1. Introduction

In addition to propositional attitudes, there are non-propositional attitudes—states such as loving one's department, liking lattice structures, fearing Freddy Krueger, and hating Sherlock Holmes. There are persuasive reasons to believe that such instances of liking, loving, fearing, and hating fail to be analyzable in terms of or otherwise reducible to propositional attitudes. But to learn that such attitudes aren't propositional is to learn something that they are not. The present paper aims to say what they are.

As an initial statement, non-propositional attitudes are intentional mental states that are of or about things not in virtue of relating a subject to a proposition(s) concerning those things. To the extent that the ascriptions of a successful folk-psychology serve as a guide to the mental states themselves, and, in light of ascriptions such as the following, the default position is that there are such attitudes: ‘John likes his dog’, ‘Ann loves God’, ‘John fears Freddy’, and so on. Just as true propositional attitude ascriptions such as ‘S believes that p’ give one reason to think that there are beliefs and that their objects are propositions, true non-propositional attitude ascriptions such as ‘S fears o’ give one reason to think that there are mental states with non-propositional objects. Given the prevalence of such ascriptions, it is surprising that the states to which these ascriptions answer have received so little attention in contemporary philosophy.

A bit more contrast may be helpful. Belief has been a central case in much of the philosophy of mind and language. In fact, this might partially explain why non-propositional attitudes have received so little attention, for certain distinctions get lost. ‘John believes that running with the bulls will get him killed’ is a canonical ascription of a propositional attitude. It features an attitude verb flanked by a subject term and a ‘that’-cause. But our ordinary mentalistic discourse also allows one to ascribe the very same state to John using a noun-phrase complement: ‘John believes the proposition that running with the bulls will get him killed’. And our belief ascriptions are more flexible still, for one can ascribe a propositional attitude with a simple noun-phrase complement such as a name (in this case, a name
of a theory): ‘John believes Logicism’. But change the attitude verb and non-propositional attitudes come into focus. Consider, for example, fearing. ‘John fears that running with the bulls will get him killed’ reports a propositional attitude, but quite plausibly ‘John fears bulls’ and ‘John fears Sally’ do not. Furthermore, fearing that p is clearly distinct from fearing the proposition that p (which, if it makes any sense at all, appears to be of a kind with fearing bulls or fearing Sally). These distinctions deserve philosophical attention.

In offering a positive account of the non-propositional attitudes, I follow the methodology of Russell in ‘On Denoting’:

A logical theory may be tested by its capacity for dealing with puzzles, and it is a wholesome plan, in thinking about logic, to stock the mind with as many puzzles as possible, since these serve much the same purpose as is served by experiments in physical science (1905; 484–5).

The point extends to philosophical theory more broadly. In the present case, the theory of non-propositional attitudes is guided by the consideration of two puzzles concerning them. The puzzles provide hard cases, and I believe that by working through them we reach not only a clearer understanding of the phenomena, but also a compelling theory.

**Puzzle 1 (The Proposition Puzzle)**

1. John fears that the party will be poorly attended.
2. It is not the case that John fears the proposition that the party will be poorly attended.
3. That the party will be poorly attended is the proposition that the party will be poorly attended.

It is possible that (1)-(3) are all true. But if one holds that propositional attitudes are simply two-place mental relations between individuals and propositions and holds that one designates the very same proposition by ‘that the party will be poorly attended’ and ‘the proposition that the party will be poorly attended’, then (2) contradicts (1) and so (1)-(3) can’t all be true. Something must be given up.

**Puzzle 2 (Prior’s Puzzle)**

A.N. Prior, in his seminal book on the attitudes, poses the following challenge (where ‘V’ is to be replaced by an attitude verb):

(a) S’s V-ing o constitutes a relation between S and o when o exists, but (b) not when o doesn’t; but (c) S’s V-ing o is the same sort of thing whether o exists or not. Something plainly has to be given up here; what will it be? (1971; 130).

