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Common mechanisms in intelligence and development: A study of ability profiles in mental age-matched primary school children

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ABSTRACT

Background and aims: We examine the relationship between individual differences and cognitive development in order to address the question of whether variability in each might be due to common mechanisms. In two experiments, we compare the cognitive profiles of groups of younger and older children matched on overall mental age (MA) using standard tests of intelligence (British Abilities Scales-II; BAS-II, and Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, 3rd edition; WISC-III).

Results: In both experiments, MANOVAs revealed few differences in the profiles of younger and older MA-matched children. In Experiment 1, no reliable differences were found on the six BAS-II core scales, and only one group difference was found on the supplementary, Speed of Processing diagnostic test, where the older children outperformed the younger children. In Experiment 2, analyses of the 10 core scales of the WISC-III revealed two group differences. These were on Coding, where the younger children’s performance was superior to the older children, and on Arithmetic, where the older children outperformed the younger children.

Conclusions: The degree of similarity between cognitive profiles of younger and older MA-matched groups suggests that a common mechanism may indeed underlie variability in individual differences and development. The findings further suggest that children of different ages, who are of the same overall ability level, are at the same developmental and intellectual level. However, further research is needed to determine just how similar ability-matched children remain over the course of development.

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1. Introduction

Is being more intelligent like having more development? Or, are the two things different? If one took a group of children, varying in chronological ages but matched on overall mental age, would they be found to be equivalent in their thinking? Or, would, for example, the younger children show advantages over the older children on some tests, and the older children show advantages over the younger children on other tests of abilities? These questions have relevance both at practical (e.g., educational) and theoretical levels. However, in part because they have been studied separately, intelligence and cognitive development have been conceptualized as separate forms of cognitive variability, with separate causal accounts of their underlying mechanisms. Within intelligence research, the emphasis has long been on quantifying the abilities of large numbers of individuals of the same age (here, the term psychometrics is often used). The focus of this approach is primarily on measuring within-age individual variability. By contrast, the field of cognitive development has focused on attempting to understand the processes underlying age-related changes in ability. That is, the central interest within this approach is explaining how variability emerges between-ages for the average child.

While descriptions of various candidate mechanisms have been offered at both the brain level (see e.g., Andreasen et al., 1993; Deary & Caryl, 1997; Geake & Hansen, 2005; Haier, Jung, Yeo, Head, & Alkire, 2004; Mabbott, Noseworthy, Bouffet, Laughlin, & Rockel, 2006; Posthuma et al., 2002; Szameitat, Schubert, Muller, & von Cramon, 2002) and the genetic level (see e.g., Plomin, DeFries, & McCallern, 2008; Posthuma & de Geus, 2006), it is the convergence of these descriptions at the cognitive level that motivates the current study. Additionally, given the divergence in paths taken to the study of intelligence and development, it is noteworthy that within their separate literatures, theoretical accounts bear several similarities with regard to the
mechanisms held to underlie variability. For example, at the cognitive level, within the literature on intelligence, one can find causal accounts for single mechanisms such as speed of processing (e.g. Anderson, 1992, 1998; Burns, Nettelbeck, & Cooper, 1999; Jensen, 1993; Nettelbeck, 1987, Wright et al., 2001), inhibition (e.g., Dempster, 1991), capacity (see e.g., Ackerman, Beier, & Boyle, 2005; Jensen, 1998) and complexity (Halford, 1999). Similarly, within the literature on cognitive development, one can also find descriptions of speed of processing (e.g. Hale, 1990, Kail, 1996, Nettelbeck, 1987, Wellman & Gelman, 1992), inhibition (Houdé, 2000), capacity (e.g., Jensen, 1998) and complexity (Halford, 1999). This raises the question of whether, for example, the speed of processing mechanism referred to within the literature on intelligence is the same mechanism that has been described in the literature on development. If so, differences in intelligence and differences in cognitive development may be explained by variability on a single dimension — a proposal Davis and Anderson referred to as the ‘uni-dimensional hypothesis’ (see Davis & Anderson, 1999, 2001).

