A Civic Alternative to Stoicism: The Ethics of Hellenistic Honorary Decrees

This article shows how the public inscriptions of Hellenistic poleis, especially decrees in honor of leading citizens, illuminate Greek ethical thinking, including wider debates about questions of central importance for Greek ethical philosophers. It does so by comparing decrees’ rhetoric with the ethical language and doctrines of different ancient philosophical schools. Whereas some scholars identify ethical views comparable to Stoic ideas in Hellenistic decrees, this article argues that there are more significant overlaps, especially in decrees from Asia Minor dating to after 150 BC, with fourth-century BC ethical philosophy, especially Aristotle’s, and its Hellenistic continuators. The overlaps between decrees and philosophers’ approaches had complex, diverse causes (section 4), probably sometimes including philosophical education and influence. Comparison of philosophy and epigraphy shows that, in the same way as the polis continued to flourish after Chaironeia, critical reflection about the ethical foundations of civic life also remained vibrant, among both philosophers and citizens.

1. INTRODUCTION

In 76 BC, Iatrokles, a citizen of the polis of Mylasa in Caria, was praised in an honorary decree passed by the Mylasan civic sub-division of the Otorkondeis for releasing poor citizens from loan contracts, “thinking that justice is more profitable
than injustice” (λυσιτελεστέραν ἡγούμενος τήν δικαιοσύνην τῆς ἀδικίας).¹ This claim is striking for its abstract character: the decree describes, not only Iatrokles’ behavior, but also the ethical attitude that underpinned it. The claim is also striking because it represents almost a quotation of words of Socrates in Plato’s Republic: towards the end of Book I, Socrates claims that he has refuted Thrasymachos, by showing that “injustice is never more beneficial than justice” (οὐδέποτε . . . λυσιτελέστερον ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης).² Moreover, the comment evokes the principal thesis of the Republic as a whole: the life of justice will always be more beneficial than the life of injustice, even if the just person encounters the worst deprivations and torment.

This article argues that this is not an isolated example. Almost all inscribed Hellenistic honorary decrees appeal to abstract concepts, such as virtue and justice. Some historians interested principally in political narrative and institutions or social history have seen this as a severe obstacle to historical investigation.³ This skeptical approach underestimates the role of abstract honorific language itself in mediating power relations,⁴ as well as in expressing collective attempts at mutual understanding and at grasping the ethical world. Honorific rhetoric offers vivid insights into Hellenistic ethics, culture, and politics.

Indeed, this article argues that many honorary decrees, especially the longer, more elaborate ones which become more frequent after c. 150 BC,⁵ must be taken seriously as complex ethical texts: as documents presupposing, or expressing, sophisticated ideas about the good man, the good citizen, and the good polis. Because they had to be widely accessible and intelligible, decrees inevitably lacked the argumentative style of ancient philosophical works on ethics. Nevertheless, in praising leading citizens, decree-drafters often set out almost utopian notions of good citizen conduct, paradigms to stimulate emulation and to advertise the quality of local civic life to posterity.

The method used to analyze the ethical language of decrees is to compare their ethical language and ideas with those of ancient philosophical schools. It must be emphasized that many of the ideas discussed are very widely attested in Greek literature and culture: philosophers rarely had a monopoly on any given line of thinking.

¹. I. Mylasa 109, ll. 8–10.
². Pl. Rep. 354a8–9; cf. 354b7; 360c8.
³. See Habicht 1995: 88; compare Thonemann 2011: 204–205, 241, on the need to emerge from the “trap” or “cave” of honorific rhetoric, which conceals the truth of inequalities of power and wealth. There has not so far been a decisive concerted reaction among scholars against the traditional approach to decrees’ ethical content advocated by M. Holleaux, who severely criticized the second-century BC drafter of a decree of Cretan auxiliaries on Delos for Aglaos of Cos for having mastered “l’art d’écrire pour ne rien dire”: the decree contains “cette langue prolixe et diluée, veule et vague, toute en formules abstraites, qui était chère aux lettres de l’époque,” such that “presque aucun fait précis n’émerge de cette verbosité molle et fluente” (Holleaux 1913: 9–23, quotation p. 18). Contrast the identification of a distinctive ethical position in this decree at the end of section 3d below.
⁴. Ma (2002: 193–94) accepts that the language of the Aglaos decree (previous note) is platitudeous, but finds it nonetheless interesting as the currency of power and political communication (compare Veyne 1976: 239).
⁵. Compare, for example, Robert 1960a: 325. Shorter, less rhetorical honorary decrees certainly also survived: compare Habicht 1995: 89.
There is much scope for further research, to which I hope to contribute, which will compare the ideology of inscribed decrees with those of a whole range of other genres, including rhetoric, historiography, biography, and drama.

Nonetheless, the project attempted in this article—comparison of decrees with philosophy in particular—offers a distinctive perspective on decrees’ ideology, regardless of whether there were any direct connections between ancient philosophical works and decrees. Comparison with ancient philosophy makes it possible, first, to classify the ethical ideas of a decree with conceptual precision but the lowest possible risk of anachronism. Second, comparison with self-consciously sophisticated and abstract ancient philosophical works is particularly useful for estimating the precise register of inscribed rhetoric, and the nature and level of its intellectual content and intellectual pretensions; it helps, for example, to distinguish trends in earlier and later Hellenistic decrees (sections 2 and 3 below).

Third, comparison with ancient philosophy brings into particularly sharp focus the discursive context within which decree-drafters wrote. In this respect, the method applied here is something like an inversion of the method of interpreting texts of political philosophy pioneered by Pocock and Skinner.\(^6\) Those scholars use intellectual and non-intellectual texts from the same period to help reconstruct the broader debates and controversies to which an author of a prominent work of political philosophy was responding, in order to bring out that author’s rhetorical or polemical intentions. In this article, conversely, the ideas of high philosophers are used to add definition to the complex strands of mainstream Greek ethical thinking. This is possible because, as products of their time and place, Greek philosophers necessarily engaged with different lines of mainstream thinking, even if they reacted forcefully against some or all of them; in doing so, they often brought to the surface the fundamental issues and fault lines at stake even in non-philosophical discourse, where they were more diffuse or submerged. Decrees’ ethical claims can be understood differently against this background: comparison with ancient philosophers’ sharply defined ideas and rhetoric makes it possible to identify what is distinctive, pointed or even polemical in the ethical rhetoric of a decree, even if it initially seems bland to a modern reader.

In the particular case addressed here, the controversies between the new Hellenistic schools, especially the Stoics, and adherents of the fourth-century BC schools, especially the Peripatetics, sharply expose some of the main underlying fault lines of Greek ethics from the later fourth century onwards. They crystallize tensions concerning, for example, the relationship between reason and emotion (see section 3a below) or the standing of the individual vis-à-vis other people, material wealth, and the wider world (see sections 3c-d below). Perhaps most clearly, they throw into relief wider tensions between more individualistic, cosmopolitan approaches and more civic, community-oriented ones (compare section 3e below). Consideration of that philosophical background thus provides a very

useful framework for assessing how inscribed decrees engage with live ethical problems and disputes.

The widespread modern picture of Hellenistic philosophy and wider ethical thought as dominated by the Stoics and other new schools and the assumptions they developed, still influential among Hellenistic historians,\(^7\) has led most previous studies of decrees’ ethics to emphasize convergences with the Hellenistic schools, especially Stoicism. Moretti argues that many decrees’ language of energetic, unflinching civic euergetism derived partly from Stoic philosophy.\(^8\) Echoing Moretti, Wörrle comments on the value placed on exertion by citizens in many later Hellenistic decrees, which he sees as an expression of “popularized Stoic ethics.”\(^9\) More recently, Dreyer has seen later Hellenistic decrees’ frequent interest in the virtuous lifestyles of civic benefactors as closely connected with the practical ethical teachings of the Middle Stoa of Panætius and Posidonius.\(^10\)

The similarities which these scholars identify between the ethics of certain decrees and those of Stoic philosophers are highly generic. The shortage of well-preserved complete Hellenistic Stoic works is a partial obstacle to testing for more specific overlaps, though the work of scholars of Hellenistic philosophy on reconstructing Hellenistic Stoic terminology and arguments\(^11\) offers ample material for comparison. Relying on this evidence, this article will show that the ethical language and ideas that feature in Hellenistic honorary decrees overlap only slightly with Stoic ones, while often converging strongly with rival intellectuals’ ideals.

Indeed, the decree for Iatrokles is unexceptional in converging strongly with a major fourth-century BC ethical work. As Louis Robert pointed out, calling for further research,\(^12\) many Hellenistic—and especially later Hellenistic—honorary decrees gave prominence in their picture of the good citizen to ethical language and ideas convergent with mainstream fourth-century philosophy, rhetoric, and related thought. There is much further scope for future study of decrees’ overlaps with other fourth-century literature and thought, but I focus here on many decrees’ particularly interesting and important overlaps with Aristotle’s ethical philosophy, in content and sensibility. Many relevant decrees also chime with the ideas of many of Aristotle’s Hellenistic Peripatetic successors, whose rich philosophical contributions have been made more accessible by a series of recent studies.\(^13\)

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\(^7\) Consider recently Thonemann 2016: 87–88.
\(^8\) Moretti 1977: 85–86, recently discussed by Wiemer 2016: 24n.100, 27, who posits some other convergences between decrees and Stoic ethics.
\(^11\) See the fragments collected in Long and Sedley 1987: chs. 26–67. For overviews of the Stoic approach to ethics that can be reconstructed from this evidence: Inwood and Donini 1999; Schofield 2003.
\(^12\) Robert 1960b: 213; 1967: 12n.1.
\(^13\) See (for example) Hahm 2007; Sharples 2010; Inwood 2014; Fortenbaugh 2018.
It has now become almost a new orthodoxy that, far from dying at Chaironeia, the traditional Greek polis flourished in the Hellenistic period. This article adds a major new dimension to that picture. An established, idealistic, polis-centered ethical code dominated public rhetoric throughout the Hellenistic period. Moreover, in the period after c. 150 BC, changing social and political conditions led a significant number of Hellenistic citizens to offer in their public rhetoric a relatively sophisticated articulation of that code: an articulation resembling that of Aristotle and the Peripatetics, its most thorough and explicit surviving philosophical spokesmen. Even if some Hellenistic political thinkers turned away from the polis, civic ideals still had many eloquent and thoughtful defenders.

In section 2, I show how the pervasive institution of the honorary decree for a leading citizen, which came to prominence in Athens and other poleis in the second half of the fourth century BC, embodied some specific fourth-century ideals, especially Aristotelian ones. Section 3 then goes on to demonstrate and analyze the emergence after c. 150 BC of more developed, precise articulations in decrees of ideas strongly convergent with fourth-century ethical thought and its Hellenistic continuators. Until the end of section 3, the article remains neutral in most cases concerning the question whether the overlaps between Hellenistic decrees and fourth-century philosophical ethics are a result of any form of philosophical influence on relevant decrees. Section 4 addresses this additional question, arguing that various processes were probably at work, including exchange between Peripatetics and active citizens as co-defenders of the civic ideal.

2. THE HELLENISTIC HONORARY DEGREE AS AN INSTITUTION EMBODYING ARISTOTELIAN IDEALS

Common Greek ethical and political assumptions, richly attested in earlier periods, dominate the typical content of a Hellenistic honorary decree for a home citizen: decrees demonstrate the conservatism, geographical consistency, and often very generic character of “Greek popular morality.” Aristotle and the Peripatetics shared and developed many of these assumptions, but they were by no means uniquely Aristotelian.

Particular actions are almost always mentioned or catalogued in decrees, sometimes in considerable detail, but they are usually presented as evidence for honorands’ long-term dispositions (for example, ἀρετή, “virtue”; εὔνοια, “good will”; and φιλοτιμία, “love of honor”). Typically, a description of past services builds up to

14. To cite a few examples from many, see Gauthier 1985; Ma 2002; Bencivenni 2003: 1–4 (all building on the approaches to the Hellenistic period of A. Momigliano and L. Robert).
16. For this notion: Dover 1974.
18. Quaß (1993: 32, 49–50) suggests that these were traditional aristocratic concepts adopted and adapted by poleis.
the decreeing of honors, “for the sake of virtue” (ἀρετῆς ἔνεκα).19 This tendency of decrees is consistent with the shared assumption of most ancient philosophers that the focus of ethical assessment and education should be, not individual actions or dilemmas, but agents’ long-term dispositions, especially states of virtue (ἀρετή) and vice.20

Although Hellenistic decrees almost invariably praise virtue, there is little sign of anything reminiscent of sophisticated philosophical examinations of the criteria for judging an act or state virtuous, such as Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Mean.21 As opposed to such specific doctrines, Hellenistic honorary decrees usually presuppose commonsensical ideas about virtue widely attested in Greek texts from all periods of antiquity. These are strongly consistent with Aristotle’s approach to virtue in his *Rhetoric*, a work in which he sought to capture popular views without substantial modification, in order to provide material for effective persuasion of real audiences.22

Decrees inevitably give the polis a central place as the arena for virtue.23 Some honorific formulae attribute to honorands, as evidence for their praiseworthy civic dispositions, relatively undemanding behavior and habits, such as scrupulous adherence to the law,24 preservation of trust as a magistrate,25 accurate accounting,26 or a tendency to refuse bribes.27 However, the typical rhetoric and formulae of Hellenistic decrees also emphasize that virtuous honorands act for the good of others, often self-sacrificingly and supererogatively: they show good will (εὔνοια) and “enthusiasm” (προθυμία or σπουδή) to the community and individual citizens28 and do as much good as possible for their polis,29 sometimes using or sacrificing their own private financial resources30 or risking their own safety.31 This tallies with Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*: indeed, Aristotle there inevitably concentrates on civic values and activities,
defining virtue, in a way strongly resembling the virtue rhetoric of Hellenistic decrees, as a “capacity to do good to others” (δύναμις ἐνεργετική). 32