The recognition of non-propositional attitudes and a proper understanding of them allows us to solve these puzzles. In fact, by working through the puzzles, one comes to have a better understanding of what non-propositional attitudes are and what they are not. The plan is as follows: I first argue that the answer to puzzle 1
lies in differentiating states with propositional contents from states that are merely about propositions. I argue that the key difference concerns the having or lacking of truth or accuracy conditions and I show how a certain representationalist theory of the non-propositional attitudes illuminates in what this difference consists. These considerations lead, at a very general level, to a view according to which non-propositional attitudes are representational states that relate one to a word-like representation that (unlike a sentence-like representation) lacks truth or accuracy conditions. I then turn to the second puzzle which demands that one examine the metaphysical structure of the non-propositional attitudes at a deeper level. By considering puzzle 2 I show where the representations offered in the treatment of puzzle 1 must be located. The view I offer is compatible with many familiar views concerning representation individuation that one finds in the literature on propositional attitudes. Indeed, the goal of the present paper does not include settling questions about how to individuate, say, empty representations, name-like representations that co-refer, and so on. Those are indeed important (and all too familiar) questions, but a general theory of, say, names is not necessary for showing that a positive account of a certain kind of state—the non-propositional attitudes—can be given. Rather, the more modest goal is to show that non-propositional attitudes can be treated in a non-reductive and non-derivative way that puts our understanding of them at least on a par with our understanding of the propositional attitudes.

Before proceeding, two additional preliminary remarks are in order. First, besides propositional and objectual fearing, liking, loving, and so on, there appear to be both quantified and generic cases: one might fear every snake or love dogs. I wish to put such cases aside in this discussion. Views concerning generics are highly controversial and quantificational cases bring in unnecessary complications that would merely distract us. I see no reason for thinking that the view offered below couldn’t be extended to these cases, but, for the sake of focus and simplicity, the discussion will be centered on attitudes towards objects.

Second, the states in which I am interested are indeed intentional. A phenomenon (e.g. a state or an event) is intentional if and only if it is about something. This is true of the states in question. In fact, Brentano’s famous and influential characterization of the mental as intentional features some of the cases in which we are interested:

> Every mental phenomenon includes something as object within itself, although they do not all do so in the same way. In presentation something is presented, in judgement something is affirmed or denied, in love loved, in hate hated, in desire desired and so on (1874, 88–89).

Furthermore, the states in question meet two additional marks of the intentional. First, they may be about things that fail to exist. One can like Sherlock Holmes, fear Pegasus, and so on. Second, the states in question individuate more finely than by reference. Just as one might believe that Superman flies without believing that Clark Kent flies, one might fear Superman but not fear Kent. In fact, it is difficult to see how, in general, we would successfully explain and predict behavior without drawing this distinction at some level in our theory. If Lex fears Superman and
believes that Kent is at The Daily Planet, (all else equal) it would be surprising if Lex avoided The Planet. If, on the other hand, Lex fears Superman and believes Superman is at The Planet, we should expect Lex to stay far away. If fearing Superman is identical to fearing Kent, this distinction is lost.

2. Puzzle 1—The Proposition Puzzle

Puzzle 1 provides us with an important limiting case. It is tempting to characterize non-propositional attitudes as intentional states about non-propositional things. Puzzle 1 shows us that things aren’t quite that simple. Moreover, the puzzle forces care with how we think about our comparison class, the propositional attitudes.

Propositional attitudes are said to be mental or intentional relations holding between subjects and propositions. But this is at best imprecise, for there are intentional states relating subjects to propositions that are not propositional attitudes. For instance, John might fear the proposition that grass is green. This is, of course, odd, and perhaps pathological,13 but of present interest is that it is distinct from the propositional attitude of fearing that grass is green. Notice that sentences such as ‘John fears the proposition that grass is green’ and ‘Sally loves the proposition that snow is white’ do not seem to report propositional attitudes as we normally conceive of them. John and Sally are said to be in states concerning abstract objects that most of us normally bear only to actual, concrete objects. Neither fearing Charles Manson nor loving Charlie Sheen consists in a propositional attitude relation to these men. Simply changing the object to a proposition does not a propositional attitude make. But what makes it the case that John’s fearing that p is a propositional attitude but John’s fearing the proposition that p is a non-propositional attitude? On the face of things, both appear to consist in a subject standing in the fears-relation to a proposition. If the story isn’t in some way complicated, that is, if we can’t substantiate the difference, we find ourselves uncomfortably stuck in the proposition puzzle.

Here is an intuitive way to bring out the difference between fearing that p and fearing the proposition that p (just to stick to a specific attitude): in fearing that p, the proposition that p is the content of the attitude, but in fearing the proposition that p, the proposition that p is the object of the attitude.14 We might then say that propositional attitudes are not simply intentional relations subjects bear to propositions, but rather that propositional attitudes are intentional states with propositional content. (That still constitutes standing in a relation to a proposition, of course, but it’s a rather roundabout relation.) But this is not yet fully satisfactory, for it is little more than a label. On the one hand, there are intentional states that are said to have propositions as objects and on the other there are intentional states that are said to have propositions as contents. This difference needs fleshing out.

