Booth, A.L. and Zoega, Gylfi (2007) Worker heterogeneity, new monopsony, and training. Working Paper. University of Iceland, Reykjavík, Iceland.
This is the latest version of this item.
Text (Working Paper (unrefereed))
Download (449Kb) | Preview
A worker's output depends not only on his/her own ability but also on that of colleagues, who can facilitate the performance of tasks that each individual cannot accomplish on his/her own. We show that this common-sense observation generates monopsony power and is sufficient to explain why employers might expend resources on training employees even when the training is of use to other firms. We show that training will take place in better-than-average or ‘good’ firms enjoying greater monopsony power, whereas ‘bad’ firms will have low-ability workers unlikely to receive much training.
|Item Type:||Monograph (Working Paper)|
|Keyword(s) / Subject(s):||Firm-financed general training, worker heterogeneity, hierarchical assignment models, monopsony|
|School or Research Centre:||Birkbeck Schools and Research Centres > School of Business, Economics & Informatics > Economics, Mathematics and Statistics|
|Date Deposited:||08 Feb 2011 14:16|
|Last Modified:||17 Apr 2013 12:33|
Available Versions of this Item
Worker heterogeneity, new monopsony, and training. (deposited 26 Jan 2011 15:24)
- Worker heterogeneity, new monopsony, and training. (deposited 08 Feb 2011 14:16) [Currently Displayed]
Archive Staff Only (login required)