PROCEDURAL JUSTICE AND
THE PROBLEM OF INTELLECTUAL DEFERENCE

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Abstract: It is a well-established fact that we tend to underestimate our susceptibility to cognitive bias on account of overconfidence, and thereby often fail to listen to intellectual advice aimed at reducing such bias. This is the problem of intellectual deference. The present paper considers this problem in contexts where educators attempt to teach students how to avoid bias for purposes of instilling epistemic virtues. It is argued that recent research in social psychology suggests that we can come to terms with this problem in two steps, the second of which involves educators communicating their intellectual advice in a procedurally just manner. The components of the relevant form of procedural justice are specified and related to Miranda Fricker and David Coady’s notions of epistemic justice. Finally, a series of objections are considered and responded to.

1. Instilling Virtue, Avoiding Bias

What is the purpose of education? I will follow Alvin Goldman in taking it that ‘[t]he fundamental goal of education, like that of science, is the promotion of knowledge.’\(^1\) Before considering what it is for something to be a fundamental goal of education, it should be noted that Goldman is here working with a conception of knowledge that equates knowledge with true belief.\(^2\) In other words, taking knowledge to constitute a goal of education is to take true belief to constitute a goal of education. This being a goal of education makes sense of the fact that educators typically strive to make sure that any material presented to students is factually correct (consider controversies regarding teaching creationism) as well as clear and easy to understand and as such not

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\(^1\) Goldman (1999: 349).

\(^2\) See Goldman (1999: 5).
likely to lead to misunderstandings (consider the use of textbooks as opposed to sometimes esoteric primary sources, particularly early in the educational process).

There might be other goals of education beside that of knowledge, of course. For one thing, there are arguably a number of non-epistemic goals relevant to education. Prominent candidates include those of enabling students to embark on a successful career, to be morally decent human beings, as well to participate in the democratic process. At the same time, it seems that the epistemic goal of attaining knowledge is still paramount, at least in the following sense: Attaining knowledge is conducive to, if not necessary for, attaining non-epistemic goals like those just mentioned. For example, it will arguably be hard for students to have a successful career if they don’t know a substantial amount of things. Moreover, doing the morally right thing requires having an at least largely accurate picture of the world, since good intentions will do us little good, and might even make for great harm, if combined with a mistaken view about one’s situation and the likely consequences of one’s options. And, finally, making wise political choices, be it directly or by electing representatives, requires accurate information about the relevant candidates, the functioning of society, and about what means are conducive to what political goals.

That the epistemic goal of knowledge is paramount in relation to non-epistemic goals, in the sense just outlined, does not imply that it is unique in that respect. For one thing, there might be other epistemic goals, beside knowledge. Plausible candidates include understanding and wisdom. However, as I have argued elsewhere, we have good reason to believe that knowledge, in the sense of true belief, is the only epistemic goal. For that reason, I will henceforth assume that (a) knowledge, thus understood, is the only epistemic goal of education, since the only epistemic goal, and (b) the goal of knowledge is paramount compared to any non-epistemic goals of education, for the reasons provided in the previous paragraph. That the goal of knowledge thereby is both unique in the epistemic realm and paramount compared to other non-epistemic goals of education is what warrants saying that the goal of knowledge is the fundamental goal of education, as Goldman puts it.³

³ See Ahlstrom-Vij (2013a).

⁴ Notice that it doesn’t follow from the claim that knowledge is the fundamental goal of education that educators should be imparting just any pieces of knowledge to their students, including knowledge of completely trivial matters. As we have seen, knowledge is the fundamental goal of education, partly on account of the fact that knowledge—in the sense of true belief—is unique in being an epistemic goal.
If knowledge is the fundamental goal of education, we have reason to instill epistemic virtues in students. This follows in so far as there is a legitimate consequentialist notion of virtue, on which virtues are simply dispositions conducive to achieving goals. Within moral philosophy, this is the notion of virtue that we find in John Stuart Mill’s *Utilitarianism*.\(^5\) For Mill, moral virtues are dispositions that promote moral ends. In that respect, Mill is not a virtue *ethicist*, but he has a virtue *theory*. That is, he doesn’t define the good in terms of virtue, but the other way around.\(^6\) As he puts it, ‘actions and dispositions are only virtuous because they promote another end than virtue’.\(^7\) For Mill, who is a hedonist, the end in question is happiness.

Two things should be noted. First, a consequentialist about moral virtue does not need to deny that virtues can be accompanied by certain *motivations*. For example, for Aristotle, it would be a motivation to do the virtuous thing for the sake of the noble. Someone accepting Mill’s virtue theory also does not need to deny that virtues tend to be *acquired* in certain ways (if indeed they are), e.g., through experience. What Mill and other consequentialists about virtue would deny is simply that these things are *necessary* for possessing virtue. All that is required for virtue possession is the relevant disposition being such that it promotes happiness.

Second, Mill also does not deny that there are cases in which we value moral virtue in itself. To the contrary, utilitarians, according to Mill, ‘not only place virtue at the very head of the things which are good as means to the ultimate end, but they also

\(^5\) See Mill (2001/1861). A similar notion can be found in Driver (2001). Others have connected virtue with utility in a less direct manner than Mill and Driver do. For example, Hume (1975/1777) maintains that ‘[i]t is the nature and, indeed, the definition of virtue, that it is a quality of the mind agreeable or approved of by every one who considers or contemplates it. But some qualities produce pleasure, because they are useful to society, or useful or agreeable to the person himself; others produce it more immediately’ (261, fn. 1; emphasis in original). Sidgwick (1884) suggests that ‘it is primarily the volitions to produce certain particular effects which we regard as grounds for attributing virtue’ (224-5), although he finds it ‘difficult to say how far an act which is concerned by the agent to be good but which is really bad can ever be judged to be virtuous’ (224).

\(^6\) See Driver (2001).

\(^7\) Mill (2001/1861: 36).
recognize as a *psychological* fact the possibility of its being, to the individual, a good in itself, without looking to any end beyond it. However, here as elsewhere, we must distinguish between *valuing* something for its own sake, and something being *valuable* for its own sake—and, on Mill’s utilitarianism, only happiness is valuable for its own sake.

Taking Mill’s theory of moral virtue as our model, we may develop a consequentialist theory of *epistemic* virtue. More specifically, we may take epistemic virtue—or at least a *kind* of epistemic virtue, in so far as we want to be pluralists with respect to notions of epistemic virtue—to consist in a disposition that promotes epistemic goals, including that of knowledge. This is what justifies the claim made earlier, to the effect that, if attaining knowledge is a fundamental goal of education, educators have reason to instill epistemic virtue in students, the reason being that (consequentialist) epistemic virtue consists exactly in a disposition to promote that goal.

