Ahlstrom-Vij, Kristoffer (2021) Esoteric Reliabilism. Episteme 18 (4), pp. 603-623. ISSN 1742-3600.
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AhlstromVij-EsotericReliabilism.pdf - Author's Accepted Manuscript Download (349kB) | Preview |
Abstract
Survey data suggest that many philosophers are reliabilists, in believing that beliefs are justified iff produced by a reliable process. This is bad news if reliabilism is true. Empirical results suggest that a commitment to reliable belief-formation leads to overconfident second-guessing of reliable heuristics. Hence, a widespread belief in reliabilism is likely to be epistemically detrimental by the reliabilist’s own standard. The solution is a form of two-level epistemic consequentialism, where an esoteric commitment to reliabilism will be appropriate for an enlightened few, while a form of epistemic fetishism—on which some heuristics are treated as fundamental epistemic norms—is appropriate for the rest of us.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | This is a pre-copyedited, author-produced PDF of an article accepted for publication following peer review. The version of record is available online at the link above. |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij |
| Date Deposited: | 17 Oct 2019 05:57 |
| Last Modified: | 08 Aug 2025 08:04 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/29397 |
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