A disjunctive conception of acting for reasons
Hornsby, Jennifer (2008) A disjunctive conception of acting for reasons. In: Haddock, A. and Macpherson, F. (eds.) Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780199231546. (Submitted)
A disjunctivist conception of acting for reasons is introduced by way of showing that a view of acting for reasons must give a place to knowledge. Two principal claims are made. 1. This conception has a rôle analogous to that of the disjunctive conception that John McDowell recommends in thinking about perception; and when the two disjunctivist conceptions are treated as counterparts, they can be shown to have work to do in combination. 2. This conception of acting for reasons safeguards the connection between considerations that move us to act in particular ways and considerations that favour our acting in particular ways.
|Item Type:||Book Section|
|Additional Information:||The volume is expected to be published in 2007.|
|Keyword(s) / Subject(s):||disjunctivism, acting for reasons, knowledge|
|School:||Birkbeck Schools and Departments > School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy > Philosophy|
|Depositing User:||Jennifer Hornsby|
|Date Deposited:||11 Dec 2006|
|Last Modified:||17 Apr 2013 12:33|
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