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    Is logical knowledge dispositional?

    Steinberger, Florian and Murzi, J. (2013) Is logical knowledge dispositional? Philosophical Studies 166 (1), pp. 165-183. ISSN 0031-8116.

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    Abstract

    In a series of recent papers, Corine Besson argues that dispositionalist accounts of logical knowledge conflict with ordinary reasoning. She cites cases in which, rather than applying a logical principle to deduce certain implications of our antecedent beliefs, we revise some of those beliefs in the light of their unpalatable consequences. She argues that such instances of, in Gilbert Harman’s phrase, ‘reasoned change in view’ cannot be accommodated by the dispositionalist approach, and that we would do well to conceive of logical knowledge as a species of propositional knowledge instead. In this paper, we propose a dispositional account that is more general than the one Besson considers, viz. one that does not merely apply to beliefs, and claim that dispositionalists have the resources to account for reasoned change in view. We then raise what we take to be more serious challenges for the dispositionalist view, and sketch some lines of response dispositionalists might offer.

    Metadata

    Item Type: Article
    Keyword(s) / Subject(s): logical knowledge, change in view, dispositions, blameless but blind reasoning, propositional knowledge
    School: School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy > Philosophy
    Depositing User: Sarah Hall
    Date Deposited: 25 Nov 2014 11:17
    Last Modified: 25 Nov 2014 11:19
    URI: https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/11107

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