NATIVIST COSMOPOLITANS: INSTITUTIONAL REFLEXIVITY
AND THE DECLINE OF "DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS" IN
AMERICAN NATIONALIST THOUGHT

Ever since Tom Paine declared that "Europe, not England is the parent country of America," there has been a strong tendency for scholars to perceive the United States as the world's first universal nation, an entity formed without reference to a pre-modern ethnic core. (Kaufman 1982: 2) This argument tends to assert that the Anglo-Protestant elites who founded the United States assumed a liberal-universalist "cultural idiom" of nationhood.1

This exceptionalist view of the American nation came to be widely promulgated by the "consensus" school of historiography between the 1930's and the early 1960's. (Higham 1955; Solomon 1956; Kohn 1957; FitzGerald 1979: 79-80) Though its popularity has waned in recent decades, the exceptionalist argument underlies the work of many contemporary social thinkers. Recent examples include Seymour Martin Lipset ('Being American…is an ideological commitment'), Wilbur Zelinsky ('American nationalism has been international in character from the outset'), Liah Greenfeld ('the Ideal Nation') and Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. ('the future was America'). (Zelinsky 1988; Greenfeld 1992: 438; Schlesinger 1993: 24; Lipset 1996: 31)2

Against the grain of the exceptionalist argument, a second avenue of historical-sociological investigation has appeared, predicated on the claim that American national discourse has been shaped by a hegemonic white, Anglo-Protestant cultural elite. This line of enquiry could first be detected just prior to World War I in the writings of
Pluralists like Horace Kallen or Randolph Bourne. (Bourne [1917] 1964: 108; Kallen 1924: 83, 104-5) It later attained popularity among "new political historians" like Lee Benson and Joel Silbey, or critical sociologists like C. Wright Mills and E. Digby Baltzell. (Benson 1961; Mills 1956; Baltzell 1964; Silbey 1985) More recently, David Roediger, Rogers Smith, Ashley Doane and Reginald Horsman, among others, have backed the contention that varieties of "ascriptive Americanism" have been used to safeguard the cultural, economic and political privileges of a dominant, "WASP" or white ethnic group. (Horsman 1981; Roediger 1991; R. Smith 1995; Doane 1997)

This paper grants that both the exceptionalist and ethnoculturalist interpretations of American nationalism are well-supported by historical evidence. However, few players in this highly-charged debate have acknowledged the pervasive dualism which runs through the writings of most of the individuals cited in the historical literature. Fewer still have sought to investigate the nature of this paradox. The tradition established by Gunnar Myrdal's *An American Dilemma* (1944) provides no exception. That important work led to a fertile debate concerning the dissonance between white (and, to a far lesser extent, Anglo-Protestant) American thought and action on the race issue, but paid scant attention to the logical and rhetorical dualism present within dominant group discourse itself.

This essay seeks to address this gap in the literature using historical evidence which illustrates that partisans from each side of the current debate often adopt discursive evidence from the same individuals. Our enterprise will therefore be one of clarification and analysis. Clarification, in that we shall present empirical evidence for a pattern of pervasive dualism in the historical record. This will be followed by an analysis which
unwinds and isolates the complex causal strands which gave rise to what Ralph Waldo Emerson referred to as American "double-consciousness."

THE ADVENT OF "DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS"

The art of American double-consciousness, according to Emerson, lay in balancing notions of "race" and "rights," in other words, (Anglo-Protestant) ethnicity and universalist liberty. (Goldman 1992: 284) Even so, Emerson was clearly not the first practitioner of this cultural style, whose origins may be traced to the mid-eighteenth century.

The Revolutionary Generation

The pattern of dualism which is a hallmark of American thought on the question of nationality had already emerged prior to the American Revolution. Benjamin Franklin, for example, as early as 1751, explicitly defended the Englishness of the American colonies, emphasizing that it was hardly:

Necessary to bring in Foreigners to fill up any occasional Vacancy in a Country; for such Vacancy...will soon be filled by natural Generation...And since Detachments of English from Britain sent to America, will have their places of Home so soon supply'd and increase so largely here; why should the Palatine Boors [Germans] be suffered to swarm into our Settlements, and by herding
together establish their Language and Manners to the Exclusion of ours? Why should Pennsylvania, founded by the English, become a colony of Aliens, who will shortly be so numerous as to Germanize us instead of our Anglifying them, and will never adopt our Language or Customs, any more than they can acquire our Complexion. (Franklin [1751] 1961: 232, 234)

Franklin later added that "[O]ur Land owners will have no cause to complain if English, Welsh and Protestant Irish are encouraged to come hither instead of Germans." (Kerman 1983: 24-5) Commenting on the same matter in 1753, Franklin continued to castigate the Germans, remarking that "Unless the stream of their importation could be turned from this to other colonies...they will soon outnumber us." However, at the conclusion of this very same passage, he appears to change his tune, suggesting that:

I am not for refusing entirely to admit them into our Colonies: all that seems to be necessary is to distribute them more equally, mix them with the English, establish English Schools where they are now too thick settled...I say I am not against the Admission of Germans in general, for they have their Virtues, their industry and frugality is exemplary; They are excellent husbandmen and contribute greatly to the improvement of a Country. (Franklin [1753] 1961: 483, 485)
Thomas Jefferson concurred with this liberal view in 1817, writing that he wished to keep the doors of America open, so as to:

Consecrate a sanctuary for those whom the misrule of Europe may compel to seek happiness in other climes. This refuge once known will produce reaction on the happiness even of those who remain there, by warning their taskmasters that when the evils of Egyptian oppression become heavier than those of the abandonment of country, another Canaan is open where their subjects will be received as brothers and secured against like oppression by a participation in the right of self-government. (Kohn 1957: 138)

Jefferson was also known to exclaim: "I like the dreams of the future better than the history of the past," or, in writing to Joseph Priestley in 1800, " [The] Gothic idea that we are to look backwards instead of forwards...and to recur to the annals of our ancestors for what is most perfect in government, in religion & in learning, is worthy of those bigots in religion & Government, by whom it has been recommended, & whose purposes it would answer." (Gossett 1963: 127; Kohn 1957: 150-51)

Yet is precisely the force of Jefferson's futuristic liberalism that renders his Anglo-Saxonism so surprising. Here it may be seen that Jefferson's liberal cosmopolitanism was part of a dual consciousness shared with an American Anglo-Protestant nationalism. This is evident in his utterance: "Has not every restitution of the antient Saxon laws had happy effects? Is it not better now that we return at once into that
happy system of our ancestors, the wisest and most perfect ever yet devised by the wit of man, as it stood before the 8th century?" (Horsman 1981: 22) On the immigration question, he was also capable of sustaining a highly defensive argument, musing that European immigrants would infuse the American Republic with "their spirit, [and thereby] warp and bias its direction, and render it a heterogeneous, incoherent, distracted mass." (Spalding 1994: 40)

The "race-rights" tension similarly did not escape Alexander Hamilton, another key founding father, who at once supported the civic nationalist idea of attracting respectable Europeans who "would be on a level with the First Citizens," while expressing his reservations about non-British immigration by comparing foreigners in America to foreigners in Rome:

> Among other instances, it is known that hardly anything contributed more to the downfall of Rome than the precipitate communication of the privileges of citizenship to the inhabitants of Italy at large....And how terribly was Syracuse scourged by perpetual seditions, when, after the overthrow of the tyrants, a great number of foreigners were suddenly admitted to the rights of citizenship. (Spalding 1994: 39; Jones 1992 [1960]: 68)

Hamilton's ethno-cultural sentiments emerge yet again with his injunction for the powers that be "to render the people of this country as homogeneous as possible, [which] must lead as much as any circumstance to the permanency of their union and prosperity." (Knobel 1996: 16)
The Mid-Nineteenth Century Literati

