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    Counterfactuals

    Edgington, D. (2008) Counterfactuals. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1), pp. 1-21. ISSN 0066-7374.

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    Abstract

    I argue that the suppositional view of conditionals, which is quite popular for indicative conditionals, extends also to subjunctive or counterfactual conditionals. According to this view, conditional judgements should not be construed as factual, categorical judgements, but as judgements about the consequent under the supposition of the antecedent. The strongest evidence for the view comes from focusing on the fact that conditional judgements are often uncertain; and conditional uncertainty, which is a well-understood notion, does not function like uncertainty about matters of fact. I argue that the evidence for this view is as strong for subjunctives as it is for indicatives.

    Metadata

    Item Type: Article
    School: Birkbeck Schools and Departments > School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy > Philosophy
    Depositing User: Administrator
    Date Deposited: 13 May 2011 08:47
    Last Modified: 17 Apr 2013 12:19
    URI: http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/2695

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