Decrees’ interest in maximal benefactions is nevertheless sometimes qualified with a concern for the distribution of the benefits conferred. For instance, in an example from a decree for a foreigner, 33 the second-century BC Aiginetan decree for the Attalid governor Kleon explicitly states that he was responsible for “good,” in accordance with justice. 34 The virtue of δικαιοσύνη (justice) often attributed to Hellenistic honorands, probably often retained this association with the distribution of goods: for example, the adverb δικαίως (“justly”) could be paired with the adverb ἰσως (“equally”). 35 Decrees’ frequent concern with distributive justice as well as benevolence also chimes with Aristotle’s approach in the Rhetoric, where his identification of virtue as involving benefaction is closely followed by an analysis of the virtue of justice as “the virtue through which each has his own, within the bounds of the law.” 36

In the same way as the typical content of Hellenistic honorary decrees for home citizens reflected very widespread Greek ethical assumptions, one of the principal functions of such decrees was also strongly consistent with those widely shared basic ideas. By passing and publishing honorary decrees, poleis used public political institutions and language for educational ends, establishing and propagating paradigms of good citizenship for other citizens to emulate. 37 This can be seen as a practical implementation of a pervasive line of Greek political thinking, strongly advocated by Aristotle and the Peripatetics: it is not only legitimate, but also vital, that civic institutions educate citizens in virtue, thereby “making the polis one.” 38

In most respects, therefore, the content and function of Hellenistic decrees for home citizens can be equated only with the widespread, commonsensical Greek ethical ideas collected by Aristotle in his Rhetoric, which closely resemble the generic rhetoric about virtue and the polis of, for example, much fourth-century Attic oratory. A different case can, however, be made concerning another function of the institution. The institution of the honorary decree for a home citizen can be viewed, with regard to the kinds of relationships between citizens which it created and secured, as a practical embodiment of a complex ethical and political approach to friendship similar to that advocated by Aristotle in his ethical works, and

32. Arist. Rh. 1366a38, 1366b4.
33. Although the main focus of this article is on decrees for home citizens, honored foreigners were often, as here, praised almost as if they were members of the civic community, or, at least, of an enlarged community of those benevolently disposed to the polis.
34. IG IV² 2 749 (Aigina, 159–144 BC), ll. 22–24.
35. E.g., I.Priene² 19, ll. 8–10.
developed by Hellenistic Peripatetics. Aristotle presents in his works an ambivalent picture of the “political friendship” that holds together a good polis. His slightly fluid and equivocal picture appears to leave room for political friendship to combine features of both “utility friendship,” mutual good will based on recognition of shared interest, and “virtue friendship,” mutual good will arising from mutual appreciation of good character.

Honorary decrees for home citizens presented a similar mixed picture of the nature of the relationship of reciprocal good will (εὐνοια) to which they give prominence. This relationship is partly one of utility friendship (friendship διὰ τὸ χρήσιμον): decrees sometimes make it explicit that the honorand is being honored because he has been, or is, “useful” (χρήσιμος) for polis life, or some aspect of it. The δήμος responds with reciprocal honors and rewards, often including privileges and exemptions of material value, which are themselves immediately useful to the honorand. From this perspective, the relationship between honorand and fellow citizens is based on a particular form of χάρις (“grace” or “gratitude”): the δήμος shows gratitude towards the benefactor, which itself demands further reciprocal benefactions. The centrality of χάρις to Hellenistic civic ideology is elsewhere evident in the paying of cult to the Χάριτες.

On the other hand, the civic friendship involved in decrees is also close to Aristotelian character or virtue friendship (friendship δι’ ἀρετῆς). The honoring δήμος almost always publicizes its appreciation of the virtuous character of the honorand, commenting on his ἀρετή or calling him a “good man” (ἀγαθός). Indeed, the two basic features of Aristotelian character friendship are combined in the ubiquitous formula that honors are awarded on account of the honorand’s virtue and good will (ἀρετῆς ἄνεκα καὶ εὐνοιας). Occasionally, a decree makes it explicit that this relationship of virtue friendship is reciprocal: the honorand recognizes that the honoring community is a group whose members’ characters are such that they particularly appreciate virtue. The intangible honors granted through decrees,

39. See, for example, Tsouni 2018, text, sec. 3 Ts, 120.8–122.4; sec. 21 Ts, 143.1–17 (also Sharple 2010, chapter 15, text A, sections 4–5 and 37).
42. Some examples involving citizen honorands: IG II1 1 359 (Athens, 328/7 BC), ll. 17–19; I.Priene2 19, ll. 11–12. In a case involving a civic subdivision, the Otokondeis of Mylassa praised Iatrokles (cf. above) for having made himself useful for both individuals and the whole δήμος (κατὰ ἴδιαν ἐξοικεῖα τὸν πολιτείαν καὶ κατὰ κοινὸν τῶν σύμπαντος δήμως χρήσιμον ἔκανεν διόρθωσιν, I.Mylasa 109, ll. 5–6).
43. The cult of Δήμος and the Χάριτες was introduced in Athens in the later second century BC: see Mikalson 1998: ch. 6, discussing earlier bibliography. As scholars have noted, Aristotle himself refers to cult of the Χάριτες as a means for cities to encourage benefactions: Arist. EN 1133a3–4; compare Tsouni 2018, text, sec. 22 Ts, 143.19–24 (also Sharple 2010, chapter 15, text A, section 38). For a Hellenistic example outside Athens, consider the cult of the Χάριτες and Μνήμη in Hellenistic Teos: Ma 2002: text no. 18 (probably 203 BC), 1. 34.
44. See I.Priene2 68 (new edition of I.Priene 112) (mid-first century BC), ll. 13–14, discussed in section 3b below.
especially the praise itself and resulting recognition, fit particularly well into the context of an Aristotelian virtue friendship.

It is possible that honorary decrees for home citizens were among the many environmental influences that shaped Aristotle’s reflections about types of friendship and their relationship to politics. Indeed, the practice of passing honorary decrees for home citizens probably gained prominence during Aristotle’s time in Athens: such decrees came to be regularly inscribed at Athens from the 340s onwards. In any case, both Aristotle’s ethical philosophy and the genre of the honorary decree for a leading citizen reflect the same complexity or uncertainty in attempts to understand the polis: the polis is viewed simultaneously as an association for mutual utility (διὰ τὸ χρήσημον), in which actions, agreement, and material contributions and rewards are paramount, and a community of virtue (δἰ ἀρετή), in which citizens’ characters, intentions, and mutual appreciation are primary.

3. INCREASED ETHICAL COMPLEXITY IN LATER HELLENISTIC DECREES

After c. 150 BC, some honorary decrees showed much greater complexity in articulating and developing the basic ethical framework identified in the previous section, in ways much more directly comparable with ancient philosophical approaches. To posit this change is not to deny that earlier Hellenistic decrees could be complex documents, rich in descriptive content. Indeed, as Rosen shows, there was an earlier transition towards greater complexity around 330 BC, when honorary decrees of Athens and other poleis, increasingly passed and inscribed for home citizens as well as foreigners, began to describe in detail honorands’ whole careers and specific civic contributions, evidence for their lifelong virtue. However, only in the later Hellenistic period did a significant number of decree-drafters begin to use concentrations of abstract, elevated language, sometimes expressing second-order ideas about the nature of virtue and its connections with human nature, desire, emotion, material goods, happiness, and the polis. It is in relation to these fundamental issues that it is possible to identify the closest and most interesting overlaps with fourth-century BC ethical writing, including not only the commonplaces of Aristotle’s Rhetoric or much fourth-century Attic oratory, but also the distinctive ethical rhetoric and teachings of Plato’s dialogues and especially Aristotle’s ethical works, a tradition which was also being developed by sympathetic Hellenistic philosophers.

46. Compare Arist. EE 1243a31–32: “civic [sc. friendship] looks to the agreement and the thing” (ἡ μὲν οὖν πολιτικὴ [βλέπει εἰς τὴν ὁμολογίαν καὶ εἰς τὸ πράγμα]).
47. Rosen 1987: 282–85, discussing the second Athenian decree for the younger Euphron, the Prienian decree for Apellis, and the Nesian decree for Thersippos.
This later Hellenistic period is traditionally interpreted as one in which the ideals favored by Aristotle were in eclipse. Indeed, Gauthier argued that poleis’ image of the good civic benefactor sometimes shifted in the later Hellenistic period from that of the modest, power-sharing, law-bound citizen to that of the magnanimous quasi-monarch.\(^{48}\) It is certainly true that, as Gauthier argued, certain republican political ideals which Aristotle strongly favored were under some strain, though certainly not moribund: ideals of power-sharing, political equality, and public scrutiny were put under pressure by some (always partial and contested) tendencies towards the “privatization,” “domestication,” or even “depoliticization” of civic life.\(^{49}\)

Indeed, in many poleis in the later Hellenistic period, there was a particularly marked tendency, probably an intensification of earlier trends,\(^{50}\) for leading benefactors to gain new, less constrained types of power, often by holding continuous office and using their wealth to exercise extensive influence and patronage outside the official, regulated channels of magistracies and assembly debates. Crucially, local elites could now be formally honored for contributions, such as one-off donations or hospitality in their own homes, which they made outside the context of formal office, or beyond the standard responsibilities of a magistracy they did hold.\(^{51}\) Some benefactors could even use their wealth to buy exemptions from formal magistracies and liturgies.\(^{52}\) Local elites had amassed estates and resources as a result of long-term changes across the Hellenistic period, which can be traced in Asia Minor,\(^{53}\) but the disappearance of Hellenistic kings and royal monopolies created new economic and political opportunities for them, not least to fill the void as indispensable civic benefactors.\(^{54}\)

In a parallel sign of pressure on the “Aristotelian” polis model, the traditional conception of citizenship (\textit{politeia}), captured by Aristotle, was put under some strain by mixing of people and inequalities within cities in the course of the Hellenistic period, especially in the unstable and cosmopolitan environment of the early Roman Empire. \textit{Politeia} was no longer so predictably a uniform, single status for a class of equal citizens; its privileges and obligations could increasingly be parcelled out and assigned separately, depending on a particular benefactor’s context and claims.\(^{55}\)

Nevertheless, as argued in detail in this section, the frequent, paradoxical corollary of this pressure on political ideals consistent with Aristotle’s in the later Hellenistic period was an increased emphasis on, and detailed articulation of,
ethical ideals strongly convergent with Aristotle’s. These included ideals giving prominence to far-reaching civic virtue, civic community, sharing of wealth, ethical education, and the connections between citizenship and personal happiness: ideals which could constrain and shape citizens’ conduct where law and procedural checks and balances could not.

It is important not to make the division between early and later Hellenistic civic life too sharp a caesura. As critics of Gauthier’s position have stressed, wealthy civic benefactors already constituted a powerful, wealthy, hereditary euergetical elite within most poleis even in the Classical period, and certainly in the early and mid-Hellenistic period. Conversely, many democratic institutions, formal obligations, and checks and balances endured into the later Hellenistic period, together with a vibrant public sphere of debate and scrutiny. The best interpretation of the socio-political background to the changing rhetoric of decrees is, therefore, that social developments after c. 150 BC intensified processes that had long shaped Greek civic life, and which came to a head in the honorific process, even in the more simple decrees analyzed above in section 2.

Throughout the later Classical and Hellenistic period, leading, politically active members of civic elites drafted speeches which became the basis of honorary decrees for their fellow elite citizens, or probably even sometimes for themselves. However, the proposals they wrote and rhetorically delivered in the assembly had to be attractive to the δῆμος, gathered in the civic assembly to vote on them. The result was bargaining between the wealthy elite and the rest of the citizens, in which rewards and honors were exchanged for civic contributions, with the wealthy often deriving great advantages. For example, in a way consistent with Aristotle’s ethics, many of the resulting honorary decrees allowed considerable scope, not only for civic virtue and community, but also for individual self-seeking and profit-making. According to the ethics of those decrees, citizens were entitled to exercise wide-ranging freedom in acquiring and preserving wealth and social standing, relatively unconstrained by institutional and normative checks on their behavior. However, this was all tolerated only on the condition, entrenched by the δῆμος in decrees and also consistent with Aristotle’s political thinking, that the wealthy should voluntarily use resulting private resources and prestige to promote communal welfare and

57. See recently Wiemer 2016: 31. On the complex, shifting, and mixed political culture of the Hellenistic cities, and the nature and extent of later Hellenistic changes, see recently Fröhlich and Müller 2005; Mann and Scholz 2012; Kah 2015 and other contributions to Matthaei and Zimmermann 2015; compare also van Nijf and Alston 2011.
58. For elite citizens as drafters of honorary decrees, see Fröhlich 2005: 255, with n.118.
60. For the Classical Athenian precedents, see Ober 1989; Descat 1995: esp. 985–88; for the continuation of these phenomena in the Hellenistic period, see (for example) Habicht 1995: 92; Ma 2013; for their further continuation in the Imperial-era Greek city, see Zuiderhoek 2009.
61. For the corresponding element in Aristotle’s political thought, see Yack 1993.
the ethical education of fellow citizens. \(^{62}\) The new conditions of the later Hellenistic world intensified these processes, yielding more ambitious assertions of individual and elite power, but also ever more idealistic conceptions of civic virtue.

