Pelliccia, Marco (2015) Bargaining in global communication networks. Working Paper. Birkbeck College, University of London, London, UK.
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Abstract
Abstract We study a Rubinstein-Stahl two-player non-cooperative bargaining game played by n players connected in a communication network. We allow the players to communicate with any peer in the same component via the existing paths connecting the peers in a given communication network (global interaction). The unique stationary subgame perfect equilibrium profile characterizes the players’ expected payoff as function of their betweenness centrality score. Secondly, we study a dynamic link-formation game which allows the players to activate new linkages or sever existing ones in order to increase their bargaining power for a given marginal cost per link. We identify the conditions under which the pairwise stable network structures which arise belong to the family of the nested split graphs. These are graphs where the neighbourhood of each node is contained in the neighbourhoods of nodes with higher degrees.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Monograph (Working Paper) |
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| Additional Information: | ISSN 1745-8587: BWPEF 1507 |
| Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | Communication; Network; Noncooperative bargaining; Network formation |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Business and Law > Birkbeck Business School |
| Depositing User: | Administrator |
| Date Deposited: | 20 May 2016 09:21 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:24 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/15272 |
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