AGAINST THE BIFURCATION OF VIRTUE

Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij
University of Kent, Canterbury

It has become customary in the virtue epistemological literature to distinguish between responsibilist and reliabilist virtue theories. More recently, certain problems affecting the former have prompted epistemologists to suggest that this distinction in virtue theory maps on to a distinction in virtue, specifically between character and faculty virtue. I argue that we lack good reason to bifurcate virtue in this manner, and that this moreover counts in favor of the virtue reliabilist.

1. A Distinction in Virtue Theory—and in Virtue?

It is customary in the virtue epistemological literature to distinguish between two types of virtue theory: reliabilist and responsibilist. Reliabilist virtue epistemologists understand epistemic virtue in terms of reliable dispositions and take (reliable) perception to be a paradigmatic example of such virtue (e.g., Ahlstrom-Vij forthcoming, Greco 2010, Sosa 2007, Goldman 1992, Sosa 1991). Responsibilist virtue epistemologists, by contrast, understand epistemic virtue in terms of acquired character traits, and take such virtue to require either reliability in combination with the agent being motivated to attain truth or other epistemic goods (Zagzebski 1996), or simply that the agent be motivated thus, whether or not she is also reliable (Baehr 2011). The relevant kind of motivation is typically characterized as a love of epistemic goods as such (Zagzebski 2003) or considered in their own right (Baehr 2011), as opposed to for what they might yield.

That there is such a distinction in virtue epistemological theory should be uncontroversial. More recently, however, it has become popular to suggest that this distinction in theory maps onto a distinction in epistemic virtue, between faculty virtues and character virtues. This suggestion can be traced back to a problem. While responsibilists hold that instantiating an epistemic virtue requires being motivated to attain epistemic goods, there are uncontroversial cases of knowledge that involve no motivation, perhaps most saliently cases of perceptual knowledge. Since virtue

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1 The distinction goes back to Axtell (1997).
epistemology is in the business of accounting for epistemic phenomena like knowledge, that’s a problem for the responsibilist.² Recently, responsibilists have sought to respond to this problem by suggesting that there are two kinds of virtue, only one of which requires the relevant kind of motivation.³ For example, Heather Battaly (2012) suggests that there are ‘different sorts of intellectual virtues, with ties to different sorts of knowledge’ (17). Similarly, Jason Baehr (2011) holds that, ‘an intellectual virtue is a character trait that [involves] a positive psychological orientation toward epistemic goods’ (102), while acknowledging that ‘a trait’s being epistemically reliable […] is sufficient for its counting as an intellectual virtue in an alternative but also legitimate and pretheoretical sense’ (135). Even virtue reliabilists like John Greco and John Turri (2011) now maintain that ‘it is plausible that a complete epistemology must feature both faculty-virtues and [character] trait-virtues’.

However, for such a multiplication of virtues to be called for, we need to have independent reason to distinguish between different kinds of virtue. The following is not an independent reason: It enables the responsibilist to avoid the aforementioned challenge posed by non-motivated knowledge. By contrast, the following would be an independent reason: there are types of knowledge that the virtue reliabilist cannot account for, unless she accepts that there are character virtues in addition to faculty virtues. Indeed, it is exactly this kind of claim that we will be concerned with in the below: the claim made by Battaly (2012: 17), Baehr (2011: 48) and Zagzebski (1996: 273-80) to the effect that, unless we postulate character virtues in addition to faculty virtues, we cannot account for the ‘high-grade’ knowledge possessed in cases of character virtue.

As the term ‘high-grade’ knowledge suggests, the challenge for the virtue reliabilist is supposed to lie in the (allegedly) superior epistemic value of such knowledge. In what follows, I will consider the most promising attempts to cash out this value in terms of the instrumental epistemic

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² While some virtue epistemologists deny that their virtue theory is seeking to account for traditional epistemic phenomena like knowledge (e.g., Roberts and Wood 2007, and Kvanvig 1992), many virtue epistemologists—such as Zagzebski (1996), Sosa (2007), Greco (2010), and Baehr (2011)—take themselves to be in exactly that business. It is with the latter epistemologists that I am concerned here. Notice that, while Baehr (2011) denies that character virtue is unlikely to play a central role in the analysis of knowledge (44-6), he grants that there is a fully legitimate reliabilist notion of virtue (124). Consequently, his rejection of the idea that character virtues are to play a central role in the analysis of knowledge does not amount to a rejection of the idea that a virtue epistemology acknowledging a wider set of virtues is to play such a role.