Bargaining between benefactors and beneficiaries cannot, however, offer a full explanation of the honorific process and honorific rhetoric. As Veyne stressed, it is also necessary to give weight to non-instrumental motivations, including the collective protection of the social distance of the elite from their fellow citizens. \(^{63}\) Veyne himself sometimes calls on Aristotle’s notions of “magnanimity” (μεγαλοψυχία) and benevolence (ἐμπροσθεσία) to capture the relevant attitude of Hellenistic great benefactors. \(^{64}\)

In addition, honorary decrees should be read as products of collaborative pursuit of visions of a just, sustainable civic order. Both the demos and benefactors seeking to distribute the civic burden widely sought effective arguments and motivational devices to persuade and stimulate all citizens to use their talents and resources voluntarily for the common good. Even if the significance and strength of the formal, regulated public financing of civic life by Greek poleis were often greater than sometimes thought, especially for the Hellenistic period, \(^{65}\) euergetical benefactions were always a necessary supplement. The changed conditions of the later Hellenistic period posed the problem of civic stability and finance with renewed urgency: often chronic debt crises and the expansion of costly civic cultural and educational activities made voluntary, euergetical donations more indispensable than ever, \(^{66}\) for example in the funding of civic gymnasia. \(^{67}\) This demanded the articulation of a more subtle, arresting vision in decrees of the centrality of civic virtue in the good life, which could persuade the mobile and relatively untouchable rich. Appeal to ethical ideals consonant with Aristotle’s, including the combination of material incentives with more ethical and patriotic arguments, was central to this project.

The rest of this section presents and interprets the detailed evidence for the late Hellenistic developments in decrees’ ethics, examining in turn decrees’ approaches to five major areas of debate: first, the question of the psychological nature of virtuous states of character; second, the question whether virtue necessarily benefits its possessor; third, the question whether, if virtue does indeed necessarily contribute to a happy, fulfilled life, bodily and “external” goods (especially material resources) are also necessary for happiness or fulfillment (eudaimonia); fourth, the question of what role, if they do indeed contribute to it, external goods play in the happy, fulfilled life; and, fifth, the question whether it is necessary to be a citizen of a polis in order to live a virtuous life. Most of the examples are derived

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67. Schuler 2004: 190–91 (on the eventual dependence of Hellenistic civic gymnasia on funding provided by unelected benefactors, not only elected gymnasiarchs).
from decrees of the poleis of Western Asia Minor, but some comparative evidence is drawn from other regions. The question of whether there was any philosophical influence on relevant decrees is deferred until section 4: this section itself seeks only to show significant similarities in principles and sensibility.

A) WHAT IS THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE VIRTUOUS AGENT?

Drafters of later Hellenistic honorary decrees shared their predecessors’ predominant concern with states of character and intentions, as opposed to discrete acts in isolation. However, a significant number of later Hellenistic decree-drafters took a more detailed interest than earlier drafters in the precise psychology of virtuous action, using relatively sophisticated concepts and rhetoric comparable to those common in Greek philosophical debates, especially (but not only) Aristotelian and Peripatetic contributions.

The Sestian decree for Menas (120s BC) illustrates the new psychological complexity possible in a later Hellenistic decree. It praises Menas for organizing physical activities in the gymnasium through which the “souls” (ψυχαί) of young citizens were led “in their characters” (τοῖς ἰθεσιν) towards virtue (πρὸς ἀρετήν). Similarly, the Iasian citizen Melanion was praised in a first-century BC decree for having an appropriate “state” (ἐξής) during his philosophical studies: the fact that this “state” was “appropriate” for philosophical studies makes clear that it was a state of soul or character. The word ἐξής is very rare in inscriptions, but central to philosophical studies of moral psychology, not least Aristotle’s.

A significant number of later Hellenistic decree-drafters expressed or applied versions of a principle of moral psychology to which the major philosophical schools were in different ways all committed: the principle that a virtuous agent’s soul should be a harmonious unity; that its psychological faculties, intentions, and decisions should be aligned with one another and with the agent’s actions. For example, when the leading citizen Apollonios was posthumously honored at Metropolis in approximately 130 BC, he was praised for accepting the leadership of a group of young citizen soldiers in the war against Aristonikos, “deciding (προαιροῦμενος) to make clear his good will (ἐὔνοιαν) through his actions (διὰ τῶν ἔργων).” Similarly, Moschion of Priene was praised in the later second century BC for deciding (προαιροῦμενος) and later wishing (βουλοῦμενος) to “be consistent with himself” (στοιχεῖν ἐαυτότι) by assisting his polis in particular ways.

This concern with internal psychological consistency and action guided by stable psychological states was in harmony with Stoic thought. For example, in

68. I.Sestos 1, ll. 71–72.
69. I.Iasos 98, ll. 15–16.
70. E.g., Arist. EN 1105b19–1106a24.
71. For different approaches to the ideal of psychological consistency among Classical and Hellenistic philosophers, see Gill 2006
72. I.Metropolis 1, face A, ll. 24–25.
73. I.Priene² 64 (new edition of I.Priene 108) (after 129 BC), ll. 69, 162.
the Stoic tradition, Seneca argues that one’s impulse (impetus) and action (actio) should coincide, “so that you are in agreement with yourself” (ut . . . tibi ipse consentias):74 in other words, it is important to be consistent with oneself (στοιχείων ἑαυτῶν), as in the Prienian decree. Furthermore, the broader psychological focus of many later Hellenistic decrees, evident in these examples, chimes with the central interest of Hellenistic ethical philosophers, both Stoic and Epicurean, in offering therapy and guidance for individual souls, by prescribing all-encompassing enlightened “ways of life” through which individuals can engage in “care” or “technology” of the self.75

However, there were also significant differences between the moral psychology of these decrees and that of relevant Hellenistic philosophers. For one thing, a benefactor’s psychological condition was always embedded in a decree in the context of a particular city community: it was defined against the background of an inherited, consensual civic culture of norms and institutions (compare section 3e below).76

Even as far as the intrinsic qualities of a good psychological state are concerned, relevant decrees tended to portray something different from the Stoic ideal, let alone the Epicurean ideal of pleasant contentment. Indeed, a significant number of later Hellenistic decree-drafters gave prominence to a particular type of psychological consistency central to Aristotle’s ethical philosophy. This is harmony between distinct sources of motivation: between the virtuous agent’s considered thoughts and his desires; between his deliberated beliefs and his feelings of pleasure and pain; between his reason and his emotions. In relevant decrees, as in Aristotle, good desires, pleasures, and emotions could play their own distinct, positive, active role in the agent’s virtue, in harmony with the contribution of his reason.

In the tradition established by Chrysippus, the Stoics argued that the virtuous man should mainly eliminate or subjugate to true reason his passions, which are really false value judgments; there is only one source of motivation.77 As Graver has shown, the Stoics were not as implacably hostile to all emotion as their modern stereotype might suggest: although the unruly passions (pathe) must be subjugated, beneficial states of “good feeling” (εὐπάθεια), such as joy, which remain after passions have been eradicated, can accompany or even complement rational decision-making.78 However, it would still have been a departure from the distinctiveness of the Stoa for any Stoic to argue that emotion comes anywhere near matching rationalization in making its own distinct, active contribution to helping an individual identify the virtuous action to take and motivating him to perform it.

By contrast, it was a distinctive claim of Aristotle’s moral psychology that considered thoughts, deliberated beliefs, and reason, on the one hand, and desires, pleasures,
and emotions, on the other, are all active components of an overarching state of virtue. Aristotle presents virtue of character as a disposition to experience an appropriate, rationally determined or determinable “mean” quality and amount of emotion and pleasure in any circumstances, as well as to perform corresponding actions.\textsuperscript{79} Such a state of virtue of character is necessary for developing practical rationality (φρόνησις), in the same way as φρόνησις is necessary for developing such virtue of character.\textsuperscript{80} Moreover, Aristotle classifies virtue of character as, in psychological terms, a δέξις προαιρετική:\textsuperscript{81} it is a state of character involving, or leading to, decision (προάρεσις). Such a state of character necessarily includes both dispositions to think and deliberate and dispositions to feel and desire in particular ways,\textsuperscript{82} for Aristotle elsewhere defines προάρεσις as a “deliberated desire” concerning things in our power (βουλευτικὴ δρέξις τῶν ἐφ’ ἡμῶν).\textsuperscript{83}

Hellenistic Peripatetics sustained and developed this distinctive feature of Aristotle’s philosophy, continuing to insist on the positive, active role of pathos in shaping and motivating virtuous action, alongside logos. This approach recurs, for example, in the summary of Peripatetic ethics found in Stobaeus,\textsuperscript{84} which is traditionally attributed to the Augustan philosopher Aurius Didymus. Although it could have been written by a quite different Didymus, this summary certainly bears strong marks of later Hellenistic Peripatetic debates.\textsuperscript{85} Since it is one of the best pieces of evidence for tendencies in Hellenistic Peripatetic ethics, especially in the later Hellenistic period, this summary will be a key text for comparison with decrees in the rest of this article. Hellenistic Peripatetics advocated their Aristotelian approach to pathos in polemical opposition to Stoic thinking on the topic, advocating moderation of passion (metriopatheia) rather than absence of passion (apatheia).\textsuperscript{86} Indeed, as Inwood puts it, “in the increasingly sharp debate between Peripatetics and Stoics which characterized ethics between the mid-second century BCE and the first century CE, the passions became one of the two key points of debate (the other being the number and significance of the goods)” (for the latter, compare section 3c below).\textsuperscript{87}

Some Hellenistic decrees dating to before c. 150 BC already show an interest in balancing different sources of motivation. For example, the Athenian decree

\textsuperscript{79} Arist. EN 1106b10–1107a2.
\textsuperscript{80} Arist. EN 1144b31–32.
\textsuperscript{81} Arist. EN 1106b36.
\textsuperscript{83} Arist. EN 1113a10–11.
\textsuperscript{84} Tsouni 2018, text, sec. 10 Ts, 128.18–26; sec. 17 Ts. 139.1–18 (also Sharples 2010: chapter 15, text A, sections 13 and 32). For Peripatetic ideas about the passions, see also the texts in Sharples 2010: chapter 16; Inwood 2014: 88–103.
\textsuperscript{85} Schmitz 2014 (esp. chs. 4 and 6) and 2017 shows how this summary can be closely and fruitfully linked with Peripatetic debates of the first century BC also known from other sources; compare also Inwood 2014: 77–78 (favoring a later first-century BC context). On the other hand, for skepticism about the possibility of identifying even the approximate date (let alone the author) of the summary itself, see Hahm 2018.
\textsuperscript{86} See, for example, Sharples 2010: chapter 16, text I.
\textsuperscript{87} Inwood 2014: 91; compare Sharples 2010: 146.
of 285/4 BC for King Audoleon of the Paionians claims that he shared in Athenian pleasure in the recent recapture of the town of Athens by the Athenian δῆμος, thinking that his own salvation and that of the δῆμος were common (νομίζον εἶναι κοινὴν καὶ αὐτ[ῶ] τὴν τῆς πόλεως σωτηρίαν). Like Aristotle’s well-habituated, virtuous man, therefore, Audoleon experienced positive pleasure which was aligned with his rational political judgment.

Nevertheless, this kind of moral psychological approach became more pronounced and widespread in inscriptions in the later Hellenistic period. For example, in the clearest sign of convergence with Peripatetic thinking and divergence from Stoicism, some decrees explicitly celebrated emotion as an active source of virtuous motivation. Pathos was strikingly cited as a desirable aim in the mid-first-century BC first decree of Priene for Zosimos, which praised him for providing a tutor in philology in the gymnasium, helping to lead the young men’s souls towards virtue and “humane emotion” (πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ πάθος ἁνθρώπινον). Although such an explicit reference to the concept of pathos is rare in epigraphy, Chaniotis has recently shown how Hellenistic (especially later Hellenistic) inscribed decrees showed an intense interest in describing and prompting emotional responses among citizens, including as positive sources of civic motivation.

Other later Hellenistic decrees also spelled out in detail the value of balancing rational belief with alternative sources of motivation, even though they did not explicitly stress the positive contribution of pathos to motivation in a way that would automatically have alienated Stoics. In an extended example, the later Hellenistic Mylasans endorsed a long honorary decree which gave equal weight throughout to the citizen Ouliades’ thinking and desiring. The participle σπεύδων (“being eager to”) is used three times in the decree, to convey Ouliades’ enthusiasm and desire to contribute to the common good in different ways. However, early in the decree he is praised for serving as a magistrate, including as a “councilor” (Βουλευτής), “always sticking to the best state of mind” or “judgment” (τῆς ἄριστῆς ἄξις γνώμης ἀντιχώμενος). Ouliades’ virtuous aspirations were accompanied by the best possible cognitive state. Moreover, immediately after the second use of the participle σπεύδων, the participle νομίζων (“thinking”) is used, as if to balance it out. It is first commented that Ouliades participated in some diplomatic business, “being eager to join in increasing, as far as was in his power, the good will and friendship accruing to the δῆμος” (σπεύδ[ῶ]ν δὸν ἐστὶν ἐφ’ ἐαυτῶι σ[υ]γαγαγ[ῆ]ν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν τῶι δῆμωι εὐνοίαν τε καὶ φιλίαν). In a continuation of the same sentence, it is then claimed that, “thinking that it was best also that the citizens should conduct their shared life, as far as it was in his power, in concord” (καλλιστον δὲ
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νομίζον εἶναι καὶ τὸ τοὺς [π]ολίτευς ὁσον ἐστὶν ἐφ’ ἣν ἔτατοι μεθ’ ὁμοίας τὴν μετ’ ἀλλήλων συναναστροφῆς ποιόθεν, Ouliades acted as arbitrator and judge to resolve disputes between citizens.94 Ouliades’ civic enthusiasm was thus accompanied by an intellectual grasp of the ethical importance of civic concord.