The literary phenomenon known as the "American Subversive Style," already in place by the 1820's, foregrounds the tension between dominant ethnicity and universalist liberalism which we have been discussing. (Reynolds 1988: 202) The new liberal-individualist spirit infused the work of mid-nineteenth century writers like Edgar Allan Poe, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Walt Whitman, Henry Wadsworth Longfellow, Herman Melville and, later, the James brothers, Henry and William. Figures such as these, though they dealt with American themes, were attracted to self-exploration and technical experimentation. (Crunden 1994: 75, 165; Porsdam 1987)

Poe, Melville, Longfellow and Thoreau, for instance, while interested in fostering an American literature, were equally adamant about the need for a spiritual, individual-centred creative process, and were often ambiguous in their portrayal of American subject matter. (Marshall 1988: 394-96, 405-8) The introverted spirit of these writers gives us the first glimpse of the modernist anti-nationalism which would later be directed at Anglo-Saxon cultural hegemony. Perhaps Longfellow's character Churchill in the novel *Kavanagh* (1849) was clearest in this regard: "Nationality is a good thing to a certain extent," he says, "but universality is better." Accordingly, Churchill prefers "what is natural" to what is national. (Kammen 1991: 82; Marshall 1988: 392-3)

The pseudo-modernist spirit in Longfellow led him to avoid a communally-oriented literature of collective representation, but any re-casting of America on purely cosmopolitan lines would have been unthinkable to Longfellow or virtually anyone else
in the nineteenth century.⁴ Henry James' cosmopolitan individualism, for example, had little impact on his disdain for the "vast contingent of aliens" whom he saw as debasing Anglo-American culture in the late nineteenth century. (Greenfeld 1992: 469) William Dean Howells, James' contemporary, expressed similar sentiments. (Glazer 1975 [1987]: 20)

Their ambiguity on this subject comes across in the same kind of double-consciousness that the Founders displayed. For example, Herman Melville waxed poetic about Americans as "not a nation, so much as a world...the heirs of all time...On this Western Hemisphere all tribes and peoples are forming into one federated whole...." (Hollinger 1995: 88) Yet when Melville was in a less ebullient mood, he would retreat from futurism into a "gothic" nostalgia and look favourably upon No-Popery as an expression of popular culture. Walt Whitman displayed a similar ambiguity, speaking of America's universal humanism while admiring Maria Monk's No-Popery invectives and claiming to be influenced by its populist content. (Kohn 1957: 152; Reynolds 1988: 65, 142-3)

In analogous fashion, the lineaments of double-consciousness were exposed by the debate over the roots of English. For example, Whitman, influenced by Anglo-Saxonist philology, wrote in *Leaves of Grass* (1855) that "the Anglo-Saxon stock of our language [is]… the most important part, the root and strong speech of the native English for many centuries," later adding that "I think the Saxon has an element no other language has." (Bernbrock 1961: 42, 190) These statements were in keeping with his 1840's query: "What has miserable inefficient Mexico...to do...with the great mission of peopling the New World with a noble race?" (Horsman 1981: 235)
Like so many others, however, Whitman could display a more generous, cosmopolitan frame of mind, as when he speculated about the evolution of the English language. "Like the American nation, it [English] gathers to itself the elements of power from the four corners of the globe," Whitman wrote. "The colonies of Plymouth-rock and Jamestown have grown into a mighty nation; and one of the forms of growth, has been the adoption of the citizens of other nations. So the Anglo-Saxon has grown into the present English by the free adoption of words from other languages." (Bernbrock 1961: 47)

Horace Greeley, a contemporary of Whitman's who was both a Fourierite individualist and Republican radical, might be expected to have solidly backed a liberal-universalist position toward ethnic and racial minorities. He certainly gave indication of this when he pressed the Republican leadership in 1856 not to nominate a Know-Nothing, William Johnson, for vice-president - as this would alienate the foreign-born. Greeley also supported equal suffrage for New York's blacks in 1846 against the overwhelming majority of opinion both inside and outside his party. (Foner 1970: 248, 262-63)

Even so, Greeley was still capable of expressing his opinion of the Irish as "deplorably clannish, misguided and prone to violence." He also fell into the practice of calling on northern blacks to prove themselves economically before devoting their energies toward securing political equality and criticized the activism of black political leaders. (Silbey 1985: 71; Foner 1970: 298) The same "restricted liberalism" characterized iconoclastic personalities like Charles Anderson. In addressing the New England Society of Cincinnatti in 1850, he combined his view that there was "an actual
greatness, perhaps decided superiority, in these British families of men" with the counter-
opinion that "this idea of any 'Destiny,' or of any inborn or primitive superiority 
appertaining to ours, or to any other division of the human race, constitutes, in my 
judgment, a double error...." (Hall 1997: 136)

Despite ample evidence of dualism on the "race-rights" question before his time,
it is Ralph Waldo Emerson's pronouncements that provide us with the richest lode of 
evidence for the existence of double-consciousness (a term Emerson coined) in the 
Anglo-American psyche. With regard to immigration, for instance, Emerson is known to 
have remarked:

How much more are men than nations....The office of America is to liberate, to 
abolish kingcraft, priestcraft, caste, monopoly, to pull down gallows, to burn up 
the bloody statute book, to take in the immigrant, to open the doors of the sea and 
the fields of the earth...This liberation appears in the power of invention, the 
freedom of thinking, in readiness for reforms.

On the subject of the nation's identity, he was just as emphatic, calling the United States 
[in 1846] "the asylum of all nations...the energy of Irish, Germans, Swedes, Poles and 
Cossacks, and all the European tribes, of the Africans and Polynesians, will construct a 
new race...as vigorous as the new Europe which came out of the smelting pot of the Dark 
Ages." (Curti 1946: 202-3) Emerson's exuberance is noteworthy, especially in view of 
the fact that he wrote at about the same time that:
It cannot be maintained by any candid person that the African race have ever occupied or do promise ever to occupy any very high place in the human family...The Irish cannot; the American Indian cannot; the Chinese cannot. Before the energy of the Caucasian race all other races have quailed and done obeisance.

A thorough reading of Emerson shows that these pronouncements were hardly exceptional in the ante-bellum period. The beginnings of this line of thought can be traced to 1822, when Emerson declared:

I believe that nobody now regards the maxim 'that all men are created equal,' as any thing more than a convenient hypothesis or an extravagant declamation...for the reverse is true,—that all men are born unequal...The least knowledge of the natural history of man adds another important particular to these: namely, of what class of men he belongs to--European, Moor, Tartar, African? Because Nature has plainly assigned different degrees of intellect to these different races, and the barriers between are insurmountable...." (Goldman 1992: 242-44, emphasis added)

Emerson's reaffirmation of the genealogical link between England and America continued into the 1850's, when he concisely argued that immigrants did not affect the ethnic composition of the United States:

So far have British people predominated. Perhaps forty of these millions [in the Empire] are of British stock. Add the United States of America, which reckon (in
the same year), exclusive of slaves, 20,000,000 people...and in which the foreign element, however considerable, is rapidly assimilated, and you have a population of English descent and language of 60,000,000, and governing a population of 245,000,000 souls. (Emerson [1856] 1902: 25-6, emphasis added)

What makes Emerson unique is less his contradictory beliefs (which were the norm in his day) than his valiant attempt to explain the contradiction, which gives us a unique window into the psyche of the nineteenth century American liberal elite. As Anita Goldman explains, Emerson often conflated race with culture and advocated liberal and ethnic nationalist theories in tandem:

Although rights and race represent contradictory views of the self and nation, the two concepts are not at cross purposes in Emerson's writings. Neither rights nor race alone is sufficient to represent Emersonian double-consciousness, and the two concepts gain justification and force by the fact of their juxtaposition. The incessant elaboration upon this condition of double-consciousness in Emerson's writings--his affirmation of ties which are both distinctively racial and which express his commitment to liberal ideals--has clear applicability in the field of American nationalist thought, where the social significance of "race" has often gone unaccounted for in the compromised extension of rights. (Goldman 1992: 284)
The preceding discussion of secular double-consciousness in American thought during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries illustrates how Anglo-American thinkers expressed the latent tensions between their dominant ethnicity and their commitment to liberal-egalitarian principles. We shall now examine how the thinking of religious and secular figures in the latter half of the nineteenth century tended to run along the same dualistic paths that had been carved out by their predecessors.