³ This is not to suggest that virtue responsibilists haven’t attempted to account for non-motivated knowledge in responsibilist terms. See, e.g., Zagzebski (1996: 280), as well as Baehr (2011: 42) for a convincing critique.
value (Section 2), intrinsic epistemic value (Section 3), and personal worth (Section 4) associated with the motivation had in cases of character virtue. In each case, it will be argued that the relevant value considerations fail to motivate a distinction in virtue. This moreover counts in favor of the virtue reliabilist due to the following asymmetry: The virtue reliabilist can account for what the virtue responsibilist cannot, such as cases of non-motivated, perceptual knowledge, while the arguments to be considered fail to give us any reason to believe that there in turn are types of knowledge that can be accounted for by the responsibilist but not by the reliabilist. Since we should only postulate kinds—including kinds of virtue—that serve explanatory purposes, that counts against the responsibilist and in favor of the virtue reliabilist.

2. Motivation and Instrumental Epistemic Value

One straightforward way in which the ‘high-grade’ knowledge associated with character virtue might be of a higher grade than the supposedly lower-grade knowledge had in cases of faculty virtue is in terms of instrumental epistemic value. For example, Zagzebski (2012) has recently suggested that ‘intellectual virtues are qualities that arise out of epistemic conscientiousness’ (49). Conscientiousness is ‘the self-reflective version of the natural desire for truth’ in that it is ‘a natural desire brought to self-reflective consciousness and accompanied by the attempt to satisfy it with all of one’s powers’ (48). Moreover, ‘once a person becomes reflective, she thinks that her trustworthiness is greater if she summons her powers in a fully conscious and careful way, and exercises them to the best of her ability’ (48). That, according to Zagzebski, is what makes conscientiousness epistemically relevant:

We trust that there is a connection between trying and succeeding, and the reflective person thinks that there is a closer connection between trying with the full reflective use of one’s powers, and succeeding. Conscientiousness comes in degrees. There is probably a degree of conscientiousness operating most of the time since we have some awareness of ourselves and the exercise of our powers most of the time. But higher degrees of conscientiousness require considerable self-awareness and self-monitoring (Zagzebski 2012: 48-9).

In other words, what we trust, according to Zagzebski, is that trying harder when it comes to monitoring ourselves in a self-reflective manner will increase our chances of attaining that which we are striving for as epistemic creatures, which includes true belief. It is not hard to see how the motivational component of virtue fits into this picture: Being motivated to attain true belief is to
want to try harder, for example by becoming more self-reflective, which we in turn trust will increase our reliability.

The problem is that, since our self-reflective capacities are not only fallible but also subject to a number of self-serving biases, being motivated to self-reflect will sometimes increase our reliability, and sometimes not.\(^4\) Since true belief is intrinsically valuable, the virtue reliabilist can account for the value of motivation in cases where it increases our reliability, on account of the following thesis regarding the sufficiency of reliability for motivation being valuable:

\[(MR_S) \text{ Motivation is epistemically valuable if it increases your reliability.}\]

The virtue reliabilist can also account for the value of such motivation in cases where it fails to increase your reliability, for the simple reason that there is no value to account for in such cases. Hence, the following thesis regarding the necessity of reliability for motivation being valuable:

\[(MR_N) \text{ Motivation is epistemically valuable only if it increases your reliability.}\]

Consequently, we are not here dealing with a type of knowledge the value of which cannot be accounted for unless we postulate character virtues, which is the kind of knowledge the virtue responsibilist needs to identify in order to make a case for postulating such virtue in addition to faculty virtue. Motivations are sometimes valuable and sometimes not, and the virtue reliabilist can account for both types of cases with reference to \((MR_S)\) and \((MR_N)\).

It might be objected that it has not been ruled out that motivation might be instrumentally valuable in relation to some intrinsic epistemic value separate from that of true belief. However, for that possibility to benefit the virtue responsibilist, we would need reason to believe that there are bearers of fundamental intrinsic values in addition to true belief, where fundamental intrinsic values are ones whose intrinsic value does not derive completely from one of its components. For example, if true belief is of fundamental intrinsic epistemic value, all factive mental states (such as knowledge) will be of intrinsic value, but not fundamentally so. I have argued elsewhere that true belief is unique in being of fundamental intrinsic epistemic value, at least among the most plausible candidates of knowledge, justification, and understanding (see Ahlstrom-Vij 2013). This, however, leaves open a more direct dialectical route for the virtue responsibilist: maybe motivation is itself intrinsically valuable. Let us consider that possibility.

