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title: "The Emergence of Threat Infrastructures: Plan S and Behavioral Change"
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# Defining Threat Infrastructures
‘Threat infrastructures’ are platforms that are established or promised to be established solely or primarily in order to change the behavior of incumbent initiatives through fear. In recent years, such platforms have featured heavily in the scholarly communications landscape and have been driven primarily by funders pushing for open access. Examples include The Wellcome Trust’s _Wellcome Open Research_, the Gates Foundation’s _Gates Open Research_, and the European Commission’s _Open Research Europe_. Threat infrastructures are also a core mechanisms within cOAlition S’s ‘Plan S’ document (cOAlition S, 2018).

Such threat infrastructures are part of an encroaching structure of ‘platformization’, as Penny C. Andrews has it (2020) in the field of platform studies (Bogost & Montfort, 2009; Schweizer, 2010; van Dijck, 2013), in which the control of underlying infrastructures is becoming ever more important in the scholarly communications world. In this piece I outline why this framing of threat infrastructures is helpful; I document some recent cases of the development and use of threat infrastructures; I show the challenges of infrastructural governance and corporate ownership of such platforms; and I close with some remarks on the efficacy of a theory of change driven by such threats.

It is important to note up front that threat infrastructures are _not_ simply potentially disruptive and innovative new platforms with features that _may_ threaten incumbents. There are matters of _intent_ inherent in ascertaining whether a platform is a threat infrastructure. A threat infrastructure either must have an explicit declaration of ultimatum _or_ it must be established at a scale that means that it is unlikely to achieve market dominance, but instead acts in concert with other mechanisms – such as researcher-directed funding mandates – as a lever to negatively prompt behavioral change.

The Public Library of Science (PLOS) for instance, is a good example of an organisation that threatens, but that is not a threat infrastructure. PLOS was established, both reactively and radically, out of frustration with many elements of the scholarly communications ecosystem. For instance, board members were angered by aspects of conventional peer review. As Catriona J. MacCallum put it, ‘[t]he basis for such decisions’ in peer review ‘is inevitably subjective. The higher-profile science journals are consequently often accused of “lottery reviewing,” a charge now aimed increasingly at the more specialist literature as well. Even after review, papers that are technically sound are often rejected on the basis of lack of novelty or advance’ (2006). PLOS saw a problem and thought that they could fix it. To do so, they established their journal _PLOS ONE_ in 2006 on the radical (Giles, 2007; The Editors of The New Atlantis, 2006) idea of ‘technical soundness’ in which papers are judged on whether their methods and procedures are scientifically solid, rather than on whether their results are thought to be important (PLOS, 2016; Poynder, 2011, pp. 25–26 notes that there is a subjectivity involved in such appraisals anyway, though).

In many ways, PLOS and _PLOS ONE_ look threatening. The radicalism of their proposal – in which ‘peer review doesn't, and shouldn't, stop’ at publication (Spezi et al., 2018) – carries many dangers for incumbent players. Among these, primarily, is the fact that PLOS’s peer review model is also a revenue model; by publishing more material, under an article processing charge (APC) system, the organization found a way to monetize open access in ways that were not possible for highly selective venues (Poynder, 2011, p. 11). Questions incumbents might ask could include: will such a practice become the norm? Will our own economic model hold up in competition to this?

PLOS is also, in some ways, an infrastructure. Its new modalities of peer review were driven by technological possibility, rather than just by social change. This was an area ‘where the increasing sophistication of web-based tools [could] begin to play a part’ and PLOS’s new partnership with the TOPAZ platform at the time drove their implementation of post-publication review (MacCallum, 2006). ‘We have barely begun’, wrote the Founders of PLOS, ‘to realize the potential of this technological change’ (P. O. Brown et al., 2003).

