Lillehammer, Hallvard (2017) The nature and ethics of indifference. The Journal of Ethics 21 (1), pp. 17-35. ISSN 1382-4554.
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Abstract
Indifference is sometimes said to be a virtue. Perhaps more frequently it is said to be a vice. Yet who is indifferent; to what; and in what way is poorly understood, and frequently subject to controversy and confusion. This paper presents a framework for the interpretation and analysis of ethically significant forms of indifference in terms of how subjects of indifference are variously related to their objects in different circumstances; and how an indifferent orientation can be either more or less dynamic, or more or less sensitive to the nature and state of its object. The resulting analysis is located in a wider context of moral psychology and ethical theory; in particular with respect to work on the virtues of care, empathy and other forms of affective engagement. During the course of this discussion, a number of recent claims associated with the ethics of care and empathy are shown to be either misleading or implausible.
Metadata
| Item Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Additional Information: | The final publication is available at Springer via http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10892-016-9215-z |
| Keyword(s) / Subject(s): | INDIFFERENCE, DETACHMENT, VIRTUE, VICE, CARE, EMPATHY |
| School: | Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences > School of Historical Studies |
| Depositing User: | Hallvard Lillehammer |
| Date Deposited: | 19 Apr 2016 10:05 |
| Last Modified: | 17 Jul 2025 04:24 |
| URI: | https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/14497 |
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