\(^4\) See Kornblith (2012) for an extended discussion.
3. Motivation and Intrinsic Epistemic Value

While there is no reason for the virtue responsibilist to deny (MR_s), she may deny (MR_N), i.e., the claim that motivation is only epistemically valuable if it increases your reliability. Indeed, focusing on motivations for knowledge rather than truth, Zagzebski (1996) claims that ‘the intrinsic and primary value of the motivation for knowledge […] is not derived from its connection with any other good, not even the good of knowledge’ (203). If Zagzebski is right, we should reject (MR_N), and moreover postulate character virtue to account for the additional value manifested by those motivated in the relevant manner, as compared to those possessing mere faculty virtue. However, in this section, I will argue that Zagzebski is mistaken on this point, and that we lack reason to postulate an intrinsic value of motivation.

To see why, consider Henry Sidgwick’s (1981/1907: 405-6) famous point that happiness is more likely to be attained if we don’t consciously pursue it. It seems plausible that something similar can hold in at least some epistemic cases. Consider the following:

SANDY: Sandy is highly motivated to attain knowledge, and on that account consciously working hard to develop strategies for attaining it. But she is a terrible at epistemic strategizing, to the extent that her efforts simply serve to drive her deeper and deeper into error and ignorance. In this respect, Sandy is an epistemic analogue of the tennis player who is far less likely to ace her serve when really wanting to ace her serve and thereby consciously trying to ace her serve, than when she doesn’t try so hard and simply ‘goes with her gut’. Similarly, had Sandy been less motivated, and thereby less prone to strategize about how exactly to attain knowledge, she would (let’s assume) have gone with her gut and thereby also have been highly reliable. As things stand, however, she’s highly unreliable, exactly on account of being highly motivated.

On Zagzebski’s picture, Sandy’s motivation for knowledge remains (intrinsically) valuable despite promoting nothing but error and ignorance. But is it really right to say that motivation is valuable thus? Imagine that Sandy finds out that her motivation is highly detrimental to her pur-

5 Zagzebski (2003: 140) addresses this point, but merely to suggest that it raises questions about whether someone who spells out epistemic norms in instrumentalist terms can provide epistemic advice. Since the instrumentalist rejoinder to this kind of complaint is well known (see, e.g., Brink 1986), I won’t address it here.
suit of knowledge. If the motivation were intrinsically valuable, that value could reasonably be taken to compensate for her lack of success in attaining what she desires, namely knowledge. By way of analogy, say I get to choose between a life of happiness and a life of autonomy, but can’t have both. If I go for happiness, I can regret not being autonomous while still reasonably saying ‘I’m fine with living a life lacking in autonomy, since at least I’m happy.’ That is, I can take one intrinsic good (happiness) to be compensating for the lack of another (autonomy). But were Sandy to respond to information suggesting that her motivation is highly detrimental to her pursuit of knowledge by saying ‘I’m fine with that, because the fact that I’m motivated to attain knowledge makes up for my lack of success in actually coming to know things’, we would think she’s not making sense (or that she’s not sincere in her desire for knowledge—but we’re assuming that she is). The problem for Zagzebski is that, if motivations were intrinsically valuable, Sandy’s response should make sense. More specifically, we can spell out the following argument, presenting what we might refer to as a problem of compensation for Zagzebski:

1. Were motivations intrinsically valuable, Sandy’s compensatory response in SANDY would make sense.
2. Sandy’s compensatory response in SANDY doesn’t make sense.
3. Hence, motivations aren’t intrinsically valuable.

