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The Rise of Cosmopolitanism in the Twentieth Century West: A Comparative-Historical Perspective on the United States and European Union¹

One of the primary debates of the post-Cold War era revolves around the pole of cosmopolitanism - nationalism, a classic antinomy which presents somewhat of a paradox. To wit, since the late 1980s, there has been a clear increase in ethnic conflict, in which most of the *dramatis personae* employ the language of nationalism.² Dominant ethnic communities couch their appeals in the language of 'national' sovereignty, while separatist minorities speak of 'national' self-determination.³ But if nationalism is enjoying a revival, so too is its arch-enemy. The increasing degree to which organisations, goods, people and information cross national boundaries has given rise, since 1960, to the term 'globalisation.'⁴ This ferment has in turn revived an older discourse of cosmopolitanism, the subject of this work. So it seems that both nationalism and cosmopolitanism are enjoying a resurgence.⁵

A related paradox arises from divergent trends in American and European foreign policy since 9/11. It increasingly appears as if Europe is charting a 'cosmopolitan' path while the United States remains an actor focused primarily upon its own national self-interest. There is much in this argument, whether we explain it as a result of different political cultures or, as Robert Kagan, does, in the realist terminology of military might.⁶ Yet this article suggests that developments in the political sphere are but one face of the cosmopolitan card. The other concerns ethno-culture, and here it is apparent that America's recent drift toward greater political nationalism has had little impact on its post-war trend toward cultural cosmopolitanism. On the other hand, the growing political

cosmopolitanism of Europe has not always been accompanied by greater cultural cosmopolitanism. This partly explains why 9/11 had only a limited impact on American ethnic relations while the American ethno-nationalist right has made few inroads as compared with Europe.⁷

How are we to interpret the cosmopolitanism-nationalism conundrum? In terms of normative theory, the cosmopolitan-national question has been hotly debated for a decade, with many impressive results in fields such as political philosophy and international relations theory.⁸ Some of the seminal work in this area, notably Chris Brown's distinction between 'cosmopolitan' and 'communitarian' theories of I.R. or Jeremy Waldron's defense of cosmopolitan ethics, has helped to define the parameters of debate for all scholars.⁹ Nevertheless, with the possible exception of intellectual history, comparative and empirical work has largely sidestepped questions of cosmopolitanism.¹⁰ Instead, empirical efforts have concentrated on the relationship between *globalisation* and the nation-state.¹¹

The equation of 'cosmopolitanism' with normative debates and 'globalisation' with the empirical realm is evident even in studies which attempt to bridge these discourses. For instance, David Held's pioneering work remarks upon the growth of a global civil society of trans-national organisations and the role these play in fostering new forms of world solidarity. However, while globalisation is the principal terminological outlet for the first (empirical) part of his book, the term cosmopolitanism is reserved for the latter section which deals with normative questions in democratic theory.¹² In the work of many theorists of globalisation, certain classes of supranational organisations owe their origin to global civil society (i.e. Amnesty International, Greenpeace), while others

appear as the product of 'top-down' functional or realist processes (i.e. IMF, EU).¹³ Nevertheless, both functional and civic organisations are subsumed under the rubric of 'globalisation' and bracketed off from questions of 'cosmopolitanism.'

This paper suggests that such a device is problematic. Instead, it is more effective to use the conceptual division to denote two distinct empirical realms: the 'medium' of expanding technological networks and functional interdependencies (a.k.a. globalisation), and the 'message' of cosmopolitan ideas and identities. The two greatly affect each other, but remain substantially independent social forces. Hence the ideas that flow within expanding *global* networks in one period can be primarily nationalist (i.e. 1789-1914), while those that course through *national* networks may be strongly cosmopolitan (i.e. 1750-1789, 1945-2000). Only in this manner can one explain the relative cosmopolitanism of a poorly-integrated eighteenth century Europe and the subsequent nationalism which prevailed in that far more 'globalised' continent a century or two later. A recent photo of a Pakistani Islamic militant celebrating the Trade Center bombings dressed in a Chicago Bears T-shirt provides a shockingly graphic portrayal of the medium-message disjuncture.¹⁴ The crucial changes thus need not be technological or functional, but rather ideological and ontological.

This would suggest that cosmopolitanism can assert itself as a source of social power independent of globalisation.¹⁵ Cosmopolitanism may operate within ostensibly functional institutions like the French state, the IMF or the EU or through grassroots associations like Greenpeace, the Pan-European Union or the Socialist International. Sometimes 'functional' organisations are heavily penetrated - or even constituted - by grassroots NGOs.¹⁶ More to the point, as we shall see in our case studies, it is frequently

the case that lines of influence connect the two. Thus cosmopolitan social movements, like their nationalist counterparts, often give rise to political structures and serve to revitalise them throughout their lifespan.¹⁷

To reiterate: the *praxis* of cosmopolitanism remains largely uncharted territory.¹⁸ This paper will provide three new departures from the existing literature: a) a consideration of the 'dualistic' nationalist proclivities inherent in much pre-twentieth century cosmopolitan thought;¹⁹ b) an analysis of the twentieth century expansion of organised cosmopolitanism in the West from its grassroots beginnings to political realisation, and its conflict with nationalist social actors; and c) consideration of the ethno-cultural nature of cosmopolitanism in the United States and the civic-political quality of European cosmopolitanism.

The National-Cosmopolitan Question Revisited

Cosmopolitanism has both its ideological and etymological origins in ancient Greece, where the term *kosmopolitēs* referred to an individual who considered her/himself a citizen (*politēs*) of the world (*cosmos*).²⁰ We shall denote cosmopolitanism, therefore, as an ideology and/or movement for universal community. It matters little whether the universalist project is fully elucidated as a millenarian or Utopian vision, so long as there are no *self-imposed* geographical limits placed on those who would spread the Gospel. We shall therefore refer to particular supranational and transnational projects (such as the EU, dar-ul-Islam or the Peace movement) as cosmopolitan if they compete

for loyalty with ethnic or national particularisms and maintain a spirit of deepening and extension that is *potentially* universal.

Notice that this definition focuses on the transcendence of ethno-national congruity, namely the linkage between territory (space) and ancestry (time). However, transcending the limits of ethno-national space-time does not imply relativistic neutrality: cosmopolitan movements are often strongly particularist in their ideology. On this score, proselytising religions (i.e. Christianity) and many empires (i.e. Rome, Soviet Union) are as cosmopolitan as the well-travelled voyeurs of the Enlightenment or Modernist experimentalists. They, too, must overcome the resistance of those who wish to maintain the sanctity of their ethnic boundaries. Further, we should not confuse a cosmopolitan movement's ethno-national source (i.e. Russia and Communism, France and Napoleonic Liberalism, Anatolian Turkey and the Ottoman Empire) with nationalism. These were universal movements which sprang from ethno-national bases which they transcended to a greater or lesser degree over their lifespans.

Secondly, cosmopolitanism can assume either trans-ethnic or trans-national form. Those who seek a trans-ethnic universality which eschews the cultural domination of any ethnic group are *cultural* cosmopolitans, even if they confine their project within the boundaries of a particular state. Notice that the above goes beyond Chris Brown's definition of cosmopolitanism as the 'refusal to regard existing political structures as the source of ultimate value.'²¹ Our definition is wider, in that it considers as cosmopolitan: a) open-ended trans-national and supranational projects; b) those who seek a universalist, trans-*ethnic* community within the boundaries of a particular state; and c) actors who

would accord existing political structures *some* value, albeit less than their transcendent project.

Cosmopolitanism and the Nation-State: Cultural and Political Considerations

Linked to the above definition is the belief that cosmopolitanism, as with nationalism, sports both political and cultural (or 'civic' and 'ethnic') variants.²² This is critical, since the fault line between cosmopolitanism and national phenomena varies depending upon the aspect of each (i.e. cultural or political) that we are attempting to juxtapose. In *political* terms, cosmopolitan movements seek to supersede the institutional and territorial boundaries of the state. The emphasis here rests squarely on concrete issues of power and administrative reach, which the political cosmopolitan seeks to redistribute upwards from the state to a relevant supranational actor. Constitutional arrangements thus become central, since these stipulate how power is to be divided between the cosmopolitan centre and the federal or confederal units (i.e. depoliticised nations). The formulae for taking legislative decisions, executing federal power and safeguarding individual rights are all implicated in this kind of cosmopolitanism. To a great degree, these practical questions are the bane of modern supranational federations like the USSR or EU.

Notice that *political* cosmopolitanism need make no *cultural* claims. Indeed, beyond the transfer of power upwards and extension of authority outwards, political cosmopolitan asks little. In theory, cultural nations could remain the primary foci of space-time identity even as a world state assumed a complete monopoly on all functions

of government from policing and tax-raising to monetary policy and social services. So long as there existed flourishing national civil societies and limits to the trans-national mobility of people, the overarching cosmopolitan administration would pose little threat to national particularity.²³ In fact, cosmopolitan schemes of the past four centuries have rarely asked this much, often contenting themselves with some division of powers between the centre and the (con-) federal units.²⁴ Moreover, cosmopolitan polities like the pre-1900 Ottoman Empire, pre-war USSR and late Hapsburg Empire often accepted the permanence of ethno-national identities.

