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    New paradigms in the psychology of reasoning

    Oaksford, Michael and Chater, N. (2019) New paradigms in the psychology of reasoning. Annual Review of Psychology 71 , pp. 305-330. ISSN 0066-4308.

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    Abstract

    The psychology of verbal reasoning initially compared performance with classical logic. In the last 25 years, a new paradigm has arisen, which focuses on knowledge-rich reasoning for communication and persuasion, and which is typically modelled using Bayesian probability theory rather than logic. This paradigm provides a new perspective on argumentation, explaining the rational persuasiveness of arguments that are logical “fallacies.” It also helps explain how and why people stray from logic when given deductive reasoning tasks. What appear to be errorful responses, when compared against logic, often turn out to be rationally justified when seen in the richer rational framework of the new paradigm. Moreover, the same approach extends naturally to inductive reasoning tasks, where people extrapolate beyond the data they are given, and where logic does not readily apply. We outline links between social and individual reasoning and set recent developments in the psychology of reasoning in the wider context of Bayesian cognitive science.

    Metadata

    Item Type: Article
    Keyword(s) / Subject(s): Reasoning, inference, persuasion, argument, probability, Bayes theorem, logic, world knowledge, non-monotonicity, fallacies
    School: Birkbeck Schools and Departments > School of Science > Psychological Sciences
    Depositing User: Administrator
    Date Deposited: 14 Feb 2019 13:18
    Last Modified: 19 Jan 2020 22:28
    URI: http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/26250

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