It is also timely to address the question of the relationship between intelligence and development for practical reasons. For example, there has been growing interest within the educational setting concerning plans to adopt strategies to teach children in classes based on ability and not age (Ong, Allison, & Haladyna, 2000; Paton, 2008; Tomlinson, 2012; Ungoed-Thomas, 2005). This involves that curricula be designed so that in each of the core subjects (i.e., English, mathematics, science and history) classes are taught to children of a variety of ages, but who share similar overall levels of cognitive ability. Thus, within the ‘ability not age’ approach, one might find, at primary school level for example, classes of 6-year-olds through to 10-year-olds being taught together.

Proponents of the view that younger, more able and older, less able children are equivalent in their learning needs might be expected to argue that intelligence and cognitive development constitute variation on the same dimension. However, empirical support for this view is lacking. Indeed, it directly contradicts one crucial piece of foundational research carried out by Merrill (1924); later reviewed by Spitz (1982) in which a mental age (MA) matching design was used to examine the abilities of children of different chronological ages (CA). Using the Stanford–Binet test (Binet, 1916), Merrill showed that groups of younger, more able children and older, less able children arrived at their overall similar level of ability via different strengths and weaknesses on the variety of sub-tests comprising the Stanford–Binet. We present these findings shortly. However, the key point is that if differences in intelligence and cognitive development are caused by variability to a single common mechanism, then we might expect there to be no differences in the performance profiles of the two groups on any of the sub-tests: age differences would be compensated for by intelligence in the younger group, and differences in intelligence would be compensated for by age in the older group. Fig. 1 presents a comparison between Merrill’s younger (n = 15, mean CA = 5.5 years) and older (n = 54, mean CA = 11.9 years) groups, on 11 sub-tests within the Stanford–Binet (Binet, 1916). The two groups were matched on an overall mean mental age of 8.0 years. On the y-axis, tasks are divided according to the age-level for which they were intended (i.e., the categories VII, VIII and IX contain the tests typically suited for 7, 8 and 9 year olds, respectively). On the x-axis, bars represent reliable differences in percentage points between younger and older children on a given task (i.e., the performance score for one group, subtracted from the performance score of the other group). Bars to the left of zero represent the tasks where the younger children were reliably better than the older children and, conversely, bars to the right of zero represent the tasks where the older were reliably better than the younger group. The figure shows that the younger children reliably outperformed the older children on six sub-tests. These were: (1) Comprehension (showing knowledge of appropriate behavior in various social situations); (2) Similarities (explaining the relationship and similarities between two objects); (3) Superior Definitions (providing definitions of words); (4) Rhymes (finding as many words as possible within one minute that rhyme with a given word); (5) 60 words (recalling as many words as possible in 3 min from a list of 60 items); and (6) Weights (ordering objects of the same size but different weights in ascending order). Fig. 1 also shows five tasks in which the older children were reliably better than the younger children. These were: (1) Fingers (without counting, the child tells the experimenter how many fingers he/she has on one hand); (2) Counting Backwards (the child counts backwards from 20 to 0 in 40s, making no more than one error); (3) Change (how much change should be expected from a given purchase); (4) 3 words (using three words provided by the experimenter to produce a sentence); and, (5) Date (knowing and correctly stating the date).

While both groups exhibited the same overall MA, Fig. 1 shows different profiles of abilities in the younger and older groups. From this data, Spitz (1982) concluded that younger, more able children would be more likely to excel on tasks involving verbal reasoning and abstraction while older, less able children would excel at tasks tapping experience, maturation and rote learning. On the basis of this, Spitz argued that it is inaccurate to characterize the two groups as being of the same developmental, or the same cognitive level. This point is critical as it suggests that intelligence and development contribute differentially to ability and thus are not variations on the same dimension.