Double-Consciousness and American Organized Protestantism

The conflation of "race" and "rights" in the prose of mid-nineteenth century literati also characterizes the writing of Anglo-Protestant religious elites. The arena of church-state relations illustrates this well: Protestant leaders of the late nineteenth century, especially Baptists and Methodists, continually rejected calls to write Protestant religiosity into the Constitution, yet they emphatically asserted that "the government of these United States [is] necessarily, rightfully, and lawfully Christian." (Handy 1991: 10) Here again we see the tension implicit in the pattern of double-consciousness: Anglo-Protestants wanted their tradition to be supreme, but their universalist liberal commitments would not countenance boundary-defending measures of legislative origin.

Witness the lack of enthusiasm for the National Religious Association's Christian constitutional Amendment displayed by many prominent churchmen in the 1870's. Such a move would have been too explicit, smacking of both religious establishment, which evangelicals historically feared, and of a lack of faith in the power of the Gospel. However, though they rejected the efforts of the NRA, the American Protestant elite sympathized with their motive to make the United States a "Christian" nation. Beneath
the respect for a separation of church and state, therefore, was the undeniable zeal to transform the infidel into the (Protestant) Christian.

To this end, Protestant leaders used every instrument at their disposal to ensure that social pressure was brought to bear on legislators and opinion-makers. In effect, a Protestant "voluntary establishment" was being unleashed, which led to conformity at the civic level, influenced political and legislative discourse and shaped practices in the nation's public schools.6 But, as Robert Handy explains, "the goal of a Protestant civilization was to be realized by persuasion only-so most Protestant leaders sincerely believed." (Handy 1971: 55; Handy 1991: 26; Goodheart 1991: 135-6 )

The emphasis on individualism and voluntarism that characterized the evangelical position on church-state relations also held with respect to the relationship between Anglo-Protestant ethnicity and the American nation. Immigrants, even if Catholic, should not be excluded by legislation, but rather were to be converted to "true" Christianity and transmuted into (Anglo) Americans by the new nation's liberal democracy, free land, public schools and Anglo-Protestant culture.

The roots of this voluntarist posture were certainly in place by the 1840's, when large-scale Catholic immigration led to a strong spirit of cooperation among various Protestant denominations, as symbolized by the formation of the Evangelical Alliance for the United States in 1847. Protestant leaders, though vehemently opposed to Catholicism, nevertheless eschewed immigration restriction, their hands stayed by their liberal inheritance. Buoyed by a sense of divine election, these clergymen confidently predicted that they could effect a new reformation on American soil and convert the immigrants to the "American" faith. (Billington 1938: 280; Jordan 1982: 21-25)
The public school was assigned a leading role in the fight for the ethnic transmutation of the immigrant. Thus Samuel Bowles, in an editorial in the Springfield (Mass.) Republican, declared in 1866 that: "The only true and, in the end, effective engine against Popery is enlightened education. For the education of a well-balanced mind cannot be satisfied with the senseless forms, which go to make up all that Popery is." (Demerath & Williams 1992: 43; May [1949] 1967: 42) At the denominational level, evangelical Protestants maintained a similar optimism: the Catholic immigrant would see the light and convert to the "national" religion. (Moorhead 1994: 147)

Protestant optimism flowed seamlessly into Anglo-Saxon optimism, for in the same manner as the "education" of Catholic immigrants would lead them to the true faith, it would subsume them in the Anglo-Saxon race. This was confirmed at a meeting of the Evangelical Alliance in 1887, when Samuel Harris, the Episcopal Bishop of Michigan proclaimed, to rapturous applause, that:

The consistency of the divine purpose in establishing our evangelical civilization here is signally illustrated in the fact that it was primarily confided to the keeping of the Anglo-Saxon race…endowed with a certain race conservatism and a certain consistency of race type, it has sturdily maintained itself, even to the present time. Refusing to depart from its own type, it has compelled other people to conform to that type and constrained them to accept its institutions, to speak its language, to obey its laws.
In conclusion, Harris reinforced the pattern of liberal ethnicity that had come to be so firmly established by his time, writing that while "it has come to pass that...our nation is composite, it continues to be homogeneous, obeying the laws of Alfred and speaking the language of Shakespeare and Milton." (Handy 1971: 105-6, emphasis added)

Harris was merely recycling thoughts brought to the fore by the Congregationalist leader Josiah Strong a few years earlier. Strong, alarmed at Catholic immigration, had insisted that, "During the last ten years [1875-85] we have suffered a peaceful invasion by an army more than four times as vast as the estimated number of Goths and Vandals that swept over Southern Europe and overwhelmed Rome." On the other hand, Strong reaffirmed the optimistic convention that "the Anglo-Saxon race is to be, is, indeed, already becoming, more effective here than in the mother country. The marked superiority of this race is due, in large measure, to its highly mixed origin." (Strong [1885] 1963: 42, 210)

For other Protestant figures, the adaptability of the Anglo-Saxon ethnie to new environments and the universalist possibilities inherent in the English language made the Anglo-Americans Christianity's chosen servants: "In politics and morals," wrote O.B. Super in the Methodist Review in 1890, "the Anglo-Saxon, especially the American, seems destined to be the teacher of the world." (Moorhead 1994: 147) Here again, a universalist claim (universal possibilities of the English language) is balanced by a particularist one (Anglo-Saxons as teachers of the world), reinforcing an established pattern of duality

A final pillar of traditional American Protestant ideology was that diverse immigration provided evidence of American election, and that the world's tribes would
gather in the United States for the new millennium. "In the gathering of all nations and races upon our shores," exclaimed Baptist Home Missionary Society superintendent Hubert C. Woods in 1889, "do we not witness the providential preparation for a second Pentecost that shall usher in the millennial glory?" (Davis 1973: 44-50) In making this triumphalist assertion, Woods was indulging an American Anglo-Protestant proclivity for millennial thinking - a rhetorical device that in no way precluded a deeper belief in the sanctity of the United States as an ethnic, Anglo-Saxon nation. This combination of cosmopolitan millennialism and dominant ethnicity thereby imparted a unique flavour to the Protestant clergy's variant of double-consciousness.

**Double-Consciousness and American Historiography**

The position of the clerical Anglo-Saxonists discussed above neatly harmonized with secular currents of thought ascendant at the time, illustrating how closely intertwined the two traditions were in American life. With regard to the latter, John Higham observed,

> The Anglo-Saxonists were pro rather than con. During an age of confidence almost no race-thinker directly challenged a tolerant and eclectic attitude toward other European groups. Instead, Anglo-Saxon and cosmopolitan nationalisms merged in a happy belief that the Anglo-Saxon has a marvelous capacity for assimilating kindred races, absorbing their valuable qualities, yet remaining essentially unchanged. (Higham 1955 [1986]: 33)
The early pages of Theodore Roosevelt's *Winning of the West* give us a sense of this optimistic, voluntarist, dominant ethnicity: "Some latter-day writers deplore the enormous immigration to our shores as making us a heterogeneous instead of a homogeneous people; but as a matter of fact we are less heterogeneous at the present day than we were at the outbreak of the Revolution. Our blood was as much mixed a century ago as it is now." (Roosevelt 1889I: 21) Historians like Roosevelt are important because they hold a key position in the community, responsible for creating its ethno-history, a narrative that tells a story, inspires the people and provides them with a sense of shared ancestry. (Smith 1986: 25-6) Such ethno-histories may employ universal techniques and theories, but tend to do so within the particularist framework of collective memory.