Yet PLOS is not really a threat infrastructure. Its purpose in adopting new modes of review and of radical open access was not in order to persuade everyone else that they should do likewise and thereby survive. It was, instead, to become a – or even, the – major player in the new open access scholarly communications landscape and to capitalize on new technological possibilities: ‘We founded the Public Library of Science three years ago to work toward realizing these opportunities’ (P. O. Brown et al., 2003). PLOS was not interested in whether Nature, Cell and Science wanted to change to survive: ‘Most science is not’, as they put it after all, ‘published in _Science_, _Nature_, _Cell_, or even _PLoS Biology_’ (MacCallum, 2006). It was happy for these other entities to die should its new theories bear out and was not interested in preserving them by showing them how to change. Further, PLOS was well funded to the tune of a nine-million dollar grant from the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, ‘allowing PLoS to make all published works immediately available online, with no charges for access or restrictions on subsequent redistribution or use’ (Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, 2002). This was a level of investment above and beyond a minimum viable demonstration or sideshow enterprise. PLOS may threaten incumbents, but changing their behaviour was not its goal. Thus, not all infrastructures that threaten are threat infrastructures.

As will become apparent, assessing whether platforms constitute threat infrastructures is an important and useful exercise because it intersects with the complex market environment of scholarly publishing. The emergence of threat infrastructures reflects a new understanding of the limits of financial market pressure on incumbent players but also intersects with governmental mantras of supposed non-interference in market dynamics. The use of threat infrastructures in current practice shows both a new level of frustration from those who pay for the dissemination of research work but also reveals concessions about the possibility of radical change within the system.

# ‘Plan S’ and the Birth of Threat Infrastructures
Threat infrastructures are not necessarily specific to scholarly communications. However, there are few domains of practice that are as confused in terms of market pressure as scholarly and research publication cultures and this leads to an environment ripe for the emergence of threat infrastructures. That scholars are shielded from price sensitivity while acting as both suppliers and as proxy purchasers through library budgets – and wanting different outcomes in each case (prestige in the former, read access in the latter) – makes for a tangled web (Eve, 2014, Chapter 2; Suber, 2010). It is a world where funders tread carefully around their grantees, even while footing the bills for their research publications. Incumbent publishers thus hold a great deal of power. They also hold a great deal of the scholarly and research record under copyright and will do so for many decades to come. As the majority of academic articles are signed over on copyright transfer to publishers, it is not only access to the future that is at stake, but the ability to read the past record. Incumbent publishers hold many cards.

What happens, though, when those paying for publication become frustrated with the processes and social conservatism of the academy? In 2018, Science Europe announced the launch of the ‘Plan S’ initiative. The Plan is designed to accelerate the transition towards open access and is supported and endorsed by a coalition of funders, worldwide, including the Austrian Science Fund, the Academy of Finland, the Agence Nationale de la Recherche in France, Science Foundation Ireland, Italy’s Istituto Nazionale di Fisica Nucleare, the Luxembourger National Research Fund, the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research, the Research Council of Norway, the Polish National Science Centre, the Slovenian Research Agency, the Swedish Research Council for Sustainable Development;, the Swedish Research Council for Health, Working Life and Welfare;, Vinnova, the Higher Council for Science and Technology in Jordan, United Kingdom Research and Innovation; the Wellcome Trust, the Gates Foundation, Aligning Science Against Parkinsons, the European Commission, and the World Health Organization.

‘Plan S’ – presumably named after the last initials of its first architects, Robert-Jan Smits and Marc Schiltz (rather than there being 18 other previous plans) – consists of ten principles to which researchers and publishers must adhere if they receive funding from a supporting organization:

