Edgington, D. (2008) Counterfactuals. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1), pp. 1-21. ISSN 0066-7374.Full text not available from this repository.
I argue that the suppositional view of conditionals, which is quite popular for indicative conditionals, extends also to subjunctive or counterfactual conditionals. According to this view, conditional judgements should not be construed as factual, categorical judgements, but as judgements about the consequent under the supposition of the antecedent. The strongest evidence for the view comes from focusing on the fact that conditional judgements are often uncertain; and conditional uncertainty, which is a well-understood notion, does not function like uncertainty about matters of fact. I argue that the evidence for this view is as strong for subjunctives as it is for indicatives.
|School or Research Centre:||Birkbeck Schools and Research Centres > School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy > Philosophy|
|Date Deposited:||13 May 2011 08:47|
|Last Modified:||17 Apr 2013 12:19|
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