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    The effect of corporate governance on the performance of US investment banks

    Mamatzakis, Emmanuel and Bermpei, T. (2015) The effect of corporate governance on the performance of US investment banks. Financial Markets, Institutions & Instruments 24 (2-3), pp. 191-239. ISSN 0963-8008.

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    Abstract

    This paper focuses on the impact of the corporate governance, using a plethora of measures, on the performance of the US investment banks over the 2000–2012 period. This time period offers a unique set of information, related to the credit crunch, that we model using a dynamic panel threshold analysis to reveal new insights into the relationship between corporate governance and bank performance. Results show that the board size asserts a negative effect on performance consistent with the ‘agency cost’ hypothesis, particularly for banks with board size higher than ten members. Threshold analysis reveals that in the post‐crisis period most of investment banks opt for boards with less than ten members, aiming to decrease agency conflicts that large boards suffer from. We also find a negative association between the operational complexity and performance. Moreover, the CEO power asserts a positive effect on performance consistent with the ‘stewardship’ hypothesis. In addition, an increase in the bank ownership held by the board has a negative impact on performance for banks below a certain threshold. On the other hand, for banks with board ownership above the threshold value this effect turns positive, indicating an alignment between shareholders’ and managers’ incentives.

    Metadata

    Item Type: Article
    Additional Information: This is the peer reviewed version of the article, which has been published in final form at the link above. This article may be used for non-commercial purposes in accordance with Wiley Terms and Conditions for Self-Archiving.
    School: Birkbeck Schools and Departments > School of Business, Economics & Informatics > Management
    Divisions > Birkbeck Schools and Departments > School of Business, Economics & Informatics > Management
    Depositing User: Emmanuel Mamatzakis
    Date Deposited: 06 Mar 2020 06:17
    Last Modified: 25 Jun 2020 21:11
    URI: http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/30871

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