1. ‘Authors or their institutions retain copyright to their publications’ and ‘All publications must be published under an open license, preferably the Creative Commons Attribution license (CC BY), in order to fulfil the requirements defined by the Berlin Declaration’;
2. ‘Funders will develop robust criteria and requirements for the services that high-quality Open Access journals, Open Access platforms, and Open Access repositories must provide’;
3. ‘In cases where high-quality Open Access journals or platforms do not yet exist, the Funders will, in a coordinated way, provide incentives to establish and support them when appropriate; support will also be provided for Open Access infrastructures where necessary’;
4. ‘Where applicable, Open Access publication fees are covered by the Funders or research institutions, not by individual researchers; it is acknowledged that all researchers should be able to publish their work Open Access’;
5. ‘The Funders support the diversity of business models for Open Access journals and platforms. When Open Access publication fees are applied, they must be commensurate with the publication services delivered and the structure of such fees must be transparent to inform the market and funders potential standardisation and capping of payments of fees’;
6. ‘The Funders encourage governments, universities, research organisations, libraries, academies, and learned societies to align their strategies, policies, and practices, notably to ensure transparency’;
7. ‘The above principles shall apply to all types of scholarly publications, but it is understood that the timeline to achieve Open Access for monographs and book chapters will be longer and requires a separate and due process’;
8. ‘The Funders do not support the ‘hybrid’ model of publishing. However, as a transitional pathway towards full Open Access within a clearly defined timeframe, and only as part of transformative arrangements, Funders may contribute to financially supporting such arrangements’;
9. ‘The Funders will monitor compliance and sanction non-compliant beneficiaries/grantees’;
10. ‘The Funders commit that when assessing research outputs during funding decisions they will value the intrinsic merit of the work and not consider the publication channel, its impact factor (or other journal metrics), or the publisher’.

Point three in this list explicitly establishes a set of threat infrastructures: ‘In cases where high-quality Open Access journals or platforms do not yet exist, the Funders will, in a coordinated way, provide incentives to establish and support them when appropriate; support will also be provided for Open Access infrastructures where necessary’.

The framing here is one of market gap and stimulation. The establishment of new infrastructures is mandated ‘in cases where high-quality Open Access journals or platforms do not yet exist’, despite the fact that much of Plan S focuses on the need for a transition towards open-access titles. In other words, the only viable situation under which such journals or platforms might not ‘yet’ exist would be in instances of publisher refusal to transition. Indeed, the use of the term ‘yet’ also re-enforces the time-limit threat of Plan S, stressing the urgency. For at what point is the ‘yet’ to be evaluated, but _now_, in the present?

The clause stipulates that ‘where necessary’ the funders will ‘provide incentives to establish and support’ open-access journals and platforms ‘when appropriate’. It notes further that ‘support will also be provided for Open Access infrastructures’. There are many caveats to these clauses. How will it be determined whether it is ‘necessary’ to support ‘Open Access infrastructures’? Who will say when it is ‘appropriate’ to support new journals and platforms? What does it mean to ‘provide incentives’ to setup these platforms, as opposed to setting them up oneself? To what agent does the Plan here gesture?

First, let me tackle the distinction in Plan S’s rhetoric between open-access journals and platforms and ‘Open Access infrastructures’. Although I would contend that journals and platforms, in particular the latter, should be considered infrastructures, in the Plan S context, infrastructures appears to refer to broader, supporting, non-publishing platforms. Examples might include the Directory of Open Access Journals and the Directory of Open Access Books, SHERPA/RoMEO, and the distributed system of institutional and subject repositories that enable green open access (Browse by country and region, n.d.; Directory of Open Access Journals, n.d.; Harnad, n.d.; Jisc, n.d.). These infrastructures are widely relied upon in institutional contexts, mostly for the monitoring of open-access funder compliance (an aspect of practice that has come under concerted critique from some commentators (see, for instance, Lawson, 2019)). Other initiatives such as The Global Sustainability Coalition for Open Science Services (SCOSS) have also proposed mechanisms to financially support such underlying infrastructures (2019).

These are not the threat infrastructures, though. It is instead the coordinated establishment of new open-access journals or platforms that constitute this component. It is notable that the wording of the Plan specifies that funders will only ‘provide incentives to establish and support them when appropriate’, rather than stating that they will ‘establish and support them when appropriate’. This does not seem to be the case of what has actually happened in practice.

# Existing Threat Infrastructures
The two most prominent examples of threat infrastructures that have actually been created come from two Plan S signatory organisations: the Wellcome Trust and the Gates Foundation. Both of these entities has established its own Plan-S compliant output venues for their grantees, using the underlying software platform built by F1000. In addition to being fully gold open access, with no publication fees for grantees, these platforms also feature a host of technological innovations of the type touted by PLOS over a decade ago: post-publication peer-review, for instance, being just the most prominent of these.