The nature of Anglo-American historical narrative changed somewhat between 1875 and 1925, but it was not until the 1930's that a new generation of historians began to interpret the United States as a truly cosmopolitan melting pot. Historiography during the 1875-1925 period was therefore completely reflective of the "double-consciousness" paradigm.7 Hence, as Edward Saveth notes, the Anglo-Protestant historians who dominated the American academy combined the ethno-cultural belief "that the United States was essentially an Anglo-Saxon country and [must be] preserve[d]...as such" with "the [universalist] idea of the United States as a refuge for the oppressed of Europe...[and] a composite nation." (Saveth 1948: 13-14) To reiterate, it is necessary to understand that liberal and Anglo-Protestant attitudes were not opposing viewpoints, but part of the same myth-symbol complex of dualistic beliefs. (Higham [1955] 1986: 33, 133; R. Smith 1995: 238-39)
Double-Consciousness and the Frontier Thesis

Elite narratives of American national identity in the late nineteenth century were centred around the Anglo-Saxon myth, an Anglo-American version of the Teutonic germ theory, which traced the origin of democracy and liberty to primitive tribes in the forests of Germany. Employing a mix of Teutonism and Social Darwinism, Herbert Baxter Adams, John Fiske, John W. Burgess and James K Hosmer drew parallels between ancient Anglo-Saxon institutions and those of the village life of contemporary New England, such as the town meeting or "folk-mote." Meanwhile, the most popular nineteenth-century American historians, George Bancroft, William Prescott, John Motley and Francis Parkman, helped popularize the myth among a wider audience. (Ross 1984: 917) An indication of the theory's popularity in 1891 is the view of one observer that "so wide has been its acceptance, and so strongly installed is it in the minds both of students and readers that it may seem more bold than discreet to raise the question regarding the soundness of the theory." (Saveth 1948: 26)

Anglo-Saxonist historians regularly blended both ethnocentric and universalist passages in their pronouncements on the matter of American identity. However, what is less well-known is that their environmentalist successors performed an identical cognitive feat. The key figure in this process, of course, was Frederick Jackson Turner. Drawing on the work of future presidents Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, Turner pushed the environmental interpretation to its conclusion and attempted to refute the Teutonic origins theory, thereby undermining a principal cornerstone of American
Anglo-Saxonism. According to Turner's new "frontier thesis" presented in 1893, "in the crucible of the frontier the immigrants were Americanized, liberated, and fused into a mixed race, English in neither nationality nor characteristics." He conceived of American society as a melting pot in which "all gave and all received and no element remained isolated." (Saveth 1948: 26)

In large measure, though, Turner's pronouncements differed little from those of Emerson or any other proponent of double-consciousness. The best evidence for this lies in the specifics of Turner's writing. For instance, despite talk of Americans as a "new product which held the promise of universal brotherhood," Turner repeatedly singled out the Anglo-Saxon, Scotch-Irish and German elements as central to the national enterprise and the frontier experience. (Turner 1920: 23, 68, 92, 102-5, 164, 349, 351) In addition, Turner occasionally slipped into the habit of referring to the Anglo-Saxons as the "native stock," though Turner's definition of the nation had definitely expanded to include the previously marginalized Germans.

Turner's work proved a major break in the paradigm shift from Anglo-America to Universalist America, but Turner himself did not successfully make that break, turning his back on the "large immigrations of the eighties" of southern/eastern Europeans to the cities. (Turner 1920: 351) Turner's inspiration was Western regionalism and his scientific tools were Lamarckianism and environmentalist theories of race formation. The desire to see a unique American ethnic type, different from the Briton and based on the Western experience, led Turner to interpret the frontier environment as a race-shaping one. However, Turner's lack of deeply felt liberal universalism meant that his cosmopolitan Americanism tended to evaporate in the light of its practical correlates.
For example, many of Turner's later writings indicate that he envisaged an essentially Anglo-Protestant, rural America, albeit with a more inclusive definition of dominant ethnicity than his Anglo-Saxonist colleagues. In many ways, therefore, Turner helped narrate the new distinction between the "old" stock, of northern and western Europe, and the "new" immigration. Hence, by 1900, he was explicitly criticizing the newer immigration, both for its diversity and its urbanity, claiming that the closing of the frontier and the new immigration had "effects upon American social well-being [that] are dangerous in the extreme" and deploring the "peaceful conquest of the old stock by an international army of workers." (Saveth 1948: 132, 134) Evidently, Turner had merely emphasized one part of his inherited American mythomoteur\(^8\) (frontier, liberty, agrarianism) without jettisoning the other symbols (Protestantism, Nordic whiteness).

Indeed, as Turner's statements reveal, the Turnerian revolution should be viewed less as a victory for universalism than as a refinement of American dominant ethnicity, which rendered it a more native American product. Consequently, on the eve of the twentieth century, an established pattern of ethno-national/universalist-liberal duality, or "double-consciousness," operated as the prevalent idiom of nationalist discourse among the American cultural and political elite.

**The Twentieth Century: Age of Reckoning**

The vitality of the dualist juggernaut began to falter towards the end of the nineteenth century, a process which was substantially complete by the 1920's. Emerging from this process was a new well-defined split between ethno-nationalist and liberal-
universalist social actors. On the ethno-nationalist side of the ledger, one could count the foundation of the Immigration Restriction League in 1887, the near-passage of a literacy test for immigrants in 1897, the rise of the second Ku Klux Klan in the 1920's and the passage of the Johnson-Reed Act in 1924.⁹ (Higham [1955] 1986; King 2000)

Similarly, liberal universalists coalesced behind the tenets of Liberal Progressivism after 1905, predicated on the beliefs of John Dewey and William James that the Anglo-Saxon element was merely one ingredient in a global, American melting-pot. (Lissak 1989: 141) From this point, in the first decade of the twentieth century, the contradictions inherent in American dualism were exposed, forcing individuals to take sides. No longer could one be both an ardent cosmopolitan and a romantic Anglo-Saxon nationalist. Instead, one either had to support the white, Anglo-conformist vision of the nation or a cosmopolitan, post-WASP variant of Americanism. Exactly what was the stake that had been driven into the heart of double-consciousness? This is the problem with which we shall next concern ourselves.

**INTERROGATING THE PHENOMENON OF DOUBLE-CONSCIOUSNESS**

The dualist cultural idiom employed by American elites in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries - which simultaneously extolled the virtues of American universalism while affirming a romantic Anglo-Protestant Americanism - and the subsequent decline of this dualist idiom, can only be sufficiently explained by employing a multi-causal strategy.
The most prominent explanations include the following:

1) The inclusive character of Anglo-American ethnic nationhood
2) The dualistic heritage of Anglo-American Protestantism
3) The changing degree of institutional reflexivity in the United States

Let us consider each in turn.

**The Inclusive Character of Anglo-American Ethnic Nationhood**

The first explanation rests on the notion that Anglo-American elites were ethnic nationalists, but maintained a liberal posture toward immigration, provided it came from northwestern Europe. This generated an aura of universalism whose rhetorical stamina was as limited as the era of northwestern European immigration. Fredrik Barth's emphasis upon the importance of ethnic boundaries highlights the fact that ethnic groups are not hermetically sealed bagfulls of racial or cultural "stuff." Rather, ethnicity admits of a high degree of demographic permeability - so long as symbolic boundaries (including phenotype) are maintained over time. (Barth 1969: 20-25) Accordingly, we might imagine nineteenth-century Anglo-Protestant dominant ethnicity in the United States to be a highly assimilative construct which nevertheless maintained its symbolic exclusivity. Since nearly all American immigrants prior to the 1870's came from Canada or northern Europe, phenotype was not an issue. Instead, it is plausible that American elites sincerely believed that German, Irish and Scandinavian immigrants
would recombine into American Englishmen, just as Saxon, Celt and Norman had in the
Old World.

