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    Property dualism, epistemic normativity and the limits of Naturalism

    Onof, Chris (2008) Property dualism, epistemic normativity and the limits of Naturalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (1), pp. 60-85. ISSN 0031-8205.

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    Abstract

    This paper examines some consequences of the (quasi-) epiphenomenalism implied by a property dualistic view of phenomenal consciousness. The focus is upon the variation of phenomenal content over time. A thought-experiment is constructed to support two claims. The weaker claim exhibits an incompatibility which arises in certain logically possible situations between a conscious subject’s epistemic norms and the requirement that one be aware of one’s conscious experience. This could be interpreted as providing some epistemic grounds for the postulation of bridging laws between the physical/functional and phenomenal domains. The stronger claim has it that the ontology of property dualism is not properly able to account for the certainty I have of being phenomenally conscious. The problem is viewed as resulting from the neglect of the intensional context involved in a proper representation of the argument for property dualism. It is argued that only a transcendental move can do justice to this certainty I have.

    Metadata

    Item Type: Article
    School: School of Social Sciences, History and Philosophy > Philosophy
    Depositing User: Sarah Hall
    Date Deposited: 02 Dec 2014 16:29
    Last Modified: 02 Dec 2014 16:29
    URI: https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/11217

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