However, one common obstacle to virtue is *cognitive bias*, i.e., systematic and predictable tendencies for inaccurate judgment. Cognitive bias constitutes an obstacle to virtue by reducing one’s reliability, and making it harder to avoid false belief and thereby also to attain knowledge. Consequently, given the prevalence of cognitive bias, attaining virtue is often going to require avoiding bias. From this it follows that, if we have reason to instill epistemic virtue in students, for the reasons presented above,

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8 Mill (2001/1861: 36; emphasis added).
9 However, see fn. 11.
10 After all, even virtue epistemologists defending non-consequentialist notions of epistemic virtue tend to accept that there also is a consequentialist notion of epistemic virtue. See, e.g., Baehr (2011: 135), as well as Battaly (2012) on the virtues attaching to what she refers to as ‘low-grade’ knowledge.
11 Note that Mill eventually makes a move that doesn’t translate to the epistemic case: ‘Virtue, according to the utilitarian doctrine, is not naturally and originally part of the end [of happiness], but it is capable of becoming so; and in those who love it disinterestedly it has become so, and is desired and cherished, not as a means to happiness, but as a part of their happiness’ (2001/1861: 37). That is, we might start to derive happiness from exercising virtue. That is not to say that virtue is (or becomes) intrinsically valuable—only happiness is, and it is virtue leading to happiness that makes it valuable. It is, however, to say that each instance of virtue may *bring* happiness, and as such come to have *instrumental* value. The same does not happen with epistemic virtue, because it is not a psychological attitude of the subject that determines its value. What determines its value is it leading to knowledge. As such it might in the case of epistemic virtue be a good thing that we desire such virtue for its own sake, in so far as that’s conducive to coming to know, but it does not follow that virtue in any relevant sense thereby becomes *part* of the sole bearer of intrinsic epistemic value, i.e., knowledge.
then we also have reason to teach students how to avoid bias, since such bias constitutes a common obstacle to achieving epistemic virtue.

This brings us to the topic of the present paper, which concerns a problem that presents itself for educators attempting to teach students how to avoid bias for purposes of instilling epistemic virtue: we tend to underestimate our susceptibility to bias on account of overconfidence, and thereby fail to listen to advice aimed at reducing bias (Section 2). This is the problem of intellectual deference. It will be argued that recent research in social psychology suggests that we can come to terms with this problem in two steps (Section 3), the second of which involves educators communicating their intellectual advice in a procedurally just manner. The components of the relevant form of procedural justices will be specified (Sections 4) as well as related to Miranda Fricker and David Coady’s notions of epistemic justice (Section 5). Finally, a series of objections will be considered and responded to (Section 6).

2. Overconfidence and the Problem of Intellectual Deference

If what was argued in the previous section is on the right track, educators have reason to instill epistemic virtue in students, and a derivative but substantive reason to teach students how to avoid cognitive bias. However, as mentioned already in the above, when thinking about how to go about doing the latter, we encounter a problem. In this section, it will be argued that the relevant problem can be understood as a problem of deference, and of intellectual deference in particular. But before spelling out the problem, we need to say something about what constitutes deference.

When we defer to someone, two things happen: we listen to that someone, and believe what they are saying because they are saying it.\textsuperscript{12} For present purposes, to listen is simply to attend to someone’s speech and process the content of what they are saying. As such, there is an act component to listening (attending to), as well as a more or less automatic result of performing such acts (processing content). In a mo-

\textsuperscript{12} To say that someone believes what someone else is saying because they’re saying it is to make a mere causal claim, and not to prejudge the issue of the believer’s epistemic reasons for the relevant belief. The latter are relevant to whether or not the believer can be said to be justified on the basis of deference, which is not something that I will take a stand on here. However, if there’s a sense of ‘knowledge’ that has knowledge come out identical to true belief, knowledge (in that sense) does not require justification or reasons, and believing that \( p \) as a causal consequence of being told that \( p \) amounts to knowledge in so far as \( p \) is true.
ment, we shall discuss some empirical assumptions regarding the relation between listening and believing what one is being told. For now, it suffices to note that there is no conceptual connection between the two. More specifically, listening to someone does not necessarily entail taking on board what one is being told, or being particularly prone to change one’s mind in case one believes something to the contrary. Listening is certainly compatible with both (i.e., believing and a willingness to change one’s mind), but entails neither as a matter of conceptual necessity.

Again, to defer to someone is to listen to them and believe what they are saying because they are saying it. I will make a simple but potentially controversial, normative assumption about when we should defer, as follows: knowledge being the epistemic goal, we should defer to those who know what they are talking about.\(^\text{13}\) To know what one is talking about, in the sense employed in so far as we follow Goldman, is to speak the truth.\(^\text{14}\) Taking someone speaking the truth to constitute a sufficient condition for it being the case that the hearer should defer to her might be taken to raise worries about blind deference, i.e., cases wherein a hearer should defer to a speaker, on account of her speaking the truth, without the hearer knowing anything about the speaker’s epistemic credentials. As I have defended the idea that there is nothing epistemically objectionable about such blind deference elsewhere, I will not pursue that possibility here.\(^\text{15}\)

\(^{13}\) See Hawthorne and Srinivasan (2013) for a defense of an idea along these lines. Notice, however, that Hawthorne and Srinivasan, unlike Goldman (1999), do not equate knowledge with true belief, although they suggest that much of what they say would apply to such a notion as well (see Hawthorne and Srinivasan, 2013: 13).

\(^{14}\) Notice that this disqualifies people who believe truly but provide insincere reports from being said to know what they are talking about, while it qualifies people who do not believe what they are saying but nevertheless speak the truth—consider, e.g., Lackey’s (2008) creationist teacher—as knowing what they are talking about.