The correlate of this position holds that the contradictions between a liberal
immigration policy and the maintenance of ethnic boundaries were exposed through
*praxis*. Specifically, as soon as the supply of immigrants shifted away from the Nordic
northwest of Europe toward the southeast of that continent and Asia, Anglo-American
elites sensed a threat to their ethnic boundaries. The Chinese Exclusion Act (1882), and
the train of immigration restrictionist socio-political ferment between 1885 and 1925 is
therefore to be attributed to the greater social distance between Anglo-Protestants and the

There is a large measure of truth in this explanation, and it likely underlay the
thought-process of many Anglo-American writers. Theodore Roosevelt made the
connection between English and American social processes particularly explicit in the
late 1880's when he compared the American assimilation of German and Celt to the
English absorption of Saxon, Briton and Dane. (Roosevelt 1889I: 247) Emerson revealed
the same sentiment when he gave thanks that the United States had been spared the
"black eyes, the black drop, the Europe of Europe." (Higham [1955] 1986: 65)

Even so, the logic of liberal, anglo-conformist assimilation only appears to
account for a portion of "race-rights" dualism, there being numerous chinks in its armor.
To begin with, such an explanation fails to properly account for variation in the timing of
nativism during the supposedly uncontentious era of northwestern European immigration.
For instance, there was considerable anti-Catholic agitation during 1840-1860, but less
More important, the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was a labour-driven bill that was widely condemned by the leading Anglo-American cultural, political and economic voices, who wished to maintain a free flow of immigration from China. Hence a founder of the Connecticut Republican party declared in 1870, "With our flag over me, and the New Testament in my hand, I say Let them [Chinese] come!" (NY Tribune – 05/07/1870) A large part of their openness stemmed from the economic utility of the Chinese, but it was also rooted in the universalist belief that the coming of the Chinese represented God's will and confirmed the central role of the United States in world history. (Seward 1881: 254; Davis 1973: 19, 24-5; Gyory 1998: 249)

Second, once this elite began to accept the need for restrictions to be placed on immigration (in the late 1880's), its arguments focused more strongly on the "old" immigration from Ireland and Germany than on the new. Namely, the Catholicism, intemperance and political acumen of many of the "old" immigrants and their children was perceived to be a more pressing affair than the racial exoticism of the southern/eastern European "new" immigrants. (Davis 1973: 86-7; Jones 1992 [1960]: 152-54; Knobel 1996: 195; Strong 1885 [1963]: 55) Large-scale Catholic immigration had been a fact of life since the 1830's. Consequently, we must explain why the volume of anti-Catholic rhetoric rose after 1885. This points to an internal (i.e. growth of institutional reflexivity), rather than external (i.e. new sources of immigrants) dynamic of elite attitude change.

One other, more serious, objection to the "liberal, anglo-confomist" argument also bears mentioning. Namely, that Anglo-American elites' liberal attitude to pre-1880 immigration from northern Europe cannot conceivably explain the presence of numerous
universalist exhortations. These universalist pronouncements constitute the kernel of dualist discourse - embracing peoples from the "four corners of the world." Such utterances clearly fall outside the ambit of anglo-conformist assimilation, and cannot be woven into any story involving an analogy between England and the United States. To explain this universalism therefore requires an explanation which transcends the notion of assimilative ethnicity. We shall therefore have to entertain arguments which focus more narrowly on the cognitive structures which might have generated double-consciousness.

The Dualistic Heritage of Anglo-American Protestantism.

One such cognitive apparatus is religious. It is well-known that American Protestantism developed a more radical, decentralized, "low-church" structure than its British or Anglo-Canadian counterparts. (O' Toole 1996; Handy 1976) Though regionally diverse, American Protestants had been subject to New England's influence as a result of the two Great Awakenings (1725-50, 1780-1830) and through the growth of Protestant voluntary associations like the ecumenical Evangelical Alliance. Indeed, the vibrancy of this network of associations has led some to comment that there arose a Protestant "voluntary establishment" during the nineteenth century. (Hutchison 1989: 4, 303) And while it is undeniable that New England Protestantism had divested itself of Calvinism by the nineteenth century, this does not invalidate the contention that Calvinist cultural idioms had crystallized an important, dualistic, American habit of mind prior to that period.
This mental reflex can arguably be traced to the Old Testament, so central to the Calvinist tradition. For instance, the Old Testament tends to name the Jews as a people chosen by God:

Now therefore, if ye will obey my voice indeed, and keep my covenant, then ye shall be a peculiar treasure unto me above all people: for all the earth is mine. And ye shall be unto me a kingdom of priests, and an holy nation. (Exodus 19:5-6).

Yet, despite the predominantly ethnic tone, the selective reader can tease out some universalist passages, such as:

Know ye therefore that they which are of faith, the same are the children of Abraham. And the scripture, foreseeing that God would justify the heathen through faith, preached before the Gospel unto Abraham saying, In thee shall all nations be blessed. So then they which be of faith are blessed with faithful Abraham (Gal. 3:6-9). (O'Brien 1988: 4-6)

The New Testament is considerably more universalist in tone, and the combination of pre and post-Christian influences arguably reinforced the sense of double-consciousness on the "race/rights" question among nationalists in Christian nations. (Hastings 1997: 199-200, 202) Anglo-American elites of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as heirs of
the free-church and Calvinist traditions, would be expected to display a particularly prominent form of this dualism.

One relatively simple test of the aforementioned argument is to examine the writings of prominent writers on the matter of nationhood who hail from outside the American Protestant tradition. This tactic foregrounds the limitations inherent in our second, "low church" explanatory scheme. For example, a closer perusal of the writing of several French and English figures demonstrates that double-consciousness is clearly a broader, trans-Atlantic phenomenon.

The French-born settler Hector St. John de Crèvecoeur, for example, is often quoted to provide examples of America's cosmopolitan nationhood. This is unsurprising, for Crèvecoeur waxed eloquently in 1782 about Americans' "strange mixture of blood, which you will find in no other country." (Kohn 1957: 3) The archetypal American apparently left "behind him all his ancient prejudices and manners," while on American soil, "individuals of all races are melted into a new race of men, whose labours and posterity will one day cause great changes in the world." Notwithstanding the effusiveness of his rhetoric, Crèvecoeur's enthusiasm for the new mixed-origin American was a posture conditioned by both romantic millennialism and Crèvecoeur's outsider status in his adopted homeland.12 (Daniels 1998: 29-30)

Behind the rhetoric, Crèvecoeur was only too well aware of the Anglo-Protestant nature of America. First of all, he employed the Anglo-Saxon pseudonym Hector St. John for his Letters, rather than his real name, Michael-Guillaume-Jean de Crèvecoeur, illustrating the anglo-conformist pressures prevalent at the time. We would likewise do well to remember that Crèvecoeur, according to Liah Greenfeld, "was as firmly
convinced of the Englishness of America as any American of British descent." Indeed, he remarked that an English traveler in America would feel pride that his fellow nationals "brought along with them [To America] their national genius, to which they [Americans] principally owe what liberty they enjoy and what substance they possess." (Greenfeld 1992: 408-9)

Some fifty years later, another Frenchman, Alexis de Tocqueville, fell prey to the same kind of thinking. At times, Tocqueville appears to be exhorting his readership to behold a new futuristic nation:

Imagine, my dear friend, if you can, a society formed of all the nations of the world...people having different languages, beliefs, opinions: in a word, a society without roots, without memories, without prejudices, without routines, without common ideas, without a national character, yet a hundred times happier than our own.