On the other hand, a corollary of the above is that political cosmopolitanism poses an affront to the aims of *political* nationalists (i.e. separatists), who seek to render cultural and political boundaries congruent.²⁵ Unlike *cultural* nationalists like the Gaelic, Valencian or Hindu Revivalists of the nineteenth century, who are content to revive and modernise ethnic histories, languages and rituals, political nationalists are fired by the liberal aim of autonomy from a larger unit (often an empire or overarching state).²⁶ So to the extent that cosmopolitan polities attempt to monopolise political power, they incur the enmity of political nationalists. Whether we consider the resistance of Israelite against Roman, Serb against Ottoman or Estonian against Soviet, the meeting of political cosmopolitanism and political nationalism has been marked by strife. Even on the plane of the purely ideational, the two have repeatedly clashed. Hence the special antipathy which proponents of political nationalism, from Rousseau to Fanon, have reserved for cosmopolitanism.²⁷

Cultural forms of cosmopolitanism, on the other hand, present little obstacle to political nationalists, and vice-versa. Cultural cosmopolitanism can adopt a number of

guises, from the intolerant universalising zeal of religious crusaders to the existential stance of being a 'world citizen,' which can be traced to the Cynics and Stoics of Antiquity.²⁸ The latter, liberal orientation has developed strongly in the past few centuries. During the Enlightenment, a number of new facets of liberal-cosmopolitanism emerged, notably the cachet attached to foreign travel and the consumption of foreign goods, as well as the importance of staying abreast of fashionable trends from the cultural centres of Paris and London. This sensibility tended to look askance at patriotic and religious enthusiasm as characteristics of the lower social orders, while placing great value upon the presence of a world (or at least pan-European) Republic of Letters, knit together by the French *lingua franca*, written correspondence, and Parisian-style salons.²⁹

More recently, liberal cosmopolitanism has vaulted beyond a mere tolerance toward, and mastery of, foreign cultures, toward a 'postmodern' engagement with them as an ingredient in self-construction and a tool for weakening the hegemony of the Western power centre. 'A...genuine cosmopolitanism is first of all an orientation, a willingness to engage with the Other,' remarks Ulf Hannerz. 'It is an intellectual and aesthetic stance of openness toward divergent cultural experiences, a search for contrasts rather than uniformity.' Jeremy Waldron adds that a cosmopolitan is someone who does 'not associate his identity with a secure sense of place [or]... take his cultural identity [from]...a limited subset of the cultural resources available in the world.' Waldron approvingly quotes Salman Rushdie, who declares that '*The Satanic Verses* celebrates hybridity, impurity, intermingling...it is a love song to our mongrel selves....'³⁰

This constellation of ideas and liberal cultural practices need not threaten the political nation, particularly if limited to a particular lifestyle enclave. Even where

cosmopolitan ideas come to dominate at the level of a nation-state's cultural policy (i.e. 'colour-blind' immigration, 'multicultural' curriculum), they seldom pose a threat to its political integrity. On the other hand, cultural cosmopolitans do pose a clear and present danger to cultural nations, since at the cultural level, the cosmopolitan-national question turns on the status of existential space-time boundaries. Ethnic/national identities are both anchored by myths of homeland (delineated space) and ancestry (delineated time).³¹ Cosmopolitans wish to supersede these boundaries while nationalists seek to defend them. This leads to an insuperable conflict between the cosmopolitan posture – whether liberal or otherwise - and the commitments demanded by the cultural nation, which (in Regis Debray's words):

With its stress on a beginning and flow in time, and a delimitation in space, raises barriers to the flood of meaninglessness and absurdity that might otherwise engulf human beings. It tells them that they belong to ancient associations of 'their kind' with definite boundaries in time and space, and this gives their otherwise ambiguous and precarious lives a degree of certainty and purpose....³²

The contradictions between cosmopolitanism and nationalism appear most clearly with respect to diverse, large-scale immigration, which can disrupt a cultural nation's sense of shared ancestry; or historical revisionism, which can fragment or profane the cultural nation's myths and memories. Taken at once, the ascent of cultural cosmopolitanism can lead to the attenuation of a cultural nation's sense of continuity, and even to its demise. For instance, the decline of ethnic groups as varied as the Sorbs, Wends, Assyrians,

Cornish and Polabs can be traced to either mass in-migration and/or to their elites' cosmopolitan admiration for cultures other than their own. As one pamphlet for sale in a Cornish nationalist bookstore lamented, 'Among the [eighteenth century] Cornish there was a diminished feeling or sentiment of national consciousness...They had 'aped' the English gentry to the extent they had become provincial English.'³³

The foregoing discussion has highlighted the mutual exclusivity of similar categories of cosmopolitanism and nationalism while stressing the compatibility between their alternative forms. That said, it is important to flag up the very real linkages that have bridged cultural and political varieties of both nationalism and cosmopolitanism. For example, so many nationalist movements made the shift from cultural to political objectives that Miroslav Hroch established a theory by which nationalism 'A' (cultural revival) leads to phase 'B' (political organisation) and thence to 'C' (mass movement). Anthony Smith and John Hutchinson have both isolated similar shifts from cultural to political phases of agitation.³⁴

The script for cosmopolitanism reads in a similar manner: the length and breadth of history is replete with examples of the iron fist of cultural homogenisation accompanying the velvet glove of benign political cosmopolitanism. The Roman Empire's Latin-Christian cultural project, Napoleon's emphasis on French culture, and Khrushchev's Russifying 'Soviet Man' theme demonstrate the difficulty in maintaining a neutral political cosmopolitanism. Even the European Union, ostensibly a culture-free project, seeks to capture the primary loyalties of Europe's population (as against their respective national identities), carefully gauging this cultural trend through instruments like the Eurobarometer surveys.³⁵

The link between the cultural and political partakes of other forms as well. Thus many a cultural cosmopolitan from Voltaire to Daniele Archibugli has entertained political hopes for a more globally-integrated world polity. Ulrich Beck has gone so far as to call for a 'cosmopolitan revolution' to establish global governance.³⁶ Still others of the cultural cosmopolitan stripe have become involved in political agitation, notably Tom Paine and Anarchsis Cloots in the French Revolution, and Karl Marx or Leon Trotsky in the service of International Socialism.³⁷ Similarly, as we shall see, pacifist, ecumenist and pan-European grassroots organisations have provided much of the motive force behind the establishment of cosmopolitan institutions like the League of Nations and European Union.

While the historical record shows an association between cultural and political manifestations of cosmopolitanism and nationalism, there have been enough instances of apolitical cosmopolitanism (i.e. *philosophes*) and cultural nationalism (i.e. Cornish, Balinese, Acadian) to warrant a careful distinction between the intellectual provinces of culture and politics. This is germane to our discussion since the rise of cosmopolitanism has assumed a more cultural hue in the United States and a more political colouring in Europe. Overall, though, I contend that cosmopolitanism has greatly increased its social force during the twentieth century. This echoes Linklater's claim that 'there has been...growth in cosmopolitan moral consciousness' in the recent period.³⁸

The Dualist Interregnum in Western Cosmopolitanism: 1789-1914

Before turning to Linklater's 'recent period,' it is worth examining the trajectory of cosmopolitanism during its 'dark age' from its mid-eighteenth century heyday until the World Wars of the twentieth century. Cosmopolitans frequently lament three turning points in European history. The first concerns the shift in emphasis from liberal cosmopolitanism to nationalism during the second phase of the French Revolution, between 1792 and 1794. The second involves a similar *volte-face* among German *aufklärer* (Enlightenment intellectuals), who turned their back on cosmopolitanism to embrace a romantic ethnic nationalism, beginning in 1806. And the final caesura concerns the nationalist fragmentation of International Socialism from 1914.

Many scholars who have considered these turning points believe that they reflect the spread of the modern ideology of nationalism. These so-called 'modernist' theorists of nationalism assert that the norm of nationhood is a strictly post-1789 artefact. In effect, the pre-modern period in Europe is seen to be characterised by cosmopolitan strata of monarchs, warriors, nobles and clerics who preside over a diffuse social structure in which national sentiment is unknown. Intellectual currents reflected this cosmopolitan social structure. The rise of nationalism, with its mobilisation of the masses, is held to irrupt this longstanding pattern, fragmenting the universal whilst integrating the particular. The romantic movement is considered to have ushered in the intellectual death-knell of Enlightenment cosmopolitanism.³⁹

Our argument is that while the idea of nationalism became far more significant after 1789, no decisive break with the cosmopolitan *weltanschauung* transpired. Instead,

both nationalism and cosmopolitanism remained continuous themes throughout the nineteenth century. Take the historical junctures mentioned above. Many consider that a cosmopolitan sensibility was shattered by the exigencies of war. In the French case, the activity of counter-revolutionary states led the First Republic's administration to downgrade the citizenship status of foreigners, whilst German intellectuals reacted against French universalism soon after Prussia's defeat at the hands of the *Grande Armée* in 1806.⁴⁰ Meanwhile, nationalist tensions related to war readily led to centrifugal tendencies within the Second International.⁴¹

This analysis seems beguilingly simple, yet a story centred solely on the role of warfare remains problematic. Marwick has shown that wars often do not lead to *lasting* social change.⁴² After all, previous conflicts (i.e. Wars of Austrian and Spanish Succession, or the Seven Years' War) did not lead to any enduring global vogue for nationalism. Moreover, English, German, Latin American and Russian cosmopolitans continued to look to Paris as a cultural centre and to peer down their noses at the ethnocentric 'enthusiasms' of their respective mass publics.⁴³ Finally, it is difficult to explain such stark intellectual changes from a latter-day perspective: as an exercise, imagine the likes of Hannah Arendt, David Mitrany or Jeremy Waldron suddenly espousing the nationalist credo.

