How convinced should we be by negative evidence?
Hahn, Ulrike and Oaksford, Mike and Bayindir, H. (2005) How convinced should we be by negative evidence? In: Bara, B. and Barsalou, L. and Bucciarelli, M. (eds.) Proceedings of the 27th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society. New York, U.S.: Cognitive Science Society, Inc., pp. 887-892. ISBN 0976831813.
Abstract
The role of probabilistic reasoning in moral decision making has seen relatively little research, despite having potentially profound consequences for our models of moral cognition. To rectify this, two experiments were undertaken in which participants were presented with moral dilemmas with additional information designed to anchor judgements about how likely the dilemma’s outcomes were. It was found that these anchoring values significantly altered how permissible the dilemmas were found when they were presented both explicitly and implicitly. This was the case even for dilemmas typically seen as eliciting deontological judgements. Implications of this finding for cognitive models of moral decision making are discussed.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Book Section |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | Stresa, Italy, July 21-23 2005 |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Science > School of Psychological Sciences |
| Research Centres and Institutes: | Birkbeck Knowledge Lab |
| Depositing User: | Administrator |
| Date Deposited: | 21 Sep 2016 15:19 |
| Last Modified: | 02 Aug 2023 17:26 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/16154 |
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