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    Criminal law and the autonomy assumption

    Reeves, Craig (2014) Criminal law and the autonomy assumption. Journal of Critical Realism 13 (4), pp. 339-367. ISSN 1476-7430.

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    Book synopsis: This article considers and criticizes criminal law‘s assumption of the moral autonomy of individuals, showing how that view rests on questionable and obscure Kantian commitments about the self, and proposes a naturalistic alternative developed through a synthetic reading of Adorno‘s and Bhaskar‘s account of the subject in relation to nature and society. As an embodied, emergent, changing subject whose practically rational powers are emergent, polymorphous, and contingent, the subject‘s moral