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ENGLISH FUNDING OF THE SCOTTISH ARMIES IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND, 1640–1648*

LAURA A. M. STEWART

Birkbeck College, University of London

ABSTRACT. The rebellion against Charles I’s authority that began in Edinburgh in 1637 involved the Scots in successive invasions of England and armed intervention in Ireland. Historians have almost universally taken a negative view of Scottish involvement in these wars, because it has been assumed that the Scottish political leadership sacrificed all other considerations in order to pursue an unrealistic religious crusade. This article suggests that aspects of the Anglo-Scottish relationship need to be reappraised. Using estimates of English payments to the Scots during the 1640s, it will be argued that the Scottish leadership made pragmatic political decisions based on a practical appreciation of the country’s military and fiscal capacity. Substantial payouts from the English parliament enabled the Scottish parliamentary regime to engage in military and diplomatic activities that the country could not otherwise have afforded. The 1643 treaty that brought the Scots into the English Civil War on the side of parliament contrasts favourably with the 1647 Engagement in support of the king. It will be shown that, although the English parliament did not honour all of its obligations to the Scots, it does not automatically follow that the alliance was a failure in financial terms.

‘The English were for a civill League, we for a religious Covenant.’¹ Robert Baillie’s oft-quoted description of the treaty agreed between the English and Scottish parliamentary regimes in the autumn of 1643 has influenced assessments of the Anglo-Scottish relationship in this period ever since. It has been the foundation of a familiar portrayal of the Scots as a monolithic group of naive religious enthusiasts, made ‘arrogant’ by the extraordinary military and diplomatic successes of the years 1639 to 1641.² Historians of the Civil War period have carried out penetrating analyses of the Scottish presence in England during the

mid-1640s, but the perspective remains predominantly hostile: by their narrow commitment to religious uniformity, unrealistic expectations of their own military capability, and limited understanding of the workings of English parliamentary politics, the Scots rendered themselves vulnerable to manipulation by more sophisticated political operators.³ Historians of Scotland have been no less condemnatory. In a general work on seventeenth-century Scotland, Rosalind Mitchison argued that the Anglo-Scottish alliance was founded on incompatible religious aims and promoted by men who had given no thought to how Scotland’s armies could be supported.⁴ Although David Stevenson recognized that the Scots could not passively sit back and wait on events in Ireland and England, his interpretive framework rested on the belief that, from January 1644, it was ‘downhill all the way’ for the Scottish parliamentary regime.⁵ John Scally has recently endorsed Stevenson’s position. In his account, the regime’s ‘pan-British plans’ became ‘wildly unrealistic’ and ‘outrageous’ as the prospect of a negotiated settlement drifted ever further from view.⁶

A more optimistic interpretation of the Anglo-Scottish relationship has recently been put forward by Allan Macinnes. His study of ‘the British revolution’ suggested that Scottish military and political action ought not to be judged solely on its repercussions for factional alignments at Westminster. By focusing on English parliamentary activity, historians have tended to caricature the Scots as political ingénues, whose religious ideology made them more concerned with ends than means. Macinnes, by contrast, has asserted that the idealism and ideological consistency displayed by the Scottish political leadership was always ‘tempered by political pragmatism’.⁷ These are valid points, albeit ones that require a fuller investigation than Macinnes’s study allowed, but have they proved strong enough to make historians rethink the Anglo-Scottish relationship? Or has Macinnes advocated the academic equivalent of moving deckchairs on the Titanic?


⁵ Stevenson, Revolution and counter-revolution, pp. xvi, 177–8.


The view that the Scottish ship of state was sinking, and sinking fast, from 1644 onwards has been confirmed by Ian Gentles. His recent study of ‘the English revolution’ focused primarily on the fiscal and military transformation of the English state necessitated by the parliamentary challenge to Charles I, which would eventually enable Oliver Cromwell to conquer almost the entire archipelago. Gentles does not, by any means, construct a neo-Whig teleology, where the New Model triumph becomes an inevitability. He does conclude that the Scots were simply unable to compete with superior English resources, even on home ground. ‘Heroic exertions’ could not ultimately prevent ‘financial and logistical weakness’ from ‘fatally’ undermining the very existence of the Scottish parliamentary regime.8

These conclusions rested primarily on Gentles’s reading of the only published work on Scottish government finance then available. An article written by David Stevenson in 1972 showed that although the Scottish parliamentary regime had undertaken significant reforms to an out-dated fiscal system, it remained too fragile to support simultaneous military interventions in Ireland and England. Scotland’s fiscal weakness meant that the country’s political leadership became dependent on the English parliamentarians honouring treaties that offered financial support for Scottish military intervention in Ireland and England. Stevenson concluded that the Scots displayed their ‘gullibility’ by believing ‘repeated though often vague English promises to pay them’. This view was reinforced by Stevenson’s later study of the Scottish army in Ulster, which revealed that the English parliament had already shown itself to be an unreliable paymaster before negotiations to send a force into England were seriously under consideration.9 Peter Edwards has recently summed up the prevailing consensus on Scottish participation in the Civil Wars: over-confidence had ‘seduced’ the Scots into believing that they could lead a militant Protestant crusade across the entire archipelago. By 1645, the Scots were militarily over-extended and their political agenda had become ‘untenable’.10

This article aims to provide estimates of the value of English financial contributions to the Scottish government between 1641 and 1648. It does not attempt to estimate the total cost of raising and supplying Scotland’s armies. Historians of this period clearly owe much to Stevenson’s pioneering study, but the complexity of the records and the limited capabilities of the computing tools available

11 Scotland’s parliamentary record is available in a cumbersome printed form: Acts of the Parliaments of Scotland, ed. T. Thomson and C. Innes (12 vols., Edinburgh 1814–75). The Scottish Parliament Project, St Andrews University, has recently completed a searchable online version of these records, The records of the parliaments of Scotland to 1707 (RPS), ed. K. M. Brown et al. (St Andrews, 2007). Its editors.
to historians in the 1970s prevented Stevenson from fully appreciating the value of English financial contributions to the Scottish regime. Awareness of the financial significance of the English alliance suggests that the Scottish decision to enter the English Civil War in 1643 was based on a pragmatic assessment of Scotland’s military, fiscal, and diplomatic position. Although the English parliament certainly failed to prioritize the needs of the Scottish army in Ulster, this article will show that it continued to provide valuable financial support. It will therefore be suggested here that the funds provided through the English alliance enabled the Scots to pursue a British agenda that could not otherwise have been afforded. Only by engaging in the wider archipelagic arena, so it was believed, could Scotland’s political and religious autonomy be secured within the British multiple monarchy.