Although propositional contents have been asked to play many roles, one thing that seems to be widely agreed upon is that they either are or determine accuracy, veridicality, or satisfaction conditions, which are in turn captured in terms of truth. One’s belief that p is accurate just in case the proposition that p is true. One’s desire that q is satisfied just in case the proposition that q is true.15 When one perceives that r, her perception is accurate (veridical) just in case the proposition that r is true.
When an attitude has a propositional content, the attitude is sensitive to the truth of the proposition. The sensitivity varies across the attitudes: when the proposition in question is true, belief is *accurate*, desires are *satisfied*, perception is *veridical*.\(^{16}\)

To put things in general terms, for any attitude \(V\), \(V\) is a propositional attitude just in case for any subject \(S\) and proposition \(p\) such that \(S\) stands in \(V\) to \(p\), if \(p\) were true, then things would be as \(S\)'s \(V\)'s them to be. For instance, when one believes that \(p\), if \(p\) were true, things would be as one believes them to be. If one fears that \(p\), if \(p\) were true, things would be as one fears them to be. And so on.

With this observation on the table, we can draw a clear contrast with the non-propositional attitudes, for they do not appear to have conditions of accuracy, satisfaction, and so on. Even when non-propositional attitudes have propositions as objects, the states are not relevantly sensitive to the truth of the proposition. Suppose, for example, that John loves Sally. There seems to be no sensible question of the form, ‘When is John’s love accurate/satisfied/true?’ Similar considerations apply to the other non-propositional attitudes. It is false that if one fears the proposition that \(p\), then if \(p\) were true, things would be as one fears them to be. No notion of accuracy, satisfaction, or truth seems to get a grip in the cases of non-propositional liking, fearing, loving, hating, etc.\(^{17}\) So, unlike the propositional attitudes, non-propositional attitudes do not have propositional *content* (not even when they are about a proposition).

We can now flesh out the intuitive answer to the question ‘what makes it the case that John’s fearing that \(p\) is a propositional attitude but John’s fearing the proposition that \(p\) is a non-propositional attitude?’. Propositional attitudes have propositions as contents, which is to say that they are sensitive to the truth of the proposition in the way outlined above. Non-propositional attitudes directed at propositions merely have propositions as objects and so are not sensitive to the truth of the propositions they are about.

### 2.1. Grounding the distinction in representations

A representational theory of mind allows one to elegantly explain the difference between being an intentional state with a proposition as object and being an intentional state with a propositional content. Suppose for a moment that the language of thought hypothesis is true.\(^{18}\) On such a view, in \(V\)-ing that \(p\), one stands in a relation to a *sentence* in the head that means or expresses that \(p\). But something similar can be extended to the non-propositional attitudes: in \(V\)-ing \(o\), one stands in a relation to a *term* in the language of thought that refers (or putatively refers if there is no referent) to \(o\).\(^{19}\) The difference between an attitude that has a proposition as content and one that doesn’t is, on the representationalist view, a difference between sentential representations that express propositions and name-like representations that refer to things (some of which are propositions). And this maps neatly to our discussion of truth-conditions and propositional content above. Whereas sentences are true or false, referring terms are not.

So, we can explicate the difference between fearing that \(p\) and fearing the proposition that \(p\). Indeed, we can do so in a way that accounts for the difference in sensitivity to the truth of the proposition.
To recap, fearing that \( p \) is a propositional attitude, which has a proposition as *content* and fearing the proposition that \( p \) is a non-propositional attitude directed at a proposition—it merely has a proposition as *object*. We saw that the content/object difference can be fleshed out in terms of sensitivity to the truth. And as I have argued, that difference can be explicated in terms of representations that express and representations that refer. Returning to the initial statement of the proposition puzzle then, (2) is not the negation of (1) and so all of (1)-(3) may be retained.

Extending the representational theory of propositional attitudes to the non-propositional attitudes is attractive for additional reasons. As noted above, one might fear Pegasus even though Pegasus doesn’t exist and in fearing Superman one needn’t fear Kent. It is hard to see how to make sense of these facts without appeal to representations. But, as noted, the representations needed can be thought of as mental analogs to names rather than sentences. One of course faces the challenge of accounting for name-like representations that can be individuated (at least in part) by something other than reference and that can exist even when they have no referent. I will have a bit more to say about these issues below. Presently, it is enough to see that something representational and name-like seems exactly called for. In the next section, we will see how this thought can be put to additional use and fleshed out in further detail. In particular, puzzle 2 demands that we build on the representationalist picture by clarifying the metaphysical structure of the states and properly locating the representations in that structure.

