Gemes, Ken (2010) A vindication of a refutation of global scepticism, a refutation of global perceptual scepticism and a refutation of global existential scepticism. Analysis 70 (1), pp. 63-71. ISSN 0003-2638.Full text not available from this repository.
Gemes ( 2009) argued that, given that I believe that I have hands and I believe that it is not the case that I have a hand with a wart on it, it must be the case that at least one of my experience-based beliefs (EBBs) is true. This follows since the contradictions of those two propositions believed by me are jointly inconsistent. Gemes ( 2009) concluded that this refutes the sceptical claim that it is possible that all one's EBBs are false. The first section of this article addresses some objections to the argument of Gemes ( 2009). The second section develops new counter-examples to the claim that it is possible that all one's EBBs are false, and then argues that they are also counter-examples to the claim that it is possible that all one's direct, that is, perceptual, EBBs are false. The third section presents counter-examples to the claim that it is possible that all one's positive, that is, existential entailing, EBBs are false. Readers who are already convinced of the soundness of the argument of Gemes ( 2009) might skip the first section of this article.
|School or Research Centre:||Birkbeck Schools and Research Centres > School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy > Philosophy|
|Date Deposited:||16 Dec 2010 09:27|
|Last Modified:||17 Apr 2013 12:19|
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