However, in most other instances, we see a different side to Tocqueville's futuristic Americanism:

There is hardly an American to be met with who does not claim some remote kindred with the first founders of the colonies; and as for the scions of the noble families of England, America seemed to be me to be covered with them.

(Tocqueville 1835I: 173-74)
Tocqueville also repeatedly referred to the Americans as the "English race in America" or the "Anglo-Americans," indicating that, like Crèvecoeur, he felt the terms basically interchangeable. Like those before him and many after him, it seems Tocqueville's cosmopolitan view of America was merely a rhetorical tool used only in his more visionary moments.

A similar pattern suffuses Lord Acton's oft-quoted essay, "Nationality," penned in 1862. In its pages, Acton, an Englishman, appears to champion the mixture of ethnic groups in one society: "Christianity rejoices at the mixture of races, as paganism identifies itself with their differences, because truth is universal and errors various and particular." Accordingly, nation-states "in which no mixture of races has occurred are imperfect; and those in which its [ethnic diversity's] effects have disappeared are decrepit." (Acton 1862 [1996]: 31, 36)

However, several paragraphs later, Acton performs an apparent volte-face which makes it clear that ethnic mixture which is not territorially segregated results in an undesirable state of affairs:

The vanity and peril of national claims founded on no political tradition, but on race alone, appear in Mexico. There the races are divided by blood, without being grouped together in different regions. It is, therefore, neither possible to unite them nor to convert them into the elements of an organized State. They are fluid, shapeless and unconnected, and cannot be precipitated, or formed into the basis of political institutions…. (Acton 1862 [1996]: 35)
Furthermore, Acton was quick to emphasize that his multiculturalist prescriptions should not be translated into a belief in the equality of cultures. On the contrary, in multinational states, "inferior races are raised by living in political union with races intellectually superior…Nations in which the elements of organisation and the capacity for government have been lost...are restored and educated anew under the discipline of a stronger and less corrupted race." (Acton [1862] in Birch 1989: 28)

Acton's contemporary, John Stuart Mill, was no less vexing in his dualism. Hence in 1860, Mill argued that a "feeling of nationality," which requires the effect of "race and descent," is necessary for the proper functioning of representative government. (Goldman 1992: 250) On the other hand, Mill famously declared that tradition and nation could serve as sources of stagnation. "Where, not the person's own character, but the traditions or customs of other people are the rule of conduct," Mill wrote, "there is wanting…the chief ingredient of individual and social progress…The despotism of custom is everywhere the standing hindrance to human advancement." (Mill [1859] 1974: 185, 200)

Even Count Arthur de Gobineau, that apostle of Nordic superiority and race-thinking, had his dualistic moments, as in the 1850's, when he qualified his beliefs by adding that "It would be unjust to assert that every mixture is bad and harmful…Artistic genius, which is equally foreign to each of the three great [race] types arose only after the intermarriage of white and black....Although the whites are the most beautiful of the original races, the most beautiful people of all have come from the marriage of white and black." (Gossett 1963: 343-44) In summary, the claim that Americans were uniquely
prone to double-consciousness in matters of nationalism because of their low-church heritage of dualism, is at best a limited conclusion.

**The Role of Institutional Reflexivity**

The liberal nature of Anglo-American ethnic nationhood, and its subsequent collision with "unassimilable" newcomers, offers us some insight into the startlingly contradictory statements we have reviewed, and their gradual disappearance after 1885. Likewise, the dualistic "second language" of identity conferred upon Anglo-Americans by their brand of Protestantism sheds some light on the patterns observed. Nevertheless, having run the phenomenon of American double consciousness through the gauntlet of our first two paradigms, it is apparent that a significant portion of our documentary evidence remains unexplained by "native American" hypotheses. In order to bridge this gap, we require a macro-theory, that of reflexive modernization, that transcends the American context.

According to Anthony Giddens, institutional reflexivity refers to the process whereby the analysis and discussion of society, situated in major societal institutions and often conducted by experts, in turn shapes that society. Methods of surveillance and record-keeping, which greatly developed during the nineteenth century, are integral to the effectiveness of institutional reflexivity. (Giddens 1991: 20-21, 149) As a corollary of his position, Giddens envisions institutional reflexivity as a diachronic process - the degree, or density of reflexivity increases over time. Specifically, we may isolate two ingredients in the development of institutional reflexivity: an improvement in
surveillance/information gathering and a growth in the efficacy of the rational bureaucratic structures that process this new data.

One important site of growing reflexivity in the late nineteenth century was the academy. American universities were beginning to lose their reliance on religious sponsorship, beginning in the 1870's with nonsectarian, albeit Protestant, institutions like Cornell. (Kraut 1979: 96) The growth of academic professional associations, outside the orbit of organized religion, issued from the same social forces. (Persons 1987: 28-9; Bass 1989: 49-53; Jarausch 1983) These expanding secular networks helped broaden the bandwidth of scientific enquiry and intensify the rate with which academics could exchange information. The new critical mass of intellectual exchange helped sharpen conceptual boundaries, accentuate the degree of specialization, refine scientific techniques and hasten the spread of new ideas. The replacement of religious and romantically-inspired narrative histories with document-driven, "scientific history" in the late nineteenth century provides but one example of the effects of the reflexivity juggernaut. (Plumb 1969; Kennedy 1977; Ross 1984)

In a similar manner, the reflexive feedback of scientific knowledge pervaded the influential institutional realm of American Protestantism. For example, the Social Gospel movement, which gained ground in the late 1880's, largely based its criticism of laissez-faire (including free immigration) on the findings of empirical social science. Unchecked capitalism, urbanism and expansion were singled out for criticism, as were traditional, individual-centred approaches to social improvement. One outcome of the Social Gospel's recognition of the importance of institutional solutions to social problems was a critique of the optimistic, pro-immigration, "divine providence" doctrine. This connection
appears most strongly in the persona of Josiah Strong, an important Social Gospel figure who influenced Protestant opinion in favour of immigration restriction in the 1880's and 1890's. For Strong, "political optimism" was singled out as "one of the vices of the American people....We deem ourselves a chosen people, and incline to the belief that the Almighty stands pledged to our prosperity...Such optimism is as senseless as pessimism is faithless." (Strong 1885 [1963]: 41-2; Gossett 1963: 196-97; Jordan 1982: 143-44, 168-70)

The impact of reflexive modernization registered an analagous influence in the province of the natural sciences. Its influence on the discipline of human biology is particularly germane to our discussion. Anglo-Americans had been able to indulge in both romantic ethno-nationalism and universalist liberalism partly because they conflated biological "race" and anthropological culture. (Higham [1955] 1986: 24). Since the laws of heredity had yet to be uncovered in the nineteenth century, it was often believed that cultural change could facilitate racial change. Accordingly, theories that set forth Christianity, Enlightenment education and climate as agents of racial "whitening" occupied a central place in eighteenth and nineteenth century race thinking in both Europe and the Americas.15 (Eze 1997: 24)

These ideas were reflected in the prevailing discourse on American national identity. Lamarck's belief in the inheritance of acquired characteristics, for example, greatly influenced Frederick Jackson Turner's frontier thesis. (Billington 1971) Likewise, physician Benjamin Rush, signatory to the Declaration of Independence, believed that blackness was a disease, like leprosy, that could be cured with proper treatment. (Perea 1997: 159) Savannah doctor Eugene Corson subscribed to a similar theory, propounding
the idea, in 1877, that black Americans would throw off their "ill-adapted" skin colour with education, a process he likened to "the running of a dirty stream into a pellucid lake which eventually clears leaving no trace of mud." (Harper 1980: 215) Similar tendencies could be observed in turn-of-the-century Brazil, where, in an age in which genetics was in its infancy, "whitening" emerged as the paramount ideal of the intellectual elite. (Skidmore 1993: 46)

