BEYOND “THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIETY”: BROADENING AND DEEPENING RELATIONAL THINKING IN GROUP ANALYSIS

Sasha Roseneil


Contact details:
Professor Sasha Roseneil
Department of Psychosocial Studies/ Birkbeck Institute for Social Research
Birkbeck, University of London
Malet Street
London WC1E 7HX
s.roseneil@bbk.ac.uk
Beyond “the relationship between the individual and society”: broadening and deepening relational thinking in group analysis

Sasha Roseneil

Abstract

The question of “the relationship between the individual and society” has troubled group analysis since its inception. This paper offers a reading of Foulkes that highlights the emergent, yet evanescent, psychosocial ontology in his writings, and argues for the development of a truly psychosocial group analysis, which moves beyond the individual/society dualism. It argues for a shift towards a language of relationality, and proposes new theoretical resources for such a move from relational sociology, relational psychoanalysis and the “matrixial thinking” of Bracha Ettinger which would broaden and deepen group analytic understandings of relationality.

Keywords:
individual; society; group analysis; relationality; relational sociology; relational psychoanalysis; Foulkes; psychosocial.

Author contact details:
Professor Sasha Roseneil, Department of Psychosocial Studies, Birkbeck, University of London, Malet Street, London WC1E 7HX.
s.roseneil@bbk.ac.uk
tel: 020 3073 8362
Introduction

A preoccupation with the troubling question of “the relationship between the individual and society” is one of the distinctive characteristics of group analysis as a psychotherapeutic modality. Both the body of writing that constitutes “group-analytic thinking”, and the training programmes that transmit and reproduce group analysis devote considerable attention to this knotty problem. Group analysis is not, however, alone in this; the historical and philosophical emergence and consequences of the individual/society dualism have been subject to extensive exposition and critique across the social sciences and humanities for many decades. The disquisitions of Foulkes on this subject are the starting point for group-analytic thinking, and indeed for this paper, and within these, I will argue, there are suggestions of a psychosocial ontology that was more innovative and ground-breaking than is often realized. However, these intimations of the psychosocial have an evanescent quality, tending to slip from Foulkes’ theoretical grasp. Moreover, they have been largely unrecognized by those who have followed on and developed his work, with the consequence that the individual/society dualism repeatedly reasserts itself in group analytic thinking. In this context, I shall suggest that group analysis would now, in the early 21st century, be best served by relinquishing its attachment to this problematic. Instead of encouraging interminable engagement with the unsolvable dilemma of whether to “prioritize” the individual or society, I propose a shift in our conceptual horizons towards a language of relationality, the ground for which was
laid in Foulkes’ work, but which can be developed in dialogue with recent developments in psychoanalytic and sociological thinking.

Exemplifying the self-understanding that characterizes group analysis as counter-normative, group analysis repeatedly *abstracts* a single phrase from the work of Foulkes that might be seen as crystallizing the essence of his departure from dominant, western, post-Enlightenment ways of thinking: the individual is “an artificial, though plausible, abstraction”. This phrase represents what Farhad Dalal (Dalal 1998) refers to as “the Radical Foulkes”, as opposed to “the Orthodox”, Freudian Foulkes, suggesting that, in speaking to “two masters” (1998: 77), Freud and Elias, Foulkes “has left a trail of inconsistencies and contradictions” (1998:11). Dalal, who clearly prefers the “Radical” to the “Orthodox”, the sociological to the psychoanalytic, argues that “as one reads through his four books, it is possible to see his [Foulkes’] view change from an individual psychoanalytic viewpoint to one that is increasingly radical, systemic, and group oriented” (1998:34). Dalal’s argument for a post-Foulkesian group analysis proposes to develop “the Radical Foulkes” so that group analysis begins with the group, not the individual (1998:157). Grounding his argument in the work of Elias, Dalal grants ontological priority to the group, as, he argues, does Foulkes, as he moves away from Freudian psychoanalysis. In what follows, I challenge both Dalal’s reading of Foulkes, and his ontological prescription for the future of group analysis.
Reading Foulkes – contextually, closely, critically

My first task, in the spirit of contextualization that I see as essential to a group analytic way of thinking, is to seek to understand the Foulkes’ construction of the relationship between the individual and society in relation to the wider body of work from which it has been extracted, and within its context of production and address.