To our knowledge, Merrill’s findings have not since been replicated. However, there are several advantages in replicating that design. Firstly, using modern tests of intelligence, it should be possible to obtain more accurate ability profiles of the younger and older groups of children. Secondly, by reducing the range of chronological ages in our groups, we may be more confident that any differences we observe, relate to differences between children who fall within the normal range of abilities (as opposed to differences between typically developing and atypically developing children). This point is especially relevant when studying lower ability children because, as the gap between their chronological age and mental age increases, so too does the likelihood that some form of learning, or developmental disorder, underlies their poorer performance. Given that the younger and older groups in Merrill’s study
were separated by approximately 6 years in age, the question is raised of whether both groups were indeed typically developing. Third, the targeted study of the cognitive profiles of younger more able and older less able children offers relevance to current calls to reform educational practices. Specifically, if it were the case that younger and older children, who are matched on overall ability, exhibit very different cognitive strengths and weaknesses, then this would suggest the need to reconsider proposals for the multi-age classroom, as a common teaching practice. Finally, the question of the extent to which younger and older mental age-matched children are similar in their cognitive abilities is highly pertinent to current theoretical debates. For example, while some theorists have proposed intelligence and development are separable (e.g., Anderson, 1992, 1999, 2001), there has also been an implicit convergence in the characterization of the cognitive mechanisms proposed to explain each type of cognitive variation.

In this paper, we outline a study in which we adopt a mental age-matching design to examine the performance profiles of groups of younger and older children who fall within the normal range of ability. Within two separate experiments, we analyze the profiles of these groups within one British sample (Year 2 vs. Year 5) and within one Western Australian sample (Year 2 vs. Year 4), using the sub-tests of the British Abilities Scales 2nd edition (Elliott, Smith, & McCulloch, 1997) and the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children, 3rd edition (WISC-III; Wechsler, 1991), respectively. In both experiments, our key objective was to determine whether, once groups were matched on overall mental ability, there were reliable differences similar to those found by Merrill, in their profiles on the individual sub-tests.

2. Method

2.1. Participants

Following parental and child consent, recruitment was carried out in two ways. In Experiment 1 we adopted the selective sampling strategy used by Merrill, in which children were recruited on the basis of teacher’s assessments. That is, we tested only those younger children whom teachers ranked among the top 5 in their class, and, for the older age group, those children whom the teachers ranked among the bottom 5 in their class. In Experiment 2, we used a subset of data from a broader research program that was not focused only on the examination of abilities of children matched on MA. Thus, in Experiment 2 we did not impose selective sampling, and tests were administered to all children within the target age groups. Children who were classified with special educational needs (SEN) were not included in any testing. For each experiment, we first provide key descriptive statistics of the full sample that were tested, before detailing the sample characteristics of the reduced data set of MA matched children.

In Experiment 1, the selective sampling resulted in the recruitment and testing of a total of 40 primary school children. This sample comprised 20 children (7 males, 13 females) in the younger age group (range: 6.0–6.8 years), and 20 children (11 males and 9 females) in the older age group (range: 10.0–10.8 years). In Experiment 2, testing was carried out on 231 children (106 males, 125 females). However, a number of cases were removed due to incomplete data leaving 207 in total. In the younger and older groups this comprised 104 children (50 males, 54 females; range: 6.6–7.5 years), and 103 children (46 males and 57 females; range: 8.5–9.8 years), respectively.

2.2. Apparatus

The apparatus consisted of the test items and all associated peripheral materials (i.e., test booklets, stopwatch, pencils and paper), from (i) the ‘School Age’ version of the British Ability Scales II (BAS-II; Elliot et al., 1997), designed for use with children aged 6.0–17.9 years, and (ii) the WISC-III (Wechsler, 1991), designed for children aged 6.0–16.0 years.

2.3. Design

The study adopted a quasi-experimental, mixed design. The between-groups factor was ability, yoked to age. The groups were younger, higher-ability (YHA) children and older lower-ability (OLA) children. The dependent variables were measures of performance on each of the sub-tests within the BAS-II (Elliott et al., 1997), and the WISC-III (Wechsler, 1991). Specifically, we converted raw scores on each test to a ‘proportion correct’ score (i.e., a proportion of the total score possible for a given test), thereby allowing for comparisons across each of the subtests and between the two versions of intelligence tests.