What is critical to understand, therefore, is the complex, intertwined relationship between ideas of nation and cosmopolis prior to the twentieth century. *Both* concepts stirred late eighteenth century hearts and minds, and continued to animate thinkers well into the twentieth, but their mutual contradictions were only dimly apprehended. In fact, this contradiction was the *established* mode of thinking for over a century in the western

world. Thus as the political environment changed (i.e. France 1792-4; Germany from 1806, Europe in 1914), intellectuals and statesmen found it a relatively easy task to embrace ideas of nationalism with genuine vigour - often transmuting their equally authentic cosmopolitan attachments into legitimating devices for their particularist attachments. Accordingly, French and German liberals/socialists began to view their particular nation as the 'chosen' vehicle for liberal/socialist progress toward a new cosmopolitan civilisation.⁴⁴

Cosmopolitanism, which modernist theorists of nationalism consign to the dustbin of pre-modernity, in fact flourished well after 1806. To begin with, as Michael Mann notes, Western European society contained many cosmopolitan currents in the intellectual, material and political (i.e. imperial, diplomatic) realm even as the nation-state deepened its grip on the masses.⁴⁵ Consider the continuing importance of Paris as an intellectual and consumer fashion centre until well into the twentieth century. Despite the resistance of nationalists, '[turn of the century] Brazilians promoted a culture that was heavily imitative of Europe,' writes Thomas Skidmore, 'It was assumed that the elite could speak and read French fluently.'⁴⁶

Closer to 'home', the cosmopolitan idea flared up in the vogue for Parisian styles and exotic objects stoked by the older fashion journals and newer department stores of nineteenth century Europe. In a fascinating study of the German trend-setting *Mode Journal*, Purdy illustrates how calls for a Prussian national civilian uniform failed to dent the rising influence of a Paris-oriented, modern fashion culture. This status culture, eagerly espoused by the German educated bourgeoisie, held vernacular German attitudes, dress and manners in utter disdain. A counter-current of nationalism - explicitly anti-

French - began as early as the middle decades of the eighteenth century, amplified somewhat during the Wars of Liberation from 1806, but did not lead to any lasting change in the emerging trajectory of cosmopolitan modernity.⁴⁷

In a world of growing national integration, Paris, and to a lesser extent, London, proved to be enduring cosmopolitan centres for intellectuals and consumers until the Second World War.⁴⁸ The French bourgeoisie imitated courtly modes of consumption and indulged in a cosmopolitan 'chaotic-exotic' style which infused the department stores of the late nineteenth century, with their 'contradictory allusions to different ethnic, geographical, and even mythical themes.' The English and American bourgeoisie followed suit in their awe of the exotic and aristocratic, while the new World Exhibitions of the nineteenth century helped to expand the cosmopolitan imagination. Neither the populism of the French and American Revolutions, nor the moralism of the Victorian Protestant crusade provided any lasting bulwark against cosmopolitanism's forward march. The rise of such phenomena as the gothic novel, Dandyism and Bohemianism by the early nineteenth century confirmed the contradictory trend.⁴⁹ This cultural exchange helped to safeguard the new economic 'globalisation' of the period. Hence, despite the entrenchment of the nation-state, there occurred a synchronic expansion of trans-national free trade (i.e. 1815-1914) to the same proportion of economic activity that it comprises today.⁵⁰

Double-Consciousness

The twin processes of nationalism and cosmopolitanism led to a remarkably ambiguous spirit which suffused political thinking throughout the Western world. American writers of the 1776-1914 period were notoriously schizophrenic, balancing the idea of America as a cosmopolitan melting pot with the notion of the United States as a purified, Anglo-Saxon Protestant nation. These ideas were held simultaneously by the *same* individuals, and this *zeitgeist* was the norm rather than the exception, a mental feat which Ralph Waldo Emerson coined 'double-consciousness.' Only with this cognitive structure in mind can we understand how he could sing the praises of the United States in 1846 as the 'Asylum of all nations...the energy of Irish, Germans, Swedes, Poles and Cossacks, and all the European tribes, of the Africans and Polynesians, will construct a new race...as vigorous as the new Europe which came out of the smelting pot of the Dark Ages.'⁵¹ Yet opine at about the same time that:

It cannot be maintained by any candid person that the African race have ever occupied or do promise ever to occupy any very high place in the human family...The Irish cannot; the American Indian cannot; the Chinese cannot. Before the energy of the Caucasian race all other races have quailed and done obeisance.⁵²

Emerson's thinking should not be interpreted as that of a consistent Enlightenment cosmopolitan who is confining his vision to 'advanced' peoples. His vision was truly

dualistic, a venerable tradition of reasoning also to be found in the writings of President Thomas Jefferson. '[The] Gothic idea that we are to look backwards instead of forwards...and to recur to the annals of our ancestors for what is most perfect in government, in religion & in learning,' excoriated Jefferson, 'is worthy of those bigots in religion & Government, by whom it has been recommended, & whose purposes it would answer.' Yet this is the same individual who argued: 'Has not every restitution of the antient Saxon laws had happy effects? Is it not better now that we return at once into that happy system of our ancestors, the wisest and most perfect ever yet devised by the wit of man, as it stood before the 8th century?'⁵³ (Kohn 1957: 150-51; Horsman 1981: 22)

As John Higham and others have noted, in the nineteenth century, 'Anglo-Saxon and cosmopolitan nationalisms merged in a happy belief that the Anglo-Saxon has a marvelous capacity for assimilating kindred races, absorbing their valuable qualities, yet remaining essentially unchanged.'⁵⁴ The same habits of argument prevailed in Europe. The *Philosophes* were especially prone to the pitfalls of double-consciousness. Condorcet, for example, stressed the need for a universal language, yet felt French uniquely suited to this task; Kant spoke of the importance of cosmopolitan rights, but considered the negroes incapable of civilisation and the state as indispensable for freedom; Saint Just championed the Declaration of the Rights of Man as superior due to its universalist message, but in the same [1791] text, he reminded the reader that 'being indifferent to one's homeland...was the source of all evils.'⁵⁵

How were such views reconciled? Consider the following tortured reasoning. In 1792, Christian Garve, the German fashion writer, argued along cosmopolitan lines that the cross-fertilisation of fashion, as with language, was beneficial to civilisation. All this

for nationalistic reasons: such a system would help to reduce Germans' fetishism of the foreign!⁵⁶ Or reflect upon Novalis' communiqué to Friedrich Schlegel, soon after the French arrived in Prussia, that 'Germanity is cosmopolitanism mixed with the most powerful [national] individuality.' A century later, Friedrich Meinecke, in his important tome, *Cosmopolitanism* (1907) would demonstrate the same pull of conflicting emotions: 'The best German national feeling also includes the cosmopolitan ideal of a humanity beyond nationality.'⁵⁷

Mazzini's thinking provides us with a further window into nineteenth century dualism. This Italian nationalist believed that the *raison d'être* of the nation is to mobilise individuals for their duty to all of humanity. He advocated Italian national unification as a prelude to a United States of Europe, and even founded an organisation called 'Young Europe' (along the lines of his nationalist 'Young Italy') to advance this aim. It would have been interesting to see whether, in practice, Mazzini would be prepared to cede hard-won Italian sovereignty to this new supranational body.⁵⁸ Even Count Arthur de Gobineau, who championed Nordic superiority in the mid-nineteenth century, reflected the contradictory spirit of the age. 'It would be unjust to assert that every [race] mixture is bad and harmful,' Gobineau averred. 'Artistic genius, which is equally foreign to each of the three great [race] types arose only after the intermarriage of white and black....Although the whites are the most beautiful of the original races, the most beautiful people of all have come from the marriage of white and black.'⁵⁹

Taken at once, western political thought from the Enlightenment to the early twentieth century displays a strong yearning for both cosmopolitanism and nationalism, and a marked tendency to conflate irreconcilable elements within the two ideas.⁶⁰ The

growing institutional reflexivity of twentieth century society, however, coupled with its great wars, helped to sharpen the conceptual boundary between cosmopolitanism and nationalism, a boundary which actualised itself in the form of distinct (and conflicting) political actors.⁶¹ Twentieth century cosmopolitans, unlike their nineteenth century predecessors, possessed little ambivalence toward nationalism: they accepted the contradiction between key tenets of cosmopolitanism and nationalism, and were prepared to endorse the former at the expense of the latter.

The Rise of Cosmopolitanism in the Twentieth Century

Cultural Cosmopolitanism in the United States

The retreat from dualism made an immediate impact upon the American intellectual and political scene. The first political actor to champion a refined, anti-nationalist cosmopolitanism was the American Liberal Progressive movement. Coalescing in Chicago by 1905, the Liberal Progressives actively espoused cosmopolitan visions of their nation, championed a 'colour-blind' immigration policy against prevailing nativist currents, and strenuously tried to interact with new immigrants via the burgeoning 'Settlement House' reform movement.⁶²

Significantly, a number of important cosmopolitan organisations - in addition to the 'Settlements' at Chicago and New York - were formed during this period, and many had Liberal Progressive links. These included the National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People (1909), the Immigrant Protective Association (1908)

and the Liberal Progressive caucus within the federal government-sponsored Americanisation Committee.⁶³ These joined with pro-immigration business interests to defeat restrictionist immigration legislation in 1912, and (unsuccessfully) challenged subsequent legislation in 1917, 1921 and 1924.⁶⁴ In spite of this, cosmopolitan activities were limited in scale, despite the fact that several famous individuals (i.e. John Dewey, Jane Addams, William James) were affiliated with Liberal Progressivism. The Liberal Progressives become significant in the broader sweep of the century, however, as their consistently cosmopolitan ideas exercised ever greater sway over the American cultural elite. The two world wars provided an important stimulus to cosmopolitan ideas, as did a more general evolution in western liberal thought.

