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    Regulating altruistic agents

    Heyes, A. and Kapur, Sandeep (2011) Regulating altruistic agents. Canadian Journal of Economics 44 (1), pp. 227-246. ISSN 0008-4085.

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    Abstract

    Altruism or 'regard for others' can encourage self-restraint among generators of negative externalities, thereby mitigating the externality problem. We explore how introducing impure altruism into standard regulatory settings alters regulatory prescriptions. The optimal calibration of both quantitative controls and externality taxes is affected. It also leads to surprising results on the comparative performance of instruments. Under quantity-based regulation, welfare is increasing in the propensity for altruism in the population; under price-based regulation, the relationship is non-monotonic. Price-based regulation is preferred when the population is either predominantly altruistic or predominantly selfish; quantity-based regulation is preferred for cases in between. JEL classification: D62, D64

    Metadata

    Item Type: Article
    School: Birkbeck Schools and Departments > School of Business, Economics & Informatics > Economics, Mathematics and Statistics
    Depositing User: Administrator
    Date Deposited: 22 Jun 2011 14:21
    Last Modified: 17 Apr 2013 12:20
    URI: http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/3643

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