The rise to prominence of particular complex psychological words, used to replace or accompany well-established, comparatively bland terms such as ἀφιτή and εὐνοία, reflects widespread attachment among decree-drafters, probably often unconscious or unreflective, to this kind of moral psychological approach. Later Hellenistic decree-drafters quite commonly ascribed to honorands the new attribute of φιλαγαθία (“love of the good”).95 Use of that word implied that the relevant honorand possessed an intellectual grasp of the abstract category of “the good.” However, it also implied that the honorand aspired to act ethically. Indeed, it suggested that desire for the good had displaced baser, counter-rational desires: the neoi (young men) of Amphipolis praised their gymnasiarch for φιλαγαθία and ἀρετὴ (“lack of love of money”).96 This concern with the suppression of baser desires by a passionate as well as theoretical commitment to the good97 is probably paralleled in the first decree from Priene for Zosimos (mentioned above): Zosimos was praised for “never pursuing his own enjoyment (?) in a way revealing a lack of experience of the fine” (ἐν οὕδετι δὲ τὴν ἱοίαν ἄπροκάλωξ διόκον ἀπόλαυσιν).98 The idealistic rhetoric about love of the good evident in the Amphipolitan and the Prienian texts, a new departure in the later Hellenistic period, strongly recalls the orientation of Plato’s ethical philosophy: virtue in the soul is a matter of experiencing, appreciating, and knowing the Good, such that counter-rational desires subside.

Another relevant complex psychological word prominent in later Hellenistic decrees was the word προαιρέσεις,99 often used interchangeably in inscriptions with the word αἵρεσις. The word προαιρέσεις, which is not attested in inscriptions of the Classical period, became a relatively standard term in Hellenistic epigraphy; it is particularly richly attested in later Hellenistic inscriptions.100 Significantly, it was a word which, as Allen has shown, came to prominence in the mid- to late fourth century BC, both in Aristotle’s philosophy and in some Athenian oratory.101 Although central to

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94. I.Mylasa 101, ll. 36–46.
95. Among many later Hellenistic examples, see, for example, I.Priene2 69 (new edition of I.Priene 113) (mid-first century BC), ll. 94, 103–104, 118–20; I.Mylasa 101, ll. 10–11, 23.
97. Compare the contrast between φιλαγαθία and φιλαυτία at Arist. MM 2.14.
98. I.Priene2 68, l. 13.
99. For fuller discussion of the importance of this word in Hellenistic decrees and ideology, see Gray forthcoming.
101. See Allen 2006. Although the simultaneous emergence of the word in both philosophy and Attic oratory is good evidence for the porous boundary between the two, Allen is probably too quick to see a simple “migration” of the concept from philosophy to political rhetoric. For one thing, fourth-century orators use the word to refer to an extended state, not (like Aristotle) to a discrete ethical decision.
Aristotle’s ethical philosophy, the word was virtually absent from Hellenistic Stoic works.\(^{102}\) In other Hellenistic prose, such as Polybius and Diodorus, the word was commonly used with the fairly banal meaning of “policy,”\(^ {103}\) which partly mirrors the Hellenistic move to use the word to refer to affiliation to a particular philosophical school.\(^ {104}\) In honorary decrees, however, it was frequently used with an explicitly broader, more ethical meaning, similar to its use in relevant fourth-century Athenian speeches.\(^ {105}\) It was used to convey something very close to Aristotle’s “considered preferential state” (ἕξις προαιρετική). That is to say, many relevant Hellenistic decree drafters represented προαιρετικής as a long-term\(^ {106}\) psychological state central to virtuous states of character.\(^ {107}\) As for its internal psychological character, decrees represented προαιρετικής as something like an integrated state of “deliberated desire” (Aristotle’s βούλευτική ὁρεξεσις) concerning things in the agent’s power:\(^ {108}\) a coherent, unitary composite of thought and desire with an immediate practical focus.

One particularly revealing example illustrates the composite psychological character of relevant decree drafters’ notion of προαιρετικής. In the first century BC, the citizens of Hellenistic Kalamai in Messenia praised a fellow citizen for his προαιρετικής of mind [or judgment] towards common affairs and... (προαιρετικής γνώμης εἰς τὰ κοινά...).\(^ {109}\) In this case, the intrinsic association of the word προαιρετικής with deliberation and considered belief was made explicit through the reference to “mind” or “judgment” (γνώμη). However, the honorand’s προαιρετικής was also represented as “directed towards” (εἰς) common affairs, rather than simply as a judgment: it was also an emotional or desiderative attitude, presumably capable of directly motivating patriotic action.

This directed, motivating, non-intellectual component to προαιρετικής is even clearer in the common tendency in decrees to describe an honorand’s προαιρετικής as directed towards (εἰς or πρὸς) the δήμος or some other body,\(^ {110}\) which evokes

\(^{102}\) See Long 2002: 211; Frede 2011: 45. The Stoic Epictetus exploited the word in the Imperial period, perhaps wresting it from the Peripatetics (Inwood 2014: 74–75, 104), but he gave it an innovative meaning, to refer to a faculty of volition (see Long 2002: 211–214, 217).

\(^{103}\) E.g., Plb. 18.3.6; 27.15.16; 29.25.2; 30.6.3–8; compare D.S. 14.45.4; 16.32.3.

\(^{104}\) See Glucker 1978: 169–92, with discussion of this and the other Hellenistic usages.

\(^{105}\) See Allen 2006.


\(^{107}\) See, for example, SGDI II 2677 (Delphi, 189/8 BC), ll. 16–17 (praise for an honorand “for his piety and the rest of his προαιρετικής” ἐπὶ τῶν εἰσεξεισαία καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν λοιπῶν προαιρετικῶν); I.Iasos 98 (first century BC), ll. 16–19 (Melanion gave a fine demonstration of his own προαιρετικής by behaving “in a self-controlled way, worthy of imitation,” σωφρόνος καὶ ἀξιόζηλοτος). Most striking is an example from a later period: IG V 1 548 (Sparta, late second–third century AD), ll. 6–10 (praise for a citizen for his προαιρετικής, obedience, and “all the rest of virtue,” ἐπὶ τῇ... προαιρετική καὶ εὔπνηθα καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ πάσῃ ἀρετῇ).

\(^{108}\) For an explicit statement of the latter limitation, see IG XII 9 900A (Eretria, second century BC), ll. 2–6.

\(^{109}\) IG V 1 1370, l. 4.

\(^{110}\) E.g., (to cite two examples at random) SEG 48.1094 (Halasarna, 300–250 BC), l. 10 (προαιρετικής “towards the deme” of a citizen priest); I.Magnesia 92b (Magnesia-on-the-Maeander, early second century BC), l. 10 (προαιρετικής of a citizen towards his πατρίς).
an element of “sympathy”\textsuperscript{111} or solidarity. Significantly, one of the few usages of προαίρεσις in this way with πρὸς in a literary text occurs in one of Aristotle’s discussions of character friendship: character friends have “mutual friendship and a mutual προαίρεσις towards each other” (ἀντιφιλία καὶ ἀντιπροαίρεσις πρὸς ἀλλήλους).\textsuperscript{112}

In conclusion, a significant number of later Hellenistic decree-drafters took a particular interest in the psychological dynamics of virtuous character and action, using elevated, quasi-philosophical vocabulary. This can be explained as part of the attempts by those decree-drafters to understand better how to motivate voluntary virtuous action, for practical reasons that became more acute in later Hellenistic poleis. Interestingly, many decree-drafters resembled Aristotle, and deviated from Stoic principles, in emphasizing the desirability of unifying reason with emotion and desire, which should play their own active, positive role in sustaining virtue; reason, desire, and emotion should even merge into a coherent, complex psychological state such as “love of the good” (φιλαγαθία) or a good “motivational state” (προαίρεσις).

B) DOES VIRTUE NECESSARILY BENEFIT ITS POSSESSOR?

Certain later Hellenistic decrees also overlap in interesting ways with fourth-century philosophy, especially Aristotle’s, on the question of the benefits of virtue for its possessor. One later Hellenistic honorific cliché concerning virtue and the beneficial was the claim that an honorand had given priority to the interests of the civic community, ahead of his private interest (τὸ ἵδιον λοιπῆλας).\textsuperscript{113} For example, the decree of Priene for Moschion (dating to after 129 BC) includes the comment that he helped to ease a grain crisis by allowing the polis to determine the price for his contribution, “mindless of what was beneficial (sc. for himself)” (τοῦ μὲν λυσιτελὸς ἀφρόντιτον).\textsuperscript{114} The implication of such language, also attested in Hellenistic historiography,\textsuperscript{115} that there is usually an opposition between the “virtuous” and “beneficial” course of action for an agent possesses great intuitive force. However, it conflicts with the eudaimonist position shared by the major philosophical schools, endorsed by Platonists, Aristotelians, and Stoics: the position that virtue and virtuous action necessarily benefit the virtuous man himself, because they are consistent with man’s true nature as a rational being.\textsuperscript{116}

\textsuperscript{111} Cf. LSJ\textsuperscript{3} s.v. προαίρεσις (8).

\textsuperscript{112} Arist., EE 1236b3.

\textsuperscript{113} Cf. IG II\textsuperscript{2} 1299 (Athens, c. 234 BC), ll. 58–59; IG XI 4 1055 (Delos, c. 230–220 BC), ll. 12–14; SEG 41.680 (Halasarna, second century BC), ll. 33–38; IG XII 5 860 (Tenos, first century BC), ll. 10–12.

\textsuperscript{114} I.Priene\textsuperscript{2} 64, l. 87.

\textsuperscript{115} See, for example, D.S. 16.32.3: Onomarchos of Phokis advocated war, οὐχ οὕτω τοῦ κοινῆ συμφόροντος προονθείς, ὡς τὸ ἵδιον λυσιτελὸς προκρίνας.

\textsuperscript{116} See, for example, Arist., EN Book I; Cic. De Off. Book III.
This example could, therefore, be taken as evidence that later Hellenistic decree-drafters generally advocated a non-philosophical outlook: one against which major philosophers were reacting in their eudaimonism. This interpretation would be supported by the fact that, in his commonsensical account of virtue in his Rhetoric, Aristotle comments that the greatest virtues are those which are "most useful" for others, rather than for the agent himself.  

However, this non-philosophical approach was not the only one advocated by later Hellenistic decree-drafters; in other decrees, perhaps better equipped to persuade the wealthy that it was in their own interest to become engaged civic benefactors, the stress lay on the advantages of virtue for the virtuous agent himself. The clearest example is the section of the honorary decree of the Otorkondeis of Mylasa for a certain Iatrokles, dating to 76 BC, with which I began this article:  


These are the reasons for the honors: Iatrokles, son of Demetrios, of the tribe of the Tarkondareis, who has been a striver after the finest things since his earliest youth, has made himself useful both to individual citizens and to the people as a whole. He takes in hand his relations and looks after them with great care. He also gives friendly loans to many of the other citizens and releases them from their contracts, giving back the deposits which have been made and donating even greater signs of faith to many, thinking that justice is more profitable than injustice. He has also acted philanthropically towards suitable poor foreigners. . . .

The “benefit” or “profit” referred to in λυσιτελεστέραν (“more profitable”) must have been that accruing to Iatrokles himself rather than to others or to society as a whole, since the “benefit” of unjust action could hardly come to anyone but Iatrokles himself. If so, as suggested in the introduction, this text echoes almost exactly the proposition that Socrates seeks to uphold, in opposition to the arguments of Thrasymachos, in Book I of Plato’s Republic: “injustice is never more beneficial than justice” (οὐδὲπότε . . . λυσιτελεστέραν ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης).  

117. Arist. Rh. 1366b3–6; Aristotle does, however, even there include virtue among the components of happiness (εὐδαιμονία) (Arist. Rh. 1360b14–24).
118. I.My.ola 109, ll. 4–10.
This is a case in which there are strong grounds for suspecting a direct philosophical allusion. The use of the same combination of words as in Plato’s Republic is highly significant. The phrase was not a cliche: the comparative of λυσιτελής does not occur together with δικαιοσύνη and ἀδικία in surviving ancient literary or epigraphic texts other than this one and the Republic. On the contrary, it is highly distinctive and idiosyncratic: it is striking that ἀδικία is mentioned at all, when it would have been possible to say merely that Iatrokles thought justice beneficial. It is thus highly plausible that the drafter had encountered the Platonic words in some source: a collection of “sayings of philosophers,” of the type that was to become popular in the Imperial period. Book I of the Republic, studied as a self-standing dialogue or school text; or the text of the Republic as a whole. A consideration in favor of the third possibility is that, as pointed out in the introduction, the phrase does not represent an isolated claim in the Republic, but gives a first concise summary of the whole approach of that work, later developed into the argument that justice is always preferable to injustice, even in the worst possible external circumstances. The decree’s author probably thus used a single phrase from the Republic in order to suggest to learned readers that Iatrokles was committed to that work’s metaphysical and ethical system: justice is necessary for the happiness of its possessor, because it constitutes and creates a correct ordering of the soul. If so, the drafter was radically rejecting the standard epigraphic formula about the relationship between the virtuous and the beneficial, implying an entirely new interpretation of “the beneficial” (τὸ λυσιτελές).

Admittedly, the decree-drafter could have intended to suggest only that Iatrokles recognized that creditors achieve a better final return by treating their debtors sympathetically, a recognition attributed in a near contemporary Abderite honorary decree to a creditor. However, the probable Platonic allusion counts against that interpretation of the Iatrokles decree. It is true that the content of the Iatrokles decree itself elsewhere implies a different view of the “benefits of justice,” also falling far short of the radicalism of the Republic: in the later part of the decree, Iatrokles is praised for preferring praise to money. This remark makes primary the social benefits of justice in honor and recognition, rather than its psychological reward, a good soul. The decree’s author could have meant to imply a similarly limited view when he claimed that Iatrokles thought justice more beneficial than injustice. However, there is no necessary discrepancy between the position that virtue brings social rewards and a more radical Platonist eudaimonism. Indeed, given the strength of the Platonic echo, the best conclusion is that the decree’s author was committed to Plato’s view in the Republic that virtue brings both psychological and social rewards.

