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### The panhellenic Socialist movement and European integration: the primacy of the leader

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## **4 The Panhellenic Socialist Movement and European Integration: The Primacy of the Leader**

Dionyssis G. Dimitrakopoulos and Argyris G. Passas

### **Introduction<sup>1</sup>**

This chapter focuses on the Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) and seeks to trace the origin and the content of its preferences on European integration since its establishment in 1974. It challenges the established view that – couched as it is in PASOK’s rhetoric in the immediate post-1974 era – construes PASOK as an initially instinctively anti-European political party that subsequently performed a policy U-turn, a true political transformation by turning from a vocal anti-EEC stance to a pro-European (even federalist) attitude (Tsardanidis 1998, 295, 299, 300; Kazakos 1994, 5; Verney 1987, 259-60, 263; Featherstone 1988, 178; Couloumbis 1993, 126; Featherstone 1994, 158-9). It also takes issue with more nuanced accounts that refer to a ‘subtle metamorphosis’ of PASOK’s stance since 1977 resulting from the exigencies of PASOK’s political competition strategy – as well as shifts in public opinion and a ‘pragmatic adjustment’ to the requirements of governing Greece (Verney 1994, 347-9; Loulis 1984, 379; Coufoudakis 1987, 238-40). The chapter advances four claims.

First, PASOK did not perform a U-turn because it did not have a clearly elaborated and explicitly articulated policy on European integration from which to depart. This is demonstrated not by the absence of a rhetorically robust thesis, since the ‘ΕΟΚ και ΝΑΤΟ το ίδιο συνδικάτο’<sup>2</sup> slogan and opposition to accession to the European Communities were unequivocal, but by the absence of a clear definition of the kind of Europe that it stood *for* in the second half of the 1970s<sup>3</sup>. In the absence of a response to this question, it is impossible to refer to a ‘U-turn’. Second, electoral, economic and geo-strategic interests, ideas (populism, initially, modernisation along social democratic lines in the second half of the 1990s) and, more importantly, institutions (specifically, the autonomy of the leader vis-à-vis the party organisation and membership) played a major role in the gradual definition of PASOK’s views on European integration. The interplay of these factors and their outcome are time sensitive. Although it is exemplified by specific events (such as the decision to support the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty and the determined pursuit of accession to the third stage of EMU) it ought to be construed as a *process*. Third, the gradual elaboration and determined pursuit of advanced preferences regarding the future of Europe – couched in the social democratic tradition as well as practical considerations - was the hallmark of the Simitis era (1996-2004); it is only during this time that PASOK (then the ruling party) had a clear objective regarding the future of Europe as well as a clear strategy regarding the country’s involvement therein. Finally, although this marked the high point in the history of the party’s policy on European integration, their adoption and pursuit have been ephemeral since they do not appear to enjoy the support of powerful ‘carriers’ or a majority within the party; in that sense, the Simitis era can be likened to a Europeanist ‘intermezzo’. Indeed, as will be demonstrated in this chapter, under George A. Papandreou, PASOK appears to

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have abandoned the left-wing federalist Europeanism doggedly pursued under the leadership of Costas Simitis.

The discussion of the content and the origins of PASOK's rhetoric and practice regarding European integration since 1974 can be divided into four phases: 1974-1984; 1985-1995; 1996-2004 and 2004-to date.

### **Rhetoric and tactics as substitutes for policy**

#### ***The origins of radical rhetoric***

Since its establishment in September 1974 PASOK has had to reconcile competing and often contradictory demands. This is so despite its initially narrow electoral basis<sup>4</sup> and Andreas Papandreou's decision to break with Enossi Kentrou (EK), the dominant but factious party of the Centre-Left of the pre-1967 period. During this period and especially the crucial years that preceded its accession to power, the remarkable diversity of PASOK's leadership, *cadres*, and voters was a key source of the multiple messages that emanated from it both with regards to European integration and other issues. Indeed, three groups can be identified at the point of PASOK's establishment, namely the 'leftists', the 'technocrats' and, finally, the 'conformists' (i.e. centrists) who stemmed from EK – the Declaration of 3 September 1974, the party's founding document, reflects an attempt to reconcile their demands (Spourdalakis 1998, 21-2)<sup>5</sup>.

The first group brought together mainly young activists who had participated in the anti-junta struggle at home and abroad, relied on a Marxist understanding of contemporary Greek politics and society coupled with nationalist overtones as well as influences stemming from dependence theory. Their rhetoric enabled PASOK to gradually attract voters from older generations (especially those who had been defeated in the civil war of the late 1940s) who had hitherto supported other parties of the Left, especially the Communist Party. The second group was composed mainly of well-educated supporters of the Centre-Left many of whom had become politically active (on the basis of a modernisation agenda) during the turbulent years that preceded the advent of the dictatorial regime in 1967. The final group brought together mainly MPs and aspiring politicians many of whom had close personal ties with Andreas Papandreou and his father, the last leader of EK, and brought with them an unparalleled understanding of grassroots politics. Many of the leftists and the ‘conformists’ were steeped into populism. Nationalism was an additional hallmark of their worldview and rhetoric. Nationalism, anti-Americanism and wider anti-Western attitudes, largely stemmed from the country’s recent history. They were couched not only in the American support for the military junta but also a sense of humiliation after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in the summer of 1974. As a result, PASOK’s formative statements reflected the prevalent feeling of anti-Americanism that dominated Greek politics in the aftermath of the fall of the dictatorial regime. This often provided fertile ground for the leftists who attacked the EEC as a sidekick of the USA that was dominated by large member states. They construed the EEC as part of the West whose interests conflicted with those of the nation.

Much of PASOK's early rhetoric on European integration and other issues reflected this understanding. This contributed to PASOK being seen as little more than a protest movement. However, much of that rhetoric also mirrored real political and socio-economic issues that the country faced. Though Andreas Papandreu's charisma enabled him to become the focal point for the aforementioned diverse groups,<sup>6</sup> in reality it was his decision to couch PASOK's establishment in three common and fundamental issues that brought these groups together. These issues concerned (i) Greece's place in the world, (ii) the make-up and the actual operation of the country's democratic institutions and (iii) significant social inequalities. PASOK's early slogans such as 'Η Ελλάδα ανήκει στους Έλληνες'<sup>7</sup> and the demands for social justice (captured in the constant references to PASOK as the party of the 'non-privileged Greeks') reflected both profound economic and social inequalities that had dogged the country at least since the end of the civil war in the late 1940s, and a prevalent sense of the need to emancipate the country from ties that had often served its allies but not its own interests (Coufoudakis 1987, 232). At the same time, the nationalist rhetoric enabled PASOK to distance itself from both of its main political rivals. Nea Dimokratia (ND), established in 1974 and led by Konstantinos Karamanlis, was the dominant party of the Centre-Right whose unequivocal pro-Western orientation was exemplified by its leader's statement that 'ανήκομεν εις τη Δύση'<sup>8</sup>. PASOK also sought to distance itself from (without challenging) the Communist Party whilst wooing its electorate<sup>9</sup>. Although it rejected the Soviet model, much of its rhetoric reflected both the concerns and the terminology of Communist Party voters. The nationalist overtones of PASOK's anti-Western rhetoric reflected the nascent political movement's the need to carve out its own space (and message) in the rapidly changing Greek political landscape of the mid- to late-

1970s but it also mirrored a powerful demand for the confident re-assertion of the nation's independence.

At the same time, significant social inequalities reflected both the country's under-developed economy and the results of more than two decades of bitter internal political strife that followed the end of the civil war. The latter created and perpetuated a profound feeling of exclusion or even oppression<sup>10</sup> inflicted on those who were (or were thought to be) on the 'wrong side' of the political centre ground while the former had led not only to large and successive waves of emigration (predominantly to the West) during the 1950s and 1960s but also the perpetuation of major economic problems including the dominant role of family enterprises of a primitive character (especially in agriculture and tourism), an overgrown service sector, an ineffective civil service that was based on (and the victim of) patronage, and an uncompetitive industrial sector that relied on protection from foreign imports and was mainly geared towards internal demand (Tsoukalas 1969, chap. 9). These economic structures largely reflected a quasi-institutionalised emphasis of public policies on short-term gains irrespective of medium- and long-term consequences as well as the short term logic and speculative character of Greek capitalists who were more interested in maximising income from public subsidies than in modernising their business practices (Tsakalotos 2001, 142).

Finally, the domestic political landscape of the mid-1970s was also marked by the compelling popular demand for the real democratisation of the Greek polity. This was the logical consequence of decades of bitter internal political strife in which the royal family, segments of the armed and security forces and powerful families often

conspired with their foreign allies and acted against the wishes of the people. Thus, the inclusion of the objective of veritable popular sovereignty and substantive democratisation in PASOK's founding declaration of September 1974 came as no surprise.

Against this background, it is hard to see why a newly-established political party should have sought to develop a set of fully-fledged proposals or objectives regarding the future of the then stagnating EC that, at that point in time, had little to offer in terms of direct assistance to an under-developed economy. Nevertheless, Prime Minister Karamanlis' historic decision to seek Greece's quick accession to the EC provided a major impetus for a fierce political debate on the issue of membership; it is in that context that PASOK's robust rhetorical statements became the substitute of a coherent policy. This debate was marked by PASOK's sustained rejection (until the general election of 1977) of the notion of membership. This marked a radical change from the consensus between the two main parties of the Centre-Left and the Right that (unlike the Left) supported the Association agreement (including the prospect of membership) in the early 1960s (Pateras 1984, chap. 1; Verney 1987, 256). Two important caveats ought to be added here.

First, although Karamanlis' decision to re-launch<sup>11</sup> Greece's accession bid was explicitly couched in *political* considerations (especially the need to strengthen democracy, secure the nation's territorial integrity against its aggressive eastern neighbour and reduce the country's dependence on the USA) PASOK's criticism was couched in primarily *economic* grounds though political considerations were present too<sup>12</sup>. This pronounced emphasis on the economic aspects of membership (and

European integration as a whole) has remained a central feature of PASOK's stance ever since<sup>13</sup>. Second, the debate regarding accession to the EC became a key political battleground for PASOK. The public debate attracted attention and Andreas Papandreou used it skilfully as a platform for the presentation of simplistic, at times ill-defined and often contradictory views whose main strength lied in their capacity to echo (and often amplify) fears, a wider defensive attitude as well as legitimate concerns regarding the country's economy.

These contradictions are extremely revealing. Papandreou made masterful use of leftist political rhetoric essentially in an effort to turn PASOK from a protest movement and an *élite* party<sup>14</sup> to a broad political alliance (of often competing interests and views) and, subsequently, a mass party whose vocation was to govern the country. This is unsurprising since the issue of membership of the EC combined two major strands of his thinking, namely the Harvard-educated and former Berkeley Economics Professor's pre-occupation with issues of economic development and the political leader's interest in broader geo-political issues such as the Cold War and the North-South divide. Three factors account for PASOK's initial formal rejection of the principle of membership.

First, given that the Left had opposed the Association agreement<sup>15</sup> and the principle of membership after 1974, a party such as PASOK that aspired to become the main anti-Right actor in Greek politics could not afford to be seen to support one of the core choices of the conservative ND. Rather, the issue of membership of the EC was an excellent opportunity for the nascent party to shape and reflect the (often assumed) wishes of the electorate that it aspired to represent. Second, given PASOK's analysis

of the country's economic problems and its position in the world, support for membership (which carries both opportunities and duties) could have blurred the simple message that its leader wanted it to carry. Indeed, PASOK's formal analysis drew not only on Marxism but also on dependence theory (especially the work of André Gunder Frank and Samir Amin) and saw the country as part not only of Europe but also of the Balkans and the Mediterranean, i.e. the periphery whose interests differed from those of the imperialist centre. As a result, the exigencies of its economic development and political emancipation could not be reconciled with membership of a Western organisation that was (i) composed of prosperous capitalist states and (ii) lacking the means to engage in market intervention that was one of PASOK's explicitly chosen means to promote economic development. PASOK expressed the fear that since the EC was the junior partner of the USA, it 'would trade full membership of the EC for concessions on Cyprus and the Aegean which would satisfy the Americans' (Verney 1987, 259). Third, in addition to these considerations, one key institutional factor helped shape PASOK's initial declarations on the principle of membership, namely the predominant role of its leader in intra-party politics. Although PASOK's establishment had been followed by an unprecedented political dialogue at the grassroots level, most of the party's pronouncements on major issues reflected its leader's tactical and strategic choices. This was the result of his hegemonic position within the party that, nevertheless, could not conceal the often uneasy co-existence of activists and members of the leadership whose views differed remarkably. Indeed, at least until 1977, the party had not debated the issue of membership of the EC (interviews with former PASOK Cabinet ministers). Rather, Andreas Papandreou's pronouncements were treated as the party's policy (Verney 1994, 298).