The argument is valid (it’s a modus tollens) and 2 should be uncontroversial. But Zagzebski might try to contest 1 along either of four lines:

First, Zagzebski might contest the very idea of intrinsic values compensating for one another in the manner discussed above, and on that account reject 1. More specifically, she might maintain that candidates for intrinsic value—be it happiness, autonomy, true belief, or motivation—only attain intrinsic value once they ‘come together’. In other words, Zagzebski might attempt to embrace a thesis about the unity of intrinsic value. However, such a response would constitute a Pyrrhic victory in this context. If you can only manifest any of the intrinsic values if you have them all, Zagzebski would need to reject not only (MRS), but also—and more importantly—the very idea that motivations are intrinsically valuable, in the sense she is after. After all, the relevant unity thesis would seem incompatible with the idea that ‘the intrinsic and primary value of

\[\text{Note that this line of reasoning doesn’t need to assume that knowledge is a bearer of fundamental intrinsic value, but only that true belief is of such value, and that knowledge is factive.}\]

\[\text{Thanks to Anya Farennikova for suggesting this response.}\]
the motivation for knowledge [...] is not derived from its connection with any other good, not even the good of knowledge’ (1996: 203). On the response under consideration, the intrinsic value of such motivation would be derived from its connection with all other goods. For that reason, this does not seem a promising response.

Second, Zagzebski might argue that the failure of the (putative) value of motivation to compensate for Sandy’s lack of success can be explained with reference to the incommensurability of the relevant values. But that cannot be it either. One value can compensate for another despite the two being incommensurable. For example, we can think that the values of happiness and autonomy are incommensurable—i.e., neither is greater than the other, nor are they equal—while still taking one to compensate for the other, as in the example above. Or consider Joseph Raz’s (1986) example of someone facing a choice between a successful career as a lawyer and an equally successful career as a clarinetist. While the values involved are reasonably taken to be incommensurable, it would still seem to make perfect sense for the person in question to reflect on their choice afterwards and say ‘I’m fine with missing out on all of the good things that other career would’ve brought, because of all of the good things that my current career is giving me’. Since such a response makes sense even in cases of incommensurable values, any appeal to incommensurability fails to explain why Sandy’s response above doesn’t make sense.

Third, Zagzebski might suggest that Sandy’s motivation for knowledge cannot compensate for an absence of knowledge, not because the former isn’t intrinsically valuable, but because it’s not as valuable as knowledge. However, if that were the case, we should expect for it to be possible to increase the motivation to a point where it does compensate for an absence of knowledge. So consider the following:

MANDY: Mandy is just like Sandy, except that Mandy is extremely motivated, and that she moreover is motivated to attain knowledge about a great many highly significant matters. Indeed, let us assume that she is the kind of inquirer that, were she to succeed in her epistemic pursuits, she would be a strong candidate for a Nobel Prize. But, just like in the case of Sandy, Mandy’s motivation simply serves to drive her deeper and deeper into error and ignorance.

If the problem with SANDY were simply that Sandy’s motivation wasn’t as intrinsically valuable as the knowledge she failed to attain, it would make sense for Mandy to say, upon finding out the

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8 Thanks to Jeff Dunn for raising this objection.
extent of her failure, that ‘I’m fine with failing to attain knowledge, because the fact that I’m extremely motivated to attain knowledge about a great many highly significant matters makes up for my lack of success in actually coming to know things’. But just like in SANDY, that doesn’t make sense.

Fourth, Zagzebski might argue that Sandy’s response doesn’t make sense on purely psychological grounds that tell us nothing interesting about value. She wants knowledge, but has no desire (let’s assume) to want knowledge. But notice that it’s not just that such compensation doesn’t make sense from Sandy’s first-person point of view; it doesn’t make sense from a third-person point of view either. To see why, consider the following:

CHOICE: We are able to realize either of two situations for Sandy. The first one is the one in SANDY: she’s motivated to attain knowledge, but failing miserably. In the second situation, she attains knowledge but lacks the relevant motivation. What should we do?

If both knowledge and a motivation to attain knowledge were intrinsically valuable, we could go for either—in either case, we’re realizing some intrinsic value that thereby compensates for the absence of the other. But it seems clear that we should realize the second situation. That means that we can not go for either, and (by modus tollens) that a motivation to attain knowledge is not intrinsically valuable.

It might be objected that this line of reasoning ignores the following consideration:

CHOICE*: We are able to realize either of two situations for Sandy. In the first one, Sandy knows but isn’t motivated to pursue knowledge. In the second one, she knows (as much and the same things) and is motivated to pursue knowledge. What should we do?