The first quantum leap in influence came with the Federal Council of Churches' adoption of Liberal-Progressive ideas pertaining to citizenship and immigration between 1910 and 1914.⁶⁵ The FCC was the ecumenical body overseeing American Protestantism. Though its influence at the congregational level should not be exaggerated, the FCC's vast organisational reach and cultural influence far exceeded that of most secular organisations. Beginning with the 1910 World Council of Churches conference on Faith and Order and continuing through to the FCC's fifth quadrennial meeting in Atlanta (1924), the Anglo-Protestant crusade took a back seat to themes of global ecumenical unity, racial tolerance and world peace.⁶⁶

Furthermore, the first Interfaith (Protestant-Catholic-Jewish) chaplaincy committee was sponsored by the FCC during World War I, and was headed by a Catholic, John Burke.⁶⁷ The FCC was also a force behind the Goodwill movement which mobilised in defense of Catholics and Jews during the high-tide of Ku Klux Klan revival

and nationalist agitation of 1918-24.⁶⁸ The FCC similarly provided the primary support base for the League of Nations in the United States and pressed for a more generous admissions policy for Jewish refugees during the Second World War.⁶⁹

The spread of liberal-cosmopolitan notions (racial equality, liberal immigration, universalistic national identity) in the secular sphere proceeded apace after World War I, reaching a 'hegemonic' critical mass among intellectual elites by the 1930s. In the field of historiography, for instance, the romantic nationalist posture (whether Anglo-Saxonist or Protestant) that reigned during the nineteenth century was replaced with more 'scientific' and/or liberal-socialist interpretations that glorified the industrial immigrant. The central place of 'old-stock' American pioneers like the Puritans, Founding Fathers or Jacksonian frontiersmen in the national narrative came to be similarly questioned.⁷⁰

The modest flow of anti-racist literature of the 1930s became a torrent during the 1940s, influencing federal government elites on both sides of the political divide for the first time. The Progressive Education Association's Committee on Intercultural Education (1937), the Common Council of American Unity, and the Office of Education's 'Americans All' broadcasts on the contributions of particular ethnic groups (1938-39) represented the front end of this new effort.⁷¹ The 1930s was also the period in which Emma Lazarus' paean to the world's immigrant 'masses yearning to breathe free' was inserted at the base of the Statue of Liberty, transforming the monument into a symbol of American universalism and openness to immigration.⁷² This directly shaped the understandings of a new generation through history textbooks, which usually featured pictures of the statue alongside talk of immigrant contributions and the American universal melting-pot.⁷³

Republican presidential nominee Wendell Willkie's best-selling *One World* (1943) and President Harry Truman's post-war policies (i.e. de-segregating the military, pressing for a repeal of the immigration quota system) demonstrated that cosmopolitan ideas had come to form part of a new 'consensus' politics based on liberal idealism and the imperatives of the Cold War.⁷⁴ Willkie, for instance, announced in the middle of the war that 'Our nation is composed of no one race, faith, or cultural heritage. It is a grouping of some thirty peoples....'⁷⁵ Truman echoed this ten years later when he (unsuccessfully) vetoed 1952 legislation that continued the restrictionist provisions of the 1924 'National Origins' quota immigration law. In so doing, Truman, whose allies in the state department failed to triumph over the Coalition of Patriotic Societies and their conservative allies in Congress, accused their opponents of violating the American creed and St. Paul's New Testament injunction that there be 'neither Jew nor Greek.'⁷⁶

Truman ultimately proved to be swimming with the tide of history, and the decade of the 1960s ushered in a cosmopolitan revolution that had been building since the mid-1930s. On the cultural front, both the nation's motion picture industry and its literature moved to embrace a broader, post-WASP definition of the nation.⁷⁷ Meanwhile, the newly activist Supreme Court, in a series of decisions between 1962 and 1964, called for the reapportionment of population between electoral districts. This ended the over-representation of Protestant rural and Southern voters in Congress as a Democratic majority in both houses emerged in 1964.⁷⁸ The Democrats' victory ensured the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the 1965 Hart-Celler immigration bill which put an end to the geographic immigration quotas of the 1924 National Origins system.

The last component of this cosmopolitan revolution occurred on the plane of popular (as opposed to elite) attitudes and behaviour. This was so for several reasons. First, the number of 18-24 year-olds in college rose from 15 percent in 1950 to nearly a third in 1970.⁷⁹ Given the cosmopolitan perspective of the post-World War I generation of professors *vis à vis* the rest of the population, university expansion undoubtedly opened up a powerful outlet for mass value change. Television provided another medium of transmission for the elite's new cosmopolitan mindset: the proportion of households with sets jumped from 9 percent in 1950 to 93 percent in 1965.⁸⁰

In consequence, between 1945 and 1970, white American attitudes toward a host of cultural issues became markedly more cosmopolitan. In terms of immigration, American attitudes relaxed considerably between the war and 1965.⁸¹ Questions pertaining to race and religion exposed similar changes. In 1944, for example, 52 percent of whites endorsed the idea that 'white people should have the first chance at any kind of job,' by 1972, just 3 percent did. More importantly, the number of white Americans opposed to black-white intermarriage fell from 94 percent in 1958 to 56 percent in 1983. Similar changes were noted on questions regarding inter-faith marriage. Once again, the period of greatest change was 1960-70.⁸²

All told, the combined effects of social reflexivity, ideological evolution, and the post-industrial boom in higher education resulted in the hegemonic rise of a trans-ethnic cosmopolitanism. Some may aver that this was merely a liberal-progressive movement akin to those which extended the privileges of citizenship to wider class and gender fractions in the western world. Yet the American trajectory was far more radical than this, for it not only took steps to include the marginalised (a strategy which might have been

combined with the retention of ethnic boundaries) but rather championed a national identity divorced from pre-modern ethnic roots. This implied a major revolution of consciousness on the part of the dominant Anglo-Protestant group and a broad acquiescence among many ethnic groups in favour of a loose-bounded society with few existential anchors. If we accept - as do Hannerz and Waldron - that cosmopolitanism can be a cultural phenomenon occurring within the individual or national community, then this surely qualifies as an instance of enhanced cosmopolitanism. Though European nations followed the American example after the 1960's, their break with the ethnic past - as we shall see - has been more protracted and partial than in the American case.

The surge of liberal cultural cosmopolitanism that sprang up in the U.S. had some political outriders. For instance, American NGO support was critical for the success of the international Peace and ecumenical movements as well as the launch of both the League of Nations and U.N.⁸³ However, the failure of the League and the rise of American unilateralism - then as now - showed that political cosmopolitanism had shallow roots compared with its cultural cousin, which proved a far more enduring force.

The Rise of Cosmopolitanism in Europe

We have catalogued the astounding cultural changes that transformed American society into a more cosmopolitan entity. Can we see a similar pattern in the European case? In cultural terms, the answer is cautiously in the affirmative. Western European states, powered by reflexive modernisation, more clearly delineated their citizenship criteria, ethnic boundaries and immigration control practices in the early twentieth

century.⁸⁴ Yet since World War II, and especially the late 1960s, many have relaxed these boundaries, moving away from ethnic conceptions toward citizenship criteria of *jus soli*. In tandem with this, European national identities have begun to be reconstituted as narratives of pluralistic history and multicultural destiny. Moreover, multiculturalism in the European context often encompasses a recognition of minority rights and improved rights for non-citizen residents.⁸⁵ This role extends to EU foreign policy: the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and a panel from the Council of Europe routinely monitors the citizenship practices of EU candidate states like Estonia, often rebuking the latter for adopting exclusionary practices toward ethnic minorities.⁸⁶

Even so, it is clear that such changes have not been as readily accepted as in the United States.⁸⁷ In many parts of both Western and Eastern Europe, the ethno-nationalist far-right has grown in political importance in recent decades. Meanwhile, even the most liberal societies at Europe's centre (such as Germany) have had difficulty institutionalising a sense of national identity divorced from their historic ethnic core.⁸⁸ This sense of cultural anxiety has carried forth into the Schengen agreement for preserving the integrity of Europe's frontiers and citizenship laws and highlights the limits of cultural cosmopolitanism in the EU.

Political strides toward supranational integration are therefore the more striking feature of Europe's twentieth century development. We mentioned earlier that ideologically-driven grassroots organising could spawn trans-national political structures and continue to energise them after their foundation. This is clear in the case of nationalism, where nationalist organisations like the American patriotic societies (not to mention European nationalist parties and leaders) repeatedly shaped public policy.

With a reverse ideological charge, the same process accounts for the emergence and perpetuation of the European Union. The idea of a politically-united Europe had been in circulation since the middle ages, but schemes for European unity - often coalescing around motifs of Christendom and Rome - fell on deaf ears for centuries. In the twentieth century, by contrast, the idea took political flight. Why this sudden shift in the fortunes of a long impotent idea? This paper would respond by pointing to a constellation of developments running in parallel to the American case. Namely, a) a refinement of cosmopolitan ideology; b) a growth in cosmopolitan grassroots organising; and c) the rise of an educated 'New Class', which helped to institutionalise cosmopolitan ideas at the national, and by extension international, levels.⁸⁹

Paradoxically, the reflexive processes which led to tighter citizenship controls and immigration laws in early twentieth century Europe prompted cosmopolitan thinking to become more rigorous and stimulated the growth of 'internationalist' social movements. For the first time, the centrality of the nationalist canon came under sustained attack from European cosmopolitan intellectuals. This is most clearly evident in the realm of historiography. Prior to 1914, even those who advocated a 'scientific' approach to history, like Leopold von Ranke and Max Weber, championed their particular nationalist cause.⁹⁰ However, after the First World War, the nationalistic mode of historiography began to fade - particularly in Britain, but also in other western European intellectual circles. In Britain, the Union of Democratic Control (UDC), an internationalist academic pressure group, was instrumental in this process. Formed in 1914, the UDC's writ soon ran through much of the English-speaking world. As Paul Kennedy notes, after 1919, the UDC's books circulated widely and were 'accepted almost completely in the English and

American universities.⁹¹ Their tone was distinctly cosmopolitan and derisive of nationalist shibboleths. For instance, in one UDC pamphlet, J.A. Hobson sought to redefine internationalism as a relation between peoples rather than states.⁹²

The professionalisation and specialisation of history in twentieth century Europe, two reflexive practices with clear counterparts in the United States, helped sift a more consistent cosmopolitanism from the dualistic chaff of nineteenth century historiography.⁹³ Synchronically, International Socialism underwent cosmopolitan reform between the Second (1889-1917) and Third (1919-43) Internationals. Whereas western European socialists of the First and Second Internationals generally supported colonialism, characterised non-Europeans as too backward for socialist revolution, and gave primary loyalty to their own nation-states, the Third International was a truly global, anti-colonialist project.⁹⁴