### 3. Puzzle 2—Prior’s Puzzle

For convenience, allow me to restate the puzzle:

(a) S’s V-ing o constitutes a relation between S and o when o exists, but (b) not when o doesn’t; but (c) S’s V-ing o is the same sort of thing whether o exists or not. Something plainly has to be given up here; what will it be? (Prior 1971, 130).

Take fearing Sally as a specific instance. If Sally exists and Jones fears Sally, it seems natural to say that what Jones’s fear *is* is a relation to Sally. If Sally doesn’t exist, it follows trivially that Jones’s fear isn’t a relation to Sally, for there is no Sally. But what Jones’s fearing Sally is is insensitive to the existential status of Sally. In fact, whether Sally exists or not, Jones’s fear may be causally efficacious; it may interact with his beliefs, desires, and other states and influence his planning and overt behavior. If Jones believes that Sally is in the other room and he fears Sally, (all else equal) we should expect Jones to intend to avoid the other room. Again, this is independent of whether Sally exists or not. But of course we cannot hold that one thing both is and isn’t a relation.

### 3.1. Briefly, roads not taken

Escape strategies are available. One might suggest giving up (b), as theorists who have been attracted to reifying the mythical and fictional have. One could, for example, adopt a Meinongian proposal or try to argue for a position according to which fictional and mythical creatures are abstract objects. Such theorists will
take the allegedly ‘empty’ cases to in fact be non-empty. But such views deserve a paper-length treatment of their own, so I will proceed conditionally. If one prefers (as I do) not to reify the mythical, fictional, and so on, how can one solve Prior’s puzzle?

Rejecting (c) constitutes another approach. One could argue that empty and non-empty cases are distinct kinds of states, perhaps one relational and the other not. But as indicated, fearing is causally similar whether directed at an existing thing such as Sally or a non-existing thing such as Pegasus. Furthermore, if the states were distinct, we should expect there to be two non-propositional states to which ‘fears’ answers. But this is not borne out in ambiguity tests. For example: there is the running of a marathon and the running of a company, which are quite obviously distinct things. The verb ‘to run’ is accordingly ambiguous, and tests such as the following indicate as much:

*John ran a marathon and a company.*

If the verb were univocal, eliding one occurrence of it would yield felicity rather than infelicity. But felicity is precisely what we find when we similarly elide verbs such as ‘to fear’, ‘to like’, ‘to love’, and so on:

Phil fears LeBron James and Sherlock Holmes.

If empty and non-empty cases involve distinct states, we should expect infelicity in such cases. Although not decisive, this suggests that there is just one state at issue here, not two. The failure of ambiguity tests in concert with the causal similarities between empty and non-empty cases speaks strongly against denying (c).

Perhaps one could deny relationality across the board. One might, for example, suggest that fearing Sally is one kind of monadic state, fearing Mary another. According to such a view, there are the monadic properties of fearing-Sally, fearing-Mary, and so on, none of which have a shared constituent. Following this line, one may deny (a) but retain (b) and (c).

One incurs too many costs by adopting this view. First, the view fails to respect inferences such as the following: we can conclude that both John and Jones fear something if Jones fears Sally and John fears Mary. It’s hard to see how that conclusion follows if John and Jones instantiate completely distinct monadic properties. John and Jones quite obviously have something in common and a relational view has an easy time making sense of that. Similarly, from John fears Sally and Jones loves Sally, we can conclude that John fears who Jones loves. Again, on a monadic view, it is hard to see how the inference could be a good one. Finally, the monadic view fails to align with the ambiguity test offered above. If fearing Sally and fearing Mary were distinct monadic properties, it is hard to explain why we freely allow for elision:

John fears Sally and Mary.

To the extent that we take our ascriptions to be a good guide to the form of the attitudes themselves, a relational view of some sort looks far more attractive.
Rather than giving up (a), one may try to finesse it. Prior’s statement of (a) suggests that S’s V-ing o simply is a relation, a direct relation, between S and o when o exists. When o doesn’t exist, this position tempts one towards Meinongianism or some other reification of the non-existent. But one might suggest that in V-ing o, S is related to o, but not directly by the V-relation. (a) could, for example, be replaced with the less loaded (a’):

(a’): S’s V-ing o relates S and o when o exists.

(a’) is intended to be compatible with (a), but putting things as in (a’) rather than (a) may help us see new options. At this juncture, one might suggest that the immediate object of, say, fearing, is a representation such as a concept or a sense. When the representation has a referent, by being related to it one is related to its referent. Call this view the ‘Concept-as-Object’ view of attitudes towards objects.