Zagzebski might argue that we should pick the latter option, and that we can only account for that if we reject (MRₙ) and take the relevant kind of motivation to be intrinsically valuable. There’s some intuitive pull to this suggestion. Still, it’s not clear that we should take the relevant intuition at face value. To see why, consider a slightly different option set:

CHOICE**: We are able to realize either of two situations for Sandy. In the first one, Sandy knows absolutely everything there’s to know. In the second one, Sandy knows absolutely everything there’s to know and is also motivated to pursue knowledge. What should we do?
If the relevant kind of motivations were intrinsically valuable, then we should go for the latter option. But it does not seem that we should go for the latter option; we may go for either—which makes complete sense, if motivations are not intrinsically valuable, and there as such is no difference in value between the options. Consequently (by *modus tollens*), the relevant kind of motivations aren’t intrinsically valuable.

It might be objected that this simply pits one intuition against another, and rejects the one that’s theoretically inconvenient. However, that ignores the general meta-ontological thesis that we should prefer ontologies with fewer rather than more existential commitments, *ceteris paribus*. In axiology, this amounts to a principle of axiological parsimony, according to which we should postulate as few fundamental values as possible. This principle does not rule out pluralist axiologies by fiat; it simply entails that pluralism is only warranted if required to account for relevant data. It also gives us reason to break intuitive stalemates—i.e., situations wherein one theory explains one intuition, and another theory explains another—in favor of the simpler theory, in the sense of the theory which postulates fewer fundamental values. In this case, that’s the theory that doesn’t postulate a fundamental intrinsic value of motivation, in addition to that of true belief. (Knowledge is intrinsically valuable in virtue of its factivity, and as such not of fundamental intrinsic value.)

Consequently, the problem of compensation remains for Zagzebski: Were motivations intrinsically valuable, Sandy’s compensatory response would make sense; Sandy’s compensatory response does not make sense; hence, motivations aren’t intrinsically valuable. Of course, if we drop the idea that motivations are intrinsically valuable, we can explain why her response doesn’t make sense: Since (MRₙ) is true and Sandy’s motivation fails to increase her reliability—in fact, it’s doing the opposite—Sandy’s motivation lacks value, and something that lacks value cannot compensate for the absence of another value. That is why Sandy’s motivation doesn’t compensate for her failure in the relevant case. Moreover, if motivations of the kind that Zagzebski is concerned with lack intrinsic value, they fail to make plausible the idea that there is a kind of ‘high-

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9 Note that invoking this principle does not commit us to taking simplicity to be of fundamental epistemic value, as opposed to of instrumental epistemic value (maybe pursuing simplicity in theorizing is conducive to attaining a goal of inquiry), or non-epistemic value (maybe simplicity brings tractability, which is pragmatically valuable). However, see Sober (2001), who expresses some skepticism over whether it’s possible to cash out the value of simplicity in terms of other values.
grade’ knowledge, the value of which we cannot explain unless we postulate character virtues in addition to faculty virtues.\(^{10}\)

4. Motivation and Personal Worth

In the previous section, it was argued that what Zagzebski has to say about the intrinsic value of motivations fails to give us any reason to postulate character virtues in addition to faculty virtues, on account of what we referred to as the problem of compensation. In this section, we will consider whether a case for postulating such virtue can be made with reference to Baehr’s (2011) suggestion that character virtues ‘plausibly bear on their possessor’s “personal worth,”’ that is, on their possessor’s goodness or badness qua person’ (23).

Like Zagzebski, Baehr locates the relevant worth in the motivations of the agent. He defines ‘an intellectual virtue [as] a character trait that contributes to its possessor’s personal intellectual worth on account of its involving a positive psychological orientation toward epistemic goods’ (102). While Baehr doesn’t deny that motivations for knowledge can be instrumentally valuable—i.e., he doesn’t deny (MR\(_S\))—he denies (MR\(_N\)) on account of taking the relevant kind of motivations to be intrinsically valuable (137). Unlike Zagzebski (1996), however, who believes that the value of motivation ‘is not derived from its connection with any other good, not even the good of knowledge’ (203), Baehr (2011) thinks that the value of motivation does depend on the good of knowledge, albeit not instrumentally. More specifically, he thinks that ‘it is apparently good in itself to love what is good in itself’ (137), and that a motivation for knowledge thereby is valuable on account of an intentional and not merely a causal (and as such strictly instrumental) relation to something good, namely knowledge.

