Gemes, Ken (2009) Nietzsche on free will, autonomy and the sovereign individual. In: Gemes, Ken and May, S. (eds.) Nietzsche on Freedom and Autonomy. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp. 33-50. ISBN 9780199231560.Full text not available from this repository.
In some texts Nietzsche vehemently denies the possibility of free will; in others he seems positively to countenance its existence. This chapter distinguishes two different notions of free will. Agency free will is intrinsically tied to the question of agency; what constitutes an action as opposed to a mere doing. Deserts free will is intrinsically tied to the question of desert; of who does and does not merit punishment and reward. It is shown that we can render Nietzsche's prima facie conflicting assertions regarding free will compatible by interpreting him as rejecting deserts free will while accepting the possibility of agency free will. Nietzsche advances an original form of compatibilism that takes agency free will to be a rare achievement rather than a natural endowment.
|Item Type:||Book Section|
|Keyword(s) / Subject(s):||deserts free will, agency free will, responsibility, compatibilism|
|School or Research Centre:||Birkbeck Schools and Research Centres > School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy > Philosophy|
|Date Deposited:||15 Mar 2011 13:42|
|Last Modified:||17 Apr 2013 12:17|
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