BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online

    A normative theory of argument strength

    Hahn, Ulrike and Oaksford, Michael (2006) A normative theory of argument strength. Informal Logic 26 (1), pp. 1-22. ISSN 0824-2577.

    Full text not available from this repository.

    Abstract

    In this article, we argue for the general importance of normative theories of argument strength. We also provide some evidence based on our recent work on the fallacies as to why Bayesian probability might, in fact, be able to supply such an account. In the remainder of the article we discuss the general characteristics that make a specifically Bayesian approach desirable, and critically evaluate putative flaws of Bayesian probability that have been raised in the argumentation literature.

    Metadata

    Item Type: Article
    Keyword(s) / Subject(s): Argumentation, fallacies, Bayesian probability, argument from ignorance, slippery slope arguments, circular arguments, Theophrastus rule
    School: Birkbeck Schools and Departments > School of Science > Psychological Sciences
    Research Centre: Birkbeck Knowledge Lab
    Depositing User: Administrator
    Date Deposited: 21 Sep 2016 15:06
    Last Modified: 02 Dec 2016 13:39
    URI: http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/16152

    Statistics

    Downloads
    Activity Overview
    0Downloads
    113Hits

    Additional statistics are available via IRStats2.

    Archive Staff Only (login required)

    Edit/View Item Edit/View Item