The party could not aspire to capture power without expressing the wishes of a large (and diverse) part of the electorate. Papandreou's public pronouncements on the principle of membership reflected this need even from an early stage. For example, on the occasion of the then French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing's visit in 1975, *Exormisi*, the party's newspaper, denounced Karamanlis' pursuit of membership as a 'sell-out' and a threat to national sovereignty, but Papandreou stated that - although PASOK was an opposition party, it supported Karamanlis' policy on France and the EC (Spourdalakis 1998, 41 fn. 33). In addition, during the early 1960s Papandreou had publicly supported<sup>16</sup> the Association agreement largely on the basis of the fact that it could facilitate the country's economic modernisation. Such contradictory statements reflected Papandreou's efforts to build a *volkspartei* capable of reflecting the wishes of large segments of public opinion<sup>17</sup>.

### ***Preparing for government***

The general election of 1977 marked a turning point in PASOK's handling of the issue of membership of the EC. PASOK became the main opposition party by nearly doubling its share of the vote (to 25 per cent that corresponded to almost one third of the seats in Parliament). Papandreou's astute (and audacious) political calculation of 1974 was beginning to pay dividends. By choosing to create a new political party in 1974 instead of leading EK, he broke not with EK's traditional electorate but with that party's ageing leadership. His objective was to attract EK's rather heterogeneous electorate without being associated with that party's leadership. Indeed, EK was the main source of PASOK's new voters in the 1977 election. Despite Papandreou's disappointment, other senior PASOK officials interpreted this result as an indication

that the electorate was beginning to see it as a party of governmental vocation (interview with former PASOK Cabinet minister). The newly-established party had already made significant progress towards becoming part of the mainstream of Greek politics but it still fell short of having the support of the majority of voters. Rhetorical devices would not enable it to overcome this barrier. Rather, the party had to have a programme and be seen to be mature enough to govern the country.

While Karamanlis was actively pursuing the objective of membership, Papandreou's task was equally Herculean. He had to (i) steer the party towards a realistic programme and (ii) attract even more centrist voters. These combined needs provided a major impetus for the gradual disengagement both from the previous extreme statements rejecting the prospect of membership of the EC and the notion that, since PASOK was in opposition, its leader could say in public whatever he wanted. Indeed, Papandreou was, at the time, taking the prospect of membership much more seriously (and realistically) than his earlier public statements would suggest (interview). There are two major indications of this fact. First, when he appointed a committee (chaired by economics Professor Apostolos Lazaris) to draft (in 1977) PASOK's programme on the basis of which he was planning to fight the 1981 general election, he appointed Grigoris Varfis (a former senior civil servant in the Ministry of National Economy who was not a party member) to ensure that PASOK's commitments would be compatible with obligations deriving from membership of the EC (interview). Varfis, an economist, had unsurpassed inside knowledge of these negotiations because he had been a senior member of the Greek negotiating team from which he resigned in January 1977 as a result of his disagreement with Prime Minister Karamanlis' efforts to achieve membership without paying particular attention to its terms<sup>18</sup>. Second,

although he was aware of the public's preference for a clear (i.e. 'yes' or 'no') answer to the question of membership, Papandreou began to gradually move away from explicit references to withdrawal from the EC. Instead, he made increasing references to 'a special agreement'<sup>19</sup> and, closer to the 1981 general election, the re-negotiation of the terms of membership and a referendum. Indeed, the party's 1981 electoral manifesto did not refer to withdrawal but to the re-negotiation of the terms of membership (interview with former PASOK Cabinet minister).

The claims regarding re-negotiation reflected an effort to portray PASOK as a party that was capable of promoting the national interest (unlike the Right which was allegedly pursuing a 'sell-out'). The promise of a referendum mirrored PASOK's claim to protect 'popular sovereignty' whilst it also drawing on the Labour government's experience and the British referendum of June 1975. The references to a 'special agreement' are more revealing in the sense that they support one of the key claims made in this chapter: PASOK did not have a clear view of the kind of Europe that it preferred in the late 1970s; rather, it was much more aware of (and vocal about) what it opposed. As a result, it was drawing selectively both on its own fuzzy ideology and events that were taking place primarily in the Greek but also (though to a lesser extent) the broader international environment. In that respect, Norway's arrangement with the EC was used to lend credence to PASOK's claim regarding the 'special agreement' that it appeared to prefer over membership. Two compelling questions remained unanswered.

First, what would be the precise content of this special arrangement? Again, PASOK's rhetoric was much more explicit about what it sought to avoid - namely

restrictions on macro-economic policy and surrendering controls over the movement of capital and goods, than what it sought to promote. Second, how far (if at all) could a country such as Greece rely on the example of Norway, i.e. a prosperous country whose geo-political position differed markedly from that of Greece? More importantly, if the EC was – as PASOK’s analysis claimed – dominated by the large member states, how would a small *non*-member (with the characteristics of Greece) influence decision making therein? If the claim regarding the Norwegian example was meant to show that there was an alternative to full membership, the claim regarding the referendum was part of a subtle but important strategic change whose aim was to shift the emphasis of PASOK’s attacks from the EC to the government’s handling of the negotiations (Verney 1994, 352).

The impact of the domestic political environment was becoming increasingly clear. While this process of change was taking place at the level of the national political landscape, disagreements within the party – exacerbated by the prospect of membership of the EC and the decisive election of 1981 – were beginning to surface. One important incident was indicative of the party’s uneasy internal balance of power. Costas Simitis – a social democrat, academic and active member of the anti-junta resistance movement, resigned on 13 June 1979 on the occasion of the party’s decision to withdraw a poster that, echoing Euro-communist views, indicated a more nuanced view on European integration: ‘Όχι στην Ευρώπη των μονοπωλίων – Ναι στην Ευρώπη των λαών’ it read<sup>20</sup> (Simitis 2005, 25). Although Papandreou’s decision was partly motivated by his wish to limit the party political prospects of one of the party’s most knowledgeable and respected senior *cadres* and was also proof of the uneasy co-existence of leftists, centrists and social democrats. This incident also

demonstrated the clear limits of Papandreou's strategy of papering over the party's internal ideological (and broader political) divisions. That this incident took place in June 1979 is not a coincidence. The accession agreement had been signed in Athens just a month earlier and the Parliament was about to debate its ratification. Although this meant that Papandreou had an excellent opportunity to prepare and present the party's own vision for the future of Europe and the country's role therein, he made a decision that was illustrative of his own tactical nous as well as his party's inability to provide a credible answer to a major political and economic issue: after making a brief statement, he chose to lead his party's MPs out of the chamber just as the debate was about to begin. The decision was made by the party's Executive Bureau in an emergency session literally minutes before the beginning of the parliamentary session. As a result, only two senior MPs (the centrists Alevras and Haralambopoulos) were aware of his decision prior to the commencement of the debate in Parliament (Verney 1994, 354). The terminology that Papandreou used in his brief statement was indicative of his decision to maximise the political damage inflicted on the government (which, in turn, was expected to portray accession as a major success of its foreign policy) and steal the thunder from the Communist Party whose MPs had also decided to avoid the debate. He denounced the decision of the government (and the European Commission) to withhold the 'minutes' of the negotiations for only they would enable Parliament to know what concessions the government had made. He argued that this was an indication of the government's 'subservience' to foreign powers and claimed that membership would dilute popular sovereignty as a result of the supremacy of EC law. This was, he claimed, a major reason why PASOK rejected the principle of membership. Instead, PASOK refused to legitimise the process that the government had chosen and promised to first inform the people 'comprehensively

and objectively' and then hold a referendum (Hellenic Parliament debate, 25 June 1979, 5499-500).

The major tactical strength of this decision lay in the idea that the government had turned membership into a *fait accompli* despite PASOK's protests regarding its implications for national sovereignty. Coupled with the Greeks' endemic sense of the 'underdog' that politicians often cultivated, and the call for a referendum (that required the assent of the President of the Republic, a post that Karamanlis was expected to occupy at a later stage) Papandreou's decision was designed to provide an escape route for PASOK by amplifying the notion that membership was now a fact, indeed one with which a future PASOK-led government would have to deal. In other words, the issue of membership had been resolved *de facto* by Karamanlis (interview with former PASOK Cabinet minister). Papandreou's conviction about this is demonstrated by his subsequent public references to the costs of withdrawal and the notion that they would perhaps be greater than the cost of membership (Varfis n.d., 1).

In addition to these tactical considerations, Papandreou's decision also reflected the 'ideological agnosticism' that permeated PASOK since its establishment. PASOK did not have a clearly defined ideological position on the EC; in fact, it is hard to pinpoint precisely PASOK's general ideological position (interview with former PASOK Cabinet minister). The rapid growth in PASOK's electoral support exacerbated the problem of its internal coherence. The internal divisions became more evident when the Committee for Analysis and Programming began to develop PASOK's programme. As a leading member of the committee acknowledged, the end result was a combination of conservative, socialist, centrist and other viewpoints

(interview with former PASOK Cabinet minister). The closer PASOK moved to becoming a catch-all party, in an effort to win the general election, the less adequate its *référentiel* was. Greece joined the EC in January 1981 and nine months later PASOK won a landslide victory in the general election. Confronted with the reality of membership and the exigencies of governing the country, PASOK was compelled to move clearly and unequivocally from populist rhetoric to concrete action.

### ***From rhetoric to praxis***

PASOK's first four years in power were marked by the use of declarations as a substitute for action<sup>21</sup> on core foreign policy issues (Coufoudakis 1987, 248). In terms of EC policy, PASOK had to find a way out of its electoral pledges. The issue of membership was resolved in a typically incremental manner. On the one hand, Papandreou quickly (and quietly) abandoned the pledge to organise a referendum. On the other hand, the government sought to re-negotiate the terms of the country's membership, thus beginning to deal in a much more pragmatic way with serious (and undoubtedly real) economic problems.

Another part of Papandreou's problem had to do with the political personnel that he had at his disposal. Indeed, he was the only member of the first PASOK Cabinet who had ministerial experience and even that dated back from the mid-1960s. Moreover, his government had to face a rather hostile civil service which he intended to reform. A former technocrat himself, he appreciated the importance of expertise and experience in the management of government business. This is why he appointed Grigoris Varfis as European Affairs Minister in charge of dealing with the entire EC portfolio apart from European Political Co-operation (EPC) business that remained

the responsibility of Foreign Secretary Yannis Kharalambopoulos (a centrist). Varfis' main task was not only to manage relations with the EC but, crucially, to prepare a memorandum for the future of Greece's relationship with the EC. Varfis was extremely well-placed to do it not only because he had first hand experience from the negotiations for Greece's accession but also because he had considerable experience as a senior official with the Ministry of Co-ordination (then Ministry of National Economy, now Finance) and was well aware of the weaknesses of the Greek economy. In addition, Papandreou appointed Costas Simitis (who, at the time, was not an MP) to the crucial post of Minister of Agriculture<sup>22</sup>. Varfis drafted the memorandum with the assistance of a small team of civil servants but without the direct input of party officials. The memorandum, presented to the EC in March 1982, is a remarkable text for three reasons.

First, far from echoing the populism of PASOK's rhetoric of the mid- to late-1970s, it provided a dispassionate and balanced account of Greek demands that reflected the major problems that the Greek economy was likely to face in the context of the EC as well as the unevenness of the accession agreement. After a concise and frank presentation of the structural weaknesses of the Greek economy, the memorandum referred clearly not only to the responsibility of the Greek government to ensure the modernisation of the economy but also the harmonious development and the convergence of the economies of the member states as key objectives of the Treaty of Rome. The Greek government claimed that its efforts to resolve the country's economic problems (that had been exacerbated by the international crisis of the late 1970s) was not only part of the national interest but was in line with the EC's repeated calls for Community action for the reduction of the discrepancies between regions and

states though this action had been hampered by the absence of appropriate mechanisms, the inefficiencies of existing mechanisms and the absence of adequate funding (Hellenic Government 1982, 7-8). Highlighting the extremely modest redistributive capacity of the EC budget, the Greek government argued that EC membership was very likely to exacerbate the country's economic problems. Crucially, it pointed out that the Community's preferential treatment of the products of other Mediterranean member states had not been extended to Greek produce. In addition, although the Common Agricultural Policy covered on average 95 per cent of the agricultural products of the nine member states, it covered only 75 per cent of Greek produce and did so in a less intensive manner. Arguing that the fight against regional inequalities should be a top priority for the EC, the Greek government proposed the introduction of a new set of arrangements - including exemptions for reasonable periods of time – and the provision of funding to Greece under EC financial mechanisms. Highlighting the importance of its own five-year economic growth plan that the PASOK government was to implement, the Greek government also asked for EC support for domestic regional and sectoral policies – especially small and medium-sized companies and tourism, and the flexible implementation of competition rules in a manner that would take into account the objectives of economic growth, the improvement of the population's living standards, the revision of EC rules for the provision of funding in a manner that would take into account the peculiarities of the Greek economy, including the small size and the low productivity of farms and the high inflation rate. Though the concluding section referred to the Greek government's belief that these measures were minimal requirements for the establishment of a regime that would not go against vital national interests, the document did not refer to the prospect of withdrawal from the EC. When Papandreou

presented the draft memorandum to senior party officials, one of them asked for an explicit reference to a threat of withdrawal to be included in the text. Nevertheless, Papandreou assured the authors of the memorandum that this would not be necessary and that he had already liaised with Karamanlis<sup>23</sup> about it (interview). This was, effectively, the end of PASOK's references to withdrawal from the EC. Indeed, when a foreign journalist asked Papandreou whether the rejection of the Greek memorandum would lead to the country's withdrawal from the EC, Papandreou stated that he had won an election, rather than organise a revolution (Varfis n.d., 1).