The growth in sophistication of the discourse on race gained amplification and precision with the eugenics movement. The term eugenics was not coined until 1883, but by 1910, an American Eugenics Record Office had been established at Cold Spring Harbor, New York, under the directorship of biologist Charles Davenport, funded by both the Carnegie Institute and philanthropist Mrs. E. Harriman. (King 2000: 166) Eugenics rapidly became the common currency of discussion about race and nationality, and its findings directly impinged on the immigration policy debates of the 1910's and 1920's. For instance, Dr. Harry Laughlin of the Cold Spring Harbor laboratory established strong connections with the State Department and with Senator Albert Johnson, who co-sponsored the 1924 Johnson-Reed Act which instituted the national origins immigration quota system. President Calvin Coolidge similarly adopted the new scientific terminology, asserting that "biological laws tell us that certain divergent people will not mix or blend." (Gossett 1963: 297; King 2000: 169)

It matters little that eugenics was based on shoddy science. What is important is that eugenic findings were legitimated by scientific methods and reflexively transmitted via the expanding print media toward the opinion-forming and policy-making centres of American society. Developments in biological science which fueled the eugenics
movement no more caused nativism than did the advances in social science which gave rise to Social Gospel Christianity. However, these forces constituted the debates of the day and forced apart the concepts of race and culture, eclipsing the ambiguous space in which double-consciousness had always existed. This compelled individuals to take sharply-defined sides as either ethnic nationalists or universalists.

Such changes occurred rapidly - almost always in the ethno-nationalist direction - in the 1880's, and have often been misinterpreted as a 180-degree value shift, a historic betrayal of traditional American universalism. Far from being conjured out of thin air, however, fin de siècle nativism drew on underlying symbolic resources. Closer analysis thereby reveals that individuals did not simply switch from universalism to ethno-nationalism, as many seem to suggest. Instead, they merely placed the emphasis on the ethnic side of their inherited Anglo-American double-consciousness complex. For instance, in 1880, Boston statesman and future nativist senator Henry Cabot Lodge, flashing the cosmopolitan side of his dualistic Americanism, eagerly welcomed that year's influx of 700,000 immigrants and showered glowing praise on the American school system, "with its doors wide open to the children of all races and of every creed." Deriding "any political divisions resting on race and religion", he condemned attempts to "divide our people according to origin and extraction."

However, just a few years later, Lodge, citing LeBon, registered his belief that there was a "limit to the capacity of any race for assimilating and elevating an inferior race." Similarly, as late as 1890, Dr. Richmond Mayo-Smith was outlining a definition of race that was more cultural than biological. Several years later, he restricted his definition to the biological realm and advocated eugenic measures. (Solomon 1956: 68, 114, 116,
Even Dwight Spencer, formulator of the concept of America's divine universal mission, like his Baptist missionary colleagues, changed his attitude from universalism to restrictionism between 1887 and 1895. (Davis 1973: 70, 85) To repeat: these individuals were not born-again nativists, but, under the impact of heightened reflexivity, found themselves forced to confront the duality of their inherited beliefs. In these cases, as in most, it was their ethnic, rather than universalist values which exercised a greater attraction.

The linkage between scientific research and society, discussed above, was further accentuated by the increasing reflexivity of the American nation-state, which now provided better social data, available from a more centralized, bureaucratic infrastructure. The decennial census of 1880 was the first to compile data on the literacy of immigrants, and the 1890 census allowed statisticians to compute the proportion of the foreign-born population unable to speak English. (Easterlin 1982: 10-11) This not only aided ethnically-conscious Anglo-Protestant legislators, but actually helped to constitute their legislation, as with the first drive for a literacy test (1894-97) to limit immigration from "undesirable" sources. (Higham [1955] 1986: 74)

The same pattern appears twenty years later with the Dillingham Commission's 47-volume report of 1911, which presented the first full-scale study of the ethnic characteristics of the American population. This report, which cost over a million dollars, helped lay the groundwork for more restrictive legislation constituted on the basis of ethnic origin, in 1921 and 1924. (King 2000: 58-9) Once again, new scientific findings fed directly into the reflexive demarcation of the nation's ethnic boundaries.
"There was very little of a national center in the first several decades of the Second American Republic," remarks Keith Fitzgerald of the post-1865 period. Only with the tightening of federal administration of immigration control through acts of 1894, 1895 and 1903 was this rectified. The result was a national, administrative focal point, which could be targeted by both liberal and nativist social movements. These in turn depended on the activities of newly-formed, national, voluntary associations. For the nativists, these included the Sons (1876) and Daughters (1890) of the American Revolution and the American Legion. For the liberal universalists, the Federal Council of Churches (1908) and Immigrant Protective Association (1908) figured prominently. (Zelinsky 1988: 105; Cavert 1968: 54-6; Fitzgerald 1987: 71, 87, 91, 95)

As our theory would predict, this trend was not confined to the United States. Just as nation-states only developed sharp demarcations of their territorial boundaries after the late eighteenth century, the ethnic boundaries of their populations were only clearly defined in the early twentieth. (Brubaker 1992: 30; Giddens [1985] 1996: 90, 210) This explains why immigration to Britain, France, Canada, Switzerland and Germany remained essentially uncontrolled until the First World War, after which restrictions appeared in all these countries. (Hollifield 1994: 147; Martin 1994: 197; Jost 1986; Holmes 1988)

Thus far, much has been mentioned about the way in which growing institutional reflexivity in the United States prompted the nation to pursue an ethno-nationalist course. The undoubted influence of the new scientific literature on America's restrictive immigration policy of the 1920's has led many to suggest that these forces generated a rise in nativism. However, a more plausible suggestion, given the evidence, is that
enhanced institutional reflexivity merely *structured* the debate by demarcating the lines of opposition between contending concepts, the pitch of nativism rising and falling for other reasons. Thus it is the case that the era of double consciousness did not give way to single-minded nativism, but rather bifurcated as modern reflexivity split the coin of dualism into its logically-consistent halves. Hence scientific arguments were employed by both the restrictionist majority *and a liberal-cosmopolitan minority*.

The earliest figures to refine pure, cosmopolitan universalism from the rhetoric of double-consciousness were Felix Adler and William James. Adler, for example, first applied a rigorous logical framework to the formerly opaque tenets of Reform Judaism, whose form of double-consciousness had endorsed the twin ideas of Jews' universal mission and their Old Testament election. Thus Adler, himself a Jew, asserted in 1878 that once the Jews had brought their universal truth to the four corners of the globe (the providential result of their forced dispersion), they would lose their particularity within a universal humanity:

The perpetuity of the Jewish race depends upon the perpetuity of the Jewish religion...So long as there shall be a reason of existence for Judaism, so long the individual Jews will keep apart and will do well to do so...when this process [of evangelization] is accomplished...the individual members of the Jewish race [will] look about them and perceive that there is as great and perhaps greater liberty in
religion beyond the pale of their race and will lose their peculiar idiosyncrasies, and their distinctiveness will fade. And eventually, the Jewish race will die. (Kraut 1979: 122-23)

Adler's consistent, rigorous interpretation of Reform Jewish universality led him to be ostracized from the New York Jewish community, a consequence of his reflexive exchange with other American radical liberals. (Kraut 1979: 106) Nevertheless, his ideas found a fertile audience among fellow travelers like William James and John Dewey. In fact, it was Dewey’s interpretation of Adler’s ideas that resulted in the first consistent vision of America as a universal melting-pot in which the Anglo-Saxon is eclipsed while "all give and all receive." This ferment in turn shaped the thinking of Israel Zangwill, whose play, *The Melting Pot* (1908) exposed these ideas to a wider audience. (Lissak 1989: 146; Gleason 1992: 5-15)