The parliamentary alliance did not, ultimately, deliver what the Scots desired. However, the skill with which the Scottish leadership negotiated their army’s exit from England in 1647 has not been considered. These men had a firm grasp of fundamental political, military, and financial realities, which ensured that the Scots were able to return home largely on their own terms and with their army intact. Sufficient English funds were forthcoming to allow the Scots to avoid the type of crisis that threatened the English parliament in the summer of 1647, when it tried to disband an army still awaiting payment of its arrears. This article therefore questions the view that the Scots were locked into a downward spiral towards disaster by the mid-1640s and establishes that Macinnes’s more constructive view of Scottish diplomacy in this period needs, at the very least, fuller investigation. The pragmatism of the regime’s leadership had averted disaster in the mid-1640s; the unrealistic proposals of the king’s Scottish friends in 1647 seriously imperilled the survival of the Scottish parliamentary regime.

I

The Scottish rebellion against Charles I was a colossal gamble for a country lacking any credible fiscal-military capability in 1638. Important recent studies, especially by Edward Furgol, have shown how the Scottish parliamentary regime decided, as Thomson and Innes had done a century earlier, that the papers of the committee of estates (Scotland’s government from c. 1638 to 1651) were not, strictly speaking, parliamentary records and so they remain in manuscript. See D. Stevenson, The government of Scotland under the covenanters, 1637–1651 (Edinburgh, 1982) for a useful guide. The main series for government papers in this period is National Archives of Scotland (NAS), PA11.

Less attention has been given to how Scotland’s armies were financed. Scottish royal revenues, although rising in the 1620s and 1630s, were clearly inadequate for the task. From the outset, the new regime was forced by necessity to find innovative ways of tapping into the nation’s wealth. Initially, as Stevenson has shown, the regime proceeded cautiously. There was no attempt to collect the king’s traditional revenues until mid-1640, so the Bishops’ Wars of 1639 and 1640 had to be funded from other sources. Much of the monies handled by central government before 1641 had been borrowed, given as voluntary donations, or coined from loans and gifts of silver plate. It is also possible that revenues from two new taxes ordered in 1640, known as the ‘tenth penny’ and the ‘twentieth penny’, had begun to come in.

In August 1640, the Scottish army invaded the north of England. By the end of the month, a Scottish army was camped on English soil and had occupied Newcastle, which was the source of most of the coal that would keep Londoners warm in the approaching winter months. Negotiation of a cessation of arms began at Ripon in October 1640, during which time the Scots insisted that their army should be supported at England’s expense. While the army remained in England – the treaty of London was not agreed until August 1641 – £850 a day would be required. More detailed demands followed on 12 January 1641, when the Scots submitted an account for losses and expenses incurred prior to the cessation of October 1640. This account shows that the Scots were using their advantageous military position to make financial gains over and above the remuneration of their soldiers. In the first part of the account, the Scots demanded compensation for the cost of an expedition to the north of Scotland, for Scottish ships impounded by the English, for the price of ammunition bought in from abroad, and for domestic fortifications. These sums amounted to £514,129. A second section then set out what were, according to Stevenson, several ‘rather vague items’, which the Scots stated they were willing to pay themselves. It seems plausible that the Scots never expected to be paid anything from the second section. These sums were probably included to show English parliamentarians that the Scots could have claimed more, and to discourage them from trying


Government accounts for the regime’s early years are incomplete. Some of the key sources were compiled at a later date and are summaries, not detailed accounts. Thus, it is often difficult to know exactly when money came into the government’s hands. NAS, PA15/1, PA16/3/5/3-4, E101/5; D. Stevenson, ‘The covenanters and the Scottish mint, 1639–1641’, British Numismatic Journal, 41 (1972), pp. 95–104; Stevenson, ‘The financing of the cause’, pp. 90–1.

All sums are in £ sterling unless otherwise stated. £12 Scots was worth £1 sterling.
to haggle the Scots down from the £514,129 detailed in the first part of the account.16

When a peace treaty was finally concluded in June 1641, a so-called ‘brotherly assistance’, worth £300,000, was agreed to cover costs predating October 1640. This was clearly much less than the Scots had asked for. It is also well known that the English parliament paid only half of this sum. Yet Stevenson’s research has revealed that the Scots actually received much more than the brotherly assistance alone, because the army’s pay from October 1640 onwards was met by the English parliament.17 A letter from the Scottish commissioners in London, read to the Scottish parliament on 10 August 1641, stated that ‘the whole arriery [in England] ... are receaved and goes from hence this day towards Newcastle by carts’.18 According to the great committee at Westminster, negotiations over the value of the brotherly assistance had been impeded by the need to pay Scottish soldiers, since ‘the daily charge of the armies does exhaust all the monies they can possibly get’.19

The brotherly assistance was never intended as payment for the Scottish force occupying the north of England, but as compensation exacted by a victorious army for the costs it had incurred defending the country from hostile invaders (albeit led by the monarch). A summary of the burdens of the kingdom up to the autumn of 1643 appears to show that the Scottish army was paid £266,050 (£3,192,600 Scots). This sum roughly accords with the cost of supplying the Scottish army for ten months at £850 a day. A further £150,000 (£1.8 million Scots) was paid on top of this as a brotherly assistance.20 In total, the Scottish regime had received just short of £416,050 (nearly £5 million Scots) as a result of the military campaigns of 1639 and 1640.