The extent to which one might call the establishment of these platforms ‘coordinated’ is questionable, but the infrastructures also pre-date Plan S itself. What is more interesting is the way in which these entities have moved much more directly to ‘establish’ rather than to ‘provide incentives to establish’ such infrastructures. The reasoning behind this must be explained by the fact that cOAlition S is a broad church that consists not only of private charitable and philanthropic funders, but also national-level, government-funded entities. The wording of Plan S is designed to accommodate a multiplicity of actors, all behaving under different sets of constraining circumstances with respect to their ability to ‘interfere’ in the scholarly communications market. (Broadly speaking, these constraints can be framed within various discourses of ‘neoliberalism’ and the understandings of the supervisory relationships, and their inversions, between states and markets (W. Brown, 2015, 2019; Davies, 2014; Gane, 2013, 2018; Zamora, 2015).) While private actors may feel no compunction at disrupting existing markets in pursuit of their own goals, governmental funders may find themselves in breach of state aid rules if they establish their own rival platforms or do not open a full tendering process for any new platform.

This explains the commissioning/tender process for Open Research Europe (ORE) (European Commission, DG Research and Innovation (RTD), 2018). This tender was a clear instance of a funder calling for the establishment of a new platform, but not being able to do the work themselves, in house. It was an example of providing ‘incentives’ (read: funding) ‘to establish’ a threat infrastructure.

Yet this call was also highly unrealistic in its technical demands. In requiring that ‘[t]he technological solution shall deliver the services described in the present tender specifications without noticeable delay for all categories of users continually and with 99.999% per year uptime’, the European Commission asked for a higher level of uptime than is guaranteed by Amazon, stating that the platform should not be offline for more than five minutes per year. The Commission also required, in the tender, that the winning supplier ‘[d]ocument the business model (processes, actors and costs) of the operation of the Platform as a publishing service as part of the sustainability deliverables’. In other words, at the same time as being the establishment of a platform, the ORE platform was also viewed as a research project into sustainability of such threat infrastructures.

Most interestingly, the tender for this project – which had to be readvertised after the first round was not awarded – nonetheless restricted itself to large, already-existing commercial entities: ‘[t]he annual turnover of the last two financial years must be above EUR 1 000 000; this criterion applies to the tenderer as a whole, i.e. the combined capacity of all members of a group in case of a joint tender’. Put otherwise, it was not possible for small, young startups to apply for this tender. The threat infrastructure was to be established by a large, extant market player with a substantial revenue base. The other flaw in this process, though, was that the finances were not well budgeted. The tender called for the following staffing: ‘Profile 1: a project/business manager (over ten years of experience) in relevant services, with experience in open access publishing; Profile 2: handling editors (senior, over 5 years of experience and junior, between 2-5 years of experience); Profile 3: certified IT developers and IT support (senior and junior, as above); Profile 4: certified software engineer (at least 2 years of experience); Profile 5: metadata specialist/librarian (at least 2 years of experience); Profile 6: communications experts (senior and junior, as above)’ but ‘[a]n indicative estimation of the cost of these tasks is 1 000 000 euros for the duration of the Framework Contract, i.e. for 4 (four) years’.

For a platform supposed to handle 5,600 articles per year that is only allowed 5 minutes of downtime, this yields just 250,000 euros per year for project management, business staff, technological staff, and communications staff. A good member of technical staff who could deliver on the uptime requirements will cost at least 70,000 euros per year. If there were two, this would leave just 110,000 euros left per year to develop the business models (marketing + management), to handle the heavy reporting on the project, to oversee the entire operation, to conduct the communications campaign, to file accounts, to handle legal, and so on.

Finally, though, for this consideration of ORE, that the organisation involved was expected to develop a fully fledged business model, after the initial funding period, exemplifies the Plan S directive to give incentives to create, rather than directly to create, threat infrastructures. In the cases of Wellcome and Gates, for example, the business model is clear: the Foundations will pay the costs per article. In the case of national funders under current market-based governmental reasoning in Europe and the US, the incentives to create new threat infrastructures is intended to lead to ongoing third-party organisations running new commercially viable platforms.

