Is the norm on belief evaluative? A response to McHugh

Greenberg, Alexander and Cowie, Christopher (2017) Is the norm on belief evaluative? A response to McHugh. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1), pp. 128-145. ISSN 0279-0750.

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12158

Abstract

We respond to Conor McHugh’s claim that an evaluative account of the normative relation between belief and truth is preferable to a prescriptive account. We claim that his arguments fail to establish this. We then draw a more general sceptical conclusion: we take our arguments to put pressure on any attempt to show that an evaluative account will fare better than a prescriptive account. We briefly express scepticism about whether McHugh’s more recent ‘fitting attitude’ account fares better.

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Item Type:	Article
Additional Information:	This is the peer reviewed version of the article, which has been published in final form at the link above. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
School:	Birkbeck Schools and Departments > School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy > Philosophy
Depositing User:	Alexander Greenberg
Date Deposited:	19 Apr 2018 07:55
Last Modified:	29 Jul 2019 05:59
URI:	http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/21991

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