By focusing exclusively on the brotherly assistance, historians have overlooked the fact that the English parliament had already met its major financial commitment to the Scottish army. Having paid off its soldiers, the Scottish regime was now free to use the brotherly assistance for what was probably always its intended purpose: the partial satisfaction of impatient creditors. As a consequence, the coffers of Scotland’s richest and most well-connected financiers remained open to the regime. Payouts favoured Sir Thomas Cunningham, factor at the Dutch staple of Veere, who was under great pressure from Dutch creditors to repay them, and the premier Scottish politician, Archibald Campbell, marquis of

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16 The second part of the two almost identical copies of this account held in the NLS carries an error: the total sum that the Scots were willing to forgo was recorded in both accounts as £271,500, but when the individual items are added up, the total comes to only £221,500. National Library of Scotland (NLS), Adv. Ms. 33/4/6, treaties at Newcastle and London, 1640–1, fos. 109r–109v; NLS, Wod.Fol.LXXIII, fos. 50v–51v; C. S. Terry, The life and campaigns of Alexander Leslie, first earl of Leven (London, 1899), pp. 147, 152; Stevenson, ‘The financing of the cause’, p. 95. See also David Stevenson, The Scottish revolution, 1637–1644: the triumph of the Covenanters (Newton Abbot, 1973), pp. 205–13, 217.
17 Stevenson, ‘The financing of the cause’, p. 95.
18 NAS, PA6/7, Appendix, 10 Aug. 1641, fos. 1r–3v. See RPS, A1641/7/39.
19 NAS, Letter, 28 July 1641, PA6/3, fos. 1r–1v. See RPS, A1641/7/17.
Argyll. Unnamed lenders resident in the capital, Edinburgh, the regime’s leading financial officer, Sir Adam Hepburn of Humbie, and the commander of the Scottish forces, Alexander Leslie, earl of Leven, also benefited. C. S. Terry’s assessment, that the deal was ‘not disadvantageous to Scotland’, would have been shared by a regime that was now in a much stronger position than its leaders could possibly have hoped for in the autumn of 1638.

II

The outbreak of Civil War in England during the summer of 1642 presented the Scots with both a threat and an opportunity. By the treaty of London, the Scottish parliamentary regime had secured the domestic religious and constitutional concessions that its leadership had been fighting for, but this would be imperilled if Charles defeated his parliamentarian antagonists and, in a strengthened position, turned his attention back to Scotland. The dominant grouping in the Scottish parliament, led by Argyll, was able to convince most of the political nation that self-preservation demanded intervention in England. Meanwhile, in England, a group of parliamentarians around John Pym were facing up to the unpalatable possibility of an imminent royal victory. Intermingled rivalries and political differences had blocked the potential for creating a unified English fighting force, directed by men with coherent objectives. In order to leapfrog these obstacles, Pym’s grouping began wooing the ostensibly neutral Scots. Accordingly, the Solemn League and Covenant was agreed by the two parliamentary regimes in the autumn of 1643. Officially, the reasons given for a second Scottish invasion of England were the need to combat popery, secure close religious ‘conjunction’ between the kingdoms, preserve the liberties of the two parliaments, and establish a lasting peace throughout Charles’s dominions. Anxious Scottish parliamentarians may also have been persuaded by the regime’s proven track record in achieving its objectives.

The basic provisions of the Anglo-Scottish treaty of 1643 gave the English parliament 21,000 men in return for £30,000 monthly, subsequently raised to £31,000 when the Scots took control of the vital garrison at Berwick in September 1643: itself an important concession, since it protected the army’s rear and safeguarded the path back over the border. Admittedly, the 1643 treaty had obliged the Scots to pay for the levying of their army prior to entering England. The Scots

21 NAS, PA14/1, fos. 6v, 7v, 11v–12v, 28v, 29r, 30v, 35r, 110r, 125r. Cunningham explained the importance of satisfying key Dutch creditors in a letter to the committee at Goldsmiths’ Hall, The National Archives (TNA), SP46/106, fo. 97.
22 Terry, Life, p. 152.
24 NAS, PA11/1, fos. 36v–39r.
also claimed that £31,000 would not pay all the army’s costs, although the English parliament did agree to settle any outstanding arrears once peace was secured. Since the Scots thought that their army would be decisive in bringing Charles back to the negotiating table, this was a condition that the Scots believed the English parliament could be held to. Although all of the brotherly assistance had not been forthcoming in 1642, the Scots had acquired sufficient funds from the English parliament to pay their army and provide some relief for their major creditors. Moreover, should the parliament prove dilatory in meeting their commitments, it would not be Scottish communities bearing the burden of unpaid soldiers roving about their fields and gardens. The League was a good deal for the Scots. It was based on a pragmatic awareness that Scotland could not simply ignore events in other parts of the Stuart dominions and a practical appreciation of the country’s fiscal weaknesses. As far as the Scots were concerned, it was the English parliament, not the Scottish regime, which would be expected to foot most of the bill for Scottish military action in England.

The question is whether the Scots did ‘foot most of the bill themselves’. From accounts produced primarily by Hepburn of Humbie, it can be estimated that the Scottish army received approximately £616,089 (£7,393,068 Scots) while it was active on English soil between January 1644 and the end of 1646. These sums were provided mainly from assessments levied on an increasing number of English counties, with some funds coming from customs and excise duties. Top-ups from Goldsmiths’ Hall in London were also occasionally provided. The problem was that these sums came in very slowly. As relations between the two allies deteriorated, an increasingly powerful faction within the English parliament sought to divert funds away from what it regarded as a mercenary force, in order to remodel the English army. As a result, Scottish troops were even more likely to supplement their income by helping themselves to the property of their English hosts. This inevitably increased resentment towards them and, as the Scottish commissioners in London realized, played into the hands of enemies who wished to convince parliament to dispense with Scottish assistance.