In the meantime, forces of social reflexivity intensified communication networks, propelling cosmopolitan social movements from obscurity to prominence within decades. The Peace movement, for instance, had sprung up on both sides of the Atlantic as early as 1815, but had little to show for itself until the First World War. By this time, the movement had become powerful enough in the United States to be able to fan support for world federalism and provide the blueprint for President Wilson's League of Nations. However, the Peace movement was also active in Europe, particularly in Britain and France. In Britain, the pacifist Federal Union advocated world federalism in a number of best-selling publications beginning just before the First World War. A stream of influential inter-war pacifist writers like Norman Angell, Bertrand Russell, J.A. Hobson and Alfred Zimmern helped to establish the pedigree of British cosmopolitanism.⁹⁵

Meanwhile, the League of Nations Union and its associated Federation of League of Nations Societies (which Zimmern helped to found in 1917) boasted a skyrocketing membership which reached more than a million by the 1920s.⁹⁶

Though the Peace movement tended to encompass a global worldview, connections between movements for peace, world unity and European integration become increasingly evident by the 1920s. In Britain, for example, Quaker pacifists already supported the idea of a United States of Europe by 1910, the National Peace League adopted the same stance in 1911 and a European Unity League was formed in 1913. In France, the International League for Peace and Freedom, Proudhon Society and the French chapters of the League for Peace through Law, the League for International Friendship and the League of the Rights of Man were prominent campaigners for European political integration. Indeed, the latter organisation alone counted some 200,000 members by the mid-1920s.⁹⁷

The rising volume of pan-European civic activity in the 1920s, which we shall consider in a moment, was driven primarily by a supranational idealism strongly linked to the cosmopolitanism of the Peace movement. In no sense were these pan-Europeanists promoting a European super-nation. 'A United States of Europe has now become the order of the day,' declared the Austrian Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, a leading pan-European of the 1920's. 'The League of Nations has become its foundation stone. A World Republic should be the final step.'⁹⁸ Tellingly, Coudenhove aired his pan-European views at the Twenty-Third World Peace Congress in Berlin (1924) and his writing conceived of a united Europe as part of a broader world-governmental fabric. He also singled out nationalists as the principal obstacle to his ideas.⁹⁹ In the same manner,

French foreign minister and pan-European Aristide Briand's cosmopolitan concerns were reflected in initiatives on *both* world peace (Geneva Protocols) and European federalism (Memorandum on a United Europe).¹⁰⁰

It is this *intensification* of pro-European social movements, largely *within* nation-states like France, that helped to breathe political life into the centuries-old 'European Idea'. Cosmopolitan dynamism was reflected in the logarithmic expansion of pro-European writing - in the form of journals, books and pamphlets - during the 1920s.¹⁰¹ More important, we find cosmopolitan thinking accompanied by determined and organised political action. This marks a significant historical departure as the cosmopolitan idea - in its European guise - attained the critical mass of social capital necessary for realisation.¹⁰²

Let us consider the most important example. Coudenhove-Kalergi penned his visionary work, *Pan-Europa* in German in 1923, his new journal, *Paneuropa*, appeared in 1924, and his first important political convert was Chancellor Seipel of Austria, who provided Coudenhove's organisation, Pan-European Union, with a new headquarters in Hofburg Palace.¹⁰³ Nonetheless, the Count found his primary audience and highest-level contacts in France. Aristide Briand, French premier during the painful war years of 1915-17, was one sympathiser with whom Coudenhove would later connect, as was the contemporary French premier Edouard Herriot, who spoke out in favour of a 'United States of Europe' in 1924 and 1925.¹⁰⁴

By 1926, the Count was in France, conferring with political leaders like Herriot, Louis Loucheur and Leon Blum. A year later, Briand, impressed by Coudenhove's activity, and now French foreign minister, decided to openly endorse the pan-European

movement. Loucheur, meanwhile, became president of the French section of the Pan-European Union, and in 1927, Coudenhove and other pan-Europeanists were received at both the French Ministry of War and the Quai D'Orsay. Aristide Briand announced that he was prepared to serve as honorary president of the Pan-European Union. All of this activity was eagerly covered by the daily newspapers, and most on the French centre-left fully supported the idea of European political union in the late twenties.¹⁰⁵

The pan-European movement's stock of social capital was rising fast, centred largely on intensifying social networks in France. By the late twenties, as we saw, several French politicians were sympathetic to this cosmopolitan cause. Aristide Briand is a pivotal figure in this regard, and his outline for a Federal Europe, presented during the tenth session of the League of Nations in 1929 generated a storm of controversy and irrevocably placed the European idea on the political agenda. A year later, the French foreign ministry prepared its Memorandum on a Federal Europe and sent it to European governments for consideration. This represents the first time in history that a European supranationalist proposal was considered by Europe's officials.¹⁰⁶

Briand's proposals were roundly attacked by the right-wing nationalist press in France and throughout Europe, underscoring the conflict between Briand's notions of political cosmopolitanism and the core doctrine of political nationalism. But they had gained the first rung on the ladder toward realisation, demonstrating the rising importance of political cosmopolitanism in Europe.¹⁰⁷

The focus of European integrationist scholars on the post-war era, suggests John Loughlin, ignores the significant lines of continuity with the inter-war period.¹⁰⁸ The 1930s were more difficult years for pan-Europeans due to the rise of fascism. Yet the

European idea enjoyed a vibrant currency among French progressive intellectuals of the thirties, and reached its zenith in British intellectual circles during 1939-40.¹⁰⁹ In France, pan-Europeanists retained the political capital they had gained in the twenties.¹¹⁰

Meanwhile, Coudenhove's Pan-European Congresses and diplomatic initiatives continued, culminating in the formation of his political pressure group for Pan-Europa at Westminster in 1939.¹¹¹ The war years drove the European idea underground, where it was universally championed by non-communist resistance movements against the Nazis.¹¹² This was powerfully expressed by the *Manifesto of the European Resistance* published at Geneva in 1944, in which nationalism and national boundaries were singled out as a primary cause of war and human misery.¹¹³

Resurfacing after the war, pan-Europeanism benefited from the genial political opportunity structure of Cold War American and British approval. Even so, the lineaments of the path-dependent force imparted to it by pro-Europeanists of the interwar period were clearly visible. In recognition of this, Winston Churchill, who had sent a letter of approval to Coudenhove-Kalergi to coincide with the 1943 Pan-European congress in New York, consulted the latter before making his famous pro-European speech of 1946. This speech pointedly invoked the legacy of the recently deceased Briand.¹¹⁴ Furthermore, after the war, a number of important pro-European organisations formed (or re-formed). These included, among others: the United European Movement, French Council for a United Europe, European League for Economic Co-operation, Socialist Movement for the United States of Europe, European Union of Federalists and the European Parliamentary Union.

Continuities with pre-war pan-Europeanism abound in these organisations. Thus Herriot was honorary president of the French Council, while Coudenhove was the inspiration behind the Parliamentary Union. Importantly, these pedigrees reached into the formative institutions of the European Union, highlighting the connections between the inter-war social movements and the institutions of an incipient European Community. Van Zeeland of the European League for Economic Co-operation was thus a signatory of the formative Treaty of Paris (1951), while Spinelli of the European Union of Federalists became EEC commissioner. Meanwhile, Alcide de Gasperi, Italian prime minister from 1945-53 and a key figure in the emergence of the EEC, had pre-war links to both the Peace and pan-European movements.¹¹⁵

The central point here is that determined, idealistic, political action - more so than functional needs, globalising networks or any interest-based calculus - provided the chrysalis for European integration. Even functionalism often appears as a smokescreen for a more idealistic Europeanism. For example, early European functionalists like David Mitrany and Ernst Haas were committed internationalists and pan-Europeans.¹¹⁶ Furthermore, *ur*-proponents of economic union, such as the leaders of the Committee for a European Customs Union (1924) were idealists who favoured political union in the strongest terms.¹¹⁷ Economic unification, which played an important role in Briand's proposals of 1929-30 and in the early EEC and ECSC treaties, should be similarly viewed as a strategic first step toward political union which in no way precluded more radical political designs.¹¹⁸

Finally, though grassroots pan-Europeanism no longer provides the momentum behind further integration, the impact of cosmopolitan ideology is a recurrent theme.

Well after the EEC's formation, for example, European integration drew strength from idealistic, committed bureaucrats in the European Commission and pro-European politicians in the member states.¹¹⁹ One of the social wellsprings of this ideology is what Daniel Bell and Alvin Gouldner term the 'New Class', which is somewhat analogous to Ronald Inglehart's 'postmaterialist' category. This sector of post-industrial societies tends to be liberal on cultural issues, university-educated, and drawn from relatively younger age cohorts.¹²⁰ It is also more likely than other sectors of the population to identify with Europe or the world rather than nation or locale.¹²¹

As in the American and Australian cases, education is key. In a recent study of anti-EU sentiment in France and Norway, higher levels of education were found to be positively correlated with pro-European sentiment and inversely correlated with anti-immigrant attitudes.¹²² This effect is strikingly noticeable among younger age cohorts, where education is a strong (inverse) predictor of support for the nationalist far right and restrictive immigration policies.¹²³ With the expansion of higher education in western Europe since 1945 (and especially post-1960), there has been an observable tendency toward reduced national pride and a greater embrace of liberal-cosmopolitan values, though the 30-year trend of rising support for European integration peaked in the late 1980s.¹²⁴

Conclusion

This article considers three aspects of the cosmopolitan-nationalist question that have been largely ignored in the empirical literature on the subject. Namely, a) the

dualism of much pre-twentieth century cosmopolitan thought; b) the twentieth century expansion and political success of grassroots cosmopolitanism in the West against its nationalist adversaries; and c) the relative cultural inflection of American cosmopolitanism as compared with the political variety espoused by its European counterpart. The paper suggests that in the twentieth century, cosmopolitanism gained influence in the West at the expense of nationalism. In the United States, this cosmopolitanism expressed itself primarily in cultural terms: as a trans-ethnic movement of social reform. In Europe, the focus was largely political, emphasising the trans-national project of European unification.

