Vance, James and Oaksford, Mike (2021) Explaining the implicit negations effect in conditional inference: experience, probabilities and contrast Sets. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 150 (2), pp. 354-384. ISSN 0096-3445.
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Abstract
Psychologists are beginning to uncover the rational basis for many of the biases revealed over the last 50 years in deductive and causal reasoning, judgement and decision-making. In this paper, it is argued that a manipulation, experiential learning, shown to be effective in judgement and decision-making may elucidate the rational underpinning of the implicit negation effect in conditional inference. In three experiments, this effect was created and removed by using probabilistically structured contrast sets acquired during a brief learning phase. No other theory of the implicit negations effect predicts these results, which can be modelled using Bayes nets as in causal approaches to category structure. It is also shown how these results relate to a recent development in the psychology of reasoning called “inferentialism.” It is concluded that many of the same cognitive mechanisms that underpin causal reasoning, judgement and decision-making may be common to logical reasoning, which may require no special purpose machinery or module.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | Polarity biases, negations, experiential learning, reasoning biases, new 27 paradigm, causal Bayes nets, inferentialism |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Science > School of Psychological Sciences |
| Depositing User: | Administrator |
| Date Deposited: | 18 Jun 2020 07:30 |
| Last Modified: | 11 Aug 2025 00:45 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/32295 |
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