The suggestion has quite a lot going for it. (b) can be endorsed, for if a representation, say the concept Pegasus, lacks a referent on the grounds that Pegasus doesn’t exist, one who fears Pegasus in virtue of fearing the concept Pegasus does not stand in a relation to Pegasus. (a), now slightly finessed, can be endorsed as well, for when one fears an existing thing, say LeBron James, he does so by fearing a representation that is of or about its referent. And finally, (c) is satisfied, for fearing James and fearing Pegasus are the same kind of thing—in both cases one stands in the fearing relation to a representation, a representation that exists independently of whether or not it has a referent.

Despite its virtues, the Concept-as-Object proposal faces an obvious and devastating problem that has been posed by Reid (1785), Anscombe (1965), Prior (1971), and others.25 Fearing James is not the same thing as fearing the sense of ‘James’, the concept James, or any other representation. One might fear those things, but one who does might not fear James, which was the target. Although the view has its virtues, it clearly fails.

3.2. Locating representations

The view entertained but rejected by Reid, Anscombe, and Prior fails only because it is ill structured; the mediation has not been properly located. The view I shall advance is a near variant that escapes the problem.

Prior’s puzzle is structurally very like the famous problem of perception. Concerning perception, the challenge is to account for the nature of visual perceptual experience in light of the fact that there could be phenomenologically indistinguishable veridical and hallucinatory experiences. That is, it seems possible that one might undergo a visual hallucinatory experience that is phenomenally indistinguishable from a case of veridical perception. As with Prior’s puzzle, then, there is a sameness constraint. In addition there is pressure towards relationality: the phenomenology of perception has it that one is put in contact with the world. Unfortunately, in hallucinatory cases there is nothing to which one is obviously related. Since veridical and hallucinatory perceptual experiences are phenomenologically (and, indeed, psychologically) similar, they should receive a uniform treatment if possible. Although each claim is plausible, they can’t all be retained.
We might (admittedly rather crudely, but for the sake of illustration) put perception’s challenge thus:

(i) S’s having a visual experiencing as of o’s being F is a relation between S and o when o exists, but (ii) not when o doesn’t; but (iii) S’s having a visual experience as of o’s being F is the same sort of thing whether o exists or not.

‘Intentionalism’ constitutes an attractive and now very popular solution to this puzzle. According to intentionalists, what it is for one to have a visual experience to the effect that o is F is to be related to a content, in particular, to the proposition that o is F. For example, an intentionalist might suggest that in both veridical and hallucinatory experiences, one is related to a content and, whether veridical or hallucinatory, one could be related to the very same content. The objects of perception, according to this view, are the ordinary mind-independent objects we think they are (in the veridical cases anyway), but upon analysis we learn that undergoing a perceptual experience consists in standing in a relation to a content.

Notice that intentionalists do not say that what one perceives or what one experiences is a content. To say this would be to make an error analogous to that made by the theorist who says that in fearing James one fears a representation. But just as the intentionalist can navigate this issue when faced with the problem of perception, the representationalist about non-propositional attitudes can navigate it when faced with Prior’s puzzle.

Returning to Prior’s puzzle, we adopt the suggestion of finessing (a) as (a’) which is here repeated:

(a‘): S’s V-ing o relates S and o when o exists.

In much the same way that the theorist entertained by Reid, Anscombe, and Prior did above, we can now take advantage of mediation through a representation. But, having reflected on the problem of perception and keeping in mind the representational view from puzzle 1, we now see how to avoid the shortcomings. By taking V-ing o to require a distinct relation (V*), we can avoid the wrong object objection but still utilize representations:

(REP): S V’s o iff S stands in the V* relation to an o-representation.

The exact details of being an o-representation are complicated, though for familiar reasons. There are a range of options that correspond to the options concerning propositional attitudes and I revisit them briefly below. Presently, we need only that an o-representation must be about only o. A name-like representation (of the sort motivated by puzzle 1) fits this profile. Let us call this view about attitudes towards objects ‘Non-Propositional Intentionalism’.

V* is a technical relation holding between a subject and a representation and its introduction is motivated by its theoretical benefits. V*-ing a representation is compatible with a range of theories of mind. One might identify it with a type of brain activity, characterize it behaviorally, or characterize it functionally, to name some well known options at this juncture. For example, if one finds a functional
characterization of the mind attractive, one might proceed as follows: One V*'s a representation just in case one is disposed to employ the representation in certain ways. More specifically: One V*'s a representation just in case one tokens a representation and that tokening tends to be caused by such and such and tends to cause so and so. The filling out of either schema will vary for distinct attitudes. That is, the typical disposition or the typical inputs and outputs for the relation underlying, say, liking (call it ‘likes*’), will plausibly differ from that underlying hating (call it ‘hates*’). As with propositional attitudes, it is a matter of debate how to settle these issues. Those familiar issues are not of present concern.

