Teleological reasoning in infancy: the naı̈ve theory of rational action

Gergely, G. and Csibra, Gergely (2003) Teleological reasoning in infancy: the naı̈ve theory of rational action. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 7 (7), pp. 287-292. ISSN 1364-6613.

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Official URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/S1364-6613(03)00128-1

Abstract

Converging evidence demonstrates that one-year-olds interpret and draw inferences about other's goal-directed actions. We contrast alternative theories about how this early competence relates to our ability to attribute mental states to others. We propose that one-year-olds apply a non-mentalistic interpretational system, the ’teleological stance’ to represent actions by relating relevant aspects of reality (action, goal-state and situational constraints) through the principle of rational action, which assumes that actions function to realize goal-states by the most efficient means available. We argue that this early inferential principle is identical to the rationality principle of the mentalistic stance – a representational system that develops later to guide inferences about mental states.

Metadata

Item Type:	Article
School:	Birkbeck Schools and Departments > School of Science > Psychological Sciences
Depositing User:	Sarah Hall
Date Deposited:	15 Oct 2019 14:33
Last Modified:	15 Oct 2019 14:33
URI:	http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/29501

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