Second, unlike most of the public statements of PASOK officials and MPs who criticised the EC, the memorandum also made positive (though certainly limited) proposals for EC-wide changes, including the enhancement and the improved co-ordination of structural funds, a theme that the EC would subsequently deal with in the 1986 and the 1990-1 intergovernmental conferences (IGCs).

Finally, although the memorandum was consistent with PASOK's pre-electoral emphasis on the economic aspects of membership, the absence of any reference to political integration was striking. A left-wing government of a small member state that was facing clear security threats could, perhaps, be expected to at least raise the issue of solidarity. The absence of such references is indicative of a deeply-embedded (though gradually weakening) sense of political distrust vis-à-vis Western Europe. This was exemplified by the Greek Presidency's<sup>24</sup> decision to veto (under EPC procedures) a statement condemning the destruction by the Soviet Union's air force of a Korean civilian airliner in 1983. This led some MEPs to condemn Greek foreign policy as 'a blow to the whole idea of political co-operation', claiming that Greek

foreign policy was ‘more aligned with Moscow’s than with those of (its) European friends’ (cited in *Financial Times*, 16 September 1983, 2). Moreover, when the European Parliament voted on the 1984 Draft Treaty on European Union PASOK MEPs chose to abstain.

The economic demands contained in the memorandum had two direct implications. First, the Commission agreed that, although the Greek government’s five-year economic plan ought to be consistent with EC commitments,

- (a) special provision would be made for financial assistance on infrastructure projects, employment and social policy measures, agriculture, transport and the environment to the tune of more than £450m;
- (b) more substantial aid amounting to nearly £1.6bn under the Integrated Mediterranean Programmes with Greece being the second largest beneficiary from this £3.97bn package which would also cover parts of Italy and France;<sup>25</sup>
- (c) £740m would be allocated to Greek agriculture between 1985 and 1991, £72m to forestry, £84m to fishing and £630m to ‘general economic development’ in addition to
- (d) efforts to improve Greece’s ‘take up’ of EEC funds despite (or, rather, because of) the deficiencies of the Athenian bureaucracy (*Financial Times*, 6 May 1983, 2).

Second, this outcome allowed Papandreou to claim that his strategy had been vindicated and that his government had honoured the pledge to re-negotiate (and improve) the terms of Greek membership of the EC. In hindsight, one can therefore claim that instead of preparing the country’s withdrawal, Papandreou’s anti-EC rhetoric was meant to prepare the EC for the re-negotiation of the terms of Greek

membership whilst serving the crucial tactical task of turning PASOK into the main vehicle for the expression of the anti-Right political forces in post-junta Greece.

## **From rhetoric to reality**

### ***Between populism and modernisation***

PASOK remained in power during the second half of the 1980s. In the absence of any serious debate within the party, government action became the means by which PASOK identified and pursued its preferences on European integration. It is in that context that spectacular contradictions between various aspects of its action became evident. Government action highlighted the serious (if not irreconcilable) tensions not only between the government's European and domestic policies, but also (if not more importantly) various aspects of PASOK's domestic policies. The most important novel characteristic of PASOK's action was the *de facto* recognition on the part of the government that membership of the EC offered the country constraints as well as opportunities<sup>26</sup>. This subtle but significant change was facilitated by the experience acquired after four years of membership (during which PASOK was in government) but also by the gradual emergence of a group of senior officials who took centre stage in the government. Costas Simitis, who became the Minister of National Economy after PASOK's electoral victory in 1985, and Theodoros Pangalos who occupied the post of Alternate Foreign Minister in charge of European affairs, are two individuals who stand out. Both were social democrats, convinced pro-Europeans and had acquired considerable experience in European affairs since 1981<sup>27</sup>.

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As regards the government's action at the European level, three major developments forced it to adopt a more active stance in the mid-1980s, namely the prospect of the accession of Spain and Portugal, the likely re-launch of the single market project and the first revision of the Treaty of Rome. The Greek government linked these three issues in an effort to promote the enhancement of the EC's re-distributive capacity from which Greece stood to gain. Arguably, this reflected more the country's needs than the party's social democratic views. Since the accession of Spain and Portugal was certain to increase competition for Greek agricultural products, the Greek government repeatedly threatened to veto the Iberian enlargement if Greek economic interests were not taken into account. At the same time, it tried (unsuccessfully) to block the decision to convene the IGC that eventually led to the Single European Act of 1986<sup>28</sup>. Tactical considerations account for Papandreou's stance. First, speaking in the European Parliament two years earlier he had made an explicit plea in favour of the reform of the EC's institutional framework; indeed, he called for a 'new Messina conference' that would enable the EC to deal with new problems without distancing itself from the spirit of the Treaty of Rome. Second, Theodoros Pangalos argued that, although the reform of the EC was a necessity, it could be achieved without an IGC (Kazakos 1987, 436-7).

Though the party had not been involved in the formulation of the proposals submitted by the Greek government to the IGC, their content echoed the defensive attitude vis-à-vis the EC that had taken root within the party and the government. The process that led to the Dooge report (which was meant to prepare the IGC) demonstrated the disparity<sup>29</sup> between the Greek views and those of other governments (Kazakos 1987, 436). A major characteristic of the Greek proposals was the vociferous support for

intergovernmental institutions and a cautious (or even hostile) attitude vis-à-vis supranational institutions. For example, Greece opposed both the involvement of the European Parliament in the appointment of the Commission and the proposal to give it veto power over future enlargements and association agreements (Ioakimidis 1996, 15-16).

Despite its initial objections, the Greek government agreed to the SEA and presented it to the Greek Parliament as an agreement that favoured Greek interests (Hellenic Parliament debate, 14 January 1987, 2616). The terminology used by some majority MPs in Parliament reflected the defensive attitude of the party vis-à-vis the integration process. For example, the inclusion of provisions regarding foreign and security policy in the Single European Act was presented very timidly, the emphasis being on consensus as a key procedural requirement that ensured that decisions could not go against Greek interests. Moreover, majority MPs were quick to point out the fact that the Luxembourg compromise had been preserved (Hellenic Parliament debate, 14 January 1987, 2615). Nevertheless, the speech made by the then Alternate Foreign Minister in charge of European affairs indicated that a robustly pro-European and decidedly social democratic discourse was now a central feature of PASOK's stance on Europe. Two aspects of his speech stand out. First, Pangalos did not confine his speech to the merits of the SEA. Rather, he presented passionately a social democratic platform for a united Europe that would entail a 'unified political entity' capable of and willing to determine the future of European peoples independently of the other major powers, promoting peace and prosperity (Hellenic Parliament debate, 14 January 1987, 2623-7). He also highlighted the importance of economic and social cohesion as a key (constitutional) objective of the EC and the future predominance of

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the political over the economic aspect of integration. The second major novelty of his speech concerned the new conceptualisation of Greece's relationship with the EC:

Pangalos castigated both the conception of the EC as a *vincolo esterno* and the notion that the EC is nothing but a 'cash cow'. Rather, membership offered a framework and a mechanism that could promote both the modernisation of the Greek economy and the long-standing objective of the Greek Centre-Left and the Left to emancipate the country from the influence of the USA. This required the self-confident involvement in EC procedures, coalition-building and a move away from the perception of the EC as a mere transaction forum.

The combination of the re-launch of the single market project with the elevation of economic and social cohesion to the level of the EC's 'constitutional' objectives (coupled with the explicit political commitment to increase the flow of funds to less-developed regions) account for the Greek government's positive stance. While the trade-off between economic liberalisation (and re-regulation) on the one hand and the significant enhancement of the EC's re-distributive capacity on the other was clear at the European level, and it accounts for the Greek government's decision to sign the SEA, this decision did not signal the adoption of a new economic policy paradigm at the domestic level, nor did it entail a new kind of relationship with the EC. This is so because PASOK's statism had roots that were as deep as those of populism.

Indeed, the Greek government was pursuing contradictory domestic policies. The significant increases in public spending that marked domestic economic policy during the first four years of socialist rule had been funded primarily by means of public borrowing. Papandreou was aware of the problem of public debt and sought to

change economic policy by appointing Simitis to the Ministry of National Economy to stabilise the finances of a country that faced a severe current account crisis<sup>30</sup>. A key part of this effort was a loan from the EC<sup>31</sup> which, crucially, was presented to the public as the real reason for the domestic stabilisation programme<sup>32</sup> (interview with former PASOK Cabinet minister). This was an indication of both the defensive attitude of the government vis-à-vis the EC and its propensity to give in to the strong populist strand that permeated the party. Instead of presenting the loan (and the EC as a whole) as a key mechanism for the modernisation of the economy, the easy route of the ‘politics of fear’ was chosen, couched in the presentation of membership as an external constraint, despite the benefits that the country derived from it.

At the same time, the socialist government was pursuing the policy of ‘socialisation’ of ailing private firms by putting them under ‘social’ (essentially state) control in an effort to fight unemployment. In other words, whilst it had agreed at the European level to a process of gradual liberalisation of the economy, it was pursuing a completely different economic policy at the domestic level. Thus, the second half of the 1980s was marked by the remarkable tensions between strategic decisions of its leadership (especially the decision to keep the country in the EC) on the one hand, and the preferences of the majority of its *cadres* many of whom occupied positions of power in the public sector (and its unions) and were the carriers of a mixture of populism and views inspired by the experience of the eastern bloc.

The power of the advocates of these views, coupled with the predominantly defensive attitude towards membership of the EC, meant that the effort to rationalise the country’s finances was short-lived. It became the victim of the rampant populism that

permeated the party as well as fears that the stabilisation programme pursued between 1985 and 1987 would lead to electoral defeat. The powerful populist section of the Cabinet (including ministers Tsovolas, Koutsoyiorgas and V. Papandreou) gave a hostile reception to Simitis' proposals to align (i.e. limit) incomes policy with inflation but after the meeting (and once Simitis had made a public announcement) Andreas Papandreou,<sup>33</sup> speaking in Parliament in the debate regarding the budget, distanced himself from his leading minister who, as a result, resigned in November 1987. That was the end of the stabilisation programme. Populism and short-term electoral considerations had won to the detriment of the first attempt actively to engage with the EC in an effort to improve the country's finances. At the same time, it highlighted the major credibility problem that Papandreou had in the European context<sup>34</sup>.

### ***The transition to a new policy paradigm***

Although PASOK was compelled to focus on its political survival as a result of the scandals of the end of the 1980s, the Maastricht Treaty and the decision to launch the process of economic and monetary union (EMU) raised issues that the party could no longer avoid. The fact that it was in opposition undoubtedly facilitated the reflection process but this remained confined to the party *élite* and was centred on prominent or ambitious members of its front bench<sup>35</sup> and their personal initiatives rather than the party's formal institutions (interviews). In fact, the party itself did not engage in a meaningful and mature dialogue (interviews with former PASOK Cabinet members). The way in which the party leadership (specifically, Andreas Papandreou) dealt with the issue of the Maastricht Treaty is indicative of this (widely confirmed) absence of organised dialogue within the party (interviews). Aware of the issues raised by the

Treaty, Papandreou dictated the party line: although PASOK MPs would vote in favour of the ratification of the Treaty, the rhetoric would highlight its deficiencies. For that purpose he chose Gerassimos Arsenis, to make the main speech on behalf of the socialists in Parliament.

Arsenis had worked for the UN Conference on Trade and Development and while he was Minister of National Economy in the first PASOK government, he was the main exponent within the Cabinet of economic views that had been influenced by the experience of third world countries. Unsurprisingly, he was also a left-wing critic of European integration; this is why he was chosen to represent PASOK on that occasion. In his speeches in Parliament - both in the plenum and the economic affairs committee, Arsenis attacked not only the Treaty's monetarist provisions regarding EMU but also the democratic deficit of the entire EMU edifice as well as the foreign policy- and defence-related provisions.

His criticism of the Treaty echoed the views held by many social democrats across Europe: (i) EMU's institutionalised emphasis on monetarism radically reduces the capacity to fight against unemployment and promote re-distribution; (ii) the institutional arrangements regarding the European Central Bank (ECB) actually increase the EC's democracy deficit; (iii) the provisions regarding the common foreign and (more specifically) security policy seem to promote the objective of turning the WEU (and the EU) into the European branch of NATO instead of promoting the development of the EU's capacity to act in the international scene.

