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    Regulating altruistic agents

    Heyes, A. and Kapur, Sandeep (2010) Regulating altruistic agents. Working Paper. Birkbeck College, University of London, London, UK.

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    Abstract

    Altruism or `regard for others' can encourage self-restraint among generators of negative externalities, thereby mitigating the externality problem. We explore how introducing impure altruism into standard regulatory settings alters regulatory prescriptions. We show that the optimal calibration of both quantitative controls and externality taxes are affected. It also leads to surprising results on the comparative performance of instruments. Under quantity-based regulation welfare is increasing in the propensity for altruism in the population; under price-based regulation the relationship is non-monotonic. Price-based regulation is preferred when the population is either predominantly altruistic or predominantly selfish, quantity-based regulation for cases in between.

    Metadata

    Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
    Additional Information: BWPEF 1010
    School: Birkbeck Schools and Departments > School of Business, Economics & Informatics > Economics, Mathematics and Statistics
    Depositing User: Administrator
    Date Deposited: 20 Jun 2013 14:28
    Last Modified: 20 Jun 2013 14:28
    URI: http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/7544

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