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    Worker heterogeneity, new monopsony, and training

    Booth, A.L. and Zoega, Gylfi (2007) Worker heterogeneity, new monopsony, and training. Working Paper. University of Iceland, Reykjavík, Iceland.

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    Abstract

    A worker's output depends not only on his/her own ability but also on that of colleagues, who can facilitate the performance of tasks that each individual cannot accomplish on his/her own. We show that this common-sense observation generates monopsony power and is sufficient to explain why employers might expend resources on training employees even when the training is of use to other firms. We show that training will take place in better-than-average or ‘good’ firms enjoying greater monopsony power, whereas ‘bad’ firms will have low-ability workers unlikely to receive much training.

    Metadata

    Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
    Keyword(s) / Subject(s): Firm-financed general training, worker heterogeneity, hierarchical assignment models, monopsony
    School: Birkbeck Schools and Departments > School of Business, Economics & Informatics > Economics, Mathematics and Statistics
    Research Centre: Applied Macroeconomics, Birkbeck Centre for
    Depositing User: Administrator
    Date Deposited: 08 Feb 2011 14:16
    Last Modified: 07 Dec 2016 14:54
    URI: http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/3049

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