In order to clarify the position, it is helpful to consider a case in which one V’s a genuine object and to then consider a case involving a non-existent. Let us suppose that Jones likes Sally. What it is for Jones to like Sally is for Jones to stand in a relation, the likes* relation, to a name-like representation that is about Sally. When Jones satisfies that condition, he likes Sally. And notice that on this account, Jones likes Sally, not a sense, concept, proposition, or representation of any other form. Furthermore, he is indeed related to Sally, albeit in a mediated way: he stands in the likes* relation to a representation and that representation is about Sally.

This position can be extended to the case of liking Holmes, Pegasus, or whatever. Although there isn’t a thing Jones likes when he likes Holmes (for the representation has no referent), his liking Holmes consists in a relation, a relation to a representation. When it’s a Holmes-representation, he does indeed like Holmes.

It is important to notice that in addition to sameness along one dimension, Prior’s challenge calls out for an account of difference along another. When the object exists one is related to it, but when it doesn’t one cannot be. The proposal on offer captures both. Sameness is covered by the claim that one is standing in a relation to a representation in all cases. Difference is located in whether or not those representations have referents. An account of empty representations is of course not trivial, but empty representations are certainly familiar: one can depict, say, unicorns and introduce names such as ‘Pegasus’ which lack a referent. The project at present is to make sense of the attitudes themselves.

Returning to Prior’s puzzle (with (a) now modified), the suggestion on offer delivers the result that when o exists and S V’s o, S stands in a relation to o. When o doesn’t exist, S doesn’t stand in that relation to o (or any other relation to o) for the obvious reason that there is no o. Despite this, V-ing o is the same sort of thing whether o exists or not since what it is for S to V o is for S to stand in a relation (V*) to a representation which doesn’t depend on o for its existence.

It is worth highlighting that substitutions for ‘V’ do not themselves pick out relations on this view, and this is as it should be. If I like Pegasus, it is not the case that there is a thing such that I like it and so I cannot stand in ‘the liking relation’ to it. What it is to like something is to stand in a relation (the likes* relation) to a representation, but there is no such thing as ‘the liking relation’, ‘the loving relation’, and so on. There can’t be if we can like things that don’t exist. Rather, an attitude of the sort in question is a complex state that one is in just in case one stands in a certain relation (likes*, loves*, and so on) to an appropriate representation.

As with propositional attitudes, it is a matter of debate how to settle these issues. Those familiar issues are not of present concern.
At a very general level then: non-propositional attitudes are representational states. To be in one is to stand in a relation to a name-like representation. As offered, this is compatible with many different ways of thinking about names, representations, and emptiness. One could follow the language of thought hypothesis or not, one could be a descriptivist about names or not, one could take the representational states to be physical or not. And the view is compatible with different approaches that differentiate, for example, V-ing Pegasus from V-ing Holmes. In, say, liking Holmes, one stands in the likes* relation to a different representation than one does when she likes Pegasus, but how to differentiate those representations is yet an open question. One might suggest distinguishing the representations in terms of syntax, cognitive role, origin, or so on. It is a virtue of the view that it demands little more than a broadly representationalist theory of mind. It is important to notice that the situation concerning representation individuation is no worse (and unfortunately no better) in the present context than the situation in which we find ourselves with respect to the propositional attitudes.

4. Conclusion

I have offered a positive account of an important but under-explored class of mental states such as loving, hating, and fearing: Non-propositional Intentionalism. In broadest terms, the view is a representationalist account guided by two puzzles. First, the proposal allows one to say in an elegant way what differentiates a propositional attitude from an attitude merely about a proposition. Second, the proposal allows one to offer a unified account of the non-propositional attitudes that captures both empty and non-empty cases by properly locating the posited representations in the metaphysical structure of the attitudes. Non-propositional attitudes needn’t be avoided, nor must they lead one to a profligate ontology of the sort envisioned by Meinong. Rather, they can be put on a par with (and profitably contrasted with) the more familiar propositional attitudes. Future work demands, among other things, integrating them into a theory of mind populated by propositional attitudes and settling the difficult questions concerning co-reference and empty representations.