\(^{15}\) See Ahlstrom-Vij (manuscript). Of course, from a first-person perspective, it is seldom going to be transparent to me what patterns of deference will have me come to know things. Indeed, in some cases, my evidence might even lead me astray. That is unfortunate, but does not change the fact of the matter: if a source knows what she is talking about, what I should do is defer, whether or not that seems right to me in light of my misleading evidence. One way to bolster this claim is by considering what I would be inclined to say if, after the fact, I find out that, contrary to what my evidence suggested, the person did in fact know what she was talking about. In that case, I would say ‘I should’ve listened.’ (I am grateful to Sandy Goldberg for this suggestion.) That is the fact I am trying to account for—what we
Those who still find the assumption that we should defer to those who know what they are talking about implausible may note the following: the main upshot of the following sections is that we have good empirical reason to believe that there are certain things that sources may do for purposes of making it likely that people will defer to them. Consequently, so long as we can agree that there are some conditions—whatever they may be—under which we should defer, what follows will constitute a worthwhile contribution, since it tells us something about what we can do to promote deference where deference is deserved. In that respect, the above assumption about when we should defer is modular, as far as the purposes of the present paper are concerned. Consequently, in what follows, anyone finding the idea that someone knowing what they are talking about is a sufficient condition for us deferring to that someone altogether implausible should feel free to substitute their favored sufficient condition for any subsequent instance of the condition suggested above.

Having said something about what constitutes deference, we may now turn to the type of context of deference that will concern us in what follows. The relevant context involves educators providing intellectual advice about how to avoid bias, and it—in line with the assumption just discussed—being the case that students should defer on account of the educators knowing what they are talking about and thereby providing sound advice. Providing such advice involves providing a request together with a suggestion for how to go about one’s epistemic business, a suggestion that’s sound in so far as it’s a good one. For example, in light of the statistician’s law of large numbers, an educator might say: ‘Listen, you shouldn’t believe that the features of a small sample will tell you anything about the features of the population from which it’s drawn.’ When students heed the request and listen to the educator, they can be said to be complying with that request.

However, students complying with educators’ requests to be listened to does not necessarily make for deference. This is because students might comply with such requests, but nevertheless fail to believe what they are being told. Given doxastic involuntarism, believing is not something that we do, so much as something that happens to us. For that reason, while we can be made to listen—more specifically, we can be made to attend (since an act) and trust that the automatic processing of content that

should be doing, given our epistemic goal, whether or not it is always going to be transparent from a first-person point of view.
follows upon attending thus will occur—we cannot be made to believe. Consequently, when thinking about the relationship between compliance and deference, we should focus on how to increase the chances that students will defer to (i.e., listen to and believe) educators providing sound intellectual advice.\(^{16}\) Moreover, as for how to increase the chances thus, I will make two empirical assumptions:

First, getting someone to listen is conducive to getting that someone to believe what is being said. This assumption is compatible with people sometimes failing to believe what they are being told, as long as getting people to listen still serves to increase the chances that they will believe what they are being told. Indeed, if we did not make that assumption, it would be hard to make sense of the great majority of persuasive practices, such as those involving advertisement, political campaigns, and public service announcements, that are geared exactly towards getting our attention.

So, the relevant empirical assumption is this: while we cannot be made to believe things, we can be made to listen, and trust that there is an imperfect but still robust enough connection between us listening and us believing the content of what we hear for listening to increase the chances of belief.\(^{17}\)

Second, convincing someone to hold certain normative beliefs in particular (i.e., beliefs about what one should or should not believe, assume, and so forth) provides us with a way to indirectly regulate their belief-formation. This is so because believing that one should believe in a certain manner is conducive to actually believing in that manner. That is not to say that the former entails the latter, of course. For example, in some cases, I will not realize that I am making an inference from what is, in fact, a very small sample. In other cases, I might realize that, but suffer from an epistemic form of weak will (assuming that there is such a thing). Still, if we assume that my normative beliefs about how beliefs should be formed have some robust influence on what beliefs I do form, there will be a positive relationship between what I believe that I should believe, and what I will believe. Indeed, this assumption seems to be un-

\(^{16}\) When asking how we can increase the chances of deference, I am assuming that certain answers (e.g., ‘By putting a gun to their head’) are ruled out as impermissible on moral grounds or otherwise.

\(^{17}\) This empirical assumption is, of course, compatible with there being other things we can do, beside bringing people to listen, for purposes of increasing the chances of belief and, as such, of deference. For example, maybe there is some \(\varphi\) such that bringing people to listen and to \(\varphi\) would serve to increase the chances of deference even further, compared to only bringing people to listen. Any such investigation would not only be compatible with, but also congenial to, the present investigation.
derlying large parts of what we do in educational settings, in so far as we try to teach students critical thinking skills.\(^{18}\)

Under these two empirical assumptions, promoting deference to educators providing sound intellectual advice involves as an important component promoting compliance with requests on the part of said educators to be listened to. Having made that clear, we are now in a position to formulate the problem educators encounter when attempting to teach students how to avoid bias. The problem is not that there is no sound advice to be had. The problem is that, in a wide variety of cases where we should defer to others providing advice of the relevant kind, e.g., on account of them knowing what they are talking about and thereby providing sound intellectual advice, we fail to do so. As we shall see, one common reason that we fail to do so is that we tend to underestimate our tendencies for bias, and therefore fail to listen, let alone defer. We may refer to this as the problem of intellectual deference.

To grasp the nature and implications of this problem, we should understand it in the context of the well-established psychological fact that, depressed people aside,\(^{19}\) most of us tend to rate ourselves as above average on desirable traits.\(^{20}\) The extent to which we deem ourselves to be more objective and less biased than others is no exception on this score. For example, using a variety of measures of objectivity, David Armor found that approximately 85 per cent of participants rated themselves as more objective than the average member of the group from which they were drawn.\(^{21}\) Similarly, in a series of studies by Emily Pronin and colleagues, subjects rated themselves as less susceptible to each of a number of described biases compared both to the average American and to various peer groups.\(^{22}\) As Pronin notes in a recent overview on

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\(^{18}\) There does for present purposes not need to be a strong connection between one’s normative beliefs and one’s belief-formation. People who fail to believe what they are being told, or fail to have the relevant normative beliefs guide their belief-formation, will be no worse off epistemically than they would have been, had they not come across the relevant source of intellectual advice. Consequently, any relation between listening and having one’s beliefs be regulated by the normative beliefs communicated— even if not a strong one—will be for the better, epistemically speaking. That is, given such a relation, some will be epistemically better off, and no one will be epistemically worse off. When it comes to intellectual amelioration, we can do far worse than that.

\(^{19}\) See Taylor and Brown (1988).

\(^{20}\) See, for example, Alicke (1985) and Brown (1986).

\(^{21}\) See Armor (1999).

