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    How fundamental is the fundamental assumption?

    Kurbis, Nils (2012) How fundamental is the fundamental assumption? Teorema 31 (2), pp. 5-19. ISSN 0210-1602.

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    The fundamental assumption of Dummett’s and Prawitz’ proof-theoretic justification of deduction is that ‘if we have a valid argument for a complex statement, we can construct a valid argument for it which finishes with an application of one of the introduction rules governing its principal operator’. I argue that the assumption is flawed in this general version, but should be restricted, not to apply to arguments in general, but only to proofs. I also argue that Dummett’s and Prawitz’ project of providing a logical basis for metaphysics only relies on the restricted assumption.


    Item Type: Article
    Keyword(s) / Subject(s): proof-theoretic semantics, Michael Dummett, Dag Prawitz, verificationist theories of meaning, realism vs. anti-realism
    School: School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy > Philosophy
    Depositing User: Sarah Hall
    Date Deposited: 20 Nov 2014 11:57
    Last Modified: 11 Jun 2021 08:22


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