concrete in particular places. Experiences are not simply the here-and-now, but are informed and constituted by heritage, custom and tradition: ‘experience is present past, whose events have been incorporated and can be remembered...’ (Koselleck 2004: 259). Moreover, spatial scale is bound to temporality in ways that will have implications for our understanding of the social meaning of security measures. In many senses, security practices express the ‘intrinsic connectedness of temporal and spatial relationships’ (Bakhtin 1990: 84). For example, the security work of the bouncer is characterised by both time and space – the pub for which he is responsible, the hours during which this is so – and yet temporality and spatiality are here inextricable. Likewise, in the experience of navigating or policing the night time economy in a large city centre, temporality and spatiality are indivisible.

Scale is a fundamental feature of spatiality and of all efforts to understand and render the social world conceivable and governable. Matters of scale pervade all visualisations and representations of conflicts and security (Valverde 2012). The issue of scale, in a broad sense, informs – and possibly troubles – movements and the relationships between the local, national and global as well as shifts between micro-, meso- and macro-level analyses. That is, security concerns are increasingly seen to cut across different scales of activities and spaces; insecurities too seem to transcend different scales from the micro-local, city/regional, national to the global, while simultaneously encompassing inter-personal, inter-group, mass atrocities and/or inter-national conflicts. Further, we cannot assume that insights from the local neighbourhood can be un-problematically transferred to the regional or international arena, nor visa versa.

Fundamental to an understanding of security processes are questions about spatial scale in particular. Hence, the bouncer outside a city-centre pub might only be interested in sending disorderly people off, as his primary concern is the property for which he is responsible – whether those he sends on their way get into a violent street fight down the block is neither here nor there. For the police officers on shift however, who are responsible en masse for the entire city centre that night, different measures would be more appropriate such as containing or mediating the situation to prevent further violence and reduce the likelihood of an arrest and charge. The distinction here is about more than the quantity of territory covered by a particular security project or measure. The bouncer works at the spatial-scale of the pub, the police officer at that of the neighbourhood or locality – but the distinction between these scales is also qualitative. Thus, measures which seem appropriate at one spatial-scale (the pub, the city, the region, the nation, the transnational) may not be deemed appropriate at others. That is, security projects tend to work at a certain scale, and do not easily travel between them.

Experiences of security and individual practices of security are also characterised by spatial-scales. In addition, what people experience in an everyday sense can affect their
behaviour and engagement with different scales. For example, in the light of Edward Snowden’s exposé, mass surveillance has different scalar effects: ‘How the mass surveillance of communications might impact upon behaviour is clearly a pertinent question; however, just as the subject who travels adapts and conforms to the requisites of travel, so too in this instance there will be adaptability and creativity in the modes of self-government that prevail in the face of our late modern intensification of surveillance practices’ (Bauman, et al. 2014: 138). Moreover, these effects and their related self-governance strategies will be informed by people’s emotional responses. This goes some way to explaining why, however hard media outlets tried, publishing and analysing Snowden’s many revelations only caused ‘slight, hardly felt, tremors, where earthquakes were expected’ (Bauman, et al. 2014: 143). Emotions – as they relate to security and security processes – are not only quite difficult to predict, but seem to be affected by spatial scale in important ways.

Furthermore, the everyday experience of space is increasingly affected by technology and ‘virtual space’ which serves to stretch or disembed social relations from local contexts of interaction, reconfiguring them across large, even infinite distances of space (and, for that matter, time) (Giddens 1990). New social spaces - such as social networking sites on the Internet – have therefore problematised the territorial dimensions of space and individual experiences of spatiality, as much social interaction is now conducted through non-territorial spheres such as ‘cyber-space’. The global, almost instantaneous reach of the Internet, and the manner in which it transforms the relationship between time and space, have generated new fears and experiences of insecurity, new opportunities and potential techniques for security authorities, and new forms of possible resistance and struggle. The pervasive nature of instant global communication facilitates the manner in which contemporary insecurities may be felt and experienced quite far away (geographically speaking) from their origins in other parts of the globe. Thus, security projects in far-off places might influence people’s perceptions and experiences of security in a more local context. That is, it may not be only local security projects that someone directly encounters which shapes their ‘experiences of security’ (and indeed their own practices of security), but also those carried out at the national and transnational level and which affect those with whom they empathise. What someone reads on the internet and sees on the television news about security may have direct impacts upon how that person experiences, responds to, and feels security measures in their everyday life, just as it might impact upon what they do to protect themselves and their loved ones. Hence, in the contemporary world, ‘we experience space not according to the distanced gaze of the cartographer, but in circles of increasing proximity or distance from the experiencing self’ (Felski 1999: 22).

