Externalism, internalism and logical truth
Besson, Corine (2009) Externalism, internalism and logical truth. The Review of Symbolic Logic 2 (1), pp. 1-29. ISSN 1755-0203.
The aim of this paper is to show what sorts of logics are required by externalist and internalist accounts of the meanings of natural kind nouns. These logics give us a new perspective from which to evaluate the respective positions in the externalist--internalist debate about the meanings of such nouns. The two main claims of the paper are the following: first, that adequate logics for internalism and externalism about natural kind nouns are second-order logics; second, that an internalist second-order logic is a free logic—a second order logic free of existential commitments for natural kind nouns, while an externalist second-order logic is not free of existential commitments for natural kind nouns—it is existentially committed.
|School:||Birkbeck Schools and Departments > School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy > Philosophy|
|Depositing User:||Corine Besson|
|Date Deposited:||19 Oct 2012 10:10|
|Last Modified:||11 Jun 2013 10:11|
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