If Baehr is right, we might thereby need to postulate character virtue in addition to faculty virtue in order to account for the personal worth attaching to ‘high-grade’ knowers possessing the relevant kind of motivation, and thereby standing in the relevant intentional relation to

\(^{10}\) It might be objected that we need to appeal to the value of motivation—and potentially to the intrinsic value of motivation—to solve the so-called value problem, i.e., the problem of accounting for the surplus value of knowledge over mere true belief (see, e.g., Zagzebski 2003). There are two problems with this objection. First, as I have argued elsewhere (Ahlstrom-Vij 2013), we lack reason to think knowledge more valuable than mere true belief. Second, even if we had reason to believe that knowledge is more valuable than mere true belief, there is no shortage of virtue reliabilists who argue that they can account for that (e.g., Greco 2010, Goldman and Olsson 2009, and Sosa 2007). This calls into question the idea that we need to appeal to the value of motivation to solve the value problem—assuming it’s a problem to begin with.
knowledge. However, Baehr’s account of virtue fails for much the same reason that Zagzebski’s does, namely on account of the problem of compensation. Irrespective of whether the value of a motivation for knowledge is intrinsic in Zagzebski’s or in Baehr’s sense, we should expect for it to make sense for Sandy, in SANDY, to say ‘I’m fine with failing to attain knowledge, because the fact that I truly love knowledge makes up for my lack of success in actually coming to know things’. That response doesn’t make sense, and as we saw in the previous section, it’s not clear that someone taking the relevant kind of motivation to be intrinsically valuable can account for that fact.

However, it might be objected that Baehr, unlike Zagzebski, has a way to rule out SANDY. Addressing cases of motivated but unreliable agents, Baehr (2007) proposes that you are only virtuous if you have good reason to believe that the actions you perform in pursuit of your epistemic goals are in fact reliable means to those goals. This constraint prevents some unreliable but motivated agents from qualifying as virtuous (e.g., motivated fortunetellers pursuing knowledge through crystal balls). Moreover, having found out about her failure, Sandy arguably lacks the relevant kind of reason, and as such also lacks virtue. But virtues and the motivations that characterize them are two separate things—if not, we wouldn’t be able to explain the value of the former with reference to the latter, in the manner that Baehr wants to do. And since two separate phenomena, lacking good reason to think oneself reliable doesn’t prevent one from being motivated in the relevant way, and thereby instantiating the relevant personal worth (while failing to be virtuous). Consequently, the problem remains: were Sandy to find out that her motivation for knowledge is, in fact, driving her deeper and deeper into ignorance and error, yet respond by suggesting that her motivation compensates for her failure, we wouldn’t think that her response makes sense—despite the fact that such a response would make complete sense, were motivations intrinsically valuable. And, as argued in Section 3, the most plausible explanation for why such a response wouldn’t make sense is that (MRn) is true, and motivations only are valuable in so far as they make us more reliable—which, as we saw in Section 2, the virtue reliabilist will have no problem accounting for.

5. Conclusion

Cases of non-motivated perceptual knowledge go to show that there are epistemic phenomena we cannot account for unless we postulate faculty virtues. Virtue responsibilists grant this, but claim that we also need to postulate character virtues. This would be true, were there in turn types of knowledge we couldn’t account for unless we also postulated character virtue. The previous sections considered the three most plausible ways to cash out this idea, with reference to the instru-
mental epistemic value (Section 2), intrinsic epistemic value (Section 3), and personal worth (Section 4) associated with the kind of motivation for truth or knowledge supposedly had in cases of ‘high-grade’ knowers possessing character virtue. In each case, however, it was shown that the relevant phenomena can be accounted for with reference to a combination of (MR$_S$) and (MR$_N$), i.e., the claim that motivation is valuable if and only if it increases your reliability. That claim is, of course, completely congenial to the virtue reliabilist.

This is not to say that there cannot be further phenomena, in addition to those considered above, that can only be accounted for if we postulate character virtue. But until such a phenomenon is identified, we need to keep in mind the asymmetry highlighted in Section 1: The virtue reliabilist can account for what the virtue responsibilist cannot, such as cases of non-motivated perceptual knowledge, while the arguments considered above fail to give us any reason to believe that there in turn are phenomena that can be accounted for by the responsibilist but not the reliabilist. That counts against the responsibilist and suggests that we can make do with the kind of virtue postulated by the reliabilist. That’s why we should resist the bifurcation of virtue that has become popular in recent virtue epistemology.

References


11 On this point, see footnote 10.

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