2.4. Procedure

2.4.1. Experiment 1

All participants were tested individually on each of the BAS II Core Scales and Diagnostic tests (Elliott et al., 1997). The full set of items administered from the BAS II Core Scales were (1) Word Definitions (providing verbal definitions for words); (2) Verbal Similarities (demonstrating how three words are related to each other); (3) Matrices (completing an array of abstract shapes by choosing the missing shape from a number of candidate shapes); (4) Quantitative Reasoning (choosing a card showing a number of dots, that completes a pattern in a sequence of other cards also showing a number of dots); (5) Recall of Design (given 5 s to look at a geometric line-drawing and reproducing it as accurately as possible); and (6) Pattern Construction (manually manipulating patterned blocks in order to match a picture showing the same blocks in a specific orientation). As per the standard instructions in the BAS II, the Core Scales were used to derive measures of MA. For each child, we computed full-scale IQ scores using their scores on the Core Scales. MA scores were created by dividing IQ scores by 100 and multiplying this by CA (in months). In addition, the following supplementary tests from the BAS II Diagnostic tasks were administered: (1) Recall of Objects — Immediate (given timed exposure to an A4 card showing 20 colored pictures of objects, once removed from view, children must immediately recall, in any order, as many items as possible); (2) Recall of Objects — Delayed (without a repeated exposure to the stimulus card, after an interval of around 15–20 min, the child is tested again on their recall for the 20 objects); 3) Recall of Objects — Spatial (children are given an empty grid and 20 tiles, each showing one of the colored objects. They must place as many of the tiles as they can, in their correct position in the grid); (4) Speed of Processing (scanning, as quickly as and as accurately as possible, lines of numbers on a page and manually crossing out the highest number in each line); (5) Digits Forward (children are read a sequence of numbers at a rate of 2 per second and asked to repeat them in the same order. Sequences start out short, e.g., 2 digits and, with correct responses, get increasingly longer to a maximum of 9 digits); and (6) Digits Backward (children are required to repeat in reverse order a sequence of numbers that are read aloud at a rate of 2 per second. Sequences are initially shorter, e.g., 2 digits, and with correct responses become progressively longer to a maximum of 7 digits).

2.4.2. Experiment 2

From the WISC-III (Wechsler, 1991) a total of 10 sub-tests were administered individually to all participants. The sub-tests used to measure verbal abilities (scales used to compute verbal IQ scores) were: (1) Information (oral responses are given to general knowledge questions); (2) Similarities (children are orally presented with two words and asked to explain how the words are similar); (3) Arithmetic (timed response to orally presented mental arithmetic problems);

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1 Using the old-fashioned formula that IQ = MA / CA × 100, this corresponds to group mean IQs of 145.5 and 67.2.
Fig. 2. Experiment 1: (a) Mean CAs and MAs in full sample of younger and older primary school groups. (Error bars show standard errors of the mean. Double stars represent significant differences at the .001 level.) (b) The actual MA–CA disparities in younger and older primary school groups. Data to the left of the dashed black vertical line (at point 0) represent children with MAs lower than their CAs. Data to the right represent children with MAs higher than their CAs.

Diagnostic measures. These data were not replaced, and were omitted from the analyses. The overall CAs and MAs for the younger and older groups are presented in Fig. 2a. The difference of 47 months in CA between the younger and older groups was reliable ($F(1,39) = 2850.65$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .99$). However, Fig. 2 also shows that the method of using teacher and school assessments to recruit groups of younger more able and older less able children was not completely reliable. Had the selective sampling been reliable, Fig. 2b would show MA–CA differences in the younger group all above zero, and MA–CA differences in the older children group all below zero. Instead, Fig. 2b shows some of the younger children obtained overall ability scores that were average, or below average for their age, and that some of the older children obtained overall ability scores that were average, or above average for their age. A one-way ANOVA confirmed the MA difference of 20.1 months between the MAs of younger and older groups to be significant ($F(1,39) = 14.77$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .280$).

3.1.2. MA matching

To compare the performance profiles of exactly matched groups, we create a subset of the data, where younger children exhibit MA greater than their CA and where older children exhibit MA lesser than their CA. This permits a categorical group comparison between younger and older children with MA differences more negative than −7.5 yielding the largest sample in the reduced dataset. The reduced dataset comprised 14 younger and 14 older children. Fig. 3a & b presents the mean CAs and MAs, and the differences between CA and MAs in these groups, in the reduced set. Fig. 3b now shows a clearer division between younger and older groups. A univariate ANOVA showed the mean difference of 47.3 months between the groups’ CAs was highly reliable ($F(1,27) = 2319.30$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .99$), while the mean difference of 4 months in their MA was not ($F(1,27) = 1.02$, $p = .321$, $\eta^2 = .04$). These groups can thus be more clearly defined as younger higher ability (YHA) and older lower ability (LHA).
ability (OLA) groups. The computed mean IQ of these groups were: YHA = 125, and OLA = 81.2.

