Empirical analysis of countervailing power in business-to-business bargaining
Beckert, Walter (2010) Empirical analysis of countervailing power in business-to-business bargaining. In: Cemmap Seminar, May 18, 2010, London, UK. (Unpublished)
This paper provides a comprehensive econometric framework for the empirical analysis of countervailing power. It encompasses the two main features of pricing schemes in business-to-business relationships: nonlinear price schedules and bargaining over rents. Disentangling them is critical to the empirical identification of countervailing power. Testable predictions from the theoretical analysis are delineated, and a pragmatic empirical methodology is presented. It is readily implementable on the basis of transaction data, routinely collected by antitrust authorities. The empirical framework is illustrated using data from the UK brick industry. The paper emphasizes the importance of controlling for endogeneity of volumes and for heterogeneity across buyers and sellers.
|Item Type:||Conference or Workshop Item (Paper)|
|Additional Information:||Seminar presented for the Centre for Microdata Methods & Practice|
|Keyword(s) / Subject(s):||countervailing power, bargaining, nonlinear prices, transaction panel data|
|School:||Birkbeck Schools and Departments > School of Business, Economics & Informatics > Economics, Mathematics and Statistics|
|Date Deposited:||08 Dec 2010 10:38|
|Last Modified:||17 Apr 2013 12:33|
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