Notes

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2 See Ben-Yami (1997), Crane (2001), Grzankowski (2012), Merricks (2009), and Montague (2007) for a defenses of the position that there are irreducible non-propositional attitudes. Notice that one might also fear that so and so, love that such and such, and so on. If one takes propositional attitudes to be those mental states canonically ascribed using an attitude verb and a ‘that’-clause complement, then there are also propositional varieties of the aforementioned attitudes.
Attitudes Towards Objects

3 ‘Sententialists’ about intensional transitive verbs argue that the best semantics for such sentences reveal hidden sentential structure in the object position. Although such a view is plausible in a limited number of cases (e.g. ‘to want’ and ‘to need’), the view lacks motivation in many other instances and often seems to get things wrong. The verbs just offered are among the problem cases for Sententialists. For powerful arguments against Sententialism, see Forbes (2000, 2006), Partee (1974), and Szabó (2003, 2005). For contemporary proponents of Sententialism, see Larson, et al. (1997) and Larson (2002). An historical proponent can be found in Quine (1960).

4 To the extent that they are mentioned, one usually sees them pushed aside. For a few prominent examples amongst many see Burge (1979) especially p. 4, Lewis (1979) especially section 1, and Searle (1983, 2010) especially chapters 1 and 2 respectively. For some speculative reasons as to why there has been neglect, see Grzankowski (2013a) especially section 2.

5 See fn. 2 and 3.

6 The puzzle isn’t limited to fearing. The same issue arises for other attitudes such as loving, hating, and liking, just to name a few. It is noteworthy that not all attitudes are puzzling in this way. As I noted above, ‘S believes that p’ and ‘S believes the proposition that p’ seem to be truth-conditionally equivalent. Though clearly related to the present line of questioning, a complete exploration would take us too far afield. Of present concern is the nature of states such as propositional and non-propositional fearing, liking, and so on that admit of the puzzle. It’s not obvious that there is a non-propositional variety of belief—if so, this may explain the difference. See King (2002) and Forbes (forthcoming) for additional discussion.

7 The relational theory of the attitudes is the dominant view. For a couple prominent examples: “A believes that S” is true just in case A stands in the belief relation to the proposition that S. The face-value theory is a default theory that must be defeated if it’s not to be accepted” (Schiffer 2006, 208). “Phoebe believes that fleas have wings” seems to say that Phoebe stands in the belief relation to the proposition that fleas have wings. I think that the semantics of belief really is as simple as it seems’ (Stalnaker 1999, 151). Both theorists take belief to be a central case from which more general conclusions concerning other attitudes can be drawn.

8 Indeed, some have held that definite descriptions of the form ‘the proposition that p’ rigidly designate propositions. For example see King (2002) and Hoffmann (2012). ‘That’-clauses are widely held to name propositions. See King (2002) and Schiffer (2006) for recent defenses.

9 Prior discusses thinking-of in particular, but the challenge extends more generally to mental states designated by verbs that accept noun-phrase complements.

10 See Carlson (1977), Leslie (2008), and Leibesman (2011) on generics. The literature on quantified complements is vast, but see Forbes (2006) for a recent and clear discussion.

11 For instance, I appeal below to name-like representations but one could just as well make use of quantified-noun-phrase-like representations or generic-term-like representations.

12 See Bealer (1993) for a detailed discussion of both the historical and contemporary uses of ‘intentional’. He defends the bi-conditional just offered (p. 104).

13 If one had a certain view about propositions, one might come to think that they could cause one serious harm (for example). Similarly for other attitudes. It is odd to love a proposition, but not impossible. In fact, maybe it isn’t even that odd. People often claim to have a favorite number. Is it so outrageous that someone might also love a number? If a number, why not a proposition?

14 A similar distinction is drawn by Forbes (forthcoming), King (2002), and Pietroski (2000). Forbes and Pietroski offer an event semantics for attitude ascriptions and are careful to distinguish between a proposition serving as the theme of an event and a proposition serving as a content of an attitude (construed as an enduring event). King captures the difference by positing ambiguity in the attitude verbs. A novelty of the present discussion is that it offers an underlying metaphysics for the distinction that may be profitably incorporated into any of a range of semantic analyses of attitude ascriptions. For present purposes, I remain officially silent on the best semantic treatment. The current concern is metaphysical.