**Affect and Emotion**

Critical security studies have typically side-lined individual and interpersonal feelings, emotions and affect as well as the meanings that people attribute to events and experiences. The everyday conversely, accords space for a focus on the emotional field
and brings to the fore the role of ‘emotion work’ (Hochschild 1979). Emotions do not exist independent of everyday life but are shaped through direct experience of practical activities and engagement with the social world. Hence, research on security that is focused upon the everyday must come to terms with, and work through the implications of, the manifest centrality of emotions to security processes. This is not only a matter of how public fears over terrorism and moral panics about disease outbreak drive immediate policy changes. Emotions also play an important role in shaping how we experience security measures, how we respond to individual and group perceptions of insecurity and traumatic events, and the practices we engage in to manage our own safety. Indeed, anger, hatred, contempt, shame, guilt, envy, fear, love, care and pity, are all powerful emotions that can be either amplified or abated based upon how issues of (in)security are understood, represented and governed – both by political authorities and by individuals and groups. In an excellent analysis of the role played by affect in response(s) to the Bali bombings for example, Emma Hutchison (2010) has highlighted how emotions can be vital to political stability and social control, particularly in a context of uncertainty and insecurity.

It has been well demonstrated that certain emotions, like fear, anger and anxiety, can ‘short-circuit the normal machinery of prudential action by virtue of their characteristic action tendencies...They induce urgency as well as impatience’ (Elster 2004: 218, emphasis in original). Impatience in particular, Elster suggests, is ‘clearly incompatible with prudence, understood as action according to long-term self-interest’ (2004: 218). The implications here are at least twofold. First, emotions can – but do not inevitably - cloud prudential judgement and decision-making at the individual level. That is, to the extent that we feel fear, anger and anxiety as derivatives of either some security measure or our own perceptions of risk, we may over-securitise our own lives and act in ways that may be imprudent. Secondly, emotions have temporal inferences. That is, particular emotions induce speed and urgency in ways that provoke fast-track decisions and actions. This is in stark contrast to legal and constitutional-political processes that intentionally slow down deliberation – one might say precisely to promote a cooling-off effect. What Pettit calls the ‘outrage dynamic’ (2001) can therefore be rather dangerous for liberal democracies, and requires ‘buffers’, ‘mediating institutions’ and constitutional processes that contain its excesses in ways that insulate formal politics and policy formation from public passions. Yet at the everyday level, such buffers and mediating institutions are far more rare and difficult to establish, and questions therefore need to be asked about how the impact of certain emotions on our everyday security practices might be augmented, mitigated or contained (if that is indeed desirable).

As many commentators have noted, in the realms of security, crime and punishment, affect and emotions have a particularly problematic place (Karstedt et al. 2011). Feelings of insecurity and fear can provoke intemperate sentiments, arouse vengeful passions and give voice to heated sensibilities of outrage, anger and ‘othering’. It is perhaps unsurprising therefore that the ‘mobilisation of affect’ remains a crucial aspect of contemporary governance, whilst fear and anxiety occupy a prominent place in
contemporary culture (Furedi 2002). Perhaps nowhere is this more evident than in the field of crime control where the temperature of penal politics has become distinctly hotter in recent decades (Garland 2001: 35). According to Amin and Thrift (2013: 157), politics itself is always ‘shot through’ with emotions ‘from start to finish’. They elaborate:

‘The animation provided by affect is crucial in the practice of world making. If there is one thing that we know about political mobilization, even more in our age than formerly, it is that affect counts. Political judgments are not made in rational or deliberative ways; they follow the ley lines of emotion.’ (Amin and Thrift 2013: 14)

Security projects set out by governing authorities can thus be understood and interrogated in part through their emotional drivers, but perhaps just as importantly, in terms of their emotional impact upon the different people and groups they seek to secure. It is these feelings, these affective dimensions of security experience, which will, in part, generate and shape our own individual security practices. After all, people engage in specific security practices or purchase security technologies incited and informed by their emotions of fear and anxiety for what might happen – even where this constitutes a ‘grudge spending’ (Loader, et al. 2015). The affective dimensions to such decisions are simultaneously rather pertinent and poorly understood.

