BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online

    Does it pay to acquire private firms? Evidence from the U.S. banking industry

    Leledakis, G.N. and Mamatzakis, Emmanuel and Pyrgiotakis, E.G. and Travlos, N.G. (2020) Does it pay to acquire private firms? Evidence from the U.S. banking industry. Working Paper. Birkbeck, University of London, London, UK.

    [img]
    Preview
    Text
    31781.pdf - Published Version of Record

    Download (519kB) | Preview

    Abstract

    We extend the U.S. bank M&As literature by examining bidder announcement abnormal returns in deals involving both public and private targets over a 32-years examination period. Our main findings document the existence of a listing effect in our sample. Banks gain when they acquire private firms and lose when they acquire public firms. Gains in private offers are even higher when bidders employ financial advisors, whereas the opposite is true for public deals. We argue that this adverse advisor effect relates to the different levels of information asymmetry between public and private targets. Our results remain robust when we control for usual determinants of bidder abnormal returns, such as the method of payment, size, or relative size and when we control for sample selection and endogeneity problems.

    Metadata

    Item Type: Monograph (Working Paper)
    Additional Information: AFRC Working Paper Series
    Keyword(s) / Subject(s): Mergers and Acquisitions, Banks, Listing Effect, Financial Advisor.
    School: Birkbeck Schools and Departments > School of Business, Economics & Informatics > Management
    Research Centres and Institutes: Innovation Management Research, Birkbeck Centre for
    Depositing User: Administrator
    Date Deposited: 28 Apr 2020 14:32
    Last Modified: 29 Jun 2020 19:39
    URI: http://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/31781

    Statistics

    Downloads
    Activity Overview
    20Downloads
    46Hits

    Additional statistics are available via IRStats2.

    Archive Staff Only (login required)

    Edit/View Item Edit/View Item