120. Morgan 2007: 5–8, 84–121.
121. I.Aeg.Thrace 11, ll. 8–14.
122. I.Mylasa 109, l. 22.
Most other decrees that explicitly present virtue as beneficial for its possessor draw attention to its social rewards in honor and renown. For example, Demetrios of Alopeke was praised by the Athenians in 116/5 BC for seeking “good reputation” (εὐφημία) among fellow citizens, rather than his narrower personal advantage.\footnote{IG II² 1009, ll. 44–45; cf. IG II² 1338 (Athens, after 86 BC), ll. 43–44. Compare also SEG 49.1041 (honorary decree for Protogenes of Olbia, c. 200 BC), face B, ll. 88–91.}

The fullest description of the social rewards of virtue occurs in the first decree of Priene for Zosimos: Zosimos is described as “knowing that virtue alone brings the greatest fruits and grateful recognition from [foreigners] and citizens who hold the fine in honor” (συνιδών δ’ ὅτι μόνη μεγάλους ἀποδίδοσιν ἡ ἄρετή καρποὺς καὶ χάριτας περὰ ξένους καὶ ἀστός τὸ καλὸν ἐν τιμή θεμέλοις).\footnote{I.Priene 2 68, ll. 13–14. Compare I.Priene 2 71 (new edition of I.Priene 117) (after 90 BC), ll. 59–60: Herakleitos’ προαίρεσις attracted the favorable judgment (διάληψις) of his fellow citizens.}

Significantly, virtue is here singled out as the only route to the greatest social rewards, an approach consistent with the strong position, shared by different philosophical schools, that virtue is necessary for happiness, such that the vicious man cannot be happy, however wealthy and powerful he becomes. The singling out of the life of virtue as a highly desirable aim is also attested in some other later Hellenistic decrees. The Otorkondeis of Mylasa (compare the Iatrokles decree) praised another benefactor for directing his life towards virtue, while their fellow Mylasan phyle of the Konodorkondeis justified two sets of honors as means of encouraging others to aspire to “the life directed towards virtue” (τὸν πρὸς ἄρετὴν βίον).\footnote{IG XII Suppl. 253, l. 2.} If the restoration is correct, the later Hellenistic Andrians even praised a group of benefactors who had fulfilled a public charge for having judged the life of virtue to be the best (τὸν πρὸς ἄρετὴν βίον ἄριστον κρίναντες εἶναι),\footnote{Cf. Arist. Pol. 1252b27–30} presumably recognizing the superior benefits this life could offer, perhaps intrinsic as well as extrinsic.

The lines of the Zosimos decree quoted above also have some more specific affinities with philosophy. The reference to recognition gained among fellow residents of Priene who “hold the fine in honor” represents a more sophisticated articulation of the basic assumptions about virtue friendship and the polis, strongly consistent with Aristotle’s philosophy, identified as implicit in the honorary decree form itself in section 2 above. As represented in this decree, the citizens and residents of Priene, who assign special importance to (“hold in honor”) “the fine” (τὸ καλὸν) in itself, resemble Aristotle’s true citizens, who recognize that a polis exists for the sake of the good life, not merely for the sake of bare life.\footnote{Cf. Arist. Pol. 1280b1–6.} Moreover, according to this representation, they also, like Aristotle’s true citizens, scrutinize the behavior of their neighbors, forming substantial bonds with those whom they recognize to be virtuous.\footnote{IG XII Suppl. 253, l. 2.} In this light, a major benefit
of virtue is the opportunity to live in a cohesive, trusting, and mutually supportive community, held together by shared appreciation of virtue.130

Despite the predominance here of the social rewards of virtue, the reference to the “fruits” of virtue as well as the gratitude it brings (καρπούς καὶ χάριτας) may imply an interest in its intrinsic psychological rewards: if “from foreigners and city-dwellers” qualifies only χάριτας and not καρπούς, the latter can include the “fruits” which spring directly from the seed of virtue. Interest in virtue’s intrinsic psychological benefits is more unequivocally evident in the opening of another Prienian decree, for Athenopolis, probably dating to c. 130 BC, which comes closest to chiming with Aristotle’s version of the philosophical position that virtue is necessary for happiness:

Resolved by the council. Lykinos, son of Lykinos, proposed. These are the reasons for the honors: Athenopolis, son of Kydimos, is a fine and noble man and worthy of his ancestors’ virtue. Offering himself as a lover of the good in all things, he previously received honors from the people, after procuring many useful things for the city through his fine and noble character. After this, maintaining the same disposition, he has not deviated from any of the things beneficial for the people, saying and doing the best things, not falling short of any love of the good. He has made himself worthy of the honors previously given to him and has not forgotten his promises. On the contrary, he has maintained his good will towards the citizens, thinking that what belongs to himself most of all is the maintenance of striving on behalf of those conducting their lives together with him. As a result, he has not been found wanting in any respect, but has rather increased his enthusiasm

130. For an account ascribing to Aristotle the view that mutual support among members of a community committed to virtue is crucial for individuals’ development both of virtuous habits and of an intellectual understanding of virtue, see Cooper 2010.
aligned with what is most fine. It is therefore appropriate and worthy of the man’s love of the good that Athenopolis should receive these honors.\textsuperscript{131}

The abstract opening description of Athenopolis’ virtues thus builds up to the claim that Athenopolis thought that what belonged to him most of all was the maintenance of striving on behalf of those with whom he shared a common life. Significantly, ὑπάρχειν with the dative is usually used in honorary decrees of Priene, as in those of other poleis, to describe the grant of concrete privileges: “let him possess” (ὑπάρχειν αὐτῶι) certain privileges.\textsuperscript{132} The drafter of the decree for Athenopolis thus pointedly made clear that Athenopolis was more interested in intangible “possessions.”\textsuperscript{133}

Indeed, according to the description in these lines, Athenopolis regarded his virtuous behavior for the benefit of fellow citizens as his most significant attribute: the thing most fundamental to his essence. This attitude strongly recalls the central eudaimonist conviction, shared by different philosophical schools, that to be virtuous is to fulfill one’s nature as a man. In particular, the decree’s identification of assiduousness (ἐκτένεια) as essential to Athenopolis’ nature recalls Aristotle’s famous identification of the “human good,” the thing most proper to a human being, as “activity of the soul in accordance with virtue” (ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ’ ἀρετὴν).\textsuperscript{134}

Admittedly, ἐκτένεια is quite a different concept from ἐνέργεια, but it would have been the best available word within the common repertoire of epigraphic virtues to convey energetic striving to act on behalf of fellow citizens. It is also true that the leading second-century BC Peripatetic Critolaus had turned away from the distinctive Aristotelian focus on activity, preferring to analyze the good life in terms of the completeness that comes from possession of different goods.\textsuperscript{135} Nonetheless, Aristotle’s own approach would have remained accessible, and certainly remained a viable alternative: Critolaus’ revisionist approach was to come under strong attack, for neglecting activity, in the first century BC and AD.\textsuperscript{136}

A further strong sign of abstract ethical reflection in the Athenopolis decree is the claim that Athenopolis’ striving was directed towards those with whom he shared a common life (τούς συγγενείας φιλομένους).\textsuperscript{137} the beneficiaries of his euergetism were not blandly identified as his fellow citizens or residents, but as those whose lives were entwined with his. This suggests an awareness of the
interdependence of different members of the polis. It also strongly recalls Aristotle’s eudaimonist argumentation. In Book X of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, for example, Aristotle claims that the virtuous man cannot achieve εὐδαιμονία merely by engaging in intellectual contemplation: as a human being, who naturally *lives together with multiple others*, the virtuous man chooses also to act in accordance with virtue (Ἠ δὲ ἄνθρωπός ἐστι καὶ πλείονες συνή, ἀφεῖται τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἄρετὴν πράττειν).138 This is another of the rare cases where a decree’s overlap with a philosopher’s doctrines in itself suggests philosophical inspiration.

The conviction that virtue is good for the virtuous agent—or even necessary for his happiness—might be thought to be restricted to the isolated cases mentioned, in such a way that it cannot be used as evidence for a more wide-ranging tendency towards ethical reflection. However, although it is rarely made explicit, a eudaimonist attitude strongly convergent with Aristotle’s arguably underlies most of the long honorary decrees for citizens of the later Hellenistic period. The drafters of such decrees generally implied through their elaborate, multifaceted presentations of the life stories of elite benefactors that a life of sustained virtuous action is highly desirable, because personally fulfilling and apt to satisfy diverse human needs.139 Indeed, it is likely that a detailed account of the rich, well-ordered life of a virtuous benefactor, engaged in social, political, intellectual, and cultural life, would usually have been more effective than any shorter rational argument as a means of advocating this ethical outlook. As Aristotle himself says in the *Rhetoric*, praise and advice share a “common form.”140

In a way consistent with this general tendency, longer later Hellenistic honorary decrees commonly contain a feature that recalls a specific aspect of Aristotle’s eudaimonistic emphasis on the importance of sustained virtuous action: many such decrees emphasize the fact that honorands maintained virtuous states of character, and corresponding motivations and actions, quite literally throughout their lives.141 Indeed, it was commonly thought appropriate that such lifelong virtue should be demonstrated “from earliest youth” (ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἡλικίας).142 This aspect of honorific rhetoric can be compared with Aristotle’s insistence that true fulfillment (εὐδαιμονία) consists of activity in accordance with virtue “in a complete life” (ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ).143 It is also consistent with Aristotle’s insistence that habituation and education in virtue should begin at the youngest possible age.144

To sum up, a significant number of later Hellenistic honorary decrees explicitly or implicitly promote a broad eudaimonist approach to ethics, not very common in

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142. E.g., *I.Metropolis* 1, face B, l. 5. On this phenomenon, see Kleijwegt 1991: esp. 234–35.
Greek non-philosophical sources but shared with Platonists and Aristotelians by the Stoics. However, the drafters of relevant decrees expressed this approach using phrasing and emphases more reminiscent of Aristotle and the Peripatetics than of the Stoics. For them, a fulfilling life consisted less in a state of wisdom than in sustained virtuous activity and meaningful, supportive social relationships.

C) IF VIRTUE DOES NECESSARILY BENEFIT ITS POSSESSOR, ARE BODILY AND EXTERNAL GOODS ALSO NECESSARY FOR HAPPINESS?

Also in line with Aristotelian rather than Stoic ideas, most relevant decrees gave prominence to bodily health and material wealth, alongside virtue, as important components of honorands’ admirable, desirable lives. Aristotle had maintained that bodily and “external goods” are necessary for happiness (εὐδαιμονία), in addition to virtue. The Hellenistic Peripatetics preserved and refined this approach, analyzing closely the nature and relationship of different types of goods. Indeed, the issue of whether bodily and external goods are necessary for happiness became (alongside the controversy over the moral status of the emotions) a principal dividing line between Peripatetics and Stoics. In stark opposition to the Aristotelian and Peripatetic position, the Stoics claimed that it is possible for a virtuous man to be “fulfilled” (εὐδαίμων) without anything more than a virtuous soul, because virtue is the only true good.

Decrees’ convergence with the Aristotelian and Peripatetic position on this issue might appear commonsensical, but the fact that contemporary Stoics strongly questioned their approach shows that this was, in fact, a live and potentially contentious issue. Furthermore, many relevant decree-drafters expressed the importance of bodily and external goods in rhetoric strongly reminiscent of fourth-century ethical works, including Aristotle’s, and the ensuing Hellenistic tradition. For example, the rhetoric of some texts appeals to the traditional Greek ideal, prominent in the fourth century, that well-being requires the safety and flourishing of both body (σῶμα) and soul (ψυχή). In an honorary decree of Peloponnesian Antigoneia/Mantineia dating to Augustus’ early reign, the marriage of the honorand, Euphrosynos, to his wife, Epigone, was described as a joining of souls and indivisible concord, on

146. See Tsouni 2018, text, secs. 6–8 Ts, 124.16–127.3; sec. 15 Ts., 136.10–16 (also Sharples 2010: chapter 15, text A, sections 9–11, 24). See also Sharples 2010: chapter 1, text X; chapter 18, passim.
147. See, for example, Inwood 2014: 54–55 on Critolaus’ development of this aspect of Aristotelianism, in dialogue with Stoic approaches.
149. Cicero advocates this Stoic view at Off. 3.20 and includes criticism of it at Fin. 4.27, 72–73. Finkelberg (2002: 35–49) thinks that this type of approach was prevalent in Hellenistic ethical thought as a whole.
150. E.g., Lysias 2.15.
151. On the dating, see van Bremen 1996: 140.
the one hand, with material estates and bodies, on the other: ἐξεύγνωστο γὰρ βιότοις [καὶ σῶμασιν ψυχαὶ καὶ παρ’ ἀμφοτέροις ἁμέραις ὁμοίων].152 The desirable shared life of husband and wife was thus represented as involving an integration of intangible spiritual goods with material and bodily goods.153

Similarly, it is a recurring theme of the long Colophonian decree for Polemaios (later second century BC) that Polemaios harmoniously harnessed bodily goods, material wealth, and goods of the soul in living an enviable life of civic virtue. The opening of the decree, concerning Polemaios’ activities in the gymnasia, is strongly convergent with the traditional emphasis in Greek educational thought on simultaneous development of both body (σῶμα) and soul (ψυχή), which found influential fourth-century expression in Isocrates’ educational theory.154 It is commented that Polemaios “nourished his soul with the finest learning” (τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν τοῖς καλλίστοις συντρέφον μαθήμασιν), but also “trained his body through the habitual activities of the gymnasia” (τὸ δὲ σῶμα τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν γυμνασίων ἐθεσμοῖς ἐναθλήσας).155 As a result of his preparation in the gymnasion, he was victorious in sacred games. Wishing to make all fellow Colophonians on equal terms from the first sharers in his choice (προαιρεσις) of life (πάντας ὁμόως σπειδῶν ἀπ’ ἀρχῆς κοινωνοὺς ποιήσασθαι τῆς τοῦ βίου προαιρεσίως), he then provided hospitality for all. This is described as a case of Polemaios making “a distribution of the material resources resulting from his life(style)”: μετάδοσιν ἐποίησατο τῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ βίου χορηγίας.156 According to this presentation, Polemaios’ training of his body yielded deserved material rewards, which he partially redistributed to fellow citizens, showing the ethical qualities of the soul which he had “nourished with learning”; he enjoyed a fine bios in both the material and the ethical sense (livelihood/life), with the two closely interconnected.