Arsenis' speech contains two noteworthy changes. On the one hand, it was the first explicit acknowledgment of the inability of individual states to deal with many of the major problems faced by citizens (Hellenic Parliament debate, 27 July 1992, 9). For a party and a country where the capacities of the states were often thought to be of Herculean proportions, this was a major change. The internationalisation of capital, argued Arsenis, means that its accord with labour and the state will have to be developed at a higher (regional, if not global) level. This is 'the one-way route' to a united Europe, as he put it, though it should involve the state as a key component, instead of seeking to eliminate it. On the other hand, it explicitly rejected the notion that non-involvement was a viable policy, arguing instead that non-participants would simply be compelled to implement the decisions that participants (even weak ones) would make – only by participating in the process of integration can one build 'political Europe' he said (Hellenic Parliament debate, 27 July 1992, 10). Castigating the conservative government's passive stance in the negotiations, he highlighted the experience of the mid-1980s regarding the IMPs which demonstrated that the socialist government's active involvement in EC-level procedures had enabled it to promote the national interest. This is an important point that PASOK later turned into one of the main planks of its European policy (see *infra*).

Papandreou's speech on that occasion was remarkable. Placing the developments that led to the Maastricht Treaty in a wider international political and economic context, he pointed out the importance of (a) Germany's relationship to Europe and (b) the idea that the rapid enlargement of the EC was likely to promote the interests of the USA by undermining the process of European integration and turning the EC to a mere free trade area. He also acknowledged that Greece had no alternative. It had to

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follow the European route in an effort to promote the kind of Europe that PASOK preferred: a democratic Europe promoting re-distribution and economic development through a robust European budget, full employment, the welfare state, the protection of the environment and territorial integrity from any external threat (Hellenic Parliament debate, 27 July 1992, 39-41). Finally, he returned to the familiar theme of Greek-Turkish relations by pointing out that the logic behind the Greek accession to the WEU had been undermined by the declaration whereby the members of the WEU re-interpreted the organisation's clause on mutual assistance<sup>36</sup>.

After PASOK's landslide victory in the general election of October 1993<sup>37</sup> participation in the third stage of EMU became one of the government's main objectives (interview with former PASOK Cabinet minister). The credibility of this commitment was demonstrated by Papandreou's choice of Cabinet ministers. Indeed, the task of preparing the country for this process was entrusted to a group of moderate and experienced ministers including centrists<sup>38</sup> and social democrats<sup>39</sup>. Mirroring the requirements of the Maastricht Treaty, the socialist government embarked on an orthodox programme of economic convergence (involving partial privatisations of state firms and reductions in public expenditure) similar to that followed by other member states in the 1980s<sup>40</sup> (Tsakalotos 2001, 156-7).

At the same time PASOK's almost instinctive nationalism remained present in some aspects of the government's foreign policy. For example, it was evident in the conflict that opposed Th. Pangalos and George A. Papandreou on the one hand, and K. Papoulias on the other (interview). Taking a hard line, the latter opposed EU

efforts to resolve the problems that stemmed from the establishment of the FYR of Macedonia as an independent state. By contrast the former supported it.

### **The Europeanist ‘intermezzo’<sup>41</sup>**

The risks created by the electoral sensitivities of the party’s leadership, the instability created by Andreas Papandreu’s poor health and the legacy of 1987 and the end of the first stabilisation programme meant that the continuation of this reform programme was far from guaranteed. Nevertheless, Costas Simitis’ election as party leader and Prime Minister in January 1996 (confirmed after PASOK’s victory in the general election of 1996) quickly dispersed these fears<sup>42</sup>. It marked the beginning of a new era that was characterised by the country’s most successful involvement in the process of integration and the pursuit by the PASOK government of the clearest and most avowedly social democratic agenda for Greece and the EU as a whole.

Simitis – a man of conviction who had repeatedly clashed with the populist elements of PASOK’s leadership and resigned twice from senior Cabinet posts and once from the party’s Executive Bureau - saw the link between Greece and the process of integration as a potentially self-reinforcing tandem. Greece stood to gain from a strong EU but only on condition of active and (above all) credible participation in the process of integration (Simitis 2005, 617). Simitis was determined to transform Greece into a reliable member of the EU’s core group of states by accelerating the pursuit of the modernisation of the country and by taking an active interest in the major debates regarding the future of Europe. He turned membership of EMU into

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the core task of his government but this was just a part of his own vision for the modernisation of Greece and the future of Europe as a whole. He was fully aware of the fact that the creation of the single currency would raise pressing and value-laden issues (including the major issue of political union) to which the social democrats ought to be able to respond (Simitis 2005).

His action while in power was underpinned by an explicit and highly developed understanding of the challenges that social democracy faces in the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. He believed that, in conditions of growing interdependence – in particular in order to respond to the challenge of globalisation, the strategy of the Left should not be limited to the national level. Rather, a political response to the growing autonomy of the market brought about by globalisation is a necessity. This task is best carried out at the European level. Turning the EU into a powerful actor capable of promoting growth, economic and social cohesion, the modernisation of the European social model, peace, security and prosperity would give the appropriate new meaning to the internationalism that characterised social democracy since its inception (Simitis 2005, 559, 563-4).

Simitis' vision regarding the future of Europe contained four key components that his government consistently promoted in the negotiations that led to the Amsterdam Treaty, the Nice Treaty and the Constitutional Treaty (Simitis 1995, 127-38; 2002, 99-107; 2005, 126-7). First, integration must move beyond the economic sphere. The gradual transformation of the EU into a political union with strong and legitimate central institutions based on the federal model with the Commission holding executive power, the EP legislative power and the Council as the second (upper) legislature

representing states<sup>43</sup> ought to be preferred to other existing models (including the Europe of concentric circles and Europe *à la carte*) because they do not rely on the rules and logic of democracy<sup>44</sup>. Second, although the Maastricht criteria do not attach sufficient importance to employment, and economic and social cohesion, they should not be abolished because individual states (acting on their own) cannot cope with the challenges posed in an increasingly interdependent world. The real alternative is to (a) turn real economic convergence into a core component of an economic policy that will promote full employment and (b) transform the Union into a leading actor in the management of the global economy. Third, the EU should promote the enhancement of the social dimension of integration in an effort to promote growth as well as the protection and adaptation of the European social model to new technological and demographic challenges. This should be combined with a more specific policy for the promotion of industrial competitiveness. In that context, the EU's re-distributive capacity ought to be enhanced and solidarity should replace the notion of *juste retour*. Finally, the Union will be incomplete as long as it does not possess the institutions and the policies that will enable it to play a more active and effective role in international politics promoting the establishment of a multi-polar order based on international law, conflict prevention, crisis management and the protection of its own external frontiers on the basis of the principle of solidarity.

One major change - in comparison to the 1980s - was the leadership's (specifically Simitis') willingness to make a positive case in public in favour of turning Greece from an awkward into a credible, confident and constructive partner. For a party (and a country) that had been used to a rather confrontational attitude marked by the government's Promethean role as the protector of the national interest, Simitis'

attitude marked a radical break with the past. Simitis was willing to talk openly about the fact that (a) membership of the EU entailed opportunities as well as constraints (unlike his predecessors who had often emphasised the latter in an effort to shift the blame for unpopular policies) and (b) one could not hope to turn the country into a credible partner capable of participating in core debates regarding the future of Europe without fulfilling the obligations that its governments had previously accepted. More importantly, unlike his predecessors, Simitis realised that the advent of the Euro had the capacity to mobilise public opinion that was tired of the scandals and the political turmoil that marked the end of the 1980s and the early 1990s. Unlike prominent members of the party leadership who advocated a slow adjustment to the criteria for the adoption of the Euro (to a large extent because of electoral considerations) Simitis imposed the adoption of the Euro (simultaneously with the core members of the Euro zone) as the primary objective of his first government.

The economic programme that led to the adoption of the single currency as part of the first wave of member states that entered the Euro zone reflected the need to fulfil the relevant formal criteria but also the deficiencies of the Greek economy as well as the need to ensure that the weaker social strata were protected from the negative effects of adaptation. In order to achieve these objectives the government combined two sets of measures. The first entailed the more systematic, rapid and determined implementation of the orthodox<sup>45</sup> economic programme of the last Papandreu government. The more pronounced efforts to reduce inflation and public debt<sup>46</sup> were coupled this time with the more sustained fight against tax evasion and greater emphasis on market liberalisation. The second (and more innovative) set of measures entailed the reform of local government<sup>47</sup>, the establishment of autonomous regulatory

agencies and, above all, an extremely ambitious programme for the modernisation of the country's infrastructure<sup>48</sup>. This programme was important for two reasons. On the one hand, it was designed to facilitate economic activity and improve standards of living. On the other hand, it was meant to create jobs and thus absorb a significant part of the pressures on employment created by the Maastricht criteria. These measures were coupled with the government's social policy that was aimed at protecting the most vulnerable social strata<sup>49</sup>.

This happened as a result of a conscious decision to reduce defence spending<sup>50</sup>. In turn, this change was facilitated by the management of Greece's relations with Turkey on a multilateral (i.e. European) rather than a bilateral basis, itself a key innovation introduced by Simitis and pursued by his government. This entailed the pursuit of long-standing Greek views but in a way that highlighted the EU-wide stakes. Seizing the opportunity offered by the Turkish government's objective of full membership of the EU, the Simitis government ended the isolation of Greece that stemmed from the fact that successive Greek governments had vetoed efforts aimed at developing Turkey's relationship with the EU. Although this policy had its roots in Turkey's aggressive policy – exemplified by the Imia crisis that took place during Simitis' first days in office, it had also run its course<sup>51</sup>. Simitis realised that Greece stood to gain (at least in terms of reductions in defence expenditure) from transforming the role of the EU in that respect. This is why he sought to turn the EU from a forum into an active mechanism for the implementation of a long-term strategy that entailed the promotion of democratisation in Turkey and the accession of Cyprus to the EU (interview with former PASOK Cabinet minister).

His modernisation project and his ambitious Europeanism were also couched in his belief that the statism that had informed PASOK's worldview and practice until 1996 had reached its limits (Simitis 2005, 561). Aware of the ability of special interests to penetrate the state and the inability of the latter to defend itself (and society) against clientelism, Simitis was willing to break with his party's quasi-institutionalised statism and promote the *état-stratège*. The policy of (partial or total) privatisation of some public firms and the emphasis that he placed on a network of regulatory agencies were the direct consequence of his views<sup>52</sup>.

Another facet of his scepticism vis-à-vis his party's traditional conception of statism was reflected in his support for supranational institutions as well as the gradual extension of QMV, against PASOK's traditional attachment to unanimity on foreign policy issues. Though Simitis did not deny that the extension of QMV should not happen prior to the development (at EU level) of common principles, policy objectives and the mechanisms that would put them into effect, he was willing to state openly, unlike his predecessors, that unanimity had also been counter-productive for Greek interests<sup>53</sup>.

Although Simitis undoubtedly innovated in terms of both the policy that he pursued and the method that he employed, his tenure as leader of PASOK and Prime Minister was remarkably consistent with that of Andreas Papandreou in one key respect. It confirmed the pattern of presidentialism that permeates preference formation in PASOK since 1974. Simitis was a long-standing and vocal proponent of intra-party democracy. While he was party leader and Prime Minister both party fora and Cabinet committees met regularly<sup>54</sup>. Thus, party members and officials as well as

government ministers had the opportunity to express any dissenting views.

Nevertheless, this did not happen for two reasons. First, there was no coherent alternative. Second, PASOK did not have an established tradition of internal political debate. Between 1996 and 2004 the party remained a passive observer of Simitis' initiatives, secure in the knowledge that his personal popularity ratings were extremely high and that he had the personal credibility that enabled him to win two consecutive electoral contests. Indeed, under Simitis PASOK increased both its overall number and share of votes<sup>55</sup>.

Although his vision regarding the future of Europe and the position of Greece therein was undoubtedly shared by a number of senior and junior government ministers, his legacy does not appear to have taken root within the party. His successor, George A. Papandreou (the eldest son of Andreas), has chosen a different course of action.

### **After Simitis: PASOK's 'exodus'<sup>56</sup> from Europeanism**

The pattern that emerged since George A. Papandreou's election as leader of PASOK in 2004<sup>57</sup> confirms the predominance of leadership as a key explanatory factor in preference formation on European integration. Nevertheless, it is important to divide this period into two distinct phases that reflect novel features in (a) the development of PASOK as a political party and (b) the nature of its preferences on European integration. The first phase commenced with Papandreou's elevation to the leadership of the party in February 2004 and ended with the party's seventh conference in March 2005. The second phase begun with the Dutch and French referenda on the

Constitutional Treaty (May-June 2005). The former is marked by the enduring presence of key traits of the Simitis era in terms of the party's formal ideological and programmatic platform and its internal organisation and leading team. The latter is clearly marked by the new leader's ideological, programmatic as well as personnel-related choices. Crucially, PASOK's presence in the opposition benches gave it the opportunity to revise its programme, strategy and tactics ahead of the next general election.