While there are clear emotional dimensions to the identification and construction of new ‘security problems’, there are also emotional dimensions to people’s everyday security practices and experiences. People’s everyday routine security practices (like always taking a mobile phone on late-night walks or circumventing a particular street or housing block) can be infused with affect and emotion. Given their manifest importance, the emotional dimensions of security processes – particularly at the everyday level - can neither be avoided nor ignored via technical language and claims of ‘objectivity’, but rather need to be acknowledged and understood, studied and analysed, to determine the role that they play not only in how security problems are identified, articulated, represented and responded to at the level of political authorities, but also in terms of how people experience security and how they carry out their own security practices. To do otherwise is to deny the human passions that inform and motivate everyday security, to stifle the emotions that are evoked by perceptions of insecurity, vulnerability and harm, and to ignore the possibilities inherent within more progressive and positive mobilisations of affect. This is by no means an easy task, but one that acknowledges the importance of engaging with people about matters that they care deeply about rather than shutting them out of processes that intimately affect them and leave them ‘penned in as spectators screaming from the sidelines’ (Loader 2011: 359). In sum, echoing Ranasinghe (2013: 104), we contend that much more needs to be known about what security and insecurity feel like to different people in diverse settings at various times.

The Future of the Everyday
What we are advocating here is the construction of detailed empirical knowledge about how security processes play out in everyday contexts – both in terms of how security projects and measures are experienced by different individuals and groups, and the allied issue of how people seek to govern their own security through sundry mundane and quotidian routines and practices. Crucial to such a project is an understanding of the role of time, spatial scale, and emotion. This empirical agenda and the scope of the issues at hand imply a number of methodological questions. They suggest a distinct qualitative dimension without foreclosing the use of quantitative methods in understanding and measuring the affective dimensions of security, albeit with careful attention to the ways in which concepts like ‘fear’, ‘anger’, and ‘anxiety’ are operationalised. They also indicate the value of various ethnographic methods, including observational studies, and psycho-social methods for revealing how people think about, feel and respond to different security measures, how they understand their own security and personal safety - indeed, what ‘security’ means to them - and what they do about it themselves on a routine basis. A useful way forward for security research – especially perhaps in the context of the everyday - is therefore through inter-methodological work, and indeed – as we have tried to do here – inter-theoretical work, that may also be ‘interdisciplinary’. The well-developed literature on ‘securitisation’ in international relations will be particularly useful in exploring ‘everyday securitisations’, including the ways in which non-state groups and actors ‘securitise’ activities such as cold-calling and anti-social behaviour. On the other hand, feminist criminologists have developed diverse approaches to understanding everyday victimisation and fear; methods which might inform rich explorations of key dimensions to everyday security.

Here we have sought to outline the possibilities that can come from a re-orientation of security research towards the empirical study of the everyday; incorporating both the lived experiences and expectation of security projects, and the routine security practices that individuals and groups engage in. Our intention has not been to displace or turn extant research on its head. Rather it has been to add to the study of formal security projects and techniques, a body of work which focuses upon the typically informal, mundane, routine and everyday dimensions of security, and an exploration of the ways in which these are interconnected, at times tensely-related, and indeed constitutive of one another. In understanding the ways in which people manage to live confidently with risk and negotiate their safety in interactions with others, more attention might be paid, we suggest, to the various and variegated ways in which individual security practices and experiences are themselves sites of political struggle and contestation. From such a perspective it may become clear that politics and security are intertwined, not opposed, such that studies of everyday security can also serve as a useful critical vantage-point from which to expose inequality and difference, and to re-engage politics rather than efface it. Far from the ‘death of politics’, it is anticipated that this will open up new possibilities for a different politics – perhaps a more nuanced ‘infrapolitics’ of everyday security. To conclude by paraphrasing Neocleous and Rigakos (2011: 8) – and by implication, to parry their thesis - the more we study everyday security, the more we expose the material inequalities, injustices, abuses of power and differential social
experiences of security projects, all of which might provide the foundations of emancipation.
References:


