Kurbis, Nils (2012) How fundamental is the fundamental assumption? Teorema 31 (2), pp. 5-19. ISSN 0210-1602.
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Abstract
The fundamental assumption of Dummett’s and Prawitz’ proof-theoretic justification of deduction is that ‘if we have a valid argument for a complex statement, we can construct a valid argument for it which finishes with an application of one of the introduction rules governing its principal operator’. I argue that the assumption is flawed in this general version, but should be restricted, not to apply to arguments in general, but only to proofs. I also argue that Dummett’s and Prawitz’ project of providing a logical basis for metaphysics only relies on the restricted assumption.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | proof-theoretic semantics, Michael Dummett, Dag Prawitz, verificationist theories of meaning, realism vs. anti-realism |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Sarah Hall |
| Date Deposited: | 20 Nov 2014 11:57 |
| Last Modified: | 15 Jul 2025 12:36 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/11046 |
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