The initial dynamics of change were threefold: 1) the intellectual evolution of liberal-cosmopolitan logic during 1900-14 which began to regard nationalism as reactionary; 2) the impact of mass warfare during 1914-45 which accelerated the anti-nationalist tendency within cosmopolitan thought; and 3) the atmosphere of increased societal reflexivity, which magnified the previous development and spawned the intensive (and later extensive) networks which helped to institutionalise cosmopolitan ideas. These associational networks were initially *national* rather than trans-national, even as they conveyed a cosmopolitan message. Western nationalist associations, by contrast, which attained prompt political success in tandem with democratic, anti-imperial or fascist revolts during 1789-1945, failed to maintain a similar momentum in the second half of the twentieth century.

The dualistic, 'cosmopolitan-nationalist' nineteenth century imagination was one casualty of the three aforementioned forces. Nationalist political hegemony was another. Beginning in France and the United States, cosmopolitan *national* networks and their

'organic intellectuals' gained elite sponsorship, enhancing the social capital of their ideas. Trans-national networks followed, rather than led, these developments. The subsequent expansion of higher education and a centralised television media helped to spawn the 'New Class' that cemented the cosmopolitan transformation of western societies. Multicultural national narratives and 'colour-blind' immigration policies were one consequence, support for European integration another.

This is not to say that cosmopolitanism has won the day. Far from it. Important reservoirs of American nationalism remain, symbolised by the unilateralism of the Bush administration and the cultural nationalism of organisations like U.S. English or Pat Buchanan's America First. Likewise, euro-skepticism, pervasive inter-governmentalism within the EU and the ethnic nationalism of the Far Right place an upper limit on European cosmopolitanism. Finally, the handful of significant minority nationalists in the EU, though generally pro-European, insist on a high degree of political self-determination. These countercurrents do not however alter this article's central thrust: that cosmopolitans have gained significant territory from nationalists in the late twentieth century West.

Notes

¹ I would like to thank the anonymous reviewers of this article for their recommendations and arguments, many of which I have taken on board. I would also acknowledge the support of an Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Fellowship which has helped to fund this research.

² As this concerns ethnic conflict and its regulation, please see Ted Robert Gurr, *Peoples Versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century* (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000); B. O'Leary & John McGarry (eds.), *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation* (New York & London: Routledge, 1993), pp. 1-40; and Donald L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

³ J. Mayall, "Non-Intervention, Self-Determination and the 'New World Order'," *International Affairs*, Vol.67, No.3 (July 1991), pp. 421- 430; Stanley Hoffmann, "Nationalism and World Order," in Kjell Goldmann, Ulf Hannerz and Charles Westin (eds.), *Nationalism and Internationalism in the Post-Cold War Era* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 210.

⁴ For more on the increased use of this term post-1990, see Waters, *Globalization* (London & New York: Routledge, 1995).

⁵ David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), p. 21.

⁶ See Kagan's celebrated article, "The Power Divide," in *Prospect* (August 2002), pp. 20-27.

⁷ The minimal impact of 9/11 on U.S. immigration policy provides a case in point. (Seminar on the "Impact of 9/11 on U.S. Immigration Policy," 12 September, 2002, Chatham House, London)

⁸ See, for instance, Christien Van den Anker, "Introduction: The Need for an Integrated Cosmopolitan Agenda," *Global Society*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (2000), pp. 479-85; Charles Jones, *Global Justice. Defending Cosmopolitanism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Peter H. Schuck, *Citizens, Strangers, and In-Betweens: Essays on Immigration and Citizenship* (Boulder, CO & Oxford: Westview Press, 1998); Martha C. Nussbaum, *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996); Kimberley Hutchings and Roland Danreuther (eds.), *Cosmopolitan Citizenship* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999).

⁹ Chris Brown, *International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches* (London & New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf), ch. 2.; Jeremy Waldron, "Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative," in Will Kymlicka (ed), *The Rights of Minority Cultures* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), pp. 93-119. Two other groundbreaking normative titles in I.R. cosmopolitan theory include Charles Beitz, *Political*

Theory and International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) and Andrew Linklater, *Men and Citizens in the Theory of International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1982)

¹⁰ A few sociologists have engaged with the cultural dimensions of cosmopolitanism, but only in a relatively exploratory manner. See Ulf Hannerz, "Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture," *Theory, Culture and Society*, Vol.7 (1990), pp. 237-51; Anthony Smith, "Towards A Global Culture?," *Theory, Culture & Society*, Vol. 7, pp. 171-191; Anthony Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity, 1995).

¹¹ Some important works in this field include: Kenichi Ohmae, *The End of the Nation-State* (New York, NY.: The Free Press, 1995); T. McGrew, "A Global Society," in T. McGrew, D. Held and S. Hall (eds.) *Modernity and its Futures* (Oxford: Polity Press in association with the Open University, 1992), pp. 62-113; J. Rosenau, *The Study of Global Interdependence* (London: Frances Pinter, 1980); Anthony Giddens, *Modernity and Self-Identity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).

¹² For instance, see Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*, p. 271.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 109-10, 124-5; Waters, *Globalization*; Giddens, *Modernity and Self Identity*.

¹⁴ See letters page, *Prospect* (October, 2001).

¹⁵ Michael Mann, *The Sources of Social Power, Vol II: The rise of classes and nation states, 1760-1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1993).

¹⁶ The UN provides a clear case of this. See, Peter Willetts, "Consultative Status for NGOs at the United Nations," in Peter Willetts (ed.), *The Conscience of the World': The Influence of Non-Governmental Organisations in the UN System* (London: Hurst, 1996), pp. 31-62.

¹⁷ There is a link here to idealist theories of International Relations, but not all cosmopolitan social action need be idealist - in fact, as with nationalism, cosmopolitan motivation may be traced to economic or political rationality, or to the influence of institutions.

¹⁸ This point has also been made in Alejandro Colas, "Putting Cosmopolitanism into Practice: the Case of Socialist Internationalism," *Millennium*, Vol.23, No.3 (Winter 1994), pp. 514-15.

¹⁹ Micheline Ishay's work certainly addresses this wider theme, but fails to notice the dualistic enthusiasm for both cosmopolitan and nationalist ideas that characterised eighteenth and nineteenth century thought.

²⁰ Daniele Conversi, "Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism," in Athena Leoussi, (ed.), *The Companion Guide to Nationalism* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2001), p. 34.

²¹ Brown, *International Relations Theory*, p. 24.

²² The original distinction between 'Eastern' (ethnic) and 'Western' (civic) nationalism was made by Hans Kohn, in *The Idea of Nationalism: a Study in its Origins and Background* (New York, NY: Macmillan, 1946). For more discussion of the ethnic-civic distinction as it applies to nationalism, please see John Plamenatz, "Two Types of Nationalism," in Eugene Kamenka (ed.), *Nationalism: the Nature and Evolution of an Idea* (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1973) or Anthony Smith, *National Identity* (London: Penguin, 1991), pp. 81-82.

²³ The idea of a world of de-politicised nations has been proposed by many, including E.H. Carr and Johann Galtung. For more commentary on this approach, see Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era*, p. 12.

²⁴ Derek Heater, *World Citizenship and Government* (Basingstoke & New York, NY: MacMillan & St. Martin's Press, 1996).

²⁵ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p. 134; Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict*, p. 231.

²⁶ For more on cultural nationalism, see John Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987). The Valencian case is dealt with in Feran Archilés and Manuel Martí, "Valencian identity & the Spanish nation-state," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 24, no. 5 (2001), pp. 785-87.

²⁷ Derek Heater, *The Idea of European Unity* (Leicester & London: Leicester University Press, 1992), p. 79; Micheline R. Ishay, *Internationalism and Its Betrayal* (Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press, 1995), p. 41; Anthony Smith, "The Supersession of Nationalism?," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, Vol. 31, 1-2, 1990, p. 6; Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (London : MacGibbon & Kee 1963), ch. 3.

²⁸ Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, pp. x-23, 170.

²⁹ Gerald Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism: a Cultural History* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997), pp. 36-47; Daniel L. Purdy, *Tyranny of Elegance: Consumer Cosmopolitanism in the Era of Goethe* (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press 1998), p. 130.

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- ³⁰ Hannerz, "Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture," p. 239; Jeremy Waldron, "Minority Cultures and the Cosmopolitan Alternative," pp. 93, 110; Waldron, "What is Cosmopolitan", *Journal Political Philosophy*, Vol.8, No.2 (Jun 2000), p. 227.
- ³¹ Anthony Smith, "National Identity and Myths of Ethnic Descent," *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change*, Vol. 7 (1984), pp. 95-130; Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Origins of Nations* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), pp. 92-120; John Armstrong, *Nations Before Nationalism* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1982).
- ³² Regis Debray, paraphrased in Smith, *Ethnic Origins of Nations*, pp. 175-6.
- ³³ Peter Berresford Ellis, *The Story of the Cornish Language* (Redruth: Tor Mark Press [1990] 1998), p. 17; Smith, *Ethnic Origins of Nations*, pp. 92-120.
- ³⁴ Extended treatment of cultural nationalism appears in Miroslav Hroch, *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: a Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups Among the Smaller European Nations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985); Anthony Smith, *The Ethnic Revival* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and John Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism*, (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987)
- ³⁵ D. Lieven and J. McGarry, "Ethnic Conflict in the Soviet Union and its successor states," in B. O'Leary & John McGarry (eds.), *The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation*, p. 68; Pim den Boer, "Europe to 1914: the Making of an Idea," in Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen (eds.), *The History of the Idea of Europe* (London & New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 67-8; Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*.
- ³⁶ Ulrich Beck, "The Cosmopolitan Revolution," address at the London School of Economics, October, 2000; Held, *Democracy and the Global Order*.
- ³⁷ Virginie Guiraudon, "Cosmopolitanism and National Priority: Attitudes Towards Foreigners in France Between 1789 and 1794," *History of European Ideas*, vol.13, no. 5 (1991), p. 793; Colas, "Putting Cosmopolitanism into Practice".
- ³⁸ Andrew Linklater, "Citizenship, Humanity and Cosmopolitan Harm Conventions," *International Political Science Review*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (2001), p. 270.
- ³⁹ Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*; Eric J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990); Benedict Anderson, *Imagined*

Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 1983); Elie Kedourie, *Nationalism* (London: Hutchinson, 1960); R.G. Poggi, *The Development of the Modern State* (London: Hutchinson, 1978).