15 Things may be a bit more complicated in the case of desire. Stampe (1986) argues that the state of affairs determined by the content of desire must also be one that would be good for a subject were it to obtain (see p. 166 for his definition of desire). Gordon (1986) offers cases that suggest that ‘the object of the appetites resists atomization’ (p. 108), arguing that some desires carry presuppositions not
tracked by the ‘that’-clauses featured in the relevant ascriptions. See also Fara (2013) for a discussion of the underspecification of desire attributions (e.g. it might be that I speak truly when I say ‘I want to catch a fish’ even though my desire wouldn’t be satisfied if I caught one too small to eat). Thank you to an anonymous referee for bringing these issues to my attention.

16 To the extent that one takes knowing and other factive states to be attitudes, they presuppose the truth of the proposition.

17 This is certainly not to hold that no instances of, say, fearing, loving, or other emotions have conditions related to truth, for there are (as noted earlier) propositional varieties of those states. Fearing that it will snow tomorrow, for example. We might say that such states have ‘appropriateness’ conditions. The non-propositional instances, however, do not.

18 With minimal alterations, the following points could be made in terms of other representational mechanisms such as concepts, senses, or mental files.

19 The suggestion is simple, but it gives rise to interesting questions and indeed points to interesting further research. For example, one might suggest that in wanting to go to the parade (a de se attitude) one stands in a relation to the mental phrase ‘to go to the parade’ which, it might be argued, refers to a set of centered worlds or perhaps to a property. Additionally, there are limit questions. No one fears, but is such state possible? Can one bear the relevant relation to a mental analog of ‘smokes’?

20 For example, Priest (2005) and Routley (1980).

21 For example, Van Inwagen (2003), Salmon (1998), and Thomasson (2003).

22 ‘*’, as is standard in linguistics, indicates infelicity.

23 One may worry that the discussion above of content versus object entails unwanted ambiguity in my own view. It either isn’t unwanted or isn’t worrisome from the point of view of the metaphysics. According to King (2002) sentences such as ‘S fears that grass is green and snakes’ are infelicitous, so (provided King’s judgements are correct) a prediction of ambiguity or polysemy would be called for. King maintains that there are two distinct fear-relations. Above I mentioned (fn. 14) a semantic proposal by Pietroski (2000) and Forbes (forthcoming). On their view, the verbs are not univocal but as far as the metaphysics goes, there is one sort of state, a fearing state, that can have content or that can have an object, and that difference is encoded lexically in two entries. See fn. 32 below for a formal representation of the truth-conditions.

24 For a dissenting voice concerning propositional attitudes, see Robert Matthews (2007) who argues that attitude ascriptions are relational but the attitudes themselves are monadic states.

25 See Prior (1971) for an especially helpful discussion.


27 If one takes contents to be singular and Russellian, problems concerning empty cases may reemerge. If the contents are singular and Fregean (see McDowell (1984) and a development for empty cases in Sainsbury (2005)) or only general, empty cases pose no such problem. See Tye (2009), especially ch. 4, for a recent and detailed discussion.

28 The suggestion bears similarity to Frege’s (1893) account of reference. According to Frege, S refers to o only if S grasps a sense of o (for him, a description of o). That is, one must stand in a distinct relation to an entity that does not depend on o for its own existence. See Kaplan (1989) for a helpful discussion.

29 As I’ve hinted above, I take seriously the claim that representations can exist and have aboutness even when there isn’t something they are about. Intuitive examples include depicting unicorns and talking about Holmes. This is part of the reason for preferring the locutions ‘o-representation’ and ‘about o’ over ‘representation of o’. O-representations are representations of o when o exists.

30 The job of ‘only’ is to ward off any worries based on the fact that propositions concerning o may be said to be about o, for recall that we are treating the attitudes in question as irreducibly non-propositional. Any proposition to the effect that o is F will be about not only o but also F.

31 A well-known and related idea can be found in the representationalist theories of propositional attitudes. Cf. Field (1978) and Fodor (1987).

32 One benefit of the semantics offered by Forbes (forthcoming) and Pietroski (2000) mentioned above (see also Forbes (2000)) is that the semantic values of attitude verbs are not relations. The
truth-conditions for ‘John likes Sally’, for example, are as follows: \( \exists e \left( S(e, j) \land L(e, \text{theme}(e, s)) \right) \). In English: there is an event, the subject of the event is John, the event is a liking event, and the theme of the event is Sally. Again, the project at present is metaphysical, but metaphysics can inform semantics. However the semantics plays out, we shouldn’t have relations as the semantic value of non-propositional attitude verbs. Doing so will force us to either reify the empty or take the attitudes to be relations to the wrong kinds of things in many cases (fearing senses, concepts, and so on). See Grzankowski (2013b) for an attempted extension of this approach to empty cases.

References