26 Gentles, English revolution, p. 207. See also Scott, Politics and war, p. 80.
27 Hepburn’s accounts were published by Army of the Covenant, ed. Terry. The figures produced here were compiled from the original manuscripts. This revealed that one of the accounts, now catalogued as NAS, PA15/7, had parts missing, although the survival of the last page meant that the final totals were unaffected. NAS, PA15/7, 7a, 8. For other army accounts, not included in Terry’s edition, see NAS, PA15/5, 6, 9.
28 NAS, PA15/7a, pp. 1–4; NAS, 1645–6, PA15/8, pp. 2–3, 124–5, 138, 162.
29 By August 1644, the Scottish commissioners were observing that the Scottish forces were not receiving timely payment by the English. See Correspondence of the Scots commissioners in London, 1644–1646, ed. H. W. Meikle (Edinburgh, 1917), p. 35.
The presence of the king in the Scottish camp from 5 May 1646 deepened tensions between the allies but did not, ultimately, bring a final peace settlement any closer. Two weeks later, the House of Commons voted to get rid of their, by now, unwelcome guests. Initially, the Scots were offered £50,000 on handing over their garrisons in the north of England, with a further £50,000 once the army was back over the border.\(^{31}\) Although fearful that English troops would be used to evict them by force and aware, from July, that the House of Commons was no longer prepared to fund their army,\(^ {32}\) the Scots held out for better terms. In the negotiations that followed, both sides agreed that the Scots should have been paid £992,000 for the entertainment of their army and the garrison of Berwick before 18 September 1646. The allies disagreed on three main points: the amount of money and provisions the Scottish army had received with the English government’s consent, the extent of the sums lifted by the Scots without parliament’s consent, and whether the Scots were entitled, under the terms of the 1643 treaty, to make any further claims.

The papers presented to the House of Commons (summarized in Appendix 1) show very different estimates for the sums received by the Scottish army in England. According to the Scots, their army had received £684,000 in money, provisions, and free quarter. When subtracted from the £992,000 that both sides agreed the Scots should have been paid, this left an outstanding sum of £308,000. Other expenses cited by the Scots amounted to £937,415. The Scottish account therefore suggested that the English ought to pay them a further £1,245,415. Unspecified ‘great losses’ were to be remitted to ‘the Consideration of the Honourable Houses’. The English argued that the Scottish army had received £607,769 in money and provisions, and had taken £855,000 in free quarter and in assessments levied ‘without consent’: a total of £1,462,768. This sum exceeded the amount that both sides had agreed the English parliament should pay the Scottish army. Scottish demands for further recompense under the terms of the August 1643 treaty were refuted.\(^ {33}\)

Is it possible for historians to judge the veracity of these respective claims?\(^ {34}\) Using calculations based on the surviving accounts of the Scottish government counties would have complained about the presence of any army in 1644, although the fact it was a Scottish force certainly exacerbated tensions. R. Bennett, ‘War and disorder: policing the soldiery in Civil War Yorkshire’, in M. C. Fissel, ed., War and government in Britain, 1598–1650 (Manchester, 1991), pp. 254–6. See also Macinnes, British revolution, p. 159. James Graham, marquis of Montrose was also harrying the north-west border in early 1644 with a small force that may have contained Scots. E. J. Cowan, Montrose: for Covenant and king (Edinburgh, 1995), pp. 145–51.

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32 Terry, Life, p. 412; Scots commissioners, ed. Meikle, pp. xxix, 184, 189.
34 G. F. T. Jones’s analysis was undermined by the author’s mistaken assumption that the terms of the 1643 treaty had not survived. Stevenson spotted this error, but dismissed the article without presenting an alternative analysis of the account. Jones’s error led him to critique the Scottish estimates from the wrong angle, but his conclusions were based on a good understanding of how the accounts
does not, unfortunately, provide a silver bullet. The accounts compiled by Hepburn of Humbie show that the Scots in fact received £616,089 from the English. No attempt appears to have been made to calculate the value of free quarter, as the papers presented to the House of Commons conceded (an estimate was provided instead). This sum is nowhere near the £464,063 which the Scots publicly claimed to have received from England in money and provisions. Although the Scottish commissioners could truthfully say that the accounts were incomplete in August 1646, it is likely that they intentionally presented a conservative estimate of what had been obtained. Of more significance were the claims made under article five of the 1643 treaty, which allowed the Scots to seek ‘further satisfaction of their breithrein of Ingland’ over and above the monthly allowance granted to the army. The English rejected these ‘several other Sums’ with the argument that the army’s costs had not, in fact, exceeded the £992,000 allowed to them. This must have been a highly contentious point; although the Scottish regiments quickly fell below full strength, it had been conceded at the outset that the monthly allowance was insufficient for the army’s needs. The English also demanded a ‘particular Account’ of the sums incurred in levying the Scottish army, for which the Scots legitimately sought recompense. If the Scots felt they had been short-changed over article five, losses there may have been made up elsewhere. If the Scots had been obliged to accept that they were only entitled to £992,000, and that they had actually received £1,462,769, then the English could have claimed that the Scots owed them £470,768.

During the last months of 1646, an agreement was reached. It obliged the English parliament to pay the Scottish army £200,000 before it crossed the border, with the promise of another £200,000 thereafter. Why was this sum settled on? If the English were willing to forego the £855,000 that they claimed the Scots had taken without consent, this left £384,231 still owing to the Scots out of the £992,000 already agreed upon. If the Scots were willing to take the £308,000 still owed to them from the £992,000, and abandon all other claims except the £387,415 in levy money, this would require the English to pay them £395,415. Looking at the final settlement in these terms reflects concessions on both sides: the Scots had relinquished their claims under article five, while the English had decided not to press their point about the value of free quarter. The figures presented to the House of Commons need to be understood as

bargaining counters, rather than as an accurate breakdown of the cost of the Scottish army. Analysis of the Scottish government’s accounts means we now know that the English estimate of what they had paid to their ally was broadly accurate. This is not surprising. The English negotiating strategy was focused on blocking Scottish claims made under article five of the treaty and on stressing the value of free quarter. Scottish demands under article five were perhaps not expected to be successful, but these items did provide the Scots with something they could afford to sacrifice.