The rhetorical dichotomy between bodily and external goods, on the one hand, and goods of the soul, on the other, is preserved in the narration of Polemaios’ subsequent visit to Rhodes. He went to study with advanced teachers in Rhodes, “thinking fine not only the prestige accruing to his life and his country from his bodily attributes, but also that which comes from taking charge of common affairs through speech and political action” (καλὸν δὲ κρίνων οὐ μόνον τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος περιγίνομεν τῷ βίῳ καὶ τῇ πατρίδι κόσμῳ, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ προϊστάσθαι τῶν κοινῶν λόγων καὶ πράξεως πολιτικῆς).157 In other words, Polemaios continued to recognize the value of

152. IG V 2 268, ll. 32–34; the restoration βιότοις (suggested by von Premerstein and skeptically reported in the addenda and corrigenda to IG V 2, p. 146) is preferable to IG’s restoration βιοῖ βιότοις, because the latter leaves καὶ παρ’ ἀμφοτέροις ἁμέραις ὁμοίων without a corresponding dative, and thus with no connection to the rest of the sentence. The restoration βιότοις plausibly makes the sentence into a description of the yoking of two pairs.


154. E.g., Isoc. 1.9, 12; 9.23–24; 15.181–82. On the emphasis of this and other decrees on the nurturing of the benefactor’s body and his soul: Dreyer 2004: 217.

155. For idealization of this kind of education in the gymnasium, compare I.Ephesos 6, ll. 15–19.

156. SEG 39.1243, col. I, ll. 1–16.

virtuous action, as well as that of physical prowess and its rewards. Although Polemaios’ blend of worldly and intangible goods ceases to be a guiding rhetorical thread of the decree after this point, it is later commented that he participated in diplomacy, “putting on the line for the people his body, soul, and whole livelihood” (σώματι και την ψυχη και τοι παντι βίων περί τοο δήμου παραβαλλόμενος). 158

While the general tone of these varied parts of the account of Polemaios’ life consistently evokes Aristotle’s approach to external goods and happiness, the closest parallel to Aristotle’s own language occurs in another context: the decree’s description of the impression of the city of Colophon gained by those who attended the festival of the Claria, in whose organization Polemaios played a leading role. According to that description, the foreigners who attended the festival recognized and reported the “excellence and resources of the city” (τὴν ἀρετὴν και χορηγίαν αὐτῆς). 159 This juxtaposition of excellence (ἀρετὴ)160 and resources (χορηγία) as praiseworthy attributes of the city recalls Aristotle’s standard formula for the good life of a man: “what prevents that man being called fulfilled who acts in accordance with complete virtue (ἀρετή) and is sufficiently equipped (κεχορηγημένον) with external goods?” 161

Interestingly, Aristotle himself extended this argument to whole poleis as well as individuals: the best life for both individuals and whole poleis is that of virtue endowed with sufficient material goods for participating in virtuous action (ὁ μετ’ ἀρετῆς κεχορηγημένης ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ὡστε μετέχειν τὸν κατ’ ἀρετὴν πράξεων). 162 Through a type of city-soul analogy shared with Aristotle himself, the drafter of the decree for Polemaios thus showed that Colophon was completely unlike the dystopia conjured up by the name of the neighboring “Polis of Slaves” (Δοῦλων Πόλης) mentioned elsewhere in the decree as the site of raiding, 163 which corresponds to Aristotle’s own notion of the antithesis of a true polis. 164 According to the decree, the Colophonian polis, like Polemaios himself, had demonstrably satisfied Aristotle’s requirements for εὐδαμονία.

D) IF BODILY AND EXTERNAL GOODS DO CONTRIBUTE TO THE GOOD LIFE, HOW DO THEY CONTRIBUTE TO IT?

Certain later Hellenistic decrees also converged with Aristotelian thinking in their explorations of the precise nature of the contribution of bodily and external

160. The drafter could have had the physical excellence of the city in mind, but the parallel with Aristotle suggests that the phrasing also evoked moral excellence.
161. Arist. EN 1101a14–16; compare 1099a32–33.
goods to the good life of the generous citizen. In addition to presenting bodily and external goods as necessary for εὐδαιμονία, Aristotle had offered detailed accounts of their role in the fulfilled life. He accepted that such goods can make a direct contribution to an individual’s well-being: they are not desirable simply as instrumental means to fulfilling types of activity. However, as already evident in the closing part of the last section, Aristotle also emphasized that external goods are indispensable for virtuous activity. A basic level of wealth and other external goods is necessary for an agent to follow any consistent, considered course of action. Moreover, the scope and influence of an agent’s virtuous activities is greatly increased if he can make use of “tools, friends, wealth, and political power.”

Hellenistic Peripatetics preserved and developed Aristotle’s approach, acknowledging the value of bodily and external goods both in themselves and as means to virtuous activity. One Peripatetic way of approaching the issue was to argue that wealth and office are good when in the hands of those with the virtue to make good use of them.

Similar attitudes to bodily and external goods are paralleled in the Colophonian decree for Polemaios. The view that bodily prowess is desirable, both for its own sake and for the recognition it brings, is implied in that decree’s reference to the “prestige” (κόσμος) accruing to Polemaios’ life, as well as to his city, from the state of his body. More pervasive in the decree is an implied commitment to the view that external goods have instrumental value as a means to virtue: Polemaios’ wealth enabled him to behave as a virtuous and effective civic benefactor. Indeed, the decree uses three times a very common epigraphic formula which encapsulates this attitude: Polemaios performed particular benevolent services or public functions “from his own resources” (ἐκ τῶν ἴδιων). The pervasive application of this formula to civic benefactors’ services in Hellenistic decrees implies that wealth was widely regarded as a substantial aid to virtuous activity, or even one of its prerequisites.

The Colophonian example might suggest that such quasi-Peripatetic emphasis on the close entwining of wealth, virtue, and the good life served aristocratic or oligarchic purposes: this approach could be used to imply that only those endowed with sufficient material resources could exercise true virtue and live a truly good life. Skinner shows that explicit readings of Aristotle along these lines were used to support oligarchy in Medieval Italy. Doubtless some wealthy later Hellenistic benefactors supported and advanced such arguments in order to entrench their power and privileges. But they could not do so unchallenged: the demos and supporters of civic community insisted, not least through honorary decrees, that the common good should dictate what constituted desirable, virtuous use of wealth.

In the *Politics*, Aristotle himself applies his principle that external goods are indispensable aids to virtuous activity in a distinctively political way. In objecting to Plato’s advocacy of a form of communism in the *Republic*, Aristotle argues that the best civic arrangement would be the following. Individual citizens should be allowed to possess private property, of which they will be induced to take good care by self-interest and personal pride. It should be left to the informal constraints of virtue and civic friendship to encourage them to deploy their private property for the public good, or the good of particular fellow citizens, in times of need. If properly inculcated in citizens, virtue and civic friendship will lead them to regard their formally private property as in some respects “common.” This theory is summarized in the following formula:

φανερὸν τοῖνον ὅτι βέλτιον εἶναι μὲν ἰδίας τὰς κτήσεις, τῇ δὲ χρήσει ποιεῖν κοινάς.\(^1\)

So it is clearly better that property should be private, but to make it common in use.

Aristotle presumably thought this arrangement superior partly for purely pragmatic reasons: it is a way of sublimating individuals’ self-interest for the common good. Nevertheless, as Kraut points out, Aristotle also had a more idealistic reason for favoring this arrangement: possession of private property makes it possible for citizens to make their own personal contributions to the common good, virtuous benefactions from which they can derive personal pride and fulfillment.\(^2\)

This aspect of Aristotle’s philosophy of property is closely echoed in the later second-century BC Prienian decree for Moschion. The relevant section concerns Moschion’s contributions of money to the city in a financial crisis:

ἐπὶ δὲ στεφα[ν]ηφόρου Κέκροπος οὐ μόνον διαφόρων γενομένης τῇ [πύλῃ χρείας, ἄλλα] καὶ παραστάσεως ἐνεχύρων, διαλαβὴν κλοίνην εἶναι τῇ[ν] οὕσις πάντωσι τῶν πολίτῶν καὶ τ[ι] . . . \(\ldots\) ἔδεικ
dραχμών ἀργυρῶματα δραχμῶν [Ἀλεξανδρείε[ων] τετρακισχιλίων·\(^3\)

In the stephanephorate of Kekrops, when the polis needed not only capital but also the provision of sureties, Moschion, *treating his property as common to all citizens*, and . . . . . . . . . . distributions (?). . . [whole line missing] . . inferior to no one in times of need concerning the common good, donated 1000 Alexander-drachmas as capital and silver plate worth 4000 Alexander-drachmas for use as sureties.\(^4\)

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The unusual description of Moschion treating his property as common to all citizens (διαλαβὼν κοινὴν εἶναι τῆς μόνῳ πάντων τῶν πολιτῶν) assimilates him to Aristotle’s virtuous citizen. He possessed considerable private wealth, which he doubtless took care to preserve and increase.174 However, in a moment of civic crisis, he “treated” it as common to all citizens, and thus effectively as, in Aristotle’s phrase, “common in use” (τῇ δὲ χρήσει κοινῆ).

It might be objected that this is, in fact, a fairly bland description of the result of Moschion’s action, appropriate to the behavior of any generous citizen. Alternatively, it might be objected that the text simply describes the particular pragmatic result of providing sureties for the polis: the relevant property became, in a way, both private and common. There are, however, strong reasons for thinking that this claim is distinctive and even philosophical. The clause about his property being common is placed early in the account, to explain the motivation of Moschion’s action (note the choice of verb, διαλαβὼν). It is not placed at the end, to describe the result of his action (in which case a verb of “making” or “rendering” would have been needed). Whereas the typical benefactor gave up his private property for public purposes, alienating what was truly his, and a civic creditor could render his own personal property in a way “common” by offering it as surety, Moschion treated his property as if it was already simultaneously “private” and “common” in the first place. In this case, therefore, the Aristotelian echo is sufficiently distinctive and strong to suspect the direct influence of Aristotle’s Politics or of a derivative work.

A similar notion of the good citizen’s use of, and attitude to, his private property is also at least implicit in other later Hellenistic decrees in which there is no evidence of direct Aristotelian influence. This is true, in particular, of the decree of Antigoneia/Mantineia for Euphrosynos, shown above to express the ideal of integration of spiritual and worldly goods in the good life. Early in that decree, Euphrosynos is praised for offering bricks which had been prepared for his own use (ἐἰς τὴν ἰδιὰν ἐγχρησίαν ἦτομομενᾶς) for the rebuilding of part of the civic gymnasium, which had been destroyed by fire. He did so “judging the public appearance of the city more important than his own domestic convenience” (τῆς κατ᾽ ὁικὸν ὃ[φε]ξ[λίς] τὸν δημόσιον κόσμον προκείμενος).175 Like Moschion, therefore, Euphrosynos possessed considerable private resources, but devoted them to public projects in a time of crisis. More generally, the same attitude to private property is evident in the way many later Hellenistic decrees, especially Prienian ones, praise wealthy benefactors’ use of their homes for the quasi-public entertainment of fellow citizens.176

It was not necessarily only those material goods that wealthy and successful individuals had obtained by their own talent and efforts which Hellenistic Greeks considered it quite legitimate for them to retain, provided that they ploughed them back into projects of communal benefit. Indeed, in c. 154 BC, a corporate group

175. IG V 2 268, ll. 18–21.
of soldiers sent to Alexandria by the Cretan federation (κοινόν) praised Aglaos of Cos for judging it best to use for the good of his fellow men not only those “advantages” (προτερήματα) which he obtained as a result of his own virtue (ἀπὸ τῆς ἰδίας ἀρετῆς), but also those which he obtained through “chance” (ἀπὸ τῆς τύχης). The word τύχη could, admittedly, have many different meanings in Hellenistic Greek, but the clear opposition with ἀρετή here strongly implies a subtle distinction, of the kind a philosopher would make, between earned and unearned advantages. There was no criticism of Aglaos’ accumulation of resources through mere chance rather than desert: on the contrary, Aglaos was praised for considering resources obtained in that way to be best used for communal ends. This example was very far from any egalitarian aspiration to material equality, or even to the elimination of the effects of luck on individuals’ material welfare. Nonetheless, there was a clear common conviction, shared by benefactor and community, that the value of wealth lies mainly in enabling benefactions for the common good.

E) IS IT NECESSARY TO BE A GOOD CITIZEN OF A POLIS IN ORDER TO LIVE A VIRTUOUS LIFE?