\(^{22}\) See Pronin et al. (2002).
what she terms our ‘bias blind spot’, the upshot of the data collected on the issue is that ‘people tend to recognize (and even overestimate) the operation of bias in human judgment—except when that bias is their own’. 23

The obvious problem is, of course, that we cannot all be above average. Consequently, a significant proportion of us must be mistaken about our own relative insusceptibility to bias, suggesting that the relevant self-other asymmetry reveals a tendency for overconfidence in the accuracy of our judgments. Indeed, the relevant kind of overconfidence has been independently revealed in calibration studies, investigating the extent to which our degrees of confidence tend to track our actual abilities. As it turns out, most of us are not very well-calibrated, in that we have a tendency to express a greater degree of confidence in our answers than is warranted by the extent to which we actually tend to get the relevant kind of questions right. 24 This tendency can be found not only among lay people, but also among scientists, where the relevant bias takes the form of a tendency to underestimate the likelihood of errors. 25

In contexts of intellectual advice, the relevant blind spot manifests itself in the hearer thinking that she does not need to listen to intellectual advice, on account of her (perceived) relative insusceptibility to bias. Having such a blind spot is compatible with acknowledging that most people are susceptible to bias, and as such are in need of intellectual advice. Indeed, the individual might even acknowledge that there are situations in which she herself could use some intellectual advice—just not in this case. However, in thinking herself unique, she will be just like the rest of us. Indeed, owing to the prevalence of bias blind spots, most people tend to think that they are not in need of intellectual advice, and that either they or their situation in that respect is unique. Factoring in that most people in a significant number of cases actually do suffer from cognitive bias, we get the problem of intellectual deference: in a wide variety of cases where we should defer to others on matters intellectual, we nevertheless fail to do so on account of failing to listen.

24 See, for example, Fischhoff et al. (1977).
3. Removing Our Bias Blind Spots

The previous section introduced the problem of intellectual deference, i.e., the problem that, in a wide variety of cases where we should defer to others on intellectual matters, we nevertheless fail to do so. We also saw that one common reason that we fail to defer is that we fail to listen on account of overconfidence, listening being necessary for deference. What can be done about this?

Return to the kind of intellectual advice that has concerned us in the above, such as that involved when an educator tells her students: ‘Listen, you shouldn’t believe that the features of a small sample will tell you anything about the features of the population from which it’s drawn.’ The problem discussed in the previous section arises when students fail to listen to the relevant advice on account of overconfidence. That is, since overconfident, they don’t think they need to listen to intellectual advice of this sort (or, indeed, possibly of any sort).

To address this problem, the educator clearly needs to do more than simply provide the relevant piece of advice, together with a request to be listened to, since that request is likely to go unheeded on account of overconfidence. What else does she need to do, in order to get her students to listen?

Maybe the educator can also ask her students to be on the lookout for cognitive biases. That is, maybe she can try to come to terms with the problem posed by our tendencies for overconfidence by urging some form of critical self-reflection on the part of her students. The problem with doing that, however, is that critically evaluating oneself for bias, for purposes of correcting any biases uncovered, is exactly what we can not expect someone with a bias blind spot to do. Owing to that blind spot, we will typically see no reason to reflect critically on the matter.26 Much like in the case of the original advice regarding the relation between features of samples and the populations from which they are drawn, students (like the rest of us) are likely not to see any reason to listen, let alone to engage in critical self-reflection. In other words, the problem with invoking a notion of such self-reflection in an attempt to solve the problem of intellectual deference is that it is part of the very problem of people not deferring that they will tend not to see the point of reflecting critically on the relevant matter.

26 I discuss problems with self-reflection approaches to bias identification and correction at greater length in Ahlstrom-Vij (2013b).
For that reason, the way to come to terms with our bias blind spots is not by insisting that we be self-reflective, but by having us take part in externally imposed educational programs, informing us of the limits of our introspective abilities when it comes to identifying bias. That, at least, is the suggestion coming out of Pronin and Matthew Kugler’s results to the effect that our bias blind spot is a result of our tendency to rely on introspective information when determining whether or not we are subject to bias. Since the processes that give rise to bias typically operate on a subpersonal level, outside the scope of our introspective gaze, our search tends to come up empty. From the fact that our search comes up empty, we then infer an absence of bias—despite the fact that such a search is more or less guaranteed to come up empty, given the inaccessibility of the bulk of the relevant operations. However, Pronin and Kugler also found that subjects who, prior to evaluating the extent to which they were susceptible to a variety of biases, were asked to read a paper highlighting the introspective inaccessibility of large parts of our mental lives, showed less of a tendency to claim that they were less susceptible to bias than their peers.

This, however, is not to suggest that we have thereby solved the problem of intellectual deference. There are two steps that need to be taken in order to solve that problem: one negative and one positive. As for the negative step, we need to counteract our bias blind spot, and thereby remove a prevalent obstacle to us listening to the relevant sources. Understanding that step in terms of excessive reliance on introspective information, along the lines of Pronin and Kugler’s findings, what we need to do is bring people to the point of not relying so heavily on information they can (or rather: think they can) uncover by looking inwards. Moreover, doing so might serve to address a subset of the problematic cases, namely those involving subjects who already believe what they are being told—e.g., that one should not assume that the features of a small sample tell one anything about the features of the population from which it is drawn—but simply fail to have the relevant (normative) beliefs impact their belief-formation, on account of considering themselves to be relatively unsusceptible to the relevant set of biases due to their bias blind spots.

But two kinds of cases remain that, moreover, are likely to make up the majority of the problematic cases: cases wherein people either have no (normative) beliefs on the matter—about statistical sampling or otherwise—and cases wherein the people

\[27\] See Pronin and Kugler (2007).
involved hold beliefs that run contrary to the recommendations provided by the sources of intellectual advice. In these cases, simply removing the relevant bias blind spot is not enough. The reason is that losing a motivation not to listen is not to gain a motivation to listen—let alone to listen to the people we should—which brings us to the second, positive step: In addition to having people not rely so heavily on introspective information, we need to bring people to do something, namely to look outwards, and listen to the sources providing sound intellectual advice. Only then can we hope to instill or revise the relevant beliefs in the subjects. So, how can people be brought to listen, under the assumption that listening is conducive to believing and, as such, to deferring? This is the question that will concern us in the remainder of the paper.

4. People Listen to People Who Listen
The previous section noted that we might be able to remove our bias blind spots by becoming educated about the limits of introspection, but also that we have not thereby solved the problem of intellectual deference. The reason is that removing an obstacle to being motivated to listen is not to provide a motivation for listening, let alone for listening to the people we should be deferring to, e.g., on account of them providing sound intellectual advice. So how can we motivate people to listen to and, ultimately, defer to sources that they should be deferring to? In this section, it will be argued that the answer lies in a notion of procedural justice. In the next section, the relevant notion will be related to Miranda Fricker and David Coady’s notions of epistemic justice.