In the end, only the first instalment of £200,000 passed into Scottish hands and the second remained unpaid.\(^{40}\) The total sum received by the Scottish army in England between January 1643 and February 1647 therefore amounted to approximately £816,089 (£9,793,068 Scots). It was less than the value of the monthly allowance, but probably more than the Scots ought to have been granted if free quarter had been fully accounted for. By this reckoning, the English did meet a substantial part of their obligations to the Scottish army in England. Crucially, the final pay-off ensured an orderly disbandment once the army returned home in February 1647.\(^{41}\) Naturally Charles I thought himself sold at ‘too cheap a rate’,\(^ {42}\) but the decision to abandon a king who had nothing to offer them and return to Scotland without rupturing the parliamentary alliance was the only credible option available at that time.

Thus far, we have been concerned with the payment of English money to Scottish forces active in England. In the wake of the Irish uprising of October 1641, the Scots offered to send troops to Ireland and a treaty was agreed in July 1642. These forces were sometimes referred to as the ‘New Scots’, to distinguish them from the resident Scottish settlers who had taken an enthusiastic part in James VI and I’s plantation schemes. As a result of the 1642 treaty, 11,371 troops were levied at Scottish expense and sent to Ulster, on condition that the English parliament paid them thereafter.\(^ {43}\) By the time these troops arrived, England was also sliding into Civil War. On 4 March 1643, leading Scottish politicians (convening as the privy council) conceded that the ‘unhappie differences and distractions’ in England had prohibited payment of the Scottish forces in Ireland and that alternative funds would have to be found.\(^ {44}\) A campaign to raise a voluntary loan for Ireland was launched in Scotland in the spring of 1643 and secured £14,427 (£173,129 Scots). The Scottish regime’s accounts suggest that

\(^{40}\) F. Peck, Desiderata Curiosa, or a collection of divers scarce and curious pieces relating chiefly to English history (2 vols., London, 1779), ii, pp. 370–1. There are two receipts, each for £100,000, dated 21 Jan. and 3 Feb. 1647.

\(^{41}\) Stevenson, Scottish revolution, p. 68.

\(^{42}\) Stevenson, Revolution and counter-revolution, p. 66, quoting D. Dalrymple, Lord Hailes, ed., Memorials and letters relating to the history of Britain in the reign of Charles the First (Glasgow, 1766), pp. 190–1.

\(^{43}\) The treaty had stated that 10,000 men would be sent, Furgol, Regimental history, p. 5; Stevenson, Scottish covenanters and Irish confederates, pp. 315–16.

approximately £163,833 Scots was raised through taxation and explicitly paid to the army in Ireland. These sums were only a small fraction of the army’s arrears, calculated to be £146,650 (£1,759,800 Scots) in early 1643. By the end of the year, arrears may have risen to £312,000 (£3,744,000 Scots). By the following spring, a despairing marquis of Argyll admitted that ‘no probable way’ existed for supplying the Ulster army and a proposal to dispatch some of these troops for service in England was put forward, although ultimately rejected. With the Scottish army now active in England, it was no doubt believed that success there would pressurize the English into supporting the army in Ireland.

The Scottish army in Ulster did not receive anywhere near the sums of money it was expecting from its English paymasters. However, one aspect of the financial relationship between the two parliamentary allies, hitherto overlooked, suggests that the English government did not simply abandon its obligations to the Scots. Records of the committee for Scots affairs, sitting at Goldsmiths’ Hall in London, show that its treasurers redeemed bills of exchange given to merchants contracted by the Scottish government to supply its forces in Ireland. The committee appears to have repaid loans worth around £121,000 (£1,452,000 Scots). Not all loans provided for the army in Ireland were repaid; it is likely that the Edinburgh merchant, Sir John Smith, was unable to redeem the bills of exchange that had secured his loan of £11,555 (£138,660 Scots), while Sir Thomas Cunningham was almost certainly left with a debt of over £5,000 (£60,000 Scots) owing to creditors in Holland. The reliance on private individuals to supply the Irish army probably cost both governments more than if their financial systems had been efficient enough to pay soldiers directly. The merchants who sent oatmeal to Ireland in February 1644 charged 17 merks per boll – £11 6s 8d Scots – when the Fife county fiars had struck the price of a boll of oats for that year at £5 Scots. Although the Scottish government had successfully used the English alliance to secure credit it might otherwise have been denied, it is nonetheless apparent that raising loans in this way was neither an efficient means of supplying the army in Ireland nor adequate for its purposes.

From around the autumn of 1645, many members of the English parliament began to regard the New Scots as an impediment to English interests in Ireland. With the Scottish army removed from England and unable to exert pressure there from early 1647, the House of Commons was able formally to give up all

45 RPCS, 2nd ser., viii, pp. 83–92, cited in Stevenson, ‘The financing of the cause’, p. 98; Stevenson, Scottish covenanters and Irish confederates, 140; NAS, PA16/3/2/5, PA15/7, pp. 21, 30, 37.
46 Stevenson, Scottish revolution, pp. 245–6, 265–6, 286–7; NAS, PA11/2, fos. 18v, 19r, 28r.
47 Estimate based on TNA, SP46/106, fos. 90–126. No systematic attempt has been made here to collate references to loans that may not have been repaid.
48 NAS, PA11/1, fos. 110v–111r; TNA, SP46/106, fo. 97. Cunningham’s debts were causing concern amongst the Scottish commissioners in London by at least the spring of 1645, Scots commissioners, ed. Meikle, p. 65.
responsible for Scottish forces in Ulster.\textsuperscript{50} This statement of intent had not, as yet, been confirmed by the House of Lords, which allowed the Scottish government to continue petitioning the English parliament for satisfaction, but by October, the committee of estates had seemingly accepted that it would have to take financial responsibility for its Ulster forces. It was agreed that a further six weeks of a tax known as the monthly maintenance would be levied in Scotland to provide forces still active in Ireland with some ‘small releife’\textsuperscript{51} Disbandment of these troops had been considered in 1644, but the proposal was welcomed neither by the men themselves, who were holding out for the payment of their arrears, nor by the shires of the south-west of Scotland, where returning troops would make landfall, nor by some members of the Scottish regime, who feared that unpaid troops would refuse to return home peaceably. The presence of disgruntled soldiers in the south-west in 1644 and in 1647 did contribute to tensions in that region.\textsuperscript{52}

