Found guilty by association: in defence of the Quinean Criterion

Egerton, Karl (2016) Found guilty by association: in defence of the Quinean Criterion. Ratio , ISSN 0034-0006.

Full text not available from this repository.

Official URL: http://doi.org/10.1111/rati.12150

Abstract

Much recent work in metaontology challenges the so-called ‘Quinean tradition’ in metaphysics. Especially prominently, Amie Thomasson argues for a highly permissive ontology over ontologies which eliminate many entities. I am concerned with disputing not her ontological claim, but the methodology behind her rejection of eliminativism – I focus on ordinary objects. Thomasson thinks that by endorsing the Quinean criterion of ontological commitment eliminativism goes wrong; a theory eschewing quantification over a kind may nonetheless be committed to its existence. I argue that, contrary to Thomasson's claims, we should retain the Quinean criterion. Her arguments show that many eliminativist positions are flawed, but their flaws lie elsewhere: the Quinean criterion is innocent. Showing why reveals the importance of pragmatism in ontology. In §1 I compare Thomasson's account and the eliminativist views to which it stands in opposition. In §2 I re-construct Thomasson's reasons for rejecting the Quinean criterion. In §3 I defend the Quinean criterion, showing that the eliminativists’ flaws are not consequences of applying the Quinean criterion, before explaining the criterion's importance when properly understood. I conclude that Thomasson, though right to criticise the methodology of ordinary-object eliminativists, is wrong to identify the Quinean criterion as the source of their mistake.

Metadata

Item Type:	Article
School:	Birkbeck Schools and Departments > School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Depositing User:	Administrator
Date Deposited:	13 Jun 2017 15:37
Last Modified:	13 Jun 2017 15:37
URI:	http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/17725

Statistics

Archive Staff Only (login required)

Edit/View Item