The reflexive tentacles of this newly refined cosmopolitanism, securely rooted in the Chicago-based Liberal-Progressive movement after 1905, first appeared on the political stage in the form of the Immigrant Protective Association, or IPA (1908). The IPA was an outgrowth of Liberal Progressivism which acted as a benevolent association for immigrants and was the first American organization to combine a thoroughgoing egalitarianism with a pro-immigration stance. Furthermore, the activity of the IPA had an immediate effect on the congressional debate because it legitimated (in Progressive terms) the legislative agenda of pro-immigration business interests. President Taft even claimed that the testimony of IPA spokesperson Grace Abbott, in 1912, convinced him to veto a bill advocating a literacy test for immigrants. (Davis 1967: 93) The Liberal
Progressive caucus was also represented within the ranks of federal Americanization committees, where its members, like Jane Addams, unsuccessfully attempted to counter the anglo-conformist tendencies of the Americanization project. (Lissak 1989: 58)

The cosmopolitan paradigm likewise reached into the racist-dominated realm of human biology. In this field, its most illustrious exponent was Franz Boas, a German-Jewish immigrant and University of Chicago anthropologist whose work, like that of many eugenicists, was sponsored by the Dillingham Commission. Boas, however, was an early relativist who took issue with many of the eugenicists' central claims. (King 2000: 65-69) Boas' detailed cranial measurements showed that, due to environmental factors, the American-born children of immigrant parents physically diverged from their parents while converging with their native-born peers from other ethnic backgrounds. (Hyatt 1990: 110) Boas' relativist perspective had incubated in Liberal-Progressive circles, and the rising influence of this cosmopolitan "New Social Science" perspective was no less of a child of reflexive modernity than the eugenics movement. (Baltzell 1964: 161-3; Szasz 1982: 43; Bass 1989: 49)

Cosmopolitan forces eventually gained the upper hand against their Anglo-Saxonist opponents for reasons other than those mentioned here. Accordingly, the period between 1945 and 1970 witnessed a relaxation of anglo-conformity, a repeal of the national origins quota immigration act, and the rise of more liberal attitudes toward race and ethnicity. This, however, has not eliminated the voice of ascriptive Americanism from the American pantheon. The two camps are now discrete entities firmly separated by a conceptual ocean. Hence, under the influence of institutional reflexivity, ethno-
nationalism and liberal universalism have broken from their dualistic embryo to serve as ideological polarities between which individuals can situate themselves.

ENDNOTES

1 Reference to cultural idioms can be found in the work of Rogers Brubaker (1992) and Margaret Archer (1996).

2 Even those exceptionalists who have acknowledged the presence of American dominant ethnicity have tended to explain it as a transient phenomenon, present only as a series of brief "nativist" upsurges against a background of liberal openness, the result of economic deprivation or racist ideology. See Higham ([1955] 1986) or Kohn (1957) for the clearest exposition of this viewpoint.

3 Longfellow, for example, has been described by Michael Kammen, as "self-consciously and confidently" promoting American national myths and traditions. (Kammen 1991: 82)

4 Even William James, who was arguably the most progressive in this regard, spoke eloquently of "our Anglo-Saxon race" as late as 1881. (Hollinger 1985: 20)

5 "Christian," when used by Protestant writers, usually referred to Protestantism, which was considered the most pure form of Christianity, a standard against which the "papist" fell short. (Handy 1971: 18)

6 This subtle intertwining of church and state occurred most prominently at the state level, with 37 of 42 states acknowledging the authority of God in their constitutions. (Handy 1971: 26)

7 The term 'melting pot' was used prior to the 1930s, but usually referred to the melting of a limited number of northern and western European peoples in a one-way direction toward a 'WASP' mould. Where the utterances were truly cosmopolitan, they were dualistic - thus affirming the retention of Anglo-Protestant purity. Mainstream American historiography did not propound a uniformly cosmopolitan variant until the 1930s, though Zangwill gave it expression as early as 1909. (Harper 1980; Gleason 1992)

8 John Armstrong first used the term in reference to the myth-symbol complex of territorialized ethnic groups in his Nations Before Nationalism. (Armstrong 1982: 8) For Anthony Smith, the term is used to denote the "constitutive myth of the ethnic polity." (Smith 1986)
9 The Johnson-Reed Act (1924) established a framework for immigration quotas directed toward the maintenance of the British and northern European-dominated ethnic composition of the American population.

10 This is exactly the argument put forth by Milton Gordon, who asserted that the United States functioned as an anglo-conformist "transmuting-pot" for ethnic assimilation. (Gordon 1964: 85)

11 Of course, pre-1880 nationalism was never as liberal as some have suggested. Thus neither the Founders, nor the most radical of antebellum Republicans (such as William Seward or William Lloyd Garrison) envisioned the marital assimilation of blacks. This therefore set an early limit to any universalist model of assimilation. (Foner 1970: 292, 295-6) Nominally Catholic nations, meanwhile, were viewed as a source of personnel, but never as a source of cultural influence.

12 A French nobleman who came to America to fight alongside Montcalm on the Plains of Abraham, Crèvecoeur settled in upstate New York and later joined the Loyalist cause. Having twice picked a losing side, and having been forced to flee by the victorious Patriots, Crèvecoeur penned his classic *Letters From an American Farmer* (1782) in 1780, which was well-received and abetted his return as French consul to the United States - where he lived for just seven more years before permanently joining his compatriots in France.

13 Robert Bellah speaks of self-reliant individualism as Americans' "first language", a discourse which is nevertheless accompanied by the "second languages" of Biblical and Republican communal narrative. (Bellah 1985: 154)

14 Giddens, however, envisions this as a discontinuous rather than evolutionary process. (Giddens [1985] 1996: 31)

15 Many eighteenth century enlightenment figures believed that racial differences were conditioned by climate, such that racial diversity within a particular climactic zone would tend to disappear over the generations. "There are many reasons for presuming," offered the Comte de Buffon, "that as…colour is originally the effect of a long continued heat, it will be gradually effaced by the temperature of a cold climate; and consequently, that if a colony of Negroes were transplanted into a northern province, their
descendants of the eighth, tenth, or twelfth generation would be much fairer, and perhaps as white as the natives of that climate." (Buffon [1748-1804], quoted in Eze 1997: 24)

16 The arguments of Gossett (1963) or Kohn (1957) most closely approximate this contention, though aspects of it also appear strongly in the writing of Higham (1955).

17 Originally a supporter of anti-Catholicism and immigration restriction, ecumenical Protestantism became neutral by 1908 and pro-immigrant by 1910. (Cavert 1968: 54-6)

18 Zangwill's connection to the Liberal Progressive reformers is demonstrated by the frequency with which Zangwill's ideas were employed by Settlement reformers at Chicago's Hull House. (Lissak 1989: 146)

19 This social movement emerged from the confluence of the ideas of Pluralist thinkers from the University of Chicago, notably John Dewey and W.I. Thomas, and Settlement reformers, particularly Jane Addams of Hull House in Chicago.

20 Adherents of what Digby Baltzell called the New Social Science, like Franz Boas in anthropology, John Dewey in philosophy, Thorstein Veblen in economics or Charles Horton Cooley in sociology, pushed a post-Darwinian set of ideas that were revolutionary for their day. Stressing the importance of environment over heredity and preaching a gospel of cultural relativism, these turn of the century thinkers paved the way for the decline of anglocentrism in America. (Baltzell 1964: 161-3)

21 Such forces include the institutionalization of universalist ideas in the social sciences (by 1930) and federal executive (by the 1940's) and the rise of mass university education in the 1950's and 1960's.

22 For more on ascriptive Americanism, see R. Smith 1997. The constituency of Anglo-Saxon or "Anglo" ethnic nationalists arguably encompasses both extremist organizations like the Christian Identity movement and the populism of Pat Buchanan's America First campaign. One recent polemic in this tradition is Peter Brimelow's *Alien Nation*, which argues for the maintenance of a white, Anglo-dominated ethnic core for the American nation-state. (Brimelow 1995: 10)

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