Chronic under-resourcing of the army in Ireland had profound consequences for the government and people of Scotland. Although the Ulster forces were by no means ineffective, Monro’s campaigns were persistently hampered by inadequate supplies and by the effects of this situation on relations between Monro, his commanding officers, and their men. Raymond Gillespie has suggested that the New Scots prioritized grievances relating to supply and pay ahead of finding common cause with the Old Scots or British settlers. Divisions were further exacerbated when Monro’s forces were denied Irish land in lieu of money for arrears. Ruthless acquisitioning of supplies inevitably made the New Scots deeply unpopular wherever they went, limiting the extent to which local communities and their leaders were willing to assist them.\textsuperscript{53} Meanwhile, the failure of the British forces to destroy Irish military capability directly threatened Scotland: James Graham, marquis of Montrose, and Alasdair MacColla recruited from amongst armed and battle-hardened Irishmen, who were only too happy for the opportunity to raid Campbell lands in western Scotland. The scourge of Irish and Highland warriors (combined with plague) devastated the country, interrupted trade, disrupted government activity, and brought the business of collecting taxes to a near standstill. Fears that the regime itself was under threat distracted the Scottish army from its task in England and diminished its effectiveness there.

\textsuperscript{50} C\textsc{j}, v, pp. 113–14, discussed in Stevenson, Revolution, pp. 68–9.
\textsuperscript{51} NAS, PA11/5, 1 Apr. 1647, 10 May 1647, 8 June 1647, 27 Sept. 1647, 29 Oct. 1647.
\textsuperscript{52} Some members of the regime appear to have been concerned that the troops from Ireland would, if disbanded, diminish the number of experienced men available to fight in other parts of the British Isles. Stevenson, Scottish covenanters and Irish confederates, pp. 152–6. The war committee of Ayr made an offer of supplies for the army in Ireland contingent on it remaining there, NLS, Adv.Ms.33/4/8, pp. 63–4.
Not all of the problems experienced by the army in Ireland were caused by inadequate supply and the Scots were arguably not much more badly treated than the native British forces that had also declared for parliament after 1642. However, inadequate supply exacerbated other political tensions, undermined the effectiveness of Monro’s forces, and exposed them to those accusations of incompetence which were also being levelled at the army in England.54

III

English money was responsible for greatly increasing the revenues available to the Scottish parliamentary regime: in total, £1,232,139, or £14,785,668 Scots, was paid directly by the English parliament. At least another £121,000, or £1,452,000 Scots, was paid by the English to merchants supplying the Scottish army in Ireland. In an English context, this does not appear to be a large sum of money. The City of London alone paid nearly half this sum in direct parliamentary taxes between 1642 and 1650.55 In a Scottish context, however, these sums were very significant. During the same period, the Scottish regime accounted for approximately £4,318,720 Scots – £359,853 sterling – in taxation revenues (see Appendix 2). These figures show why the parliamentary alliance was so vitally important for the Scottish regime. English funds almost certainly prevented Scottish forces disintegrating through lack of resources. They also provided security for loans and enabled some of the regime’s debts to be repaid.

Until the mid-1640s, the British agenda pursued by the Scots was enabled by the provision of English funds, which gave the Scottish government greater resources than Scotland could ever have supplied. From the Scottish perspective, the entry of their army into the English Civil War could not have been conducted on better terms. There are parallels with the policies adopted by another small state, Sweden, which Scotsmen may have been familiar with: during the 1640s, Sweden occupied foreign territory in order to pay for expensive wars too burdensome for the homeland to sustain.56 Such a strategy was clearly high-risk. The Scottish political agenda in 1644 depended on a swift and decisive military campaign bringing Charles back to the negotiating table. When this did not happen, the presence of a large and expensive Scottish army on English soil increasingly came to be seen as yet another point of tension between the allies. Had the Scots been paying their army, they would have had more control over its movements and, in theory, could have withdrawn it from England at any time. In practice, political rather than financial imperatives kept the army in

England, at least until the second half of 1646. Only once it became clear that the presence of the army in England was threatening to rupture the parliamentary alliance, without bringing a settlement with the king any closer, did the Scottish leadership finally decide that they had to leave. During the last months of 1646, Scottish diplomacy was aimed at securing sufficient funds to ensure a peaceful and orderly exit from England. This was successfully achieved.

While the Scottish regime had some success in pressurizing the English parliament into paying its army in England, it was incapable of doing likewise for its forces in Ireland. This had repercussions for English policy objectives there. As Nicholas Canny has pointed out, Monro’s ‘first priority’ was the defence and recovery of Irish lands belonging to fellow-Scots, not the advancement of the English parliamentarian war effort against Irish royalists. Some English parliamentarians were surely being somewhat unrealistic if they expected Monro to behave otherwise, given that the most consistent support he had received came from Scotland.\(^57\) Such supplies as Monro was able to extract from the English and Scottish regimes, and from the Irish population, maintained a Scottish armed presence in Ireland for six and a half years. The New Scots undoubtedly helped to safeguard the long-term survival of Ulster’s Protestant settlers, both Scots and English. Yet at the time of their dispersal by the New Model Army in September 1648, there was little to show for the efforts of forces that, compared to other Scottish regiments, had displayed rather unusual levels of independent-minded tenacity.\(^58\)