Foulkes’ training first in medicine, then specializing in neurology and psychiatry, and thereafter as a psychoanalyst, constituted the conditions of possibility of his thinking and writing. More than “background”, to the “foreground” of the emergence of group analysis, as he might have seen them, these disciplines, their conceptual tools and communities of practice, shaped the language with which he struggled to formulate this new field, framed his mode of argumentation, and, in the case of the psychoanalytic profession, were often his (real or imagined) interlocutors. His first major work, Introduction to Group Analytic Psychotherapy (1948), in which this famous phrase appears, both draws on the science of neurology and critiques scientific method, pays obeisance to psychoanalysis and poses a radical challenge to many of its fundamental assumptions. Contra Dalal, who sees his “Radical Foulkes” – the one who “proceeds from the group” (1998:157) - as emerging over time, my chronological reading of Foulkes suggests that what I believe is most radical and innovative about his work is evident in this first book, whilst the theoretical limitations that were to remain in his work were also present from the outset.
Introduction begins: “Life is a complex whole. It can only artificially be separated into parts, analysed” (1948:1). The assertion of ontological holism is presented as a critique of the “isolating scientific method” that gained dominance in the 19th century. Foulkes argues that abstractions are often necessary, but become problematic when applied “to every ‘disease’” (1948:3). Arguing that psychoanalysis has begun the work of acknowledging the importance of the “total situation” (1948:7), and investigating how “the present personality and the present situation, even in their totality, are inseparable from the past – that of the individual and the race – and the future” (1948: 9), he credits Freud’s topographical theory with showing that “the ‘outer’ world becomes internalised, that man’s inner dynamic world is a microcosmic reflection of the whole world, at least his whole world” (1948:10). However, he also critiques psychoanalysis for failing, thus far, to have “allotted to this social side of man the same basic importance as it has his instinctual aspect” (1948:10). He goes on to argue, in holistic terms, that it is wrong to understand “the ‘world’ and ‘society’ or even the family” in terms of “‘individual’ interactions”:

It is the same mistake, as it was, to consider the whole as the sum of its parts. From a mature, scientific point of view, the opposite is true: each individual – itself an artificial, though plausible, abstraction – is basically and centrally determined, inevitably, by the world in which he lives, by the community, the group, of which he forms a part. Progress in all the sciences during the last decades has led to the same independent and concerted conclusion; that the old juxtaposition of an inside and outside world, constitution and environment, individual and society, phantasy and reality, body and mind and so on, are
unteachable. They can at no stage be separated from each other, except by artificial isolation (1948: 10).

Clearly not the expression of orthodox Freudianism that would be expected from Dalal’s historiography of Foulkes, I see here the crystallisation of Foulkes’ struggle with the individual/society dichotomy. In this short passage, Foulkes begins by grounding his claim (albeit without acknowledging this) in a classical Durkheimian sociological ontology which claims the *sui generis* nature of society, that is, its irreducibility to the level of individuals. In the context of Foulkes’ psychoanalytic audience, this was a radical move. He goes on to articulate a strong social determinism: the individual, *artificially abstracted* from the overarching reality of society, is “basically and centrally determined” by the group.

There are a number of conceptual problems with this formulation, which, I suggest, offers an inadequate understanding of both sides of the dualism. One issue, largely unaddressed within the group analytic literature, but a major concern for sociology, is how, within such a paradigm, to account for change, at the level of the social or the individual: what are the sources of transformation, creativity, innovation? It is no accident that within sociology the individual/society dualism is commonly discussed alongside the agency/structure dualism. What might be a radical, critical move in relation to psychoanalysis is a deterministic, intellectually, politically and practically disempowering move within a wider frame of reference. In refusing the idea that “the ‘world’ and ‘society’ or even the family” might be understood in terms of the aggregation of individual actions, he
implicitly comes down on the structuralist side of the agency/ structure debate, and could be criticised for reifying the notions of “world”, “society” and “family”. From the other side of the dualism, this conceptualization of the individual closes down the possibility of accounting for the lived experience of singularity, the particularity of subjectivity at the level of the individual. This is a problem to which no form of psychotherapeutic practice can fail to attend.

However, Foulkes in fact immediately undercuts this position, with a statement that might now be understood as psychosocial, rather than classically sociological, and that is, I would suggest, more productive for group analysis than the “group genesis” that Dalal favours. Some fifty years ahead of the explicit articulation of psychosocial studies, which emerged in the UK since the mid 1990s, Foulkes proposed a remarkably similar deconstruction of the binaries of internal/ external, individual/ society, nature/ culture, as this new field. In rejecting the demarcation between psychology and sociology, which allocates to psychology the scientific study of the mind, ‘the individual’, ‘inner life’, affect and emotion, and to sociology the study of ‘society’, ‘external worlds’, and macro-structures and processes, psychosocial studies refuses the separation of the spheres of ‘psychic’ and ‘social’, and rejects the idea that ‘inner’ and ‘outer’ worlds are empirically or theoretically separable.

Addressing his audience of psychoanalysts and psychiatrists, and perceiving the need, therefore, to expand on the socio-genetic side of his argument, Foulkes goes on to develop his psychosocial ontology, emphasizing both the contemporaneous “horizontal”,
material, “economic, climatic” community and group aspects, and the “vertical”,
tergenerational, historical aspects of the social that “literally permeate” (1948:14) the
individual. In the language of Goldstein’s neurology, he posits an understanding of the
individual as “part of a social network, a little nodal point, as it were” (1948:14).
Challenging psychoanalysis to take seriously “the patient’s total life situation”, rather
than seeing “‘life’ and ‘reality’ merely as projection, screen and reflector of his
‘unconscious phantasies’”, Foulkes asserts that they are indeed both “at the same time.
The truth is, that the two can never be separated” (1948:15).

Foulkes advocated this psychosocial ontology as essential to group analysis in a number
of later writings. His 1966 paper, *Some Basic Concepts in Group Psychotherapy*,
specifies that group analysis is developing:

> a method and theory that would do away with such pseudo-problems as biological
> versus cultural, somatogenic versus psychogenic, individual versus group and
> reality versus phantasy. Instead we must endeavour to use concepts which from
> the beginning do justice to an integrated view (1966:155).

In 1973, in developing the concept of the matrix, he suggests:

> As group analysts we do not share the psychoanalytic juxtaposition of an
> “internal” psychological reality and an “external” physical or social reality which,
> for psychoanalysis, makes good sense. What is inside is outside, the “social” is not
> external but very much internal too and penetrates the innermost being of the
> individual personality (1973:226-7).

And in 1974, in the context of expounding his philosophy of mind, he says:
we cannot make the conventional sharp differentiation between inside and outside, or between phantasy and reality. What is inside is always also outside, what is outside is inside as well (1974:278).

However, a close reading of both his 1948 book and his whole oeuvre suggests that Foulkes does not consistently and coherently adhere to this psychosocial “both/and” position. On one hand, he is rhetorically drawn to emphasizing the group as “basic and central” (1948:15), and the primacy of the social, continuously speaking to an unchanging, unspecified psychoanalytic audience that registers little of the fierce debates that characterized psychoanalysis during the middle decades of the 20th century. On the other hand, beyond his attempts to conceptualize the immediacy of processes within the group analytic situation, most notably in terms of the matrix, and through an emphasis on communication and belonging, and their failures, his clinical discussions fail to engage explicitly with the dynamics of social relations, particularly in terms of their complex, gendered, racialized, national, and class differentiated historicity. The compulsive lure of a position that emphasises one side over the other, and the lack of a language with which to explore the complexities of the imbrication of the psychic and the social, mean that he does not develop a truly psychosocial group analytic theory.

Transcending the dichotomy - thinking relationally

That said, across Foulkes’ body of writing elements of a new, relational mode of thinking are discernible that might facilitate a move beyond the language of the individual/society
dichotomy. The relationality that Foulkes begins to articulate – without naming it as such – resonates with the emergence of both relational sociology and relational psychoanalysis, which each have their roots in the period in which Foulkes was active but which have only been named as such more recently.\textsuperscript{ix} Although they have developed separately, with almost no mutual recognition, Foulkes’ writing is suggestive of the possibilities of bringing them together.

Resources for relational thinking

Emirbayer (1997), the author of the influential \textit{Manifesto for a Relational Sociology}, points out that there is a fundamental dilemma facing all those who seek to understand the social world: the choice between substantialism and relationalism. This is crystallized in the distinction between conceptualizing the world in terms of substances – that is, in terms of static things - or in terms of processes - dynamic, unfolding relations (Ketokivi, 2010; Emirbayer, 1997; Elias, 1978), social networks and social ties/ bonds (e.g. White, 1992). The individual/society dualism is rooted in a substantialist ontology, which posits both sides of the dualism as static things, things which might be seen either to act under their own powers, or alternatively to “interact”, but which nonetheless remain fixed and unchanging throughout their interaction (Ketokivi, 2010:61).\textsuperscript{x} Against this, Emirbayer calls for a \textit{transactional} approach, which focuses on supra-personal relations, rather than on “individuals” or “society”. This idea of a relational sociology, which is increasingly significant within the discipline for the challenge it poses to the dominant substantialist tradition of positivist sociology, offers group analysis a productive way of
conceptualizing the social as always in movement, as processual and fluid, constituted of and through relations.

Developing in different terrain, but also with great potential for the renewal of group analytic thinking, is the now highly influential school of relational psychoanalysis that has, like relational sociology, emerged in recent years in the United States. At the core of relational psychoanalysis is the idea, fundamental to object relations theory (e.g. Klein, 1948; Fairbairn, 1952; Winnicott, 1958, 1965), that the self is constructed relationally. Object relations psychoanalysis posits a developmental theory in which the fundamentally dependent infant has to become aware of its separateness, its individuality and boundaries of self through its relationship with the mother. In Winnicott’s much cited phrase, “there is no such thing as a baby (apart from maternal provision)” (1965:39), because the primary care-giver/ mother-child matrix, and the unconscious attunment of mother to baby, make the very existence of the child possible. According to Winnicott, individuality and the “capacity to be alone” emerge through the internalization of the benign presence of the mother. The self is, therefore, from the outset, **intrinsically** social and intersubjective, and its sense of agency and autonomy are inherently relational. As Joan Riviere puts it:

> There is no such thing as a single human being, pure and simple, unmixed with other human beings. Each personality is a world in himself, a company of many. That self, that life of one’s own, which is in fact so precious though so casually taken for granted, is a composite structure which has been and is being formed and built up since the day of our birth out of countless never-ending influences and
exchanges between ourselves and others [...] These other persons are in fact therefore parts of ourselves, not indeed the whole of them but such parts or aspects of them as we had our relation with, and as have thus become parts of us. [...] We are members one of another (Riviere, 1952, quoted in Chodorow, 1999:116).

The notion of intersubjectivity – “the field of intersection between two subjectivities, the interplay between two different subjective worlds” (Benjamin, 1995:29) – which entered psychoanalysis from critical theory has come to occupy a central place within contemporary relational psychoanalysis. Understood by Jessica Benjamin as “a fragile, unenclosed space”, the concept emphasizes the ongoing permeability of the boundaries of the self, and the ways in which “the apparently isolated subject constantly assimilates what is outside itself” (Benjamin, 1998:79). Benjamin (1988; 1995; 1998) argues that the self is, in an ongoing way, reciprocally constituted in relation to the other, and therefore depends on the other’s recognition. The self is constituted out of a pre-existing “relational, social, linguistic matrix” (Mitchell, 2000:57). From this matrix are forged “individual psyches with subjectively experienced interior spaces”.

Those subjective spaces begin as microcosms of the relational field, in which macrocosmic interpersonal relationships are internalized and transformed into a distinctly personal experience; and those personal experiences are, in turn, regulated and transformed, generating newly emergent properties, which in turn create new interpersonal forms that alter macrocosmic patterns of interaction. Interpersonal relational processes generate intrapsychic relational processes which reshape interpersonal processes reshaping intrapsychic processes, and so on in an
endless Mobius strip in which internal and external are perpetually regenerating
and transforming themselves and each other (Mitchell, 2000: 57).xii

In this way, relational psychoanalysis starts to move beyond the language of “individual
and society”. From a group analytic perspective, however, relational psychoanalysis is
inherently limited by its roots in the dyadic psychoanalytic encounter. It fails to grapple
with the small group, the median/ meso-level group, and the large group, and the
movement from meso to macro-level social, cultural and political relations and
processes.

Relational thinking in Foulkes

Much of the time, wherever he is situating himself in relation to the individual/ society
dichotomy, Foulkes is implicitly invoking a substantialist ontology. However, running
through his work, in the language of processes, events, happenings, and field (e.g. in
Foulkes, 1973), these is also a more sociologically and psychoanalytically relational
strand of thinking (predating these bodies of thought by many years) that implicitly
bypasses and subverts the dichotomy. Through this he begins to weave a psychosocial
approach to relationality. We can see this, above all, in his elaboration of his central
concept of the matrix, “the network of all individual mental processes” in the analytic
group, which he understands as a construct, rather like “traffic”: “a concert of
interactions”, of processes, to be seen “not merely as interpersonal but as transpersonal”
(1966:154). Conscious and unconscious communication, verbal and embodied, the
associations, responses and dialogue within the group, which he regards as “based on the
common ground of the unconscious instinctive understanding of each other” (Foulkes, 1966:157), is then the material of group analysis. The therapist’s task is to focus on the “total interactional field, on the matrix in which these unconscious reactions meet”, rather than attempting to follow each individual separately (1966:157). Speaking in a not dissimilar way to Riviere (above), he argues that “what is called ‘the mind’ consists of interacting processes between a number of closely linked persons, commonly called a group” (Foulkes, 1973:224). When people come together in a small group, they create a “field of mental happenings”, “transpersonal processes” that “like X-rays in the bodily sphere, go right through the individuals composing such a ‘network’” (1973:224). The concept of the matrix, which has a fundamentally non-substantialist, relational flavour, is utilized to grasp these processes, and he rejects the concept of a “group mind”:

because this is a substantivation of what is meant and as unsatisfactory as speaking of an individual mind. The mind is not a thing which exists but a series of events, moving and proceeding all the time (1973:224).

Deepening matrixial thinking

To conclude, I want to briefly consider how we might further develop the relational thinking that begins to emerge in Foulkes’s work as part of a project of transcending the individual/society dualism. To do this I draw on the work of feminist psychoanalyst and artist Bracha Ettinger. There is, as Dalal (1998:50) points out, a tantalizing passage in which Foulkes suggests that “what in later development can be usefully abstracted as superego, ego and id arise from a common matrix, beginning at birth or perhaps even
prenatally” (1972:236). Sounding a rather irritated note, Dalal comments: “to keep in line with his other ideas, this would mean that the social world would somehow have to migrate across the womb and enter the neonate. He avoids engaging in the subject of how such an extraordinary thing might occur, which surely he is beholden to do” (1998:50). Ettinger, I propose, offers us a provocative theory of just this process – attending to what we might understand as the capacity for sociality, rather than the content of the social world. Suggestively for group analysis, Ettinger refers to her theory, with no reference to Foulkes, as “matrixial”.

Ettinger’s linguistically and conceptually challenging work (2006a, 2006b) critiques both the Freudian-Lacanian traditions in psychoanalysis and the newer relational intersubjective paradigm, the former with its emphasis on castration and the Oedipal moment, and the latter with its focus on the affective dynamics of attachment and separation between mother and infant. Both schools, she argues, conceptualize the subject through the lens of separations, splits, cuts and cleavages. Central to Ettinger’s theory is the notion of trans-subjectivity which originates in the language-defying state prior to birth – the “transgressive encounter between I and non-I grounded in the maternal womb/intra-uterine complex” (Ettinger, 2006b:218), a state of severality, of jointness in separation, of neither one nor two. She argues for the existence of “the matrixial stratum of subjectivization”. This is the “feeling knowing” that pre-exists birth for everyone who has been a foetus moving inside a woman: the feeling-knowing of “a dynamic borderspace” that constitutes both differentiation and linking, connectivity and co-inhabitation. Beyond the conscious knowledge of the singular subject (the individual), the
trans-subjective stratum of subjectivity is “delivered to us all, irrespective of later gender alignment and sexual orientation, from the primordial severality of human becoming in the intimacy and sexual specificity of the feminine” (Pollock: 2008:13). The “matrixial borderspace” is the psychic space which is trans-subjective and sub-subjective, and precedes and sometimes over-rides the separate subject. Ettinger’s Matrix speaks to the strangeness in me, as well as that of the intimate other irreducible to what, in later phallic constructions, will form the basis of identifications and rejections, incorporations and expulsions that mark and create boundaries and identities for discrete territorialized subjects by whom such porousness or breaching of boundaries can only be experienced as perversion (2006a:17).

Although Ettinger theorizes from the dyadic mother-foetus relation, and practices a two-person mode of psychoanalysis, her ideas are potentially generative for group analysis. Her more profound, earlier conceptualization of relationality offers us a radical understanding of subjectivity- as-encounter, and a language with which to think about trans-subjective unconscious transmission, the affect that flows so powerfully between people in analytic groups, as in all forms of intimate relationship, transgressing the boundaries of the individual. It also suggests a way of thinking about the capacity for what Ettinger calls “shareability”, or what Foulkes describes, in more prosaic terms, as the sense of belonging, of being “a respected and effective member of the group, being accepted, being able to share and to participate”, which he regarded as a basic “constructive experience” of human life (1966:155-6). Her work suggests that the potential to connect, relate, bond, and communicate beyond the boundaries of the
embodied individual, which is activated so powerfully in group analytic psychotherapy, is inherent in us all, by virtue of having been a foetus inside another human being. Our capacity to link across borders, to form the social bonds and attachments with and through which group analysis works, rests on our earliest experiences which are of simultaneous jointness and separation. With the notion of trans-subjectivity, and a theory of its genesis in the universal experience of our biological becoming, Ettinger moves radically beyond the dualisms that have so preoccupied post-Enlightenment thought.