It is an unsurprising result that later Hellenistic decree-drafters continued to endorse the view, consistent with Aristotle’s Politics178 and its Hellenistic Peripatetic followers,179 that citizenship in a polis is a prerequisite for living a virtuous life.180 Conversely, later Hellenistic decree-drafters tended to show only limited sympathy with the contrasting view, promoted by the Stoics, that the virtuous man’s most ethically important membership is his participation in a universal community of all men or all rational, virtuous beings, not citizenship of some particular polis.181 It is important to stress that the Stoics were certainly not uninterested in the local polis as a valuable stage for virtuous activity.182 Nonetheless, unlike Aristotle, the Peripatetics, and most civic decrees, the Stoics tended to bestow more importance and attention on other types of social and political engagement, including both commitment to the cosmopolis and efforts to transform individual souls in ways that, if generalized, would revolutionize society.183

177. *ID* 1517, ll. 27–30.
178. For a recent treatment: Cooper 2010.
179. For a Peripatetic argument that the good man will choose to participate in politics, see Tsouni 2018, text, sec. 23 Ts, 144.20–22; compare sec. 27 Ts (also Sharples 2010, chapter 15, text A, section 40, 45–52).
180. For example, Menas of Sestos was praised for making everything else secondary to the maintenance of a genuine, energetic commitment to his polis (*I.Sestos* 1, ll. 4–7). Compare also the tone of the rest of the account of Menas’ civic contributions (ll. 5–86). In this and other decrees, civic engagement is more than merely “an important component” (Dreyer 2010: 353) of the virtuous life.
181. Irwin 2007: 356–57. For more detailed treatment, see, for example, Erskine 1990: e.g., 19–27; Schofield 1999b: chs. 3–4; Murray 2004.
Even if this first result is predictable, it is revealing that several later Hellenistic decree-drafters added complexity and detail to their articulation of this central civic conviction in ways that were significantly convergent with the approach of Aristotle and the Peripatetics. First, as I argue in another article, some decree-drafters used language and ideas strongly consonant with Aristotle’s to present the polis as the most suitable context for the acquisition of virtue by individuals, through education. According to relevant decrees, the polis provides the ideal context for ongoing education which shapes the character of citizens, including their emotional dispositions, through practical habituation as well as intellectual instruction; the honorific process is also presented as itself crucial to this civic education. In these cases, the convergence with Aristotelian thought is so strong that the influence of Aristotelian or Peripatetic texts is likely.

Second, some later Hellenistic decree-drafters employed language and ideas strongly consistent with Aristotle’s to present the polis as the primary arena for the exercise of virtue, once its basic rudiments have been acquired. The second-century BC Metropolitan decree for Apollonios offers a reason why the good man should dedicate himself to his city: it was “appropriate” (καθήκον) for Apollonios as an excellent and good man (ἀνδρὶ καλωτὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ) to be “a protector and helper of his city.” The suggestion that such behavior is καθήκον for a virtuous man implies not only that it is incumbent on the virtuous man to contribute to his polis, but also that his polis provides a “fitting” stage for him to exercise his virtue: as Aristotle would have put it, man is a “political animal” who needs a polis in which to behave virtuously.

A later Hellenistic decree-drafter could also offer a distinctively Aristotelian-style image of the kinds of virtuous activity made possible by civic participation. In the Colophonian decree for Polemaios, it is commented that Polemaios assumed responsibility for sacred contests, “thinking that this responsibility would bring glory to his fatherland equal to that of other (responsibilities)” (διαλαβὼν τὰ χρείαν ἱσθαν ὁικεῖος τῇ πατρίδι δόξαν). This remark has the almost polemical implication that religious and cultural activities of this type are as important and valuable as the more directly political types of civic activity described elsewhere in the decree, especially diplomatic activity. This approach is consistent with Aristotle’s insistence that a true, complete polis does not merely possess institutions designed to enable and regulate citizens’

185. For Aristotle’s emphasis on the educational role of a true polis, see especially Arist. Pol. 1263b36–37.
186. See especially I.Sestos 1, ll. 70–72; I.Priene 68, ll. 74–77; I.Lasos 98, ll. 1–19.
187. For example, for Aristotelian interest in habituation, see Arist. EN 1105a17–1105b18; Arist. EN 1179b4–10. See also Burnyeat 1980; Sorabji 1980; Charles 1984: 180, 182. For the persistence and development of this approach in Hellenistic Peripatetic philosophy, see, for example, Tsouni 2018, text, sec. 1 Ts, 116.19–117.7 (also Sharples 2010, chapter 15, text A, section 1).
188. I.Metropolis 1, face A, ll. 8–9.
189. SEG 39.1243, col. IV, ll. 35–40.
secure, peaceful coexistence, but offers the full range of activities that are conducive to the development of its citizens as virtuous men.190

It would be wrong, however, to imply that later Hellenistic decrees systematically downplayed relationships above or below the level of the polis of fellow citizens. In reaction to the ever more interconnected social conditions and intellectual environment of the contemporary Mediterranean, drafters of later Hellenistic decrees engaged in a project similar to that of some contemporary Peripatetics: revising traditional civic values and virtues themselves to accommodate more cosmopolitan and cross-border relationships. This seems to have been a hallmark of later Hellenistic Peripatetic political philosophy, reflecting close dialogue with Stoicism; it is evident in both Piso’s speech in Book V of Cicero’s *De Finibus* and in the summary of Peripatetic ethics attributed to Arius Didymus.191 Along similar lines, in the later Hellenistic period civic decrees began to incorporate the universalistic virtue of “humanity” (φιλανθρωπία) into their picture of the good citizen’s attributes, using that term to describe good relations not only between citizens and strangers, but even between fellow citizens of the same polis.192

Both active citizens and philosophers were also reflecting simultaneously in the later Hellenistic world on the nature of the complex fabric of relations that make up a polis, as well as on the place of the polis in the wider human community. Building on Aristotle’s ideas, later Hellenistic Peripatetics stressed that an individual’s relations with his fellow citizens represent only one—even if a particularly important one—of several important, overlapping circles of ethical relationships within the polis. The summary of Peripatetic ethics attributed to Arius Didymus discusses love of children, brothers, parents, wives, relations, associates, and neighbors alongside love of country and fellow citizens. These internal relationships within a polis are complementary types of natural human attachment, of which other types extend to larger ethnic groups and even to the whole of humanity.193 This kind of explicit adumbration of multiple circles of ethical relationships seems to have been a wider tendency of later Hellenistic philosophy: Cicero also attempts it in *De Officiis*, almost certainly drawing on Panaetius’ work.194 This approach was also paralleled in contemporary epigraphy: for example, the decree of Priene for Moschion at one point distinguishes the virtues he showed in relations with his parents, with “those living together with him in close relations and intimacy” (τοῖς συμβιβούνται ἐν οἰκ[ε]λότητι καὶ χρήσει), and with the rest of the citizens.195

Exploration of the complexities of civic social life must have been a crucial means for poleis’ citizens to investigate how to sustain civic community and

192. Hamon 2012; Gray 2013b.
193. Tsouni 2018, text, sec. 3 Ts, 120.9–121.3; sec. 9 Ts, 127.3–14 (also Sharples 2010, chapter 15, text A, sections 4 and 12).
benefaction in the changed conditions of later Hellenistic times. The stress on the indispensable role of polis citizenship in the good life could have helped to persuade the mobile wealthy to show dedication to their polis. One relevant line of argument deployed in decrees was that successful citizens were obliged to repay the contribution made by their poleis to their success. For example, both Polemaios of Colophon and the first-century BC leading Pergamene benefactor, Diodoros Pasparos, were praised for withstanding hardships for the sake of “the territory which had nurtured them” (τὸ θρέψαν ἐδάφος). According to this approach, citizens were bound by principles of reciprocity and gratitude to remain faithful to the poleis which had nurtured them. Like most of the other later Hellenistic rhetoric considered here, this notion echoes Classical Athenian ideas, found in tragedy and oratory as well as philosophy.

In a greater number of cases, however, later Hellenistic honorary decrees sought to persuade the wealthy to show civic commitment by another means. This was the result of the common juxtaposition, clear in the long Colophonian, Sestian, and Prienian decrees, of the polis-centered approach discussed in this sub-section with the eudaimonistic approach studied in sub-section 3c above. Placed alongside each other, these two approaches amounted to the conviction that engaged polis citizenship is the best route to the individual fulfillment that comes through a flourishing life and soul.

This was a distinctive feature of later Hellenistic decrees, which marked them out from earlier Hellenistic predecessors. For example, both the third-century BC Athenian decree for Phaidros of Sphettos and the later second-century BC Colophonian decree for Polemaios give a central role to the home polis as the context of their respective honorands’ virtuous activity. However, the second-century decree, unlike the third-century decree, offers both great detail about Polemaios’ own education and early development and a highly personalized account of his later life, including his role in his own household and family. Polemaios’ personal development and welfare were thus presented as intimate concerns of the Colophonians as a whole, as well as consequences of his citizen lifestyle.

According to this general approach, it is obvious why all citizens should commit themselves wholeheartedly to their poleis. In the first century BC, the citizens of Sagalassos in Pisidia honored Manesas of Termessos for coming to their aid at a time when internal discord and external war threatened them, commenting that he treated their perilous situation as a diminution of his own interests (τὴν καθ’ ἡμᾶς...
4. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ETHICS OF LATER HELLENISTIC DECREES AND ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY

Although sections 2 and 3 have stressed the convergence between Hellenistic decrees’ ethics and those of Aristotle and the Peripatetics, until this point I have tried to remain neutral, except in a few cases, on the question whether any later Hellenistic decree-drafters were actually exposed to the works of fourth-century intellectuals or to Hellenistic works inspired by them. This section attempts a necessarily more speculative task: it offers four hypothetical explanations for the overlap between the ethics of fourth-century intellectuals, and their Hellenistic philosophical followers, and those of relevant later Hellenistic decrees. These four explanations are not mutually exclusive. Indeed, they were probably often each simultaneously relevant in particular cases.

First, the overlap was undoubtedly at least partly due in all cases to shared ethical culture: both Aristotle, his fourth-century contemporaries, and the Peripatetics, on the one hand, and later Hellenistic decree-drafters, on the other, took as their raw material a widespread, fairly stable stock of “common-sense” ethical ideas. Both philosophers and decree-drafters would have assimilated these “common-sense” views from a wide range of sources: oral tradition, but also a wide range of literary genres, poetry as well as prose. Viewed in this way, the ethical content of relevant later Hellenistic decrees, more practical and demotic than the works of Aristotle and the Peripatetics, strongly suggests that Aristotle and his followers were very successful in carrying out Aristotle’s declared project of making respectable Greek ethical ideas the basis for his own ethical philosophy.  

Nevertheless, even if the overlaps between Aristotelian philosophy and later Hellenistic decrees partly involve a commitment to the polis and civic virtue very widely shared among ancient Greeks, section 3 showed that the particular linguistic and conceptual nuances put on that common Greek outlook in a significant number of decrees were precisely those favored by fourth-century intellectuals, especially Aristotle, and their Hellenistic followers. Relevant later Hellenistic decree-drafters resembled some fourth-century figures who were not primarily intellectuals, such as Demosthenes and Aeschines, in the way they idealized civic virtue and civic relationships with elaborate rhetoric. However, they also articulated more distinctively “philosophical” approaches to second-order, abstract questions about the how and why of civic virtue, with a coloring similar to Aristotle’s and the Peripatetics’.

201. TAM III 7, ll. 10–11. For a parallel from the earlier Hellenistic period, see IG II² 1 871, ll. 18–21 (quoted in section 3a above).
202. Note Aristotle’s methodological reliance on endoxa (e.g., EN I.4–5).
Other factors than shared commonsensical assumptions were, therefore, probably at work. A second hypothesis is that the overlap was partly due to the fact that Aristotle and his followers and later Hellenistic decree-drafters were to some extent engaged in similar projects: they each sought to articulate the ethical and psychological foundations of the commonplace, longstanding assumptions underlying republican civic life. Moreover, they each faced similar challenges. The fourth-century rise of Macedon in Aristotle’s lifetime posed difficulties for civic autonomy and pride similar to those posed by the spread of Roman hegemony. Similarly, the increased weight which the civic honors system came to bear in Aristotle’s Athens (from the 340s onwards) probably reflected similar financial shortages and civic tensions to those which encouraged the distinctive rhetoric of relevant later Hellenistic decrees. From this perspective, the overlap between Aristotle and relevant later Hellenistic decrees emerges as a similarity in the responses of educated, property-owning Greeks, in two distinct periods, to civic crises and doubts about the value of the polis.

The third possible hypothesis is that fourth-century ethical language and ideas, especially Aristotle’s, did themselves indirectly influence relevant later Hellenistic decree-drafters, as a result of a long period of diffusion. By the mid-to-late Hellenistic period, Aristotelian language and ideas would have had sufficient time to diffuse into popular culture, assisted by their continuing Peripatetic advocates: in a possible parallel, it was arguably on the same timescale (one or two centuries) that Kantian “human rights” or Utilitarian “prevention of suffering” became mainstream moral concepts of crucial importance in political debates in Western European states.