One of Monro’s other key priorities was to ensure that Ireland could not be used as a springboard for a royalist invasion of Scotland. That objective was largely achieved; the Scottish parliamentary regime was not toppled by an Irish invasion. Even Montrose’s brief period of dominance was always likely to be ephemeral, as long as the regime could recall from England relatively disciplined and experienced troops determined to defend their covenanted homeland.\(^59\) However, the failure to close down the threat posed to domestic security by Irish forces had imperilled the regime’s existence and undermined Scottish military effectiveness in England. When the Scottish regime found itself under attack in the spring of 1644, its failure to destroy MacColla’s forces may have caused some members to panic and demand the return of the army in England. A full-scale withdrawal was certainly under serious discussion in September 1645. A twelve-point paper, presumably penned by the commissioners in London, made a pragmatic case against withdrawal. It listed the inconveniences of bringing such a large army back into Scotland and highlighted the possibility that English royalists would overrun the counties vacated by the Scots, thereby moving the


\(^58\) This paragraph is informed by Stevenson, *Scottish covenanters and Irish confederates*, ch. 7.

\(^59\) Stevenson recognized the scale of the crisis facing the regime but did not overestimate Montrose’s strengths. Stevenson, *Revolution*, pp. 29–35.
war towards the Scottish border. Point six was particularly important: the commissioners added that ‘our difficulties will be greater in obtaining the arrears due to our armies’ should they leave England prematurely. Having committed to intervention in England, the Scottish political leadership did not intend to discredit themselves by giving up and going home empty-handed.

The decision to maintain a Scottish military presence in England in 1646 did not, ultimately, bring the Scots very much closer to achieving their objectives. It did buy the Scottish regime sufficient time to engineer its disengagement from the English arena on acceptable terms. This was of critical importance to the marquis of Argyll’s political survival. His decision to stabilize his domestic powerbase, at the expense of the wider British agenda, must be regarded as the pragmatic option. Royalists and moderates who wished to use Scottish forces to assist the king could not now use the excuse that the army must remain on foot until it could be paid. Departure from England, followed by an orderly disbandment, gave the regime space to begin putting its house in order: taxation revenues appear to have risen in 1647, while the excise, first levied at the beginning of 1644, finally began to make some contribution to the regime’s coffers. Yet the withdrawal from England had left Argyll with no clear proposals either for addressing the state’s enormous financial liabilities or for influencing any potential settlement in England. These twin imperatives would make it increasingly difficult for Argyll to argue that the alliance with the English parliament had anything left to offer the Scots.

It has been asserted recently that ‘the Covenanters’ biggest mistake had been to depend on the promises of English financial support’. Does the evidence presented here suggest that such an assessment is correct? Scottish military activity in England and Ireland was certainly predicated on the provision of English money, not all of which was forthcoming. Even if some of the problems experienced by the Scottish regime after 1644 could have been anticipated in 1643, the potential disadvantages were still outweighed, at that time, by the perceived advantages. The conclusion of the treaty of London had suggested to the Scots that, even if the English parliament could not be wholly trusted to honour its commitments, a Scottish army was capable of exerting sufficient pressure to gain significant financial and political concessions. The failure of the English parliament to meet its commitments to the Scots in Ireland had already been exposed, but this provided another reason to enter the conflict in England. The best way for Scottish politicians to secure remuneration for their forces in Ireland was to ensure that they were the ones to broker a settlement between Charles and his English parliament. There was no doubt that the Scottish parliamentary regime

60 Scots commissioners, ed. Meikle, pp. 118–19.  
61 Scott, Politics and war, p. 124.  
62 Stevenson, Revolution and counter-revolution, p. 68.  
63 These issues will be discussed more fully in a forthcoming article.  
64 Gentles, English revolution, p. 110. This assessment is almost identical to the one put forward in an earlier article by Edwards, ‘Arming and equipping the covenanting armies, 1638–1651’, p. 264.
was taking a gamble in 1643, but at that point its army was the largest and the most experienced in the British Isles. The regime had good grounds for believing that the successes of 1641 could be repeated, perhaps even improved on, especially now that English parliamentarians were able openly to support their Scottish allies.

Scottish military involvement in the English Civil Wars is, for many cogent reasons, often regarded as a failure. Yet, as Macinnes has observed, this assessment must be tempered by consideration of the alternatives available at the time. The Solemn League and Covenant had offered the Scottish regime a unique opportunity to reconfigure the British multiple monarchy on terms that would secure both its own existence and Scottish political autonomy. It had included a commitment from the English parliament to pay Scottish forces for the duration of their campaigns and given the Scottish political leadership the practical means to achieve their ends. To a degree hitherto under-appreciated by historians, the English parliament did attempt to meet its obligations to the Scots. Civil war and plague in Scotland, more than the direct costs of financing the armies in England and Ireland, had imperilled the Scottish government’s fiscal stability.

A comparison can be made between the 1643 treaty and the 1647 Engagement agreed between the king and three leading Scottish moderates, including the duke of Hamilton. In 1643, negotiations were conducted with an English parliament that possessed the mechanisms to pay the Scottish army. In 1647, Hamilton was relying on the good word of an untrustworthy king, who was in captivity and incapable of giving practical assistance to the Scots. Compared to the clear terms set out in the 1643 treaty, the Engagement’s promises to pay the remainder of the brotherly assistance, the arrears of the army in Ireland, and the ‘charge and expense’ of their army were vague. The 1643 treaty was negotiated from a position of strength; the Engagement of 1647, by contrast, was a desperate gamble. It demanded that a Scottish army risk what Argyll had worked so hard to avoid a year earlier: facing the English New Model Army in the field. As Argyll appears to have realized, Scotland was not capable of invading England in 1648. It did not possess the funds, or even the realistic possibility that funds might soon become available. Oliver Cromwell’s forces had the home advantage and were better supplied than the Engagement army. Back in Scotland, the political elite were, by this time, deeply divided – partly as a result of the pursuit of Argyll’s British policies – and the regime lacked the political unity required for such an enterprise. The New Model Army’s victory at Preston was neither a foregone conclusion, nor did it lead inexorably to victories at Dunbar, Inverkeithing, and Worcester. Yet Preston did mark a turning point; militarily, because of the psychological impact of being beaten by an English army, and politically, because

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65 For example, Scott, Politics and war, pp. 82–5, 101–2.
the narrowly based radical faction that returned to power in September 1648, with Cromwell's assistance, could not convincingly claim to be the representative of the political nation.