George A. Papandreou's elevation to the leadership of the party was the result of a novel process both in terms of the party's history and the broader Greek political culture. As a result of plans that were afoot since June 2003 (Simitis 2005, 592), Papandreou met Simitis in the latter's private residence on 6 January 2004. In addition to Simitis' personal decision to hand over<sup>58</sup> to Papandreou the party's leadership and the responsibility for the election campaign<sup>59</sup>, they agreed to (i) revise the party's procedure for the selection of leader and (ii) call an early election in March 2004. On Papandreou's initiative, the new leader would be 'elected' directly by party members and supporters (or 'friends'<sup>60</sup>), rather than the party conference as had hitherto been the case. This required the reform of the party's charter. This reform was formally endorsed by the party's extraordinary conference held on 6 February 2004. George A. Papandreou was the only candidate. As a result, his 'victory' was entirely expected<sup>61</sup>. However, two key features of this process deserve to be highlighted for they were politically consequential (see *infra*).

First, the participation of more than one million members and 'friends'<sup>62</sup> (PASOK 2004d) was both surprising and unprecedented. This process was not as democratic

as it seemed at the time. Indeed, it was more akin to a referendum or a crowning than an election. The latter requires not only the participation of competitors but also explicit political platforms. Moreover, the fact that (i) Simitis had already designated George A. Papandreou (whose surname was - and remains – his major political asset in the eyes of many of the party’s core voters) and (ii) the party was about to face a general election after 13 consecutive years in power effectively precluded the possibility of alternative candidatures and the oxygen of political contestation that it would provide. Nobody was willing to risk appearing to divide the party. Second, Papandreou’s elevation to the leadership of the party was couched in an unspecified platform of ‘radical change’. Indeed, his involvement in public meetings, party gatherings and election rallies was dominated by one slogan: ‘George, change everything!’ which he openly endorsed. The combined effect of these two facts gave Papandreou a personal, strong but unspecified mandate which appeared to be the political equivalent of a blank cheque. Nevertheless, PASOK suffered heavy defeats both in the general election of March 2004<sup>63</sup> and the European elections of June 2004<sup>64</sup>. As a consequence, both the party and its new leader, now in opposition, could begin to re-assess its ideological and broader political position as well as its internal organisation.

During the two electoral campaigns PASOK’s formal rhetoric on European integration remained remarkably consistent with the avant-garde left-wing federalism that characterised the Simitis era (PASOK 2004a; 2004b; 2004c). Most of these preferences were re-affirmed at the party’s seventh conference held in March 2005 (PASOK 2005). More specifically, the party re-affirmed its strategic attachment to the country’s European orientation (PASOK 2004b, 198), and the quest for ‘a strong

Greece in a potent and progressive Europe for the management of globalisation', i.e. two core components of Simitis' policy (Simitis 2005; 2007a, 24). Indeed, Simitis had explicitly and unequivocally linked the country's prospects and his government's social democratic policy with 'the debate on the future of Europe and its role in the world' (Simitis 2005, 125; 564).

The party explicitly construed the country's future as being part of Europe's political union since 'a strong Europe will guarantee multilateralism and the democratic and peaceful governance of globalisation' (PASOK 2004a, 2), supported those who seek the rapid pursuit of a federal Europe equipped with its own constitution, defence and foreign policy (PASOK 2005, 7 and 31) and regarded Greece as being capable of participating in enhanced co-operation arrangements in defence (PASOK 2004c, 12). In addition, the party formally endorsed the mainstream social democratic agenda of a social, environmentally sustainable and multicultural Europe coupled with a powerful and democratically legitimate economic policy and institutions. It also re-affirmed its commitment to economic and social cohesion and the enhancement of the Union's redistributive capacity, including its budget. Finally, PASOK explicitly endorsed the 2004 enlargement, as well as the prospect of the accession of both Turkey and the countries of the Western Balkans<sup>65</sup>.

The lengthy process of internal re-organisation begun in spring 2004 and culminated in the adoption of the new charter and internal structure at the party conference of March 2005. The aim of the establishment of the new, so-called 'open party', was to turn PASOK from an elitist and hierarchically-organised party into a decentralised network of members and 'friends' - including immigrants and representatives of civil

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society – marked, in addition, by the participation of more women<sup>66</sup>. The internal reform of the party was aimed at promoting the principle and the means of participatory democracy<sup>67</sup> and improving the standard of its *cadres* largely through the use of IT. In reality though, PASOK has remained a catch-all party with a governmental vocation. The enhanced legitimacy of the new leader significantly increased his margin of discretion in terms of policy making, as well as the appointment of the party's senior *cadres* and, of course, the front bench. George A. Papandreou's PASOK is decidedly presidential and this had a direct impact on preference formation on European integration.

The ratification of the Constitutional Treaty by the Hellenic Parliament in April 2005<sup>68</sup> was the last significant event of the first phase of George A. Papandreou's tenure. Speaking during the parliamentary debate, not only did he re-affirm the party's Europeanism – explicitly drawing on his own role in (and the contribution of the Simitis government to) the Convention on the Future of Europe and the first stage of the subsequent IGC – but he also contrasted them to the conservative government's passivity and called for a referendum<sup>69</sup> (Hellenic Parliament debate, 15 April 2005, 7554-6). This demand was also supported by left-wing opposition parties and was later formally submitted to Parliament. The proposal was debated in Parliament on 12 May 2005 but the ruling conservative majority rejected it<sup>70</sup>.

Two events marked the commencement of the second phase of Papandreou's tenure as leader and the beginning of a gradual shift in his position (as well that of the party) on European integration, namely the negative outcome of the referenda in France and the Netherlands (May and June 2005) and his appointment as President of the

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Socialist International in January 2006. George A. Papandreou's political discourse (speeches, articles, etc.) is indicative of the aforementioned shift and took even more specific form in the leadership's formal proposal (March 2007) submitted ahead of the conference that defined the party's new programme.

Two key features stand out (Papandreou 2005, 4; 2006a). First, Papandreou abandoned the Constitutional Treaty just weeks after the referendum in the Netherlands. Later on he made very vague references to the need for an EU Constitution comprising two parts – one on the principles and values of the EU and one on its the decision making mechanisms (Papandreou 2006b, 4) – without articulating a clear alternative for the crisis that permeated the EU. At the same time, he criticised the conservative government for failing to participate in the ongoing discussion on the future of Europe (Hellenic Parliament debate, 4 February 2007, 83). Both he and senior officials of his choosing openly supported the view that the debate on the institutions of the EU was irrelevant after the French and Dutch referenda and that priority lies with the definition of policies that would concretely respond to citizens' needs and wishes (interviews). In other words, Papandreou clearly broke with Simitis' strategy that directly linked the reform of the Union's institutions with the policies that they produce. Second, there has been a marked shift away from the European integration-centred frame of reference on which both he and the party had drawn until then. Instead, Papandreou consistently drew on more abstract cosmopolitan references and concepts such as 'global governance', 'global democracy', 'global citizenry' etc<sup>71</sup>. In his discourse European integration did not appear to be linked directly (or even principally) to the objective of the 'humanisation [...] and democratisation of globalisation', i.e. the main priorities of the new

leadership<sup>72</sup>. Thus, Papandreou and the party gradually moved away from Simitis' project, message and strategy. Unlike Simitis, they opted for vague references to 'a strong Greece in Europe and in the world' (PASOK 2007)<sup>73</sup>. Although this emerging frame of reference informed much of the party's literature that was published on the occasion of the seventh conference, it was obscured by the Europeanist discourse on which Papandreou had to rely during the debate on the Constitutional Treaty – a milestone in his tenure as Minister of Foreign Affairs. The swift abandonment of the Constitutional Treaty and Papandreou's appointment as President of the Socialist International accelerated the transition from Simitis' left-wing federalism to what Papandreou calls 'global revolution' (Papandreou 2006a; 2007c), i.e. a cosmopolitan 'new internationalism' that promotes the democratisation of neo-liberal globalisation through the co-ordination of citizens' action. In other words, Papandreou increasingly identifies with and refers to his new role (Papandreou 2006c; 2007a) from which he tries to draw ideas, policies as well as his personal political identity. Indeed, he has publicly argued that today PASOK 'has a global presence and can take initiatives and engage in battles across the globe via the Socialist International' (Papandreou 2007b, 7). Moreover, while he draws systematically on his role as President of the Socialist International in his rare appearances in meetings of the Party of European Socialists, he does not give the same prominence to his role as leader of a party of an EU member state in his much more frequent appearances and speeches in gatherings of the Socialist International<sup>74</sup>.

In terms of the *aims and the scope of integration*, PASOK's and Papandreou's 'new agenda' construes Europe as the country's natural strategic space. Although political union formally remains an objective (PASOK 2007, 100) it is rarely present in

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Papandreou's discourse. Indeed, in a statement issued on the occasion of the 50<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the signing of the Treaty of Rome he opted for the more vague<sup>75</sup> term 'political Europe' (Papandreou 2007d). As regards the EU's international role, although frequent reference is made to the need for a more autonomous or stronger European voice (PASOK 2007, 100), the need for a multi-polar system based on international law, consultation and the peaceful resolution of conflicts, these statements remain quite abstract while references to CFSP, ESDP and the development of the Union's political and military crisis management capabilities have disappeared completely from the terminology used both by the party leader and the party's official literature (*ibid*). The increasingly abstract references to the EU's autonomous international role are deprived of an explicit statement of the instruments that could turn it into reality. So, they do little more than obscure George A. Papandreou's latent Atlanticism<sup>76</sup> or, at best, a preference for Europe construed as an *area*. Indeed, although he was very quick to abandon the Constitutional Treaty, he remained attached to the idea of further enlargement (Turkey and Western Balkans) which he dissociates from the Union's crisis (Papandreou 2006e, 4) despite the fact that 'enlargement fatigue'<sup>77</sup> was, arguably, a major contributing factor in the outcome of the French and Dutch referenda. In other words, changes that risk diluting the EU even further remain firmly on his agenda. Nevertheless, PASOK did not refrain from supporting the notion of deepening integration – e.g. by means of a larger common budget, support for policies on economic cohesion, R&D - and the expansion of the agenda of the ECB to include growth and employment, although the absence of references to a *gouvernement économique* or economic governance and the re-balancing of economic and monetary policy is striking.

Furthermore, the shift in emphasis in terms of *institutional reform* of the Union is both obvious and spectacular. Simitis' left-wing federalism (see *supra*) has been ostracised and replaced by abstract references to a 'democratic Europe' (PASOK 2007, 100). PASOK's and Papandreou's<sup>78</sup> silence on institutional reform is coupled with frequent references to the need for the country's active involvement in the relevant debate and 'the avant-garde of the countries that can and wish to go ahead' (PASOK 2007, 100). The combination of Papandreou's insistence on further enlargement – despite the significant and vocal opposition to it both in Greece and in other member states – and the abandonment of Simitis' emphasis on institutional reform leads to the conclusion that Papandreou appears to espouse an Anglo-Saxon agenda and rejects Simitis' more balanced and holistic strategy.

These remarks reflect the platform (approved by Papandreou) on the basis of which the party's new programme was effectively adopted at the conference of May 2007 (PASOK 2007). This text was subsequently presented *verbatim* as the party's manifesto and remains to date the most important point of reference. In that respect, five key points deserve to be highlighted. First, this political platform that was meant to channel and inform the debate within the party is PASOK's first and only text issued since 2005<sup>79</sup>. Second, it has been personally approved by Papandreou. Third, it bears striking resemblance to Ségolène Royal's *Pacte présidentiel* in terms of its form (i.e. a mere list of objectives and policy proposals), the basic concepts and keywords – including participatory democracy, proximity to the citizen, decentralisation, fair society - that it utilises (Moschonas 2007) - and the parallel debates that it has generated (on the cost of these proposals and the origin of funding). Fourth, after the conference, the text re-appeared in the form of PASOK's government

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programme although it refers to the Constitutional Treaty even after the meeting of the European Council in Brussels in late June 2007. Finally, it is permeated by a pronounced cosmopolitan element highlighted by extensive references to a ‘global agenda’ and the role of socialists (be they Greek or not) in promoting it whilst its European component is remarkably feeble and almost entirely buried under vague and ambiguous statements. Indeed, less than one of the document’s 123 pages is dedicated to European integration construed as both an objective and the means to an end (i.e. PASOK’s preferences under Simitis). The ‘new’, ‘patriotic’ and ‘internationalist’ PASOK construes Europe not as an *actor* that plays ‘an autonomous, powerful and progressive’ international role promoting peace, co-operation, development and security (PASOK 2005, 31) but as a mere *area* of peace and co-operation (PASOK 2007, 98) that ought to be enlarged<sup>80</sup>.

These changes in PASOK’s preferences reflect the broader political context in which they occurred. Numerous opinion polls indicated that PASOK lagged behind the ruling conservative party and appeared to be incapable of reversing this trend. Papandreou’s tactics and his capacity to lead the party were widely and openly questioned and criticised (*The Economist*, 7-13 April 2007, 43). As regards European affairs specifically, Papandreou often berated the conservative government and the Prime Minister personally for (a) undermining the country’s status within the EU, (b) their inability to manage and increase the structural funds earmarked for Greece and (c) their policy on Cyprus and Turkey’s accession bid (e.g. Hellenic Parliament debate, 2 November 2006, 767). On the other hand, neither the reform of the Union nor domestic issues with a pronounced EU dimension were used as part of PASOK’s opposition tactics<sup>81</sup>. Rather, Papandreou argued that the conservative government and

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the EU had colluded in an effort to promote ‘harmful solutions’ in pension reform in exchange for ending the supervision of the country’s public finances under EMU rules (*Eleftherotypia*, 12 May 2007).