# Neutralizing the Plan S Threat Infrastructures

In January 2020, F1000, the current provider of threat infrastructure platforms, was bought by Taylor & Francis (Page, 2020). In many ways, this seems perfectly in line with the external market economy of providers that the underlying logic of threat infrastructures supposes. In one important way, though, this buyout demonstrates the problematic nature of incentivizing external for-profit providers to create and maintain policy enhancing threat infrastructures.

What is actually happening here is that Taylor &  Francis is neutralizing the threat of Plan S for itself. As a result of owning the threat infrastructures, Taylor & Francis is now able to profit even if it does not act to convert its current roster of hybrid titles to pure gold, as Plan S demands. This is a de-risking strategy for the organization that allows it to profit in either circumstance. For, surely, Taylor & Francis was one of the institutions that was meant to feel threatened by the threat infrastructures. A large commercial player in the scholarly communications space that has been relatively slow to convert titles to full gold OA, the very idea behind the threat infrastructures was a financial threat of losing authors and readers to a new infrastructure. What does it then mean when the organisation that is meant to be threatened owns the threat and can profit from that? It means that the financial threat no longer exists.

Does this advance the goals of Plan S? In at least one sense, it does. The new infrastructures that fulfil the criteria exist and, if the Plan works, researchers will end up using it if other titles do not convert. If the goal, however, is to transition the _existing_ structure to one of widespread, pure, non-hybrid OA, then the situation is more complex. For this acquisition puts pressure on Taylor & Francis’s competitors to convert to pure gold or zero-embargo green to comply with Plan S. Other publishers will not want their researchers turning to the threat infrastructures thereby boosting their competitor’s revenues. While others could establish their own new threat infrastructure-like venues, the difference for the Taylor & Francis acquisition is that the extant platforms that they have purchased come with funder-associated prestige that is extremely difficult and time consuming to build if a competitor started a new Plan S-compliant title from scratch.

# Conclusions
The term threat infrastructures yields to us a new way of conceptualising theories of change in the contemporary scholarly communications environment. Instead of conceiving of new platforms as market competitors in the more traditional sense, these new threat infrastructures work particularly well in scholarly communications spaces where it is important to change the behaviour of incumbents. This is not to say that everyone is thinking in this vein. Steven Hill, of Research England, recently wrote that he ‘I struggle[s] to see how’ a transformation away from journal-based publishing ‘could ever be the result of incremental change from the current system. The strength of journal brand is just too strong and pervasive. The only option is radical and change that is potentially destabilising, at least in the short term’ (Hill, 2020). Yet within the context of Plan S as of 2020, driving change among incumbent entities appears to remain a priority.

We have also seen, though, how threat infrastructures can be neutralized by corporate buyout and acquisition. This is why so much emphasis has been placed in recent days on ‘the importance of experimenting with and promoting new forms of communality in not-for-profit OA publishing’ (Adema & Moore, 2018). Indeed, while the purchase of bepress by Elsevier caused enormous concern for libraries, that acquisition had a very different corporate effect and target goal to the direct acquisition of threat infrastructures seen in the recent Taylor & Francis buyout (Fitzpatrick, 2020). Governance of threat infrastructures needs to remain controllable by the organizations stimulating their development, for when they fall into the hands of those who are supposed to be threatened, the new models cease to be a problem for those entities.

Of course, this leaves us in a curious position with respect to Plan S. It could be, of course, that the Planners at the cOAlition simply do not care that their threat infrastructures are owned by the same players who have been slow with their pure gold OA uptake. After all, now Taylor & Francis has a venue and a platform that fulfils all the Plan S criteria and Plan S-funded authors will simply have to use these platforms. Perhaps everyone is a winner. But this could also be the way that such organizations successfully stratify their list, with a Plan S venue for those constrained by such mandates, their existing titles still maintained and requiring subscriptions to continue outside this walled garden, and all the while avoiding any risk from the Plan’s purported threat.

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