**Concluding thoughts**

In thinking about the most puzzling, moving and mutative moments in my experience as both member and conductor of group analytic groups – the moments when affect passes between people like electricity, when the atmosphere palpably changes, when members are able to grasp another’s psychic reality despite the inadequacy of language to represent its depth and complexity – it is not for the concepts of individual and society that I reach, nor even for the idea of the individual as an abstraction from a greater, more elemental whole. Such substantialist modes of thought might seem to provide some solid ground for the group analyst, but should we wish for solid ground, when our task is to attend to the flow? The language that offers me an ability to swim with the fast moving waters of the group is one of relationality, of process, permeability, and trans-subjectivity. Elements of such a language were there at the beginning of group analysis, and it is such a language, I
believe, that is ultimately more able to capture the vital, fluid, transpersonal, matrixial dynamics with which we work.

References


Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press.


London: Tavistock Publications.


On Foulkes’ intellectual influences see Foulkes (1946).

For example, Durkheim (1893;1895).

Foulkes later reiterates this structuralist position: “The group is not the result of the interactions of individuals” (1964:109).

The Psychosocial Studies Network, in a definition signed up to by research groups from nine British universities, states, ‘In recent years a new scholarly and social scientific subject area known as “Psychosocial Studies” (also “Psycho-Social Studies”, or “Psychosocietal Studies”) has emerged in the UK context, and work has also been applied to a range of subject matters from criminology and social justice to the rethinking of social welfare. Psychosocial Studies is characterised by a) its explicit inter or trans-disciplinarity, b) its development of non-positivist theory, method and praxis and c) its orientation towards progressive social and personal change. There is a broad theoretical commitment to the notion that psychological issues cannot be validly abstracted from social and historical context and to the task of accounting for the social shaping of subjective experience without deterministically reducing the psychic to the social. Psychosocial research draws inspiration from a range of sources including critical theory, post-structuralism, process philosophy, feminism and psychoanalysis, and various “dialects” are in process of emergence.’ [Accessed 20 March 2012].

Clearly influenced by Elias’s (1939) historical theorization of the individual, Foulkes (1966) develops the socio-historical aspect of his theory in a discussion of the post-Renaissance the idea of the isolated individual and of the Cartesian subject/object dualism.

He first restates it in his Address to the Group Analytic Society (1961:148).

He occasionally mentions, in passing, the turn to two-person approaches within psychoanalysis, and the growing emphasis on transference (e.g. 1964), but his writing is characterized by a surprising, and somewhat ironic - given his belief in the importance of groups - lack of engagement with the work of his colleagues and peers in the psychoanalytic community, and of scholarly referencing.

A similar point is made by Dalal (1998).

It is not insignificant that Elias is seen as a founding figure of relational sociology. Relational psychoanalysis has its roots in three traditions, each contesting the monadic model of drive theory: the American interpersonal tradition, developed by Harry Stack Sullivan, Erich Fromm and Clara Thompson, in the 1930s and 40s; the British object relations tradition, particularly the work of Melanie Klein, W.R.D Fairbairn, Winnicott and Bowlby; and American psychoanalytic-feminism, building on object relations theory and pioneered by Dorothy Dinnerstein and Nancy Chodorow, and elaborated by Jessica Benjamin, Muriel Dimen, Adrienne Harris and Lynne Layton, amongst others (Mitchell and Aron, 1999). Greenberg and Mitchell, who coined the term “relational psychoanalysis” in 1983, initially posited a relational model of self as an alternative to classical drive theory.

Ketokivi draws here on the American pragmatists, Dewey and Bentley (1949), and on Emirbayer (1997).

See, for instance, Greenberg and Mitchell (1983), Mitchell and Lewis (1999), Mitchell (2000), and the International Association for Relational Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy http://www.iarpp.net/.

From a group analytic perspective, relational psychoanalysis is inherently limited by its roots in the dyadic psychoanalytic encounter. It fails to grapple with the small group, the meso group, and the large group, and the movement from meso to macro-level social, cultural and political relations and processes.