Papandreou’s elevation to the leadership of the party on a radical internal reform platform highlighted (i) the lack of trust in traditional leading party figures as well as Simitis’ modernisers and (ii) the new leader’s wish to rejuvenate the party in terms of personnel (politicians and *cadres*)<sup>82</sup>. In addition, both during the process of the party’s re-organisation (May 2004 – March 2005) and since the establishment of the ‘new’, so-called ‘open’ party (March 2005) numerous overlapping committees and task forces were established within the party in an effort to define party policy and tactics. The establishment of these bodies was often advertised with great fanfare but they failed to produce any meaningful output (interview). Indeed, their operation revealed a serious lack of co-ordination<sup>83</sup> - both because there was no visible, coherent front bench and because the party essentially lacks a clear *référentiel* and convincing programmatic beliefs coupled with the corresponding tactics (interview). As a result, internal strife, insecurity and incoherence ensued as exemplified by frequent public and bitter internal disputes. This, in turn, further accelerated the pace of PASOK’s presidentialisation and the personalisation of the party’s leadership. Papandreou’s leadership is couched in the constant but incoherent use of ‘surprise tactics’ whereby the leader suddenly announces in public the party’s position on political issues that dominate the national agenda. In other words, a new, aristocratic-authoritarian<sup>84</sup> and ultimately unconvincing presidential style has emerged. It is couched not in democratic control but on the tactical use of uncertainty and the surprise effect. The most telling (without being the only) example of George A. Papanderou’s

authoritarian style was the former party leader and Prime Minister Costas Simitis' expulsion (between June 2008 and March 2009) from the parliamentary party due to his public disagreement with the party's proposal to hold a referendum for the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon<sup>85</sup>

Under George A. Papandreou PASOK's exodus from the Europeanism of the Simitis era appears to entail an aristocratic-authoritarian style coupled with a cosmopolitan message inspired by the new leader's Atlanticist instincts. Papandreou combined an autonomous style of operation (beyond any collective body or procedure) and a vague, elitist and seemingly normative conception of global politics that is devoid of any reference to either specific forms of government or methods leading to 'global democracy'. This is unsurprising since – with the notable exception of the Simitis era - the entire Greek political class has developed a habit of simply re-acting (as opposed to contributing) to the EU agenda. The latter defines the range of the domestic political debate on Europe. Paraphrasing Simitis, we argue that if 'the others' do not produce a vision for Europe, 'we' are deprived of a sense of direction in 'our' debates. However, as Simitis rightly argued, no meaningful political vision can be bestowed or 'donated'; rather, it can only be the result of active civic engagement in political strife coupled with a critical assessment of the status quo (Simitis 2007, 16). This is why PASOK entered the September 2007 general election campaign deprived of a vision for Europe at a time when the debate on the new treaty was being actively re-launched.

In addition to the gradual and subtle though manifest shift to the aforementioned new kind of rhetoric, Papandreou effectively began downplaying the importance of the

ongoing debate regarding the future of the EU. This is exemplified by his reluctance to even raise the issue or comment on important developments. In contrast, in the past he could have been expected to make a statement (at least in his capacity as President of the Socialist International) on the occasion of an event of EU-wide importance – such as the meeting of the European Council in Brussels in June 2007 that drafted the mandate and decided to convene the formal IGC that led to the Treaty of Lisbon– to make a statement and express his views. However, this did not happen, even on the occasion of the conclusion of the Treaty of Lisbon in October 2007. His silence (and that of his party) was deafening<sup>86</sup>. Equally telling was his (and his party's) limited interest in a substantive debate both in Parliament and Greece as a whole on the occasion of the ratification of the Treaty of Lisbon a year later<sup>87</sup>.

More importantly, despite the debate and the conference that endorsed the new programme in May 2007, the party did not fight the general election of September 2007 on that basis. Rather, Papandreou decided to fight the election on the basis of a campaign focused on two persons, namely him and the Prime Minister. PASOK's heavy defeat in that general election<sup>88</sup> triggered a leadership challenge. In that context, the main challenger (Ev. Venizelos, a former academic lawyer and Cabinet member) fought the leadership election largely on a platform that drew inspiration from Simitis' strategy and objectives on European integration. The leadership campaign revealed that senior frontbenchers disagreed with Papandreou's views. Indeed, based on a sophisticated analysis of the tensions between (a) European integration on the one hand and (ii) the distinction between the Left and the Right, Venizelos supported not only the explicit politicisation of European integration but also the pursuit of Simitis' entire left-wing federalist agenda (including, for example,

the transformation of the EU into a pillar of a multi-polar international system) even before the leadership campaign had kicked off (Venizelos 2006). This demonstrated clearly the EU-related political consequences of the party ‘referendum’ of 2004.

Dissenting voices were silenced and the exigencies of retaining (or re-gaining) power shifted attention away from Europe even within a self-proclaimed ‘pro-European’ party. Nevertheless, even this incident proves the main argument put forward in this chapter: the leader rules. Papandreou comfortably won the leadership election of 11 November 2007<sup>89</sup>.

Finally, it is worth noting the confusion and contradictions that characterise the party think-tank’s (ISTAME 2009) proposals that were issued ahead of the 2009 European elections. This is ISTAME’s first text on Europe<sup>90</sup> after the leadership election and can therefore be said to fully express the party’s new leader<sup>91</sup>. While the authors of the text make a clear attempt to provide answers to the major issues that confront the EU - on the basis of the key question: how much and what kind of Europe do we want? (ISTAME 2009, 4) – and rely on mainstream Europeanist terminology and old (EMU, political union) as well as new concepts (such as ‘politicisation’<sup>92</sup>) they also make confusing and unclear (as to the desired result) proposals including (i) the direct election of the President of the Commission or even the President of the European Council (!)<sup>93</sup>, and (ii) the limitation of the Commission’s exclusive power of legislative initiative which, if implemented, would deal a major blow to the Community method<sup>94</sup>, etc. Finally, while the authors of the text pay lip service to the wish to see the EU become ‘a stabilisation force within its geo-political sphere and a strong pillar in the new international architecture as a peaceful and democratic step towards a new multi-polar world’ (ISTAME 2009,41-49), no reference whatsoever is

made to the means that would make this happen, and the reference to the objective of a common defence and security policy is at best vague - even in comparison to the Union's *acquis*; rather the option of the development of the EU into a 'soft power'<sup>95</sup> is presented axiomatically (ISTAME 2009, 46).

Despite having initially under-estimated the 2009 European election's political stake, both PASOK and George A. Papandreou, subsequently turned the contest into a referendum regarding the popularity of the conservative government (Papandreou 2009a). The slogan 'we vote on Europe, we decide on Greece' that they deployed (Papandreou 2009c) is indicative in that respect. In electoral terms this was a successful strategy with the electoral result<sup>96</sup> paving the way for PASOK's (and Papandreou's) major victory in the early general election of 4 October 2009<sup>97</sup>.

### **Interests, institutions or ideas?**

Unlike the other four cases examined in this volume where (as the other contributions reveal) several independent variables have – over time – come to play a role in preference formation on European integration and, as a consequence, a more significant dose of nuance is required, the case of PASOK can be summarised in a manner that highlights one key variable that has played (and still plays) a decisive role in during the party's almost four decades in Greek political life. The primacy of the leader is the single most important and enduringly influential factor in the making of the party's preferences on European integration. The leader of the party chooses the broad direction, scope and content of the party's preferences on European integration,

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as well as strategy and tactics used to pursue them. From Andreas G. Papandreou, through to Costas Simitis and even George A. Papandreou, the leader of the party is both a substantial actor within the party and a figurehead whose actions (when the party is in office) and rhetoric (when the party is in the opposition benches) exemplifies what the party (and the government) as a whole stand for on the central issue of European integration. However, this does not mean that the content, clarity and specificity of these preferences does not vary over time. Rather, only between 1996 and 2004 (i.e. when the party and government were led by Costas Simitis) did the party have a clear objective and strategy with regards to the future of European integration, indeed one that was couched in core social democratic values coupled with an explicit belief in federalism, i.e. what we called 'left-wing federalism'. Variation over time is directly linked to the primacy of the leader (since the content of the party's preferences and strategy change when the party chooses a new leader) but cannot conceal the influence of (nor can it be completely separated from) other independent variables mentioned in the introductory chapter.

Electoral, economic and geo-strategic interests have played a role in preference formation in this case but their impact has been mediated by the leader's role. The two Papandreous have linked European integration and domestic electoral considerations, calling for referenda aiming at making political capital against the ruling conservative ND. Less ephemeral has been the influence of economic and geo-strategic interests. Both Andreas G. Papandreou and Costas Simitis have sought – in different ways – to enhance the EU's re-distributive capacity because they were aware of the exigencies of the Greek economy and (in Simitis' case) the medium- to long-term implications of this mechanism for the process of integration as a whole.

Finally, geo-strategic interests have (implicitly or explicitly) influenced preference formation though the outcome has, again, been mediated by the leader's views as well as the development of the EU. This is exemplified by the party's (more accurately, the government's) stance on Greek-Turkish relations and the role of the EU therein. While under Andreas Papandreou the EU was seen as little more than just another forum where Greece had to defend its interests, the development of the EU, the realisation of the limits of this strategy and Simitis' belief that the EU could become the means for the protection of the national interest, have led PASOK to formally accept Turkey as a candidate whose accession prospects would rely on progress made in bilateral issues as well as the issue of Cyprus.

The primacy of the leader also reflects the impact of domestic political culture. The two main parties (PASOK and ND) have traditionally been top-heavy and very centralised. Far from fostering a culture of internal debate (found in other social democratic parties such as the Swedish SAP)<sup>98</sup>, the primacy of the leader reflects the broader weakness of civil society in Greece (Mouzelis and Pagoulatos 2002). When Costas Simitis was in charge, he created numerous opportunities for internal debate but he could not create his interlocutors as well.

Finally, in terms of ideas, populism, initially, modernisation along social democratic lines in the second half of the 1990s, have also been found to have had an impact on preference formation. Populism has been a useful electoral tool during the tenure of the two Papandreous as party leaders but even they differ from each other in that Andreas was striving to make a coherent party (papering over the genuine differences that existed therein) out of a diverse protest movement in the immediate post-junta

period, while George's insistence on a referendum appeared in a mature democracy.

On the other hand, Simitis' left-wing federalism has been explicitly (and deliberately) associated with a modernisation agenda, in part as an effort to overcome resistance to change (in terms of domestic, European and foreign policy) by depicting it as archaic and outdated. The content of this modernisation agenda also reveals the influence of the policy paradigm which entailed a change of focus from (i) the 'state' to the 'public' and (ii) the 'national' defined along domestic lines to a definition that links it inextricably to the 'European'.

## **Conclusion**

Two sets of conclusions can be drawn from the preceding analysis. First, the case of PASOK provides no support for either the obfuscation or the dependence theses. As regards the former, support for European integration has not been used by PASOK in an effort 'to compensate for failure and retrenchment at the national level', nor was it a vehicle for the mobilisation of support by the party 'despite the absence of substantive social democratic policy output' (Bailey 2005, 14). Indeed, membership of the EU has generated concrete evidence indicate that action beyond the nation state can promote a social democratic agenda. Moreover, in this case there is no link between continued membership and active engagement on the one hand, with a fear of national exclusion on the other (Haahr 1993, 263). By contrast, this case indicates a degree of support for the instrumental view of European integration (Sassoon 1996, 734). Integration has been used as the means to achieve the regulation of markets (at the supranational level) as well as the modernisation of Greece – a country whose

political élite openly acknowledges the weaknesses of the nation state. However, this begs the question: *how* did this come about? In other words, was this choice (i) enduring and (ii) linked to interest-based, institutional or ideational factors?

Evidence clearly indicates that PASOK did not perform the U-turn that has been ascribed to it. Rather, its initial robust rhetoric has obscured the party's more nuanced but real position: the *terms* of membership mattered<sup>99</sup> because Greece was facing specific economic, political and geo-strategic issues. Although electoral considerations and the diversity of the ideological orientations of its leading élite were undoubtedly important factors in shaping the party's initial rhetoric, the decisive role of the leader cannot be concealed. In Andreas Papandreou's early PASOK, electoral considerations provided an important motive whilst the absence of a clearly defined and articulated *positive* ideological platform deprived the party of a yardstick against which existing alternative views could be assessed. In that historically defined context, the party leader effectively acted as a *primus solus*. In fact, this is the dominant and enduring feature of preference formation on European integration within PASOK.

Focusing exclusively on this institutionalist explanation can be misleading. After all, political institutions reflect the balance of power that characterises the context in which they are created. Indeed, the party as such has never been actively involved in policy making both when it was in opposition and – even more so – when it was in power. In that sense the top-heavy PASOK exemplifies Greek political culture that is marked by the absence of the ethos of debate on major issues<sup>100</sup>. This does not promote joint 'ownership' of party preferences that inevitably become short-lived.

