Pistoresi, B. and Salsano, F. and Ferrari, D. (2011) Political institutions and central bank independence revisited. Applied Economics Letters 18 (7), pp. 679-682. ISSN 1350-4851.Full text not available from this repository.
We build on earlier studies regarding Central Bank Independence (CBI) by relating it to political, institutional and economic variables. The data suggest that CBI is positively related to the presence of federalism, the features of the electoral system and parties, the correlation between the shocks to the level of economic activity in the countries included in the sample and, for a sub-sample of economies, the convergence criteria to join the European Monetary Union (EMU).
|School or Research Centre:||Birkbeck Schools and Research Centres > School of Business, Economics & Informatics > Economics, Mathematics and Statistics|
|Date Deposited:||20 Jun 2011 14:00|
|Last Modified:||17 Apr 2013 12:20|
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