⁴⁰ Guiraudon, "Cosmopolitanism and National Priority," pp. 594, 601; Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press 1992), p. 46; Liah Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 355; Ishay, "Internationalism and Its Betrayal," p. 82.

⁴¹ Colas, "Putting Cosmopolitanism into Practice," pp. 528-9.

⁴² Arthur Marwick, *War and Social Change in the Twentieth Century: a Comparative Study of Britain, France, Germany, Russia and the United States* (London: Macmillan, 1974).

⁴³ Newman, "The Rise of English Nationalism," pp. 51, 57; Thomas E. Skidmore, *Black into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1993), pp. 93-7.

⁴⁴ Ishay, "Internationalism and Its Betrayal," p. 109.

⁴⁵ Michael Mann, "Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?," *Review of International Political Economy* 4:3 Autumn, 1997, pp. 472-96.

⁴⁶ Skidmore, "Black into White," pp. 92-3.

⁴⁷ Purdy, "Tyranny of Elegance," pp. 138, 184-94, 236-7.

⁴⁸ James D. Norris, *Advertising and the Transformation of American Society, 1865-1920* (New York : Greenwood Press, 1990), p. 103.

⁴⁹ Grant McCracken, *Culture and Consumption: New Approaches to the Symbolic Character of Consumer Goods and Activities* (Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 1988), pp. 22-4, 167-78; Stuart Ewen, *Channels Of Desire: Mass Images And The Shaping Of American Consciousness* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), p. 69; Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class: An Economic Study in the Evolution of Institutions*, (New York, NY: MacMillan Company, 1899), p. 144; Theda Shapiro, *Painters and Politics: The European Avant-Garde and Society, 1900-1925* (New York, NY: Elsevier Scientific, 1976), p. 48.

⁵⁰ M. Mann, "Has Globalization Ended the Rise and Rise of the Nation-State?," pp. 476-7; Paul Hirst and Grahame Thompson, *Globalization in Question: The International Economy and the Possibilities of Governance* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996).

⁵¹ Merle Eugene Curti, *The Roots of American Loyalty* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1946), pp. 202-3.

⁵² Ralph Waldo Emerson [1845] in Anita Haya Goldman, *Reconciling Race and Rights: Emerson and the Construction of Nationality* (Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Harvard University, 1992), pp. 242-4; Ralph Waldo Emerson, *English Traits* (London & New York: Unit Library, Ltd. [1856] 1902), pp. 25-6.

⁵³ Hans Kohn, *American Nationalism: An Interpretive Essay* (New York, NY: Macmillan 1957), pp. 150-51; Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1981) p. 22

⁵⁴ This point has been covered extensively in, for example, John Higham, *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, [1955] 1986), pp. 33, 133; Eric Kaufmann, "Nativist Cosmopolitans: Institutional Reflexivity and the Decline of 'Double-Consciousness' in American Nationalist Thought: Interrogating a Nineteenth Century Paradox," *Historical Sociology*, vol. 14, no. 1, 2001, pp. 47-78; and Rogers Smith, "American Conceptions of Citizenship and National Service" in Amitai Etzioni (ed.), *New Communitarian Thinking* (University of Virginia: Charlottesville, 1995), pp. 238-39.

⁵⁵ Conversi, "Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism," pp. 36-8; Guiraudon, "Cosmopolitanism and National Priority," p. 603; Antonio Franceschet, "Sovereignty and freedom: Immanuel Kant's liberal internationalist 'legacy' ", *Review of International Studies* (2001), Vol. 27, pp. 218-19.

⁵⁶ Purdy, *Tyranny of Elegance*, p. 137.

⁵⁷ Friedrich Meinecke, *Cosmopolitanism and the National State* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970).

⁵⁸ Heater, *The Idea of European Unity*, pp. 88, 113, 193.

⁵⁹ Thomas F. Gossett, *Race, The History of an Idea in America* (New York, N.Y.: Oxford University Press, 1963), pp. 343-44.

⁶⁰ This is discussed in Newman, *The Rise of English Nationalism*, p. 50; Ishay, *Internationalism and Its Betrayal*, p. xxx, xxxiii; and Greenfeld, *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*, p. 314.

⁶¹ Reflexivity principally involves better record-keeping, more intensive networks of communication, and the feedback of scientific learning onto society. Passport and border control, cartography and the census are

three manifestations of this phenomenon, which helped to sharpen conceptual, ethnic and geographical boundaries. For example, the decennial American census of 1880 was the first to collect data on the literacy of the immigrant population. The 1890 census added questions on English proficiency and the 1911 Dillingham Commission report provided physiological data on ethnic populations, as well as their approximate share of the national population. Together, this welter of information helped to constitute restrictive immigration legislation based on literacy tests and origins quotas. For more on the concept of reflexivity, please see Ulrich Beck, *Risk Society: Towards A New Modernity* (London: Sage Publications, 1992); Anthony Giddens, *The Consequences of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1990), pp. 36-45; and Kaufmann, "Nativist Cosmopolitans," pp. 32-41.

⁶² Rivka Shpak Lissak, *Pluralism and Progressives: Hull House and the New Immigrants, 1890-1919* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989); Allen B. Davis, *Spearheads for Reform: the Social Settlements and the Progressive Movement, 1890-1914* (Oxford University Press, New York, 1967).

⁶³ Mark Pittenger, *American Socialists and Evolutionary Thought, 1870-1920* (University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1993), p. 178-79.

⁶⁴ Davis, *Spearheads for Reform*, p. 93; Lissak, *Pluralism and Progressives*, p. 58.

⁶⁵ Lawrence Bennion Davis, *Immigrants, Baptists and the Protestant Mind in America* (Urbana-Chicago-London: University of Illinois Press, 1973), pp. 127-8; Samuel McCrea Cavert, *The American Churches in the Ecumenical Movement: 1900-1968* (New York, NY: Association Press, 1968), pp. 54-6.

⁶⁶ Cavert, *The American Churches in the Ecumenical Movement*, pp. 84-6; Ferenc Morton Szasz, *The Divided Mind of Protestant America, 1880-1930* (University, AL: Alabama University Press, 1982), p. 88; Benson Y. Landis, *Adventure in Understanding: A Handbook of Discussion and Source Materials for Protestants, Catholics and Jews*, with an introduction by Henry Noble MacCracken (New York, NY: National Conference of Christians and Jews, 1941), p. 30.

⁶⁷ Cavert, *The American Churches in the Ecumenical Movement*, pp. 96-7.

⁶⁸ Benny Kraut, "A Wary Collaboration: Jews, Catholics, and the Protestant Goodwill Movement," in William R. Hutchison (ed.), *Between the Times: The Travail of the Protestant Establishment in America, 1900-1960* (Cambridge & New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 212.

⁶⁹ William E. Nawyn, *American Protestantism's Response to Germany's Jews and Refugees, 1933-41* (Ann Arbor: UMI Research Press, 1981); Robert Moats Miller, *American Protestantism and Social Issues, 1919-39* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1958), pp. 320-3.

⁷⁰ Kathy Vandell Scales, *The Everlasting If: American National Identity In Children's Historical Fiction, 1865-1965*. (Unpublished PhD. dissertation, University of Maryland, College Park, 1991), pp. 285-88; James P. Shenton, "Ethnicity and Immigration," in Eric Foner (ed.), *The New American History* (Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1990), p. 252.

⁷¹ Barbara Dianne Savage, *Broadcasting Freedom: Radio, War and the Politics of Race 1938-1948* (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); Philip Gleason, *Speaking of Diversity: Language and Ethnicity in Twentieth-Century America* (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), pp. 164-66; Nathan Glazer, *We Are All Multiculturalists Now* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), p. 88.

⁷² John Higham, *Send These To Me: Jews and Other Immigrants in Urban America* (New York: Atheneum [1975] 1984), pp. 73-78; Juan F. Perea (ed.), *Immigrants Out!: The New Nativism and the Anti-Immigrant Impulse in the United States* (New York, NY & London: New York University Press, 1997), pp. 48-51.

⁷³ Frances FitzGerald, *America Revised: History Schoolbooks in the Twentieth Century* (Boston & Toronto: Little, Brown & Company, 1979), p. 80.

⁷⁴ Erika Doss, *Benton, Pollock and the Politics of Modernism: From Regionalism to Abstract Expressionism* (Chicago & London: University of Chicago Press, 1991), pp. 334-5.

⁷⁵ Wendell L. Willkie, 1943. *One World* (London & Toronto: Cassel & Co.), pp. 157-60.

⁷⁶ Benjamin Munn Ziegler (ed.), *Immigration: An American Dilemma* (Boston, MA: D.C. Heath & Co., 1953), pp. 97-99.

⁷⁷ Rita J. Simon and Susan H. Alexander, *The Ambivalent Welcome: Print Media, Public Opinion and Immigration* (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1993); Scales, "The Everlasting If"; , Richard D. Alba, *Italian Americans: Into the Twilight of Ethnicity* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1985), pp. 79-80; Herbert Gans, "Symbolic Ethnicity: The Future of Ethnic Groups and Cultures in America," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 2 (1979), pp. 5-6, 9, 11.

⁷⁸ David Butler and Bruce Cain, *Congressional Redistricting: Comparative and Theoretical Perspectives* (New York: Macmillan, 1992), pp. 27-29; Mark E. Rush, *Does Redistricting make a Difference?: Partisan Representation and Electoral Behaviour* (Baltimore & London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp. 11-13.

⁷⁹ Theodore Caplow, Howard M. Bahr, John Modell and Bruce A. Chadwick, *Recent Social Trends in the United States, 1960-1990* (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1994), p.478; Michael X. Delli Carpini, *Stability and Change in American Politics: The Coming of Age of the Generation of the 1960s* (New York: N.Y. University Press, 1986), p. 29.

