BIROn - Birkbeck Institutional Research Online

    There is more to a paradox than credence

    Darby, George and Landes, J. (2014) There is more to a paradox than credence. Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (2), pp. 99-109. ISSN 2161-2234.

    Full text not available from this repository.


    Besides the usual business of solving paradoxes, there has been recent philosophical work on their essential nature. Lycan characterises a paradox as “an inconsistent set of propositions, each of which is very plausible.” Building on this definition, Paseau offers a numerical measure of paradoxicality of a set of principles: a function of the degrees to which a subject believes the principles considered individually (all typically high) and of the degree to which the subject believes the principles considered together (typically low). We argue (a) that Paseau's measure fails to score certain paradoxes properly and (b) that this failure is not due to the particular measure but rather that any such function just of credences fails to adequately capture paradoxicality. Our analysis leads us to conclude that Lycan's definition also fails to capture the notion of paradox.


    Item Type: Article
    Keyword(s) / Subject(s): paradox, measure, credence
    School: School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy > Philosophy
    Depositing User: Administrator
    Date Deposited: 20 Nov 2014 12:21
    Last Modified: 20 Nov 2014 12:21


    Activity Overview

    Additional statistics are available via IRStats2.

    Archive Staff Only (login required)

    Edit/View Item Edit/View Item