This also indicates the decidedly elitist nature of the party (and preference formation within it), as well as the the shallow nature of the apparent ‘Europeanisation’ of the Greek political class. ‘Europe does not sell’, one is told. How will it (irrespective of its precise meaning) ‘sell’ when no-one dares speak about it?

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## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> We are grateful to several PASOK MPs, MEPs, party and government officials, Cabinet members and former European Commissioners who gave confidential interviews for the purposes of this project (see appendix). The interviews were conducted between March 2006 and February 2007, i.e. when the party was in opposition. The list that appears in the appendix indicates the interviewees’ institutional role or position at that point in time. Dionyssi G. Dimitrakopoulos gratefully acknowledges the financial support provided by the School of Politics and Sociology, Birkbeck College, University of London and Maria Zampara’s contribution to tracing obscure publications from the Greek book market.

<sup>2</sup> The EEC and NATO are the same syndicate.

<sup>3</sup> Despite its rhetoric, the party (and its leader) was, at least since 1977, in search of a policy platform that would manage to reconcile contradictory demands stemming from the party’s diverse social basis, its activists and competing members of its leadership.

<sup>4</sup> It obtained just under 14 per cent of the votes in the general election of November 1974.

<sup>5</sup> As Susannah Verney appositely notes (1994, 296) ‘[t]he attempt to attract support across a broad section of the political spectrum was indicated by PASOK’s attempt to trace its origins to the triple roots of EAM (the wartime National Resistance Front), the 1960s *Anedotos*, and the 1973 Polytechnic uprising against the Junta [...]. It thus sought recognition as the heir of all the historic anti-Right struggles, laying claim simultaneously to the traditions of the Left, the Centre, and the anti-dictatorship student movement.’

<sup>6</sup> Papandreou was conscious of this diversity and has been (rightly) credited with turning it into one of the strengths of the political movement which he led (Pangalos 2004, 26).

<sup>7</sup> Greece belongs to the Greeks.

<sup>8</sup> Greece belongs in the West.

<sup>9</sup> As Verney rightly argues (1994, 304) ‘claiming to be socialist in a country where the Left had always been communist-dominated distinguished the party from the communist movement with its “sinful” Civil War past and allowed PASOK to present itself as something new.’

<sup>10</sup> For example, a ‘certificate of national probity’ was a formal requirement for the provision of a driver’s licence. Also, in 1962 there were 1,350 political prisoners (Tsoukalas 1969, 145-6).

<sup>11</sup> Accession was mentioned in the Association agreement of 1961 as a formal and mutually agreed objective.

<sup>12</sup> Political considerations initially covered both domestic and international issues but in the run-up to its accession to power in 1981, the former had become the main focus of PASOK’s rhetoric (see *infra*).

<sup>13</sup> The Simitis era is the only notable exception in the sense that under his leadership references to political integration were at least as prominent.

<sup>14</sup> This is what it was at the point of its establishment (Spourdalakis 1998, 23).

<sup>15</sup> This is so ‘because they understood its aim was to make Greece’s post-war orientation to the West irreversible’ (Verney 1987, 257).

<sup>16</sup> It is important to distinguish between the public statements that Papandreou made in his capacity as a (rather mainstream) academic economist (especially in the 1960s) and the statements that he made as a political leader.

<sup>17</sup> In his public statements Papandreou rejected both Western capitalism and the Soviet model. This was part of a strategy that was meant to expand the party’s appeal. Indeed, Papandreou’s virulent criticism of the West combined references to the inherent monopolistic tendencies of capitalism on the one hand, with the rejection of European social democracy that he portrayed as the genteel mask of capitalism, on the other. He also rejected the bureaucratic socialism of the Soviet model (Verney 1994, 304-5). Both were designed to make PASOK more attractive to segments of the non-communist Left and the centre.

<sup>18</sup> Karamanlis’ correct tactical decision mirrored the primacy of the political benefits of membership as well as the weaknesses of the Greek economy.

- <sup>19</sup> This was already present in PASOK's rhetoric but it gained greater prominence after the 1977 general election.
- <sup>20</sup> No to monopolies' Europe; yes to peoples' Europe.
- <sup>21</sup> One good example is provided by the government's decision to present the new agreement with the US as a result of which the most important US military bases remained on Greek soil although, while in opposition, PASOK had pledged to do the opposite.
- <sup>22</sup> This was an important decision because Simitis was expected to boost the pro-EC camp within the Cabinet whilst he was dealing with the crucial issue of maximising the benefits of Greek agriculture from the CAP. CAP funds were a major factor in the reduction of the intensity of the conflict with PASOK's left wing (interview with former senior Cabinet member).
- <sup>23</sup> He was President of the Republic since 1980.
- <sup>24</sup> The first Greek Presidency (July-December 1983) did not end with the traditional joint statement/presidency conclusions. This has been ascribed to the unwillingness of the French government to accept a compromise and was in line with Papandreou's opinion that the conclusions of the presidency ought to be drafted in a way that would enable European citizens to understand and accept them (Varfis n.d.). It should be noted that during that presidency Theodoros Pangalos, then a junior trade minister, had successfully promoted the establishment of a new formation of the Council of Ministers dealing with consumer protection issues (Pangalos 2003).
- <sup>25</sup> The Commission explicitly argued that IMPs were a response to many of the demands outlined in the (Greek) memorandum.
- <sup>26</sup> Taking advantage of the latter required the active engagement with EC processes instead of the frequent denouncement of other governments' (often assumed) intentions.
- <sup>27</sup> While Simitis and Pangalos were major pro-European figures, the Cabinet also included ministers who harboured either caution or downright hostility vis-à-vis European integration.
- <sup>28</sup> Papandreou did not hesitate to side with the conservative Prime Ministers of Britain and Denmark at the European Council meeting of Milan in 1985 in an effort to block this decision. The Italian presidency's ingenious procedural decision to rely on qualified majority voting enabled the circumvention of their opposition but confirmed both Papandreou's willingness to take on the majority as well as his fears regarding the impact of membership of the EC on national sovereignty. Nevertheless, it also served the purpose of reminding other member states (and the Commission) that

Greek interests could not be ignored within the context of the IGC whose successful conclusion required a unanimous decision.

- <sup>29</sup> See, for example the statement made in Parliament by Mihelagianis, a socialist MP (Hellenic Parliament debates, 14 January 1987, 2614).
- <sup>30</sup> This change has been ascribed to the influence exerted by Jacques Delors and Mitterrand's economic policy U-turn of 1983 (interviews with PASOK MEP, Athens, 27 March 2006 and former senior Cabinet member, Athens, 11 July 2006).
- <sup>31</sup> The Greek government submitted this request in October 1985 i.e. during the IGC. The Greek government had one additional source of lending, namely the IMF. Given its vehement criticism regarding the role of this institution, the Greek government was keen to avoid this option (Kazakos 1987, 439).
- <sup>32</sup> The current account problems faced by the Greek government in 1985 had turned the loan into a necessity. The programme entailed currency devaluation, a tight incomes policy and an attempt to bring the ballooning public deficit under control (Tsakalotos 2001, 144). It had received the explicit and concrete backing of Jacques Delors, then President of the European Commission.
- <sup>33</sup> Though Papandreou, speaking to one of his close collaborators, angrily cited the need to convince the party (a near impossibility at the time) about Simitis' proposal, it is more likely that he merely used it as an excuse to justify the decision to execute this U-turn; after all, he was the party's undisputed leader (interview with former PASOK MEP, Athens, 11 July 2006).
- <sup>34</sup> Despite the government's decision to embark on a spending spree that the country could not afford, PASOK lost the 1989 election.
- <sup>35</sup> These included Simitis, Pangalos, V. Papandreou, George A. Papandreou and Y. Papantoniou.
- <sup>36</sup> As Prime Minister during the second half of the 1980s Papandreou was reluctant to pursue the idea of membership of the WEU although the organisation's then Secretary-General was very positive about this prospect. As a result, Greece ended up joining the WEU a few years later (under the conservative ND government) but in a manner that effectively diluted the concrete benefits that were expected. Indeed, on the occasion of the accession of Greece, other member states declared that in case of a conflict between a member (such as Greece) and an associated member (such as Turkey), the clause of mutual assistance would not apply.
- <sup>37</sup> It won 46.9 per cent of the votes and 170 out of a total of 300 seats in Parliament.

- <sup>38</sup> G. Yennimatas and, after his death, Y. Papantoniou were Ministers of National Economy, A. Papadopoulos was Minister of Finance.
- <sup>39</sup> Simitis was Minister of Trade and Industry and Pangalos Alternate Foreign Minister in charge of European affairs.
- <sup>40</sup> Unlike similar efforts made by the conservative governments of 1990-3, this stabilisation programme (and the one followed by the Simitis government in the second half of the 1990s) does not seem to have had a negative impact on the real economy leading, instead, to 2.4 per cent growth rate in 1995. This contrasts markedly with the -1.6 per cent growth rate of 1993 (Tsakalotos 2001, table 1, 146). In addition, although this programme differs markedly from the economic policies that PASOK implemented in the 1980s, PASOK's efforts in the 1990s entailed an 'attempt to share the burden of adjustment more fairly and to shelter, to some extent, the most vulnerable sections of society' (Tsakalotos 2001, 158).
- <sup>41</sup> An intermezzo is, according to the *New Oxford Dictionary*, 'a short piece for a solo instrument'.
- <sup>42</sup> Simitis was a long-standing vocal supporter of the acceleration of the country's constructive engagement in the process of integration.
- <sup>43</sup> The process of the gradual transfer of legislative power from the Council to the EP ought to start from the areas that directly affect individual citizens such as the consumer protection, health, human rights and the protection of the environment (Simitis 1995, 131).
- <sup>44</sup> The looser models entail fewer rules. This gives greater freedom to egocentric larger states and threatens the coherence of the union. Moreover, differentiated integration should not institutionalise divergence; rather it should be designed to help weaker participants catch up (Simitis 1995, 130).
- <sup>45</sup> As Kevin Featherstone rightly argues (2003, 931), '[t]he shift to 'sound money and sound public finances' in Greece was clearly inspired by the EU and the discipline of the single currency. A different policy paradigm was imported: one that owed more to the German monetary policy tradition than to the traditional Greek electoral cycle'.
- <sup>46</sup> Speaking in Parliament in 1999, Simitis rightly claimed that the effort to reduce public debt was totally in line with PASOK's long-standing objective of national emancipation since the more you owe to third parties, the more you depend on them (Simitis 2002, 152).
- <sup>47</sup> This major reform entailed the merger of a large number of local authorities into a small number of viable bodies.

<sup>48</sup> This concerned transport and energy infrastructure (including new motorways, the modernisation of national railways, the new airport and underground of Athens, a large number of new ports and marinas) as well as infrastructure that affects the quality of life such as new hospitals, the modernisation of the water infrastructure in major urban centres and the biological treatment of sewage (Simitis 2005, 252-3).

<sup>49</sup> This policy involved, *inter alia*, increased social security benefits (especially for low income pensioners), increased unemployment benefits and the expansion of free health care to cover all registered unemployed people (Simitis 2005, 265).

<sup>50</sup> For many years Greek defence spending was one of the largest (in terms of GDP share) amongst members of NATO.

<sup>51</sup> This policy had often allowed other national governments to hide behind what was often perceived as Greek intransigence. This was no longer a viable strategy. The new Greek policy on the matter forced them (and EU institutions) to deal with the realities of Turkey's bid.

<sup>52</sup> Simitis maintains that ownership is nowadays not as important as the actual operation of public firms and objects to the primacy of ownership (over their effectiveness) of the means of production (specifically the presence of public firms) as the key criterion for the definition of a progressive economic policy (Simitis 2005, 554-8).

<sup>53</sup> Speaking in Parliament in March 1996 Simitis pointed out that one member state (Britain) had prevented the adoption by the EU of a statement in support of the Greek view on the Imia incident (Simitis 2002a, 63).

<sup>54</sup> The exact opposite pattern marked Papandreou's tenure.

<sup>55</sup> PASOK obtained 41.49 per cent of the votes in 1996 and 43.79 per cent four years later.

<sup>56</sup> According to the *New Oxford Dictionary* the term 'exodus' is mentioned in the second book of the Bible 'which recounts the departure of the Israelites from slavery in Egypt, their journey across the Red Sea and through the wilderness led by Moses, and the giving of the Ten Commandments'.

<sup>57</sup> This happened thirty years after his late father played a major role in the establishment of the party.

<sup>58</sup> The terminology used in Greece on that occasion ('the handing-over of the ring') clearly reflects the imagery of aristocratic circles. However, the remainder of the process was effectively designed in an explicit effort to disconfirm this notion. Simitis' decision to name his successor took many by surprise not because he sought to dissociate himself from what seemed to be an almost certain

electoral defeat but because of his consistent fight against his own predecessor's authoritarian practices.