⁸⁰ Caplow et al., *Recent Social Trends*, p.313.

⁸¹ Rita J. Simon, *Public Opinion and the Immigrant: Print Media Coverage, 1880-1980* (Lexington, Mass: Lexington Books, 1985), pp. 36-40.

⁸² William G. Mayer, *The Changing American Mind: How and Why American Public Opinion Changed between 1960 and 1988* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1992), pp. 366, 368, 371; M. Kent Jennings and Richard G. Niemi, *Generations and Politics: a Panel Study of Young Adults and their Parents* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981).

⁸³ The idea behind the League of Nations sprang from blueprints drawn up by the American peace movement. Meanwhile, the FCC proved a tireless campaigner for the League of Nations: consider the fact that 12.5 million of the 13.8 million letters dispatched to the International Conference on the Limitation of Armament (1921) came from its affiliates. After World War II, the FCC played the role of benign American uncle to the UN. Its Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (founded 1946), for example, 'was granted observer status at all open meetings of UN agencies,' remarks William King. Furthermore, it maintained 'consultative status with UNESCO, the Economic and Social Council and the Food and Agriculture Organization. Commission officers cultivated close ties with UN delegates and received all unrestricted UN documents....' Likewise, the FCC took an interest in the UN and had 'accredited observers' at the Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the Commission on Human Rights. See Cavert, *The American Churches in the Ecumenical Movement*, pp. 100, 105, 191; also William McGuire King, "The Reform Establishment and the Ambiguities of Influence," in

William R. Hutchison (ed.). *Between the Times: The Travail of the Protestant Establishment in America, 1900-1960* (Cambridge & New York: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 136.

⁸⁴ Rogers Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, MA & London: Harvard University Press, 1992); Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin & James Hollifield (eds.), *Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994); Torpey, John C., *The Invention of the Passport : Surveillance, Citizenship, and the State* (Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2000).

⁸⁵ These arguments appear in, for example Christian, Joppke, "How Immigration is Changing Citizenship," *Ethnic & Racial Studies*, vol.22, no. 4 (1999), pp. 629-52, and Yasemin Soysal, *Limits of Citizenship: Migrants and Postnational Membership in Europe* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994). General consideration of multiculturalism in Europe is widespread in the literature. An interesting look at the process in Sweden may be found in Aleksandra Ålund and Carl-Ulrik Schierup, *Paradoxes of Multiculturalism: Essays on Swedish Society* (London: Avebury, 1991). For a discussion of the liberalization of official German and Dutch national identity, see Dietrich Thränhardt (ed.), *Europe: A New Immigration Continent: Policies and Politics in Comparative Perspective*, (Hamburg: Lit Verlag, 1992).

⁸⁶ Steven Day, "Estonia - constructing a political community: dealing with competing ideas of inclusion and exclusion," *Democratisation* (forthcoming).

⁸⁷ Though acceptance of ethnic change has been far from universal in America, it has not expressed itself in support for ethno-nationalist populism.

⁸⁸ Witness the controversy over the introduction of Germany's new post-ethnic citizenship law as late as 1999.

⁸⁹ On the 'New Class,' see Daniel Bell, *The Winding Passage: Essays and Sociological Journeys, 1960-1980* (Cambridge, MA: ABT Books, 1980), pp. 144-64.

⁹⁰ In Weber's case, this included joining the pan-German League, opposing Polish immigration, and supporting German irredentism in Poland after the Versailles settlement. See Hans Mommsen, *The Third Reich Between Vision and Reality: new perspectives on German history, 1918-1945* (Oxford: Berg, 2001).

⁹¹ P.M. Kennedy, "The Decline of Nationalistic History in the West, 1900-1970," *Journal of Contemporary History*, no. 8 (1977), pp. 91-2.

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- ⁹² David Long, "J.A. Hobson and Economic Internationalism," in David Long and Peter Wilson (eds.), *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Revisited* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 161-88; Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, p. 98.
- ⁹³ J.H. Plumb, *The Death of the Past* (London: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 132-6.
- ⁹⁴ Colas, "Putting Cosmopolitanism into Practice", pp. 523-7.
- ⁹⁵ An excellent guide to the thinking of these and other writers is provided by David Long and Peter Wilson (eds.), *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis*.
- ⁹⁶ Paul Rich, "Alfred Zimmern's Cautious Idealism: The League of Nations, International Education, and the Commonwealth," in Long et al., *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 84; Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, pp. 94-5, 116.
- ⁹⁷ Heater, *World Citizenship and Government*, pp. 105-6; Heater, *The Idea of European Unity*, p. 119; Carl H. Pegg, *The Evolution of the European Idea, 1914-1932* (Chapel Hill & London: University of North Carolina Press, 1983), pp. 5, 8-10, 42, 93.
- ⁹⁸ Pegg, *Evolution of the European Idea*, p. 29.
- ⁹⁹ Ralph White, "The Europeanism of Coudenhove-Kalergi," in Peter M. R. Stirk (ed.), *European Unity in Context: The Interwar Period* (London & New York: Pinter, 1989), pp. 38-9.
- ¹⁰⁰ Heater, *The Idea of European Unity*, p. 132; Pegg, *Evolution of the European Idea*, p. 103.
- ¹⁰¹ Pegg, *Evolution of the European Idea*, p. 79.
- ¹⁰² Mario Diani, "Social Movements and Social Capital: A Network Perspective on Movement Outcomes," *Mobilization: An International Journal* 2(2) 1997, pp. 129-47.
- ¹⁰³ Pegg, *Evolution of the European Idea*, pp. 28-9, 33.
- ¹⁰⁴ The Pan-European Union, for instance, had little success outside France, and the Quai d'Orsay was the only major national foreign office to provide strong support for the idea. See Andrew Crozier, "Britain, Germany and the Dishing of the Briand Plan," in Preston King and Andrea Bosco (eds.), *A Constitution for Europe* (London: Lothian Foundation, 1991), pp. 213-29.
- ¹⁰⁵ Heater, *The Idea of European Unity*, p. 132; Pegg, *Evolution of the European Idea*, p. 36.
- ¹⁰⁶ den Boer, "Europe to 1914: the making of an idea," pp. 38-9; Heater, *The Idea of European Unity*, p. 145.

¹⁰⁷ Crozier, "Britain, Germany and the Dishing of the Briand Plan," pp. 221-27; Pegg, *Evolution of the European Idea*, pp. 110-13.

¹⁰⁸ John Loughlin, "French Personalist and Federalist Movements in the Interwar Period," in Stirk, *European Unity in Context*, p. 188.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., p. 197-98. Also, David Weigall, "British ideas of European unity and regional confederation in the context of Anglo-Soviet relations, 1941-45," in M.L. Smith & Peter M. R. Stirk (eds.), *Making the New Europe: European Unity and the Second World War* (London: Pinter, 1990), p. 156.

¹¹⁰ For example, French pro-Europeans of the twenties like George Bonnet (foreign minister in 1938) or Léon Blum (WWII socialist resistance spokesman and several times Prime Minister) continued to advocate Euro-federalist beliefs. See David Weigall and Peter Stirk (eds.), *The Origins and Development of the European Community* (Leicester & London: Leicester University Press, 1992), p. 29.

¹¹¹ Andrea Bosco, "Chatham House and Federalism," in A. Bosco and Cornelia Navari (eds.), *Chatham House and British Foreign Policy, 1919-45* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1992), pp. 325-6. Also see the introduction in Stirk, *European Unity in Context*, p. 12.

¹¹² Loughlin, "French Personalist and Federalist Movements in the Interwar Period," p. 198.

¹¹³ Peter Bugge, "The Nation Supreme: The idea of Europe 1914-1945," in Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen (eds.), *The History of the Idea of Europe* (London & New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 111; Waever, Ole, "Europe since 1945: crisis to renewal," in Kevin Wilson and Jan van der Dussen (eds.), *The History of the Idea of Europe* (London & New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 153.

¹¹⁴ Heater, *The Idea of European Unity*, p. 145.

¹¹⁵ It might be added that Luigi Einaudi, first post-war president of Italy, had written in favour of European federalism as early as 1918, and criticised national sovereignty as a dogmatic formula for war. See John Pinder, "Federalism in Britain and Italy," in Stirk, *European Unity in Context*, pp. 202-3, 208-9. Also see Heater, *The Idea of European Unity*, pp. 152-5.

¹¹⁶ David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1943); Ernst B. Haas, *The Uniting of Europe : Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958); Ernst B. Haas, *Beyond the Nation-State: functionalism and International Organization* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1958).

¹¹⁷ Pegg, *Evolution of the European Idea*, pp. 32-3, 77.

¹¹⁸ Monnet, Jean. *Memoirs* (London: Collins, 1978), p. 392.

¹¹⁹ M. Holland, *European Integration: From Community to Union* (London: Pinter, 1993); Johann Galtung, *The European Community: a Superpower in the Making* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget; London: Allen and Unwin, 1973). This is not to pretend that pro-European idealism is in the ascendant. The EU still marches largely to the beat of inter-governmentalism (i.e. national interests), but this does not alter the point that the cosmopolitan agenda has significantly advanced in the past half-century after a millennium of stasis.

¹²⁰ Ronald Inglehart, *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 74-5; Daniel Bell, *The Winding Passage*, pp. 144-64.

¹²¹ Pippa Norris, "Global Governance and Cosmopolitan Citizens," in Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue (eds.), *Governance in a Globalizing World* (Cambridge, MA & Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), pp. 165-6.

¹²² Jocelyn Evans, "The Attitudinal Bases of Anti-EU Sentiment in Norway and France," paper presented at *International Political Science Association*, Quebec City, Canada, August 2001.

¹²³ Hans-Georg Betz, *Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe* (Basingstoke & London: MacMillan, 1994), pp. 150-166; Katharine Betts, *Ideology and Immigration: Australia 1976 to 1987* (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1988).

¹²⁴ Norris, "Global Governance and Cosmopolitan Citizens"; Inglehart, *Culture Shift*, pp. 408-21.