The idea behind the notion of procedural justice to be developed builds on an observation made above (in Section 2), to the effect that what sources of intellectual guidance are doing is providing a request, together with a piece of intellectual advice. This should not be taken to imply that intellectual guidance, thus understood, exhausts the domain of epistemically ameliorative interventions. For example, certain biases will be best dealt with, not by

28 After all, Tversky and Kahneman (1982) famously suggested that people’s intuitions about random sampling ‘appear to satisfy the law of small numbers, which asserts that the law of large numbers applies to small numbers as well’ (25).
29 See Fricker (2007) and Coady (2010), respectively.
30 This should not be taken to imply that intellectual guidance, thus understood, exhausts the domain of epistemically ameliorative interventions. For example, certain biases will be best dealt with, not by
some concrete and constructive suggestion for how to go about one’s epistemic business. To use the example from earlier, an educator might say ‘Listen, you shouldn’t assume that the features of a small sample will tell you anything about the population from which it’s drawn’. Assuming that the hearer has been informed about the limits of introspection for the purpose of ridding her of her bias blind spot, as per the negative step discussed in the previous section, we can assume her to be open to the idea that the advice is relevant to her, and as such not be opposed to listening. Moreover, if the hearer heeds the request and listens, and the two empirical assumptions discussed above hold—i.e., there is a robust enough connection between listening and believing what is being said, and believing that one should believe in a certain manner is conducive to actually believing in that manner—listening will increase the chances that the subject will not only defer but also form beliefs accordingly.

This brings us to what will be argued in this section and the next: There is a kind of procedural justice that, if practiced by providers of intellectual advice, will increase the extent to which they are consulted on the relevant matter, as well as the rate of compliance with their requests for hearers to listen to them—which, under the aforementioned assumptions, in turn will be correlated with hearers believing what they are being told, and forming beliefs accordingly. The hypothesis is that by providing intellectual advice in a procedurally just manner, providers of such advice increase their chances of being perceived by us as just, which in turn can be expected to increase the extent to which we will consult them, as well as the rate at which we will comply with their requests for being listened to.

What is the content of the relevant notion of procedural justice? And why consider this hypothesis at all plausible? The first question is best answered by way of the second. The main source of support for the hypothesis comes from Tom Tyler and colleagues’ research into why people follow the law. On a traditional picture, people follow the law because of a fear of sanctions. However, in a landmark study, Tyler showed that fear of sanctions is not the only or even the most important factor behind why people follow the law; an equally if not more important factor is people considering the relevant authorities legitimate.31 To be legitimate is to be deserving of defer-

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31 See Tyler (2006a).
ence, and to be perceived as legitimate is to be perceived as being thus deserving. Consequently, perceived legitimacy is a property that, ‘when it is possessed, leads people to defer voluntarily to decisions, rules, and social arrangements’.\textsuperscript{32} More specifically, as perceived legitimacy goes up, so does compliance.\textsuperscript{33}

Moreover, the central factor determining whether people conceive of an authority as legitimate is the extent to which they perceive that authority to be procedurally just, which brings us back to the first question above: What is the content of the relevant notion of procedural justice? The notion can be defined in terms of four components:

The first component pertains to being provided with an opportunity to state one’s case. Let us refer to this condition as input. According to Tyler, ‘[p]eople have a tremendous desire to present their side of the story and value the opportunity in and of itself’.\textsuperscript{34} As such, being given an opportunity to state one’s case has a significant positive effect on perceived justice—i.e., on people taking someone to be just, in the sense we’re in the process of spelling out—even when we feel that we have no influence over the authority’s actual decision on the matter (e.g., about whether we are to be fined, sentenced, and so forth.).\textsuperscript{35}

The second component of justice is the hearer evaluating one’s input in a way that is sensitive only to the facts of the matter, not to the hearer’s personal preferences or prejudices. Let us refer to this as factuality.

The third component corresponds to the fact that, while people do not require that their input be reflected in the ultimate decision, they must be able to infer that what has been said at the very least has been considered.\textsuperscript{36} Let us refer to this condition as consideration. As discussed by Tyler, the relevant condition is fairly weak: in many cases, simply explaining that the input was considered but, unfortunately, could not influence the decision is sufficient for satisfying the consideration condition.

The fourth and final component of justice involves the authorities making an effort to satisfy the above conditions, as opposed to simply going through the motions. Let us refer to this component as effort.

\textsuperscript{32} Tyler (2006b: 376).
\textsuperscript{33} See Tyler (2006a: 57).
\textsuperscript{34} Tyler (2006a: 147).
\textsuperscript{35} Tyler (2006a: 127).
\textsuperscript{36} See Tyler (2006a: 149).
If people feel that they have been treated in a procedurally just manner—i.e., if they feel that the *input*, *factuality*, *consideration*, and *effort* conditions have been satisfied—they perceive the relevant authority to be just, which in turn has them consider the authority more legitimate, as well as increases their compliance with the laws laid down by that authority. In fact, perceptions of justice can give rise to a feedback loop, in that, when authorities are viewed as legitimate, their actions are more likely to be seen as being just.\(^{37,38}\)

The following are two extensions of these results that are relevant to our investigation:

First, the relationship between perceived procedural justice—i.e., the perceived satisfaction of the four conditions just outlined—perceived legitimacy, and compliance is not unique to the legal domain; it applies to *rule-following* more generally. For example, employee perceptions regarding the justice of corporate policies, and the resulting perception of the legitimacy of their employers, tracks employee compliance with corporate policies,\(^{39}\) as well as cooperative behavior more generally, including compliance with rules in the absence of explicit requests for compliance or threats of sanctions.\(^{40}\) The same goes for non-corporate employees, such as police officers and members of the military, who, too, are significantly more inclined to comply with at-


\(^{38}\) In some places (e.g., in Blader and Tyler 2003), Tyler talks about a four-component model of procedural justice. In those contexts, the components correspond to the *dimensions* along which people evaluate procedural justice, namely with respect to decision-making, quality of treatment, formal interactions, and informal interactions. By contrast, the four components discussed here pertain to what Tyler and colleagues’ research suggests constitutes the *content* of justice evaluations, in the sense of what we look for when evaluating people’s behavior or the structure of organizations, along aforementioned dimensions or otherwise.