The mean proportion correct on each of the six Core Scales is presented in Fig. 4. A MANOVA performed on these data showed no group differences in overall profiles between YHA and OLA ($F(1,26) = .69, p = .415$).

On the supplementary Diagnostic subtests included in the BAS-II, highly similar profiles between YHA and OLA were found again. Fig. 5 shows the mean proportion correct across these six tests for the YHA and OLA groups. A MANOVA performed on these data however revealed an overall main effect of Group ($F(1,25) = 7.40, p = .012, \eta^2 = .228$). Fig. 5 indicates this effect was primarily due to the large between-group differences on one sub-test, Speed of Processing. The univariate results of the MANOVA indicated that the YHA and OLA differed on two tasks, Object Immediate and Speed of Processing; with the OLA group performing better in each case (Object Immediate: 50.6 vs. 39.6; Speed of Processing: 46.8 vs. 25.6). Only Speed of Processing survived a Bonferroni correction for multiple comparisons (Object Immediate uncorrected: $F(1,25) = 4.07, p = .05, \eta^2 = .140$; Speed of Processing uncorrected: $F(1,25) = 38.64, p < .001, \eta^2 = .607$). As with the Core scales, no test indicated reliably superior performance of the YHA group.

3.2. Experiment 2

3.2.1. Full sample

Within the full sample tested, data were complete for 207 of the 232 children. Missing data were not replaced and these cases were omitted from the analysis. Fig. 6a shows the mean MA and CAs for the groups of younger (N = 104; 50 males, 54 females) and older (N = 103; 46 males, 57 females) children. Due to the fact that no selective sampling was used, Fig. 6b shows a wider distribution of abilities in both groups. Prior to selecting a subset of children more closely matched on MA, univariate ANOVAs confirmed that the differences observed were reliable, in both the CAs ($F(1,205) = 2953.83, p < .001, \eta^2 = .93$), and the MAs ($F(1,205) = 193.69, p < .001, \eta^2 = .48$) of younger and older children.

3.2.2. MA matching

MA matched groups were obtained by testing equal positive and negative cut-offs around MA–CA = 0, that allowed the greatest number of children to be retained in each group, while keeping MA stable. Selecting just those younger children for whom MA–CA differences were positive and greater than 3.5 months and older children for whom MA–CA differences were more negative than −3.5 months, and around a mean MA of 8.5 (± 1 sd) yielded the largest a subset of 39 younger children (20 males, 19 females; mean age = 7.2 years, se = 0.04) and 22 older children (12 males, 10 females; mean age = 9.1 years, se = 0.05), matched on a mean MA of 8.4 years (se = 0.07). A univariate ANOVA showed the mean difference of 22.8 months between the groups’ CAs was reliably ($F(1,59) = 676.84, p < .001, \eta^2 = .920$), while the mean difference of 1 month in their MA was not ($F(1,59) = 0.566, p = .455, \eta^2 = .009$). Once again, these groups more clearly form the YHA and OLA groups. Fig. 7a depicts the CAs and MAs for the YHA and OLA groups. The computed mean IQ of these groups were: YHA = 115, and OLA = 92.3.

A MANOVA on the proportion correct for the 10 core scales revealed reliable differences in performance between YHA and OLA on only two of the sub-tests: Coding ($F(1,59) = 16.33, p < .001, \eta^2 = .22$); and, Arithmetic ($F(1,52) = 11.58, p = .001, \eta^2 = .16$). These differences survived Bonferroni corrections for multiple comparisons ($p[0.05 / 10] = 0.005$). Fig. 8 gives the profiles of performance on the WISC-III core scales for YHA and OLA groups. The figure shows YHA outperforming OLA on Coding (77.3 vs. 55.9) and the OLA outperforming YHA on Arithmetic (47.8, vs. 44.1).