In the Greek case, the genre of rhetoric probably played a crucial role in enabling the percolation of philosophical ideas into everyday debates. For example, Greek theoretical works on rhetoric, like Aristotle’s own Rhetoric, had to mediate between abstract philosophical ethics and everyday ethical questions. Greek biography probably played an equally important role: the Greek biographical genre enabled, or required, the concrete application, in a vivid, accessible form, of abstract ethical principles about the best way to lead a human life. Indeed, it may be significant in this context that a major line of thought in modern scholarship on Hellenistic biography attributes at least a loose Aristotelian or Peripatetic orientation to it. The model of biography was probably particularly significant in the case of the rhetoric of longer honorary decrees: as scholars have noted, long honorary

203. See, for example, Liddel 2007: 94–108, with earlier bibliography.
204. On Aristotle’s Rhetoric, see Irwin 1996.
206. Note especially the tradition deriving from Leo 1901 and Dihle 1956. Scholars sympathetic to this view emphasize the role in the development of Hellenistic biography of the Peripatetics Theophratus, Aristoxenus, Hermippus, Antigonus (of Karystos), and Satyrus. As far as content is concerned, they emphasize the way in which Plutarch’s biographies, thought to be inspired by Hellenistic models, focus on the continuous development of a man’s ethical character from his earliest youth, through habituation and moral choice (see the skeptical discussion in Momigliano 1971b: 9–15). Other scholars have strongly questioned the contention that Hellenistic biography had a distinctively Peripatetic origin or orientation: see Momigliano 1971a and Fortenbaugh 2007.
decrees are themselves short biographies, which describe honorands’ lives and fit them into an ethical template.207

Fourth, overlaps in language and ideas were probably sometimes due to direct influence. That is to say, the ethical sensibilities of some later Hellenistic decree-drafters were probably partly shaped by exposure to fourth-century ethical works or to more recent philosophical works inspired by them, or to lectures based on such works. According to this hypothesis, a similar process was at work in later Hellenistic poleis to that which Allen has recently controversially identified in Athens after c. 350: civic orators looked to philosophical works for inspiration.208 Allen’s arguments about fourth-century Athens mainly rely on evidence that particular words already common in philosophical texts (such as προαίρεσις) first feature in Attic oratory after c. 350 BC. Although this article has occasionally addressed the use of particular items of vocabulary (including προαίρεσις itself) in inscriptions, the main focus has been on more substantial overlaps in ideas and rhetoric.

In some cases, as pointed out in section 3, the strength of a decree’s echoes of a philosopher’s language or approach suggests that its drafter even wanted to allude to a particular philosophical work or doctrine: the drafter of the Mylasan decree for Iatrokles alluded to the unifying thesis of Plato’s Republic; the drafter of the Prienian decree for Athenopoli alluded to a central thesis of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics; the drafter of the Prienian decree for Moschion alluded to a prominent argument of Aristotle’s Politics; and various decree-drafters alluded, using Aristotelian or Peripatetic language and concepts, to Aristotle’s ideas about polis-centered ethical education in virtue. In the light of these examples of probable direct allusion, the probability increases considerably that some of the weaker echoes of philosophical works identified in section 3 were also the result of exposure to philosophical works. That exposure could have loosely shaped those drafters’ ethical sensibilities, or even provided a stock of rhetoric and ideas for them to apply creatively in their honorific rhetoric.

It is not surprising that no decrees acknowledge or formally quote philosophers’ works: composing an honorary decree was not an exercise in literary, philosophical, or antiquarian composition, but a practical exercise in praise and persuasion, addressed to the whole civic population. Philosophical insights and doctrines thus necessarily had to be introduced in an unobtrusive way. Nonetheless, some drafters found means of indicating to educated, aware fellow citizens or outsiders that they wished to make a philosophical allusion, or to indicate that their or the honorand’s ethical sensibilities lay in one particular philosophical direction. For example, it is striking how often the abstract or programmatic principles discussed in section 3 are introduced by using a participle of a verb of thinking or believing (for example, νομίζων, διαλαβών, or ἱγοϑυμένος) to attribute an ethical attitude to a citizen.

208. See Allen 2006; 2010: esp. Part II.
The wider historical context was ripe in the later Hellenistic period for exchange between poleis and philosophers or philosophical works. On the polis side, the public educational institutions of the polis, especially the gymnasium, became integral to civic identity in the course of the Hellenistic period, even if private education also continued to play an important role. Moreover, it appears that philosophy began to play an increasing role in civic education and civic life in general in the second and first centuries. Most importantly, there are indications of young citizens undertaking their own philosophical activities within polis gymnasia: Melanion engaged in philosophical studies during his training in the Iasian gymnasium, while Polemaios “nourished his soul with learning” at Colophon, a phrase strongly evocative of Hellenistic philosophical emphasis on “care of the soul” (compare sections 3a and c above). At Athens, ephebic training came to include, in the period after c. 122/1 BC, exposure to an eclectic philosophical curriculum. There is not much evidence for the content of gymnasium libraries, which gained new prominence and funding in the later Hellenistic period. A second-century BC Rhodian list of books, which may record the contents of a gymnasium library, includes a work on Athenian constitutional affairs by Demetrius of Phaleron. In the light of the evidence considered in this article, it may well not be coincidental that Demetrius was a famous Peripatetic. The new prominence of philosophical education in poleis partly explains the fact that the early first century BC saw some philosophers take power in their poleis as “tyrants” sympathetic to King Mithridates’ revolt against Rome: the Peripatetic Athenion and the Epicurean Aristion in Athens and the self-proclaimed Academic Diodorus in Adramyttion.

There are also indications of connections in the later Hellenistic period between poleis and foreign philosophers. As discussed in section 3c above, Polemaios of Colophon had studied in the mid-second century BC at Rhodes, probably at least partly at one of the famous philosophical schools there. Moreover, travelling intellectuals gave lectures in poleis which were not major intellectual centers: Menas of Sestos

210. See Kah and Scholz 2004: e.g., P. Scholz’s introduction, 15, 22–24 (summarizing earlier views); Haake 2007: e.g., 55.
211. See Scholz 2004: esp. 103–104.
212. Compare Dreyer 2004: 227–28 and 2010: 354; Haake 2007: 274–75, 281–82. For the view that there was a general broadening of civic educational curricula, to include more intellectual and cultural elements, in the period after c. 200 BC, see Scholz 2004: 110–11.
219. Str. 13.1.66.
had arranged for “educated men” to give lectures in the gymnasium of Sestos. These travelling intellectuals included Peripatetic philosophers. For example, in the early Hellenistic period, Clearchus of Soli was famously active at Ai Khanoum. Around 200 BC, Epikrates of Herakleia was honored by the Samians for his services to the polis, including his free tuition of those unable to pay fees, in an inscription which explicitly identified him as a Peripatetic.

The Samians’ praise for Epikrates heralds a new tendency after c. 200 BC for poleis to praise philosophers specifically for their philosophical teaching and practice. Citizens may have become even more amenable to such rhetoric in the course of the second century. Haake identifies a contrast, suggestive of such a development, between decrees for philosophers from Larissa, dating to c. 170/69 and 130/29 BC respectively. The earlier two decrees (of c. 170/69 BC), for a certain Satyros of Athens, merely identify him as a sympathetic philosopher. By contrast, the later decree (of c. 130/29 BC) explicitly praises a certain Alexander of Athens for responding favorably to a request from gymnasarchs to come to Larissa to teach in the gymnasium and for behaving in a way “appropriate to philosophy” (φιλοσοφίας οἰκείας) while in Larissa, attending to the welfare of the neoi.

As far as the world of high philosophy is concerned, recent studies have revealed the dynamism and complexity of philosophical debate in the later Hellenistic world. There were some moves towards eclecticism and synthesis, but also continuing sharp divisions between (and within) schools, often based on mutual counter-definition. In the debates about ethical philosophy of this period, it is very likely that there was a “practical turn”: a renewed interest in philosophical answers to day-to-day problems of how to live and govern. This may well have reflected and encouraged exchanges between poleis and philosophers. The “practical turn” was probably most starkly reflected in later Hellenistic Stoicism, especially the works of Panaetius and Posidonius: in the second- and first-century BC Stoa there was probably a shift—of emphasis rather than doctrine—towards more interest in the morally imperfect “ordinary man,” rather than the virtuous sage. As Wiemer has recently

225. Haake 2010: 45–46; see the text (p. 40), ll. 12–17.
shown, this development in Stoicism included intensified engagement with the problems and everyday debates of Greek cities, reflected in their epigraphy.  

In addition, Aristotelianism, which had always had a practical focus in ethics, may have been undergoing a renaissance in philosophy. For example, Panaetius himself was said by Cicero to have given more attention than earlier Stoics to the ideas of both Plato and Aristotle. An anecdote in Strabo gives the impression that Aristotle’s works were lost for most of the Hellenistic period, until discovered in a hole in Skepsis in the first century BC. This anecdote, heavy in cultural symbolism, is difficult to trust; it is likely that the exoteric, and perhaps also esoteric, works of Aristotle remained quite widely available. In any case, whatever the fate of Aristotle’s written works, Hellenistic philosophers had sustained Aristotelian ideas in the interim, through both written and oral contributions to debates, and continued to engage with them in the first centuries BC and AD. Those responsible included not only Stoics, but also neo-Pythagoreans. However, the most important defenders and promoters of Aristotelian thinking were, inevitably, the Peripatetics themselves. The Peripatetics may even have gained in prominence in the later Hellenistic period: the second-century BC Peripatetic Critolaus was very successful in developing a significant public and political profile for himself and for the Peripatos. Interestingly for the argument of this paper, the Peripatetic’s public profile was probably based to a significant extent on Peripatetics’ active involvement in rhetorical and philosophical teaching in poleis (compare Epikrates of Herakleia at Samos, mentioned above): Cicero regarded the Peripatetics as leaders in first-century BC rhetorical education.

The rivalry and mutual influence of the Stoics and Peripatetics seem to have played an important role in later Hellenistic and early Imperial ethical discourse. As I explore in another article, that rivalry was probably also entwined with more practical political debates about democracy, property, and power in the first centuries

233. Cic. Fin. 4.79.
234. Johnstone 2014: 375–79. Barnes 1997 suggests that the anecdote may refer only to Aristotle’s own personal copies of his books.
236. See above, on Panaetius.
237. Thesleff (1961: 55) argues that neo-Pythagorean authors of pseudepigraphical works purporting to be works of famous Classical Pythagoreans overlaid Academic ideas with Peripatetic coloring (these were probably works of the Hellenistic and early Imperial periods; compare Centrone 2014). For relevant examples, see Thesleff 1965: 8–11, 40–41 (sections of texts purporting to be by Archytas).
240. Compare Cic. Off. 1.2, 6; also Inwood 2014: 89–90 (on Seneca’s intellectual environment, and his opposition to the Peripatetics).
of Roman control over the Greek world. These Stoic-Peripatetic debates were probably prominent in the higher education and wider public sphere in which the citizens involved in drafting decrees participated, not least as a result of the work of Peripatetic teachers. The pro-Aristotelian instincts, preferences, and beliefs aroused in some citizens by those debates probably then colored citizens’ rhetoric when they set out visions of the good man and the good citizen in honorary decrees.

5. CONCLUSION

Even in the later Hellenistic period, polis citizens were capable of a relatively sophisticated, idealistic articulation of fairly traditional civic republican ethics. Moreover, that articulation was in important respects comparable in subtlety with the complex, distinctive rhetoric and argumentation of Aristotle and his Peripatetic successors. By contrast, later Hellenistic citizens were strikingly oblivious or resistant to the rival political ethics of the Stoics, let alone the anti-politics of the Epicureans or Cynics or the skeptical accommodation to existing society of the New Academy. For example, no Stoic could have given a positive, active role in virtuous activity, comparable with that of reason, to emotion (pathos); identified public-spirited civic activity as a good man’s defining attribute; given an intrinsic role to bodily and external goods, including personal wealth, in the good life; or argued that the polis is the indispensable context for the acquisition and exercise of virtue.

Even if Stoicism was a leading philosophical approach and source of ethical legitimacy and comfort in Hellenistic monarchical courts and among itinerant Hellenistic intellectuals, civic decrees suggest that Stoicism and the underlying assumptions about the soul and the universe which it articulated did not monopolize thinking in poleis. Indeed, the content of later Hellenistic decrees can partly be interpreted as a reaction against tendencies in Hellenistic ethical and political thinking to some extent crystallized, as well as significantly adapted, by the Stoics: in particular, against any tendency to focus on the rational self and to weaken its interdependence with the material world, the physical polis, and fellow citizens.

This conclusion can contribute to ongoing reassessment of the fate of Aristotelian and Aristotelian-style thought in the Hellenistic period. Recent work, mentioned in section 4, has shown that Peripatetic philosophy remained vibrant into the later Hellenistic period and beyond, retaining a strong interest in the central role of the polis in the virtuous life, even while engaging with Stoic cosmopolitanism and universalism. The evidence of honorary decrees shows that, in parallel with this rich Peripatetic activity, citizens still engaged in running poleis in the later Hellenistic period remained committed to a set of ideals very close to those which

242. See, for example, Hahm 2007; Sharples 2010; Inwood 2014; these works partially modify the picture of Annas 1995.
animate Aristotle’s ethical and political works, at the same time as they too made accommodations with a more cosmopolitan world. As argued in section 4, it is quite likely that these two developments influenced each other.

It was far from coincidental that it was an Aristotelian-style defense of the polis, with all relevant psychological and ethical foundations, that gained a grip on the imagination of many Hellenistic citizens, especially in the later Hellenistic period. Later Hellenistic poleis had to deal with external challenges to their autonomy or even existence, as well as internal shortages, inequalities, and conflicts. In response, later Hellenistic citizens looked for comfort, legitimation, and inspiration to a set of ideals that made key to true individual fulfillment a lifestyle which only citizenship in a polis could offer: the life of energetic civic virtue and continuous, lifelong, collaborative ethical development. This was a lifestyle which always aimed at an Aristotelian “mean” between extremes: a harmonious balance of emotion and reason, of worldly and spiritual goods, of utilitarian and cultural pursuits, of individualism and sociability, and of self-assertion and self-denial.

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