<sup>59</sup> Simitis justified his choice (2005, 589-95) by referring to George A. Papandreou's popularity within and beyond the party, his work while he was Minister of Foreign Affairs and the likelihood of a new political and electoral dynamic that this decision was likely to generate.

<sup>60</sup> The party's charter stipulates that the party's friends have the right to vote and can contribute to party policy making but they cannot run for party office (art. 20).

<sup>61</sup> The family name carried significant weight especially with large segments of older generations of PASOK voters and sympathisers.

<sup>62</sup> This is roughly one tenth of the country's entire population.

<sup>63</sup> PASOK's share of the vote dropped to 40.5 per cent, but the party lost just over 5,000 votes compared to the general election of 2000.

<sup>64</sup> This was a major defeat. PASOK won 34.01 per cent of the vote, i.e. nine percentage points less than the conservative ND (43.03 per cent). The corresponding difference in the European elections of 1999 was just 3.1 per cent.

<sup>65</sup> This was in line with the views expressed by virtually all Greek political parties on the matter.

<sup>66</sup> Forty per cent is the target.

<sup>67</sup> This was to be achieved through internal consultation and accountability, referenda, an ombudsman, etc.

<sup>68</sup> PASOK and the ruling conservative ND supported the ratification (268 votes in favour) whilst 17 left-wing MPs voted against (Hellenic Parliament debates, 19 April 2005, 7712).

<sup>69</sup> This was in line with the decision of the party conference of March 2005.

<sup>70</sup> The proposal was supported by 123 PASOK and left-wing MPs but it was successfully opposed by 151 conservative MPs (Hellenic Parliament debates, 12 May 2005, 8455). Various opinion polls published a month later recorded, *inter alia*, (i) the public's support for a referendum (80-83 per cent) and (ii) the fact that - although the public felt that they knew little about the content of the Constitutional Treaty (73 per cent), the debate in parliament and its outcome (65 per cent) - there was a majority against ratification (40-46 per cent against, 30-32 per cent in favour) which, the public felt, had not been affected by the result of the French referendum. The surveys also revealed another important finding: amongst PASOK voters a majority (38-52 per cent compared to 28-29 per cent)

was prepared to vote against the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty while 20-32 per cent refused to express an opinion. ND voters supported it (38-40 per cent in favour, 32-36 per cent against) whilst Communist Party voters opposed it - 5-12 per cent in favour, 13-27 per cent against (*Ta Nea*, 1 and 2 June 2005, *Avgi* 1 June 2005; *Eleftherotypia* 2 and 5 June 2005).

<sup>71</sup> On these notions see Vertovec and Cohen (2003) and Archibugi (2004).

<sup>72</sup> This is a good example since Papandreou appears to equate the EU to classic international organisations such as the IMF and the World Bank (Papandreou 2006d, 3).

<sup>73</sup> The same logic underpins his recently (February 2009) announced five national objectives, the first of which refers, *inter alia*, to the country's 'equal participation in Europe and international affairs'.

<sup>74</sup> For instance, he has argued that '[n]ow we must reinvent Europe as peace in a globalising world, as a socialist project of humanising globalisation' (Papandreou 2008a) while in a speech in New York (2008b) he gave a different meaning to the EU: 'Now, no one can do this alone, not the US, not China, not the European Union, not others. But the US will have to play a leading role, for three reasons. First of all, it has its huge responsibility in creating, if not fully creating itself, but very much responsible for a large part of the mess, the crisis we now see. Secondly, not even the US can escape interdependency.'

<sup>75</sup> This echoes the switch of the French *Parti Socialiste* from references to the 'socialist' to 'social Europe' (Marlière, this volume, XXX).

<sup>76</sup> This is expressed through an eagerness (also encountered in New Labour) to refuse to give to the EU (or at least the prospect of joint action at that level) the prominence that he ascribes to other actors – such as the US – when it comes to dealing with major international issues – including the financial and economic crisis – despite the fact that the EU is the largest single market on the planet and a major trading bloc. In other words, unlike his predecessor who saw the EU as the 'natural' context within which Greece should define and pursue its objectives (whilst contributing to the process of integration), George A. Papandreou relies on a much more diffuse conception that inevitably privileges the status quo and the hegemonic position of the US therein.

<sup>77</sup> There is broad consensus within the Greek political class in support of enlargement (to Turkey and Western Balkans). The government's policy on Turkey's accession bid subsequently became an additional point of divergence between George A. Papandreou and Costas Simitis (Simitis 2008).

- <sup>78</sup> In his attempt to find a ‘third way’ between the Franco-German and the Anglo-Saxon models, Papandreou supported novel but incoherent proposals such as the enhancement of the EU’s legitimacy through the use of EU-wide referenda and the direct election of the ‘President of the European Union’ (Papandreou 2006f, 2).
- <sup>79</sup> Mimis Androulakis’ 70+1 ‘theses’ that were subsequently endorsed by the party at its 8th conference in May 2008 have – just like the conference itself – been completely forgotten (Hassapopoulos 2008).
- <sup>80</sup> Deepening is also mentioned though only in policy terms.
- <sup>81</sup> One good example is the *débâcle* regarding the compatibility of domestic legislation (including the Constitution) that regulates the links between public procurement on the one hand and mass media ownership on the other, with EU law (Dimitrakopoulos 2008b, chap. 5). George A. Papandreou’s PASOK was remarkably quick to retreat from the defence of the idea that membership of the EU entails both rights *and* duties (and thus do away with the image of the EU as a mere ‘cash cow’). Papandreou had a major opportunity to buck the trend and show that active engagement in the EU is the only meaningful way to define and promote the ‘national interest’ and that a provincial attitude was both counter-productive (in the long term) and ineffective (in the short term), but he avoided it, sensing the trend of Euroscepticism that permeates Greek public opinion, as indicated by the opinion polls mentioned earlier (see *supra*). This is unsurprising since, as a PASOK *cadre* put it, ‘Europe does not sell nowadays’ and senior PASOK politicians who can talk about it, refrain from doing so (interview).
- <sup>82</sup> The choices he made when he defined the party’s list for the European elections of June 2004 bear testimony to this intention.
- <sup>83</sup> The same applies to PASOK’s MEPs, whose selection was George A. Papandreou’s first major personnel decision (interview with PASOK *cadre*, Athens, 12 January 2007).
- <sup>84</sup> The expulsion of Y. Papantoniou (a senior member of Simitis-led Cabinets) from the parliamentary party is a good example of this leadership style. Papantoniou went against George A. Papandreou’s declared populist line on the issue of the privatisation by the conservative government of a major state-owned bank by declaring (rightly) that this was also the policy of the previous PASOK government.
- <sup>85</sup> As T. Pappas (2008) appositely put it, ‘Europe is the fateful word that for three decades casts its shadow on Simitis’ relations with the Papandreous’.

<sup>86</sup> This might seem to be a rather harsh criticism but it is not. Indeed, Papandreou did find the time to make a public statement regarding the suicide attack against Benazir Bhutto in October 2007 but said nothing about the Treaty of Lisbon that was agreed on just a few days earlier.

<sup>87</sup> For example in his speech in Parliament he focused on the government's 'absence' from negotiations in Brussels and the request for a referendum (Hellenic Parliament debate, 11 June 2008, 1086-90).

<sup>88</sup> It won 38.1 per cent of the votes and 102 out of a total of 300 seats in Parliament. In comparison to the previous general election, PASOK lost 276,678 votes and 15 seats.

<sup>89</sup> Approximately 738,078 members and 'friends' of PASOK voted, including 16-18 year olds, immigrants and nationals of other EU member states. George A. Papandreou won 55.9 per cent of the votes, Ev. Venizelos 38.1 and Costas Skandalidis 5.7 per cent.

<sup>90</sup> It is worth noting a text authored by Simitis' close collaborators (ISTAME 2006) which inevitably reflects the ideas and objectives of the Simitis era. An updated version of the same text was subsequently presented as the think tank's 'study' on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome (ISTAME 2007). This was a desperate effort on the part of the think tank's leadership to conceal the total absence within the party of any effort to problematise the issue of European integration.

<sup>91</sup> This text arguably reflects the views of George A. Papandreou's closest collaborators (be they elected or not, within the party or elsewhere) whose role in the making of European policy seems to be significant but has not been systematically researched (interview with PASOK cadre).

<sup>92</sup> Despite the intensive debate within academia and amongst politicians on this notion, the authors of this text do not indicate what they mean. Politicisation is the development of public political contestation both (i) on the definition of the EU's agenda and the policies that exemplify it and (ii) the operation of the EU's institutions that involves (but is not limited to) the distinction between Left and Right (Hix 2008).

<sup>93</sup> See ISTAME (2009, 14) for proposals that he had mentioned in the past and subsequently chose to re-use arguing that they are a response to 'stich-ups be they for Barroso or anybody else' (Papandreou 2009b).

<sup>94</sup> See ISTAME (2009, 14). These proposals are probably destined for the domestic audience since they were not included in the same think tank's contribution to the debate between similar organisations

attached to sister European parties during the preparation of the 2009 European election manifesto of the Party of European Socialists (ENSoF 2008, 15-17).

<sup>95</sup> On the debate as to whether (a) the EU should (or not) be confined to the role of a 'soft power' and (b) this option is 'progressive' see Hettne and Soderbaum where 'soft imperialism' is construed as the use of soft (non-military) power 'in a hard way, that is an asymmetric form of dialogue or even the imposition or strategic use of norms and conditionalities enforced for reasons of self-interest rather than for the creation of a genuine (interregional) dialogue' (2005, 539).

<sup>96</sup> Twenty-two MEPs are elected in Greece. PASOK won 36.7 per cent of the votes (and eight seats), the conservative ND 32.3 per cent (eight seats), the Communist Party 8.4 per cent while three smaller parties (including the extreme right-wing LAOS and, for the first time in European elections, the Greens) also won seats. The turn-out rate was 52.63 per cent.

<sup>97</sup> PASOK won (43.92 per cent) comfortably (more than ten percentage points of difference vis-a-vis conservative ND that came second). Thus PASOK has a comfortable majority in Parliament (160 of the 300 seats).

<sup>98</sup> Even when debates do take place they are very rarely, if at all, couched in written contributions. This is what A. G. Passas (2008) calls 'the culture of spoken word'. One of the main problems we encountered during our research for this chapter was the very limited number of written party documents. As a result, we had to rely on politicians' speeches, books and several interviews (as well as written testimonies) provided by our interlocutors.

<sup>99</sup> At least in Andreas Papandreou's mind (cf. PASOK 1976, 16 where – even with C. Simits' seal of approval - the party explicitly rejects the options of membership, 'as well as membership under certain conditions').

<sup>100</sup> Indeed, this applies not only to the party's European policy but also its switch to a new policy paradigm.

## **APPENDIX: LIST OF INTERVIEWEES**

Gerassimos Arsenis, former PASOK MP and Cabinet minister, Athens, 11 July 2006.

Paraskevas Avgerinos, former PASOK MEP and Cabinet minister, Athens, 13 July 2006.

Panos Beglitis, PASOK MEP, Athens, 27 March 2006.

Anna Diamantopoulou, PASOK MP, former European Commissioner and junior minister, Athens, 10 July 2006.

Pantelis Economou, former PASOK MP, Athens, 30 March 2006.

Yiorgos Floridis, PASOK MP and former Cabinet minister, Athens, 12 July 2006.

Yannis Kapsis, former PASOK MP and alternate Minister of Foreign Affairs, Athens, 28 March 2006.

Yiorgos Katiforis, former PASOK MEP, former member of the Praesidium of the Convention on the Future of Europe and former economic adviser to Prime Minister Andreas G. Papandreou, Athens, 11 July 2006.

Paulina Lampsa, PASOK cadre (International affairs secretariat), Athens, 12 January 2007.

Apostolos Lazaris, former PASOK Cabinet minister, Athens, 30 March 2006.

Andreas Loverdos, PASOK MP and former junior minister, Athens, 13 July 2006.

Vangelis Papachristos, PASOK MP, Athens, 30 March 2006.

Alexandros Papadopoulos, PASOK MP and former Cabinet minister, Athens, 12 July 2006.

Yannos Papantoniou, PASOK MP, former MEP and Cabinet minister, Athens, 13 July 2006.

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Christos Papoutsis, PASOK MP, former European Commissioner and Cabinet minister, Athens, 27 March 2006.

Yiorgos Romeos, former PASOK MP, MEP and Cabinet minister, Athens, 28 March 2006.

Yannis Roubatis, PASOK cadre and former MEP, Athens, 30 March 2006.

Panagiotis Roumeliotis, former PASOK MEP and Cabinet minister, Athens, 10 July 2006.

Dimitris Stefanou, PASOK cadre and adviser to George A. Papandreou, Athens, XX March 2006.

Nikos Themelis, former aide to Prime Minister Costas Simitis, Athens, 14 April 2006.

Grigoris Varfis, former European Commissioner and PASOK junior Foreign Affairs Minister (European affairs), Aegina, 31 March 2006.

Evangelos Venizelos, PASOK MP and former Cabinet minister, Athens, 11 January 2007.