Using a different standardized test of intelligence within a different sample, Experiment 2 yields results that appear largely similar to the results of Experiment 1. In both experiments we failed to replicate the findings of Spitz (1982), who reported reliable differences in the respective profiles of groups matched on an MA of 8.0 years. The results from the current study indicate that younger and older ability matched children exhibit broadly similar profiles of performance on the sub-tests.

4. Discussion

On the basis of Merrill’s earlier work, Spitz argued that MA-matched children of different chronological ages do not possess similar skills or

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2 YHA IQ = 96.5 / 77.1 × 100 = 125.1; OLA IQ = 100.5 / 124.4 × 100 = 80.7.

3 YHA IQ = 101.7 / 88.2 × 100 = 115.3; OLA IQ = 100.7 / 109.8 × 100 = 91.7.

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abilities, but that they arrived at the same overall ability level through different strengths and weaknesses. In replicating Merrill's original design, we found a very different set of results, using two standardized tests of intelligence. Our MA-matched groups of YHA and OLA children differed reliably on only 3 out of 22 sub-tests that we administered. Experiment 1 found no instances where the YHA reliably outperformed the OLA, and only one instance where the OLA reliably outperformed the YHA. In contrast to Spitz’s findings whereby the YHA had an advantage on tasks tapping verbal abilities (e.g., Comprehension, Similarities, Superior definitions, Rhymes, and 60 words), we did not find, for example, the YHA group to outperform the OLA on Word Definitions or Verbal Similarities. Similarly, where Spitz previously found the OLA to have advantage on tasks tapping experience (e.g., Fingers, Counting backwards, Change, 3 words and Date), we might have expected the OLA in our study to have the advantage on tasks such as Recall of Designs and Pattern Construction. This was not the case, and the kinds of differential patterns of strengths and weaknesses that Spitz showed were not revealed.

In Experiment 1, the YHA and OLA groups were not statistically distinguishable in their performances on the Core Scales, and there was little difference between the YHA and the OLA on the Diagnostic tests. Only one reliable difference emerged between groups. This was on the Speed of Processing task, where the OLA group showed superior performance to the YHA group. This group difference on the Speed of Processing task appears to sit at odds with the role of speed proposed by Anderson, whereby speed is argued to be responsible for producing variability within-ages, but not between-ages (Anderson, 1999). If the Speed of Processing task reliably samples a speed mechanism such as the one Anderson describes, then we would expect performance on this task to be superior in the YHA group.

Experiment 2 showed that younger and older MA-matched groups differed reliably on 2 sub-tests. On the other 8 sub-tests the groups were no different in their performances. As in Experiment 1, and again in contrast to Spitz, Experiment 2 revealed no advantage of verbal abilities in the YHA group. For instance, YHA and OLA groups were not different on Vocabulary, or Information. In contrast to Experiment 1, however, in Experiment 2, it was the YHA who outperformed the OLA on Coding; a task designed to tap speed of processing. This finding is consistent with Anderson’s speed of processing account. The OLA advantage over the YHA on Arithmetic was consistent with the results Spitz reported, suggesting an advantage of age. In contrast to Spitz, our results indicate that MA-matched children of different chronological ages are largely similar in their cognitive abilities.

While Experiments 1 & 2 appear to offer conflicting results with regard to the sub-tests tapping speed of processing, we argue that (1) differences in the relative contributions of these tests to IQ scores, and (2) differences in the processes that the sub-tests measure, account for these seemingly contradictory findings. Firstly, the respective sub-tests used to tap speed, within the BAS II and WISC-III, do not appear equivalent in their contributions to measures of intellectual ability. That is, on the BAS II measures of overall ability are created using the scores from the Core Scales. The Speed of Processing task (one of six Diagnostic measures) is used to gain insight into a child’s abilities on the Core Scales, and so performance on this Diagnostic scale does not contribute to resultant IQ scores. In contrast, the Coding sub-test on the WISC-III does form a core measures, and consequently it is used to generate overall IQ scores.

