Hornsby, Jennifer (1998) Dualism in action. In: O'Hear, A. (ed.) Current Issues in Philosophy of Mind. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 377-401. ISBN 0521632971.
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Abstract
We know what one dualist account of human action looks like, because Descartes gave us one. I want to explore the extent ot which presnet-day accounts of physical action are vulnerable to the charges that may be made against Descartes's dualist account. I once put forward an account of human action, and I have always maintained that my view about the basic shape of a correct ‘theory of aciton’ can be combined with a thoroughgoing opposition to dualism. But the possibility of the combination has been doubted and it will remain doubtful until we have a better understanding of what makes an account objectionably dualistic. In this paper, I hope to deflect some of the criticims aimed what I shall call my account, and to show that when they are turned onto their proper path their actual target is some physicalist accounts.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Book Section |
|---|---|
| Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | dualism, volitionism, trying to |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Jen Hornsby |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Apr 2016 15:20 |
| Last Modified: | 27 Jul 2025 07:02 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/14648 |
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