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    Empirical analysis of countervailing power in business-to-business bargaining

    Beckert, Walter (2011) Empirical analysis of countervailing power in business-to-business bargaining. Working Paper. Birkbeck College, University of London, London, UK.

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    Abstract

    This paper provides a comprehensive econometric framework for the empirical analysis of countervailing power. It encompasses the two main features of pricing schemes in business-to-business relationships: nonlinear price schedules and bargaining over rents. Disentangling them is critical to the empirical identification of countervailing power. Testable predictions from the theoretical analysis for a pragmatic reduced form empirical pricing model are delineated. This model is readily implementable on the basis of transaction data, routinely collected by antitrust authorities and illustrated using data from the UK brick industry. The paper emphasizes the importance of controlling for endogeneity of volumes and established supply chains and for heterogeneity across buyers and sellers due to intrinsically unobservable outside options.

    Metadata

    Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
    Additional Information: BWPEF 1107
    Keyword(s) / Subject(s): countervailing power, bargaining, nonlinear prices, transaction panel data
    School: Birkbeck Schools and Departments > School of Business, Economics & Informatics > Economics, Mathematics and Statistics
    Research Centre: Commodities Finance Centre
    Depositing User: Administrator
    Date Deposited: 18 Jan 2013 09:31
    Last Modified: 07 Dec 2016 15:30
    URI: http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/5972

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