\(^{39}\) See Tyler and Blader (2005).

\(^{40}\) See Tyler (2011: Chapter 3). To avoid confusion, I have ignored a possible terminological shift between Tyler’s earlier (e.g., his 2006a) and his more recent work (e.g., his 2011). In the former, what I have referred to as the *input* and *consideration* conditions are conditions on perceived procedural justice; in the latter, these are occasionally (e.g., 2011: 106) but not consistently (e.g., 2011: 114) treated as conditions on *perceived trustworthiness*, where the latter is treated as a separate contributory factor to perceived legitimacy, in addition to that of perceived procedural justice (see, e.g., his 2011: 112). Since this terminological shift makes no substantive difference, I will stick to Tyler’s earlier terminology, and take perceived trustworthiness—if that’s the term we should use for what’s captured by *input* and *consideration*—to be a component of perceived procedural justice.
tempts to regulate their performance in so far as they deem their employers to be just, and thereby legitimate.  

Second, perceived procedural justice is not just relevant to our tendency to comply with communicated rules or norms—i.e., doing what we are being told to do—but also to our willingness to engage in consultation, i.e., seeking advice on what is to be done in the first place. For example, on the question of whom to consult, people report being more prone to consult professionals regarding retirement saving and investment strategies who they perceive to be just than professionals who they do not perceive to be just, even when aware that the cost of receiving a just treatment would be a decreased likelihood of financial gain. Moreover, as for the question of whether to consult someone, students report being more likely to seek advice from their professors on academic as well as on personal matters, when they take the professors to be such that they would treat them in a just manner.

In other words, within a wide variety of domains, we have reason to believe that people are significantly more inclined, not simply to consult others in the first place, but also to comply with requests or recommendations provided in consultations, when those consulted are perceived to be just. In other words, the causal relationship between the relevant components can be illustrated as follows:

\[
\text{Perceived Procedural Justice (i.e., perceived satisfaction of input, factuality, effort and consideration)} \rightarrow \text{Perceived Legitimacy} \rightarrow \text{Consultation} + \text{Compliance}
\]

Indeed, the robustness of the relationship between perceived justice and compliance as well as consultation suggests that it can be invoked in order to come to terms with compliance problems generally. That is the motivation for the present hypothesis, to the effect that there is a form of procedural justice that, if practiced by sources providing intellectual advice, can be expected to increase the extent to which their requests to be listened to are being heeded in virtue of the effect of perceived justice on compliance and consultation rates. More specifically, applying the four conditions on pro-

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41 See Tyler, Callahan, and Frost (2007).
42 Tyler (2006c: Study 1 and 2).
43 Tyler (2006c: Study 3).
cedural justice identified above—i.e., input, factuality, effort, and consideration—the relevant sources can both increase consultation rates and promote compliance with their requests for being listened to by making sure that they (a) provide people with an opportunity for input on the relevant matters, (b) evaluate such input in a factual manner, (c) offer an explanation in cases where that input, after having been considered, cannot influence their advice, and (d) make an effort to do what it takes to satisfy the input, factuality, and consideration conditions.

If we were to formulate a slogan capturing what sources need to do in order to get us to defer—assuming, as above, that listening is to a robust enough extent conducive to believing what one is being told—it would be this: people listen to people who listen. In formulating the slogan thus, I am making an assumption about the relationship between perceived justice and de facto justice, to the effect that the best way to seem just is to be just. If that assumption holds, we may rewrite the graph above as follows:

\[ \text{Procedural Justice} \rightarrow \text{Perceived Procedural Justice} \rightarrow \text{Perceived Legitimacy} \rightarrow \text{Consultation + Compliance} \]

Assuming such a relationship between perceived and de facto procedural justice is not to deny that it is conceptually possible to solve compliance problems by simply seeming to be just. It should be noted, however, that it is not only unlikely that one would be able to pull off the level of deception required in the long run, but also unclear what would be gained from it. After all, maintaining the relevant deception for the purposes of merely seeming just would most likely require an equal if not greater amount of resources than would simply being just. In other words, the best way to have people perceive sources of intellectual advice to be just is for those sources to make a sincere effort to provide a forum for input, and taking into account what is being said in a factual manner, where the relevant consideration involves also explaining why the input does not change the advice given in cases where it does not.

Naturally, focusing on what sources providing sound intellectual advice can do to promote consultation and compliance by way of procedural justice, in the manner that we have done so far, might raise worries about epistemic sources that we should not defer to—e.g., because they do not know what they’re talking about, nor satisfy any other sufficient condition relevant to whom we should be deferring to—nevertheless
being able to practice procedural justice and, thereby, bring about consultation and deference. This worry speaks to the observation that bringing people to defer to the sources of intellectual advice they should be deferring to is really only half the problem of intellectual deference. The other half is that of also bringing people not to defer to sources of intellectual advice to which they should not defer.

Notice, however, that the two halves of the problem are not independent of one another. In particular, the more successful we are with respect to solving the first half of the problem—i.e., that of bringing people to defer to the sources they should defer to, e.g., on account of those sources providing sound intellectual advice, or satisfying some other sufficient condition on obligated intellectual deference—the more successful we will be with respect to the second half of the problem. This is so under the assumption that there is a practical limit to how many sources any given person can defer to. Given such a limit, increased success in bringing people to defer to the sources they should defer to will, in effect, also serve the goal of bringing people to defer only to those sources.

5. Varieties of Epistemic Justice
As should be clear from the previous sections, the relevant kind of procedural justice would be practiced, not by those on the receiving end of intellectual advice, but by the sources of advice themselves. We might say that it is a speaker-centered form of justice.44 As such, it might be contrasted with the notion of epistemic justice presented by Miranda Fricker, and with her notion of testimonial justice in particular.45 Fricker’s notion of testimonial justice captures, we might say, a hearer-centered anti-prejudicial form of justice. More specifically, it is a hearer-centered anti-prejudicial form of justice achieved through critical self-reflection. Prejudice consists in an epistemically culpable resistance to evidence for a speaker’s trustworthiness, sometimes combined with a negative and ethically culpable affective investment on the part of the hearer. The relevant kind of justice involves the hearer ‘shift[ing] intellectual gear out of spontane-

44 I’m grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this journal for this suggestion.
45 See Fricker (2007).
ous, unreflective mode and into active critical reflection in order to identify how far
[a] suspected prejudice has influenced her judgment’. \textsuperscript{46}