68 In 1643, securing English money had been a credible, albeit risky, strategy for Scotland's political leadership. The pursuit of an aggressive military strategy four years later, without such financial support, should be regarded as the more serious and decisive error.

Appendix 1 Summary of the accounts presented to the House of Commons, August 1646

The Scottish account to the nearest £ sterling

Received in monies and provisions 464,063
Received as free quarter 219,937
Owed from the charges of their army at £31,000 monthly 992,000

308,000

Owed for levying their forces 87,415
Owed under five other headings 850,000

Total received by the Scots 684,000
Total owing to the Scots 1,245,415

The English account to the nearest £ sterling

Received by the Scots in monies and provisions (including profits from coal) 607,769
Received by the Scots in free quarter and assessments levied without consent of the English parliament 855,000

Total received by the Scots 1,462,769

If the Scots are entitled to £992,000, the Scots owe the English 470,769


68 'Radical faction' has been used deliberately to replace the outdated notion of a 'kirk party'. See Alan Macinnes, 'The Scottish constitution, 1638–1651: the rise and fall of oligarchic centralism', in Morrill, ed., Scottish National Covenant, p. 107.
Appendix 2 Sources used to calculate Scottish taxation revenues and payments from England

It is not within the remit of this article to provide a full analysis of Scottish government revenues, but some explanation of the sources used is needed. Scottish government accounts from the 1640s are difficult to interpret. In the main, the regime maintained the king’s Exchequer (National Archives of Scotland (NAS), E series) as a separate institution and employed its own treasurers to deal with particular revenue streams (with some exceptions, NAS, PA series). Treasurers were expected to keep accounts to show what monies they were liable for and what monies they had spent. Thus, a treasurer would enter into the charge side of the account the entire value of the sums he was expected to collect, then enter into the discharge side of the account all the money that had not been collected or accounted for. Using the raw totals of the charge and discharge, especially when taxes are being accounted for, therefore often inflates the figures.

All sources: NAS, unless otherwise stated.

Taxes levied in Scotland

June 1640: parliament ratifies earlier orders for 10th penny; imposes a one-off tax called the 20th penny.

July 1643: one-off forced loan of £800,000 Scots and a tax of £120,000 Scots.

Jan. 1644: excise tax on a wide range of staple goods proposed; little collected before 1647.

Feb. 1645: monthly maintenance, levied almost continuously until conquest of 1651 (with parliamentary approval).

Tenth and twentieth pennies

PA16/3/5/3, Army papers, accounts, etc., 1640–54, pp. 1–2.

Loan and tax

PA16/3/2/5, Warrants of parliamentary committees, etc., 1640–58.

PA7/6/158/1, Supplementary parliamentary papers, 1649.


Monthly maintenance (including sums imposed for the use of Charles II’s household)

E27/1, Receiver-general’s accounts, 1642–51, fos. 11v, 45v–46r.

PA7/5/29, Supplementary parliamentary papers, 1647–8.


PA15/10, Accounts of Sir John Weems of Bogie, Jan.–Dec. 1648, pp. 21–3 [parts unpaginated].
PA15/11/1, Account of Sir James Stewart, 1648–9, pp. 1, 66–70.
PA15/12, Account of Sir John Smith, Dec. 1650–1, 1658–9, pp. 2–3.

Remittances for quartering in local communities

PA15/11/1, Account of Sir James Stewart, 1648–9, pp. 66–70.

Excise tax

E78/1, Accounts of Sir James Stewart, 1644–8.
E78/2, Accounts of Sir John Wauchope of Niddrie and Sir John Smith of Groathall, pp. 1–4, 10–12.
GD103/2/3/9, Compt of the excise made by Sir James Stewart of Kirkfeld, Mar. 1648, pp. 4–6.
PA15/11/1, Account of Sir James Stewart, 1648–49, p. 1.

PAYMENTS TO THE SCOTTISH ARMY IN ENGLAND BY THE ENGLISH PARLIAMENT

The ‘brotherly assistance’

PA14/1, Register of the Committee for Common Burdens, etc., Nov. 1641–Jan. 1645, fos. 7v, 39r–v.
PA16/3/5/3, Army papers, Accounts, etc., 1640–1654.

Scottish forces occupying the north of England in 1640

PA16/3/5/3, Army papers, Accounts, etc., 1640–54.

Scottish forces active in England, 1644–6

PA15/5, Account of William Levengstoune, Apr. 1644–Mar. 1645, fos. 1r–v, 8r.
PA15/9, Account of Sir James Stewart, 1646–8, fo. 3v.

Payments to secure the withdrawal of the Scottish army in 1647

Copies of the receipts can be found in: F. Peck, Desiderata Curiosa, or a collection of divers scarce and curious pieces relating chiefly to English history (2 vols., London, 1779), ii, pp. 370–1.
PAYMENTS TO THE SCOTS ARMY IN IRELAND BY THE SCOTTISH AND ENGLISH PARLIAMENTS


Calendar of State Papers (Domestic), 1645, p. 333.

PA15/7, Account of Sir Adam Hepburn of Humbie, Dec. 1645–Nov. 1646, pp. 21, 30, 37.

PA16/3/2/5, Warrants of parliamentary committees, etc., 1640–58.

National Archives, Kew, State Papers Domestic (Supplementary) SP46/106, fos. 90–126.