Edgington, D. (2010) Possible knowledge of unknown truth. Synthese 173 (1), pp. 41-52. ISSN 0039-7857.Full text not available from this repository.
Fitch’s argument purports to show that for any unknown truth, p, there is an unknowable truth, namely, that p is true and unknown; for a contradiction follows from the assumption that it is possible to know that p is true and unknown. In earlier work I argued that there is a sense in which it is possible to know that p is true and unknown, from a counterfactual perspective; that is, there can be possible, non-actual knowledge, of the actual situation, that in that situation, p is true and unknown. Here I further elaborate that claim and respond to objections by Williamson, who argued that there cannot be non-trivial knowledge of this kind. I give conditions which suffice for such non-trivial counterfactual knowledge.
|Keyword(s) / Subject(s):||Fitch, unknowability, counterfactuals, Williamson|
|School or Research Centre:||Birkbeck Schools and Research Centres > School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy > Philosophy|
|Date Deposited:||12 Jan 2011 12:08|
|Last Modified:||17 Apr 2013 12:19|
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