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    Political institutions and central bank independence revisited

    Pistoresi, B. and Salsano, F. and Ferrari, D. (2011) Political institutions and central bank independence revisited. Applied Economics Letters 18 (7), pp. 679-682. ISSN 1350-4851.

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    Abstract

    We build on earlier studies regarding Central Bank Independence (CBI) by relating it to political, institutional and economic variables. The data suggest that CBI is positively related to the presence of federalism, the features of the electoral system and parties, the correlation between the shocks to the level of economic activity in the countries included in the sample and, for a sub-sample of economies, the convergence criteria to join the European Monetary Union (EMU).

    Metadata

    Item Type: Article
    School: Birkbeck Schools and Departments > School of Business, Economics & Informatics > Economics, Mathematics and Statistics
    Depositing User: Administrator
    Date Deposited: 20 Jun 2011 14:00
    Last Modified: 17 Apr 2013 12:20
    URI: http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/3692

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