That said, the distinction between hearer- and speaker-centered forms of justice
does not get to an essential difference between Fricker’s notion of testimonial justice
and the notion of procedural justice developed here. After all, there is nothing that
prevents speakers from manifesting Fricker’s anti-prejudicial virtue of testimonial
justice, for example in deciding whom to address. The real difference between Frick-
er’s notion and the procedural notion relevant in contexts of intellectual deference is
that the former pertains specifically to prejudice, while the latter does not. More spe-
cifically, as Fricker understands testimonial justice, it guarantees that one is not prej-
udiced in one’s evaluations of people’s trustworthiness. As such, testimonial justice
might go some lengths towards helping us satisfy the factuality condition, but not
necessarily towards satisfying the remaining three conditions provided in the previous
section. The reason is this:

Those in most need of intellectual advice might be least worthy of one’s ear, from
an epistemic perspective. Moreover, someone who refuses to listen to someone who
has nothing epistemically relevant to say is not thereby prejudiced. Still, if the above
is on the right track, and one way to promote deference is to listen to people in the
manner outlined in the previous section, we might in some contexts—including those
that involve providing intellectual advice in educational settings—need to listen to

\textsuperscript{46} Fricker (2007: 91). Fricker refers to this as the correct form of testimonial justice. She wants to
also leave room for a naïve manifestation of testimonial justice (93). She discusses two kinds of naïve
manifestation: first, someone who simply happens to lack the relevant prejudices, while possessing a
general motivation to make unprejudiced credibility judgments; and, second, someone who has prej-
udiced beliefs that for whatever reason fail to influence her credibility judgments in testimonial intera-
tions. It is not clear, however, that these two kinds of cases should be categorized as instances of test-
imonial justice, naïve or not. According to Fricker, the virtue of testimonial justice ‘requires the hearer
to reliably neutralize prejudice in her judgments of credibility’ (92). Since a person may be free of
prejudice and possess a motivation to remain unprejudiced, while lacking an ability to reliably neutral-
ize prejudice, had she been subject to any, it is not clear that the first kind of case should be taken to
involve testimonial justice. Moreover, since a person’s prejudiced beliefs might fail to corrupt her cred-
ibility judgments without it being the case that, had her beliefs in fact corrupted her judgments, she
would have been able to reliably neutralize the corrupting influence, it also is not clear that the second
kind of case should qualify as involving testimonial justice. Hence, my focus on the corrective form of
testimonial justice, which in light of the above seems to be the form that is most in line with what
Fricker herself takes testimonial justice to consist in.
people who actually have nothing to say. Doing that, however, is not something that the testimonially just person needs to be doing. A testimonially just person listens in an unprejudiced manner, but is not required to listen to anyone in particular, let alone to people who have nothing relevant to say.

It should be stressed that this is not a critique of Fricker’s notion of testimonial justice. The question of what to do in light of the fact that people’s evaluations of other’s credibility sometimes are colored by prejudice—including prejudice pertaining to race, sexuality, and gender—is very different from the question of what to do in the face of the problem of intellectual deference. For that reason, what has been argued so far should not be taken to suggest that Fricker’s notion cannot do what she wants it to do, namely address problems arising on account of prejudice, and centrally negative identity prejudice. Nor is it being suggested that the notion of procedural justice developed here can replace Fricker’s. For example, it would be downright insulting to suggest that what a hearer subject to prejudicial treatment on account of her race should be doing is spend more time listening to her racist interlocutors.47

Instead, the only thing suggested is this: Fricker’s notion of testimonial justice cannot do what needs to be done in relation to the problem of intellectual deference. Hence, the need for a different notion of justice in testimonial contexts, and in testimonial contexts involving the provision of intellectual advice in particular, in addition to (not instead of) that provided by Fricker through her notion of testimonial justice. Exercising the relevant kind of procedural justice involves listening without epistemic discrimination, in the specific sense of listening without any regard for the epistemic merits of what is being said, and then explaining why what is being said has no bearing on the correct intellectual recommendation, in cases where it does not. By listening without discrimination in this manner, we are making an effort—hopefully perceived by the agent as such—to make any given person feel that they are provided with an opportunity for input. By moreover evaluating that input in a manner only sensitive to the facts, and explaining why that input cannot be taken to alter the verdict on what is the right intellectual recommendation in the relevant case, we are also trying to make people feel that their views are still given consideration in a factual manner, whether or not those views factor into the relevant recommendation.

47 I owe this point to an anonymous reviewer for this journal.
At this point, it might be objected that there is something impracticable about the relevant kind of procedural justice, since it seems to require that we listen to absolutely everyone. How could we possibly hope to do so?\footnote{I'm grateful to Miranda Fricker for raising this question.} The answer is of course that, in the great majority of cases, we cannot, but that practicing procedural justice also does not require us to do so. Such justice is compatible with putting constraints on whom one listens to, including constraints motivated by practical considerations. What is central to the kind of procedural justice relevant here is simply that we do not impose any \textit{epistemic} constraints, as in constraints motivated by the epistemic merits of what is being said.

The point that there might be several notions of justice relevant in epistemic contexts is in line with a recent suggestion by David Coady.\footnote{See Coady (2010).} Coady argues that, in addition to Fricker’s notion of testimonial justice, which as we have seen highlights unjust credibility deficits, we need to acknowledge that there also are epistemic injustices pertaining to the distribution of epistemic goods. The latter kind of injustice occurs ‘when someone’s right to know is violated’.\footnote{Coady (2010: 105).} Coady explains:

\[
\text{[\ldots] a person can have their right to know something violated in two distinguishable ways. They can be unjustly put (or left) in a position in which they are ignorant of something that they are entitled to know, or they can be unjustly put (or left) in a position in which they are wrong about something they are entitled to be right about. There seems no reason to think that either of these is inherently more of an injustice than the other (Coady 2010: 109).}
\]

Clearly, Coady’s distributive notion of epistemic justice is different from the procedural notion of justice that has been defended in the above. Moreover, there is no reason to believe that the two are in conflict with one another. To the contrary, the notion defended here complements Coady’s rather nicely. We started out our investigation by thinking about how to instill epistemic virtues in students, for purposes of enabling them to attain knowledge, and found that we might be able to facilitate such attainments through a notion of procedural justice, given the prevalence of cognitive bias as
an obstacle to virtue. For that reason, the notion of procedural justice developed above can serve as a means to correcting exactly the kind of epistemic injustices that Coady is calling our attention to, by ridding those concerned of bias, paving the way for epistemic virtue, and thereby also reducing ignorance and correcting errors, including in cases of unjust ignorance and error.

To sum up, the notion of procedural justice defended here is distinct from but in no way in conflict with the notions of epistemic justice defended by Fricker and Coady. In fact, the relevant notion of procedural justice can be utilized for purposes of mitigating cases of epistemic justice, at least as understood by Coady. However, that in itself does not go to show that the former notion will not prove problematic on some other ground. Let us consider some possible objections.

6. Objections
First, it might be objected that the legal cases at the heart of the research on the role of procedural justice and deference are simply too different from the cases that concern us in so far as we are worrying about the problem of intellectual deference. More specifically, return to one of the three problematic cases discussed at the end of Section 3, wherein a subject holds beliefs that run contrary to the recommendation provided by the source of intellectual advice, and thereby disagrees with the source. In light of this kind of case, someone might highlight the following disanalogy with the legal case: you can go along with a law you do not agree with (e.g., because you do not want to face sanctions, or because you consider the law-giver legitimate), but since belief-formation is not open to voluntary control, you cannot believe a recommendation you do not believe in, no matter how severe the sanctions or how legitimate you consider the source of the recommendation.

Clearly, there is such a disanalogy, but does it present a problem for the present suggestion that we may solve the problem of intellectual deference with reference to a notion of procedural justice? It does not. The reason is that the relevant analogy is not between believing and following the law, but between listening and following the law. Moreover, here is something we can certainly do: we can listen to a source of intellec-

Coady (2010) suggests that there is a tension between his notion of distributive epistemic justice and Fricker’s notion of testimonial justice. I remain neutral on the questions whether there is such a tension for present purposes; all that matters for our investigation is that there is no tension between the notion of procedural justice defended here and the notions defended by Fricker and Coady, respectively.
tual advice, even if we don’t agree with what she’s saying. Why is that significant? If what I have suggested is on point, being brought to listen will increase the chances of belief (or, in this case: belief-change), and as such of deference. Hence, the main question of this paper: How can people be brought to listen? Since people listen to people who listen, sources will listen for purposes of in turn having people listen to them. As noted several times already, listening does not guarantee believing what one is being told, particularly not in the face of belief to the contrary. Rather, in accordance with what is taken for granted by any practice involving attempts to bring people to believe things—even in cases where the people involved believe the opposite—we are merely trying to increase the chances of belief or belief-change, and assume that bringing people to listen stands a good chance of doing exactly that.

Let us consider a second objection. The claims made here about procedural justice are both empirical and conceptual in nature. The empirical claim is that sources satisfying the input, factuality, consideration, and effort conditions increase the chances that people will consult as well as listen to them. The conceptual claim is that those conditions capture a notion of procedural justice. Someone might object that the preceding sections do not give us sufficient reason to talk of the conditions identified as capturing a form of procedural justice. To such a person it might be worth it to point out that what ultimately matters for purposes of this paper is that there are certain conditions that, if satisfied, help us solve the problem of intellectual deference, in accordance with the above empirical claim. I find it helpful to refer to the joint satisfaction of those conditions as procedural justice, particularly given their roots in Tyler’s research as well as their place in the larger matrix of epistemically relevant notions of justice discussed in the previous section. That said, I am not particularly interested in conceptual legislation.

A third objection is this: it has been suggested that providers of sound intellectual advice should listen without epistemic discrimination, including to those who might be gravely mistaken and as such have nothing to say, in order to bring about consultation and compliance. Moreover, an empirical assumption was made about the relation between compliance and deference, to the effect that listening to someone is conducive to believing what one is being told. But given that assumption, there is a danger that those made to listen without discrimination, for purposes of practicing the relevant kind of procedural justice, might actually start believing what they are being told by people who are gravely mistaken—or so the objection goes.
In response, it should be noted that, if there’s anything that’s likely to block the route from listening to deference it’s the ability of the informed to see that those who are greatly mistaken are just that. Indeed, were it not the case that the informed typically are able to do so, education would generally be a failure. However, education is not generally a failure, and to the extent that there are challenges associated with the epistemic asymmetry characterizing educator-student relationships, it seems safe to assume that those challenges rarely if ever stem from an inability of educators to listen to the greatly mistaken without becoming convinced that they are, in fact, informed. In other words, while it is not strictly speaking impossible that the informed are in some cases misled by those greatly mistaken, it seems safe to assume that it is likely that the informed will tend not to defer, on account of being able to tell that the greatly mistaken are indeed just that.

A fourth objection to what has been argued in the above is that there is something questionable, maybe even objectionable, about practicing the relevant kind of procedural justice. Often, we listen to people because we are interested in hearing what they are saying, and not primarily for the purpose of having them listen to us in turn. If educators or other people in the business of providing sound intellectual advice listen to us primarily for purposes of having us listen to them, is there a sense in which they are using us? I am inclined to say ‘no’, the reason being this: while it would make sense to talk about people using us if the purpose of getting us to listen would be for them to gain something (think advertisement), the contexts that concern us here involve attempts to get us to listen for the purpose of benefitting us. If we can be brought to listen to sources providing sound intellectual advice, we are not being used—on the contrary, we are being helped. Specifically, we are being helped to become better thinkers.

7. Conclusion
Educators have reason to instill epistemic virtues in students, on account of how epistemic virtues constitute dispositions conducive to epistemic goals, such as knowledge, which also happens to be the fundamental goal of education. Moreover, since cognitive bias constitutes a common obstacle to such virtue, educators also have reason to teach students how to avoid bias. The problem is that it is a well-established fact that we often fail to listen to intellectual advice aimed at reducing bias on account of us being overconfident about our intellectual abilities, and thereby underestimating our
susceptibility to bias. This is the problem of intellectual deference. The present paper argued that recent research in social psychology suggests that we can come to terms with this problem in two steps, the second of which involves educators delivering their intellectual advice in a procedurally just manner. The components of the relevant form of procedural justices were specified and related to Miranda Fricker and David Coady’s notions of testimonial justice. Finally, a series of objections were considered and responded to.  

References


52 The problem of intellectual deference that I have argued can be addressed in part with reference to a notion of procedural justice is an instance of a more general problem of deference, to the effect that we often fail to defer to the people that we should defer to, be it in contexts of intellectual advice or otherwise. It is reasonable to believe that the notion of procedural justice invoked here in order to come to terms with the problem of intellectual deference can be applied for purposes of addressing other problems of deference as well. However, since I have made the relevant case elsewhere (see Ahlstrom-Vij, forthcoming), I have not discussed that possibility here.

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