These differences indicate that in addition to tapping speed, the tests may differ more critically in the cognitive processes they are sensitive to. For instance, on the Speed of Processing sub-test on the BAS II, children are tested for how quickly they can read and cross out the highest number on each line of a page containing several lines of numbers. The task is therefore heavily reliant on processing information relating to number. Given greater experience with number concepts it seems plausible that older children (i.e., who have more familiarity with number concepts via schooling) would show an advantage. This is what our results showed in Experiment 1. This argument also fits with our finding in Experiment 2 where the OLA outperformed the YHA on Arithmetic (another sub-test where experience with number concepts would likely lend an advantage). Accordingly, these findings are consistent with Spitz’s view that superior performance of older less able children over younger more able children is, at least in part, influenced by experience. On the WISC-III, the Coding sub-test used to assess Speed requires that children use a key to copy information paired with different geometric shapes, to a number of empty geometric shapes on a page. Because of the abstract nature of this task, it would seem reasonable to expect more intelligent individuals to show an advantage on this task. Indeed, the result from Experiment 2, where the YHA outperformed the OLA is consistent with this view.

In attempting to understand the source of differences between our findings and those reported by Spitz, it is important to consider a number of possible limitations in the approach we took. Firstly, in Experiment 1 the strategy for using a selective sampling procedure

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(akin to the one Spitz reported) was to maximize the likelihood of obtaining our target groups of younger more able and older less able children. However, our results showed this method was not fully reliable. Using teacher’s assessments to select the top 5 younger children, and the bottom 5 older children in their respective classes, did not result in younger children all with MAs greater than their CAs, and older children all with MAs less than their CAs. In the full sample that we tested, we found a number of younger children for whom their MAs appeared equal to their CAs, and a number of older children with MAs equal to, or above their CAs. These children were therefore not included in our comparisons of YHA and OLA groups. Consequently, in Experiment 1 we obtained a relatively small sample size (N = 28) thus limiting the generalizability of our findings (the computed power of Experiment 1 is 0.39). Importantly, though, in Experiment 2 where we achieved a larger sample (N = 61), and where we had adequate power (the computed power in Experiment 2 is 0.72), we replicated the pattern of highly similar cognitive profiles in MA-matched groups of YHA and OLA children. On a separate note, it is an intriguing finding that on the standardized intelligence test we used, 6 out of 20 older children, who were believed to be of low ability, scored average or above average in their ability. At the very least, this suggests that the older children who were performing poorly at school were doing so for reasons other than their cognitive ability. Future research is aimed at examining the role social and emotional factors might play in influencing academic outcomes for such children.

Experiment 2 revealed a different limitation, also related to the sampling process we used. Specifically, this concerns a general problem in MA-matching designs where in order to achieve groups of individuals closely matched on MA, it is typically necessary to test a great many more subjects than are used in the analysis. While the data collected in Experiment 2 were obtained as part of a broader research program, the cost (in terms of time and resources) can be considerable, and thus these factors may play a significant role in influencing final sample numbers.

Fig. 6. Experiment 2: (a) Mean CAs and MAs in full sample of younger and older primary school groups. (Error bars show standard errors of the mean. Double stars represent significant differences at the .001 level.) (b) The actual MA–CA disparities in younger and older primary school groups. Data to the left of the dashed black vertical line (at point 0) represent children with MAs lower than their CAs. Data to the right represent children with MAs higher than their CAs.

Fig. 7. Experiment 2: (a) Mean CAs and MAs for reduced set of primary school children. (Error bars show standard errors of the mean) (b) Mean MA–CA disparities of younger and older groups in reduced set of primary school children. Data to the left of the dashed black vertical line (at point 0) represent children with MAs lower than their CA. Data to the right represent children with MAs higher than their CA.
Another difference between our approach and the one Spitz adopted is that the spread of ages we tested was not as great compared to those Spitz used. Although the samples we achieved were also YHA and OLA, in our study the mean age differences in CAs between YHA and OLA groups were 3.9 years and 1.9 years, in Experiments 1 & 2 respectively. In Spitz’s study the mean age difference between YHA and OLA groups was 6.4 years. This highlights an important tension in replicating a design whereby the aim is simultaneously to create a disparity in CA, and eliminate any disparity in MA. The tension that arises is due to the fact that as the disparity between CA increases, there is increased likelihood that at the lower end of the spectrum the poorer abilities of the older less able children are due to some form of developmental disorder. Given the larger gap in ages between the samples that Spitz used, it is possible that within his OLA group were children with developmental, or learning disorders. Thus, the differences Spitz found in the cognitive profiles of YHA and OLA children may be due to important differences in the cognitive processes that underlie test performance in atypically developing children, versus lower ability children at the low end of the normal range.

A final point of difference between our approach and that of Spitz’s, concerns the tests we used. Spitz compared the performance profiles of YHA and OLA groups on the Stanford–Binet (Binet, 1916); the first revision to Binet’s early test items (1906). Our comparisons of YHA and OLA groups used the BAS II and the WISC-III, each of which have profited from over 80 years of refinement. Though over time all intelligence tests may have drawn criticisms for their power to accurately assess abilities, particularly relevant here is the possibility that the early versions of the Stanford–Binet test were verbally loaded and that the verbal instructions that accompanied several of the sub-tests may have unfairly disadvantaged children with a poorer grasp of language (see e.g., Becker, 2003). Under this view, such a limitation may have favored the younger more articulate children in Merrill’s data and disadvantaged the older ones. However, the test’s verbal loading would not account for the advantages that Spitz showed in the OLA. Herein lies another potentially important difference between the Stanford–Binet (Binet, 1916) and the tests we used. Whereas the Stanford–Binet test (Binet, 1916) included items to tap age, or maturational effects (test items such as tying shoes, counting change and correctly stating the date), there do not seem to be equivalent tasks in the BAS II, or WISC-III. Though the latter tests include sub-tests such as Recall of Designs (a drawing task in which motor control might be assumed to be more advanced in older children), this task likely also involves some component of frontal, executive control in planning the copy of that drawing from memory. Taken together, the presence of a verbally loaded Stanford–Binet (which may have advantaged Merrill’s YHA group) and lack of pure age or maturational tests in the BAS II and WISC-III, may explain the differences between the results presented here and those of Spitz.

Notwithstanding the limitations discussed, we believe that our results offer a rich source for new questions concerning the relationship between cognition and intelligence to be examined. Overall, the results of both experiments suggest a different view from that advanced by Spitz. The data from the current study suggest that when closely matched on mental age, the cognitive and intellectual abilities of groups of children of different ages are largely similar. Whatever disadvantages the OLA group experiences as a result of their lower abilities, these are compensated for by their greater age; and conversely, whatever the YHA group lacks by virtue of their lower age is compensated for by their greater ability. These findings are critical as they suggest that little discriminates differences in intelligence and cognitive development. That is, in middle childhood, one’s level of performance may be reached equally through either greater age and lower ability, or lower age and greater ability.

With regard to the issue of viability of the multi-age classroom approach, the data presented here would support the view that children, if matched closely on mental ability, are largely equivalent in their thinking. Importantly, it is not clear from the current study whether the cognitive profiles of the children we matched on mental ability would continue to be similar over the course of development. Since cognitive development is non-linear (i.e., it is protracted in early years and it reaches an asymptote in adulthood), mental-age matching becomes unviable later on. Therefore, it remains to be seen how the profiles of younger higher ability and older lower ability individuals compare in the teenage years, up until the point that MA-matching ceases to be viable. Future research incorporating a longitudinal approach would allow this question to be more fully answered.

In conclusion, and in answer to the central question raised in the introduction, we argue that being more intelligent is like having more development. The similarity observed in the profiles between YHA and OLA groups strongly suggests that the mechanisms that are responsible for variability in intelligence and development are indeed the same. Thus our study supports a more parsimonious uni-dimensional perspective. The broader implication of this view is that it would therefore be quite meaningless to study separately the mechanisms underlying intelligence from those underlying development. The challenge for future research lies in identifying precisely what the mechanisms are and explaining how these are causally responsible for the variability observed both within ages and between ages.

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References


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6 Indeed, from Becker’s analysis of the history of the Stanford-Binet test, the test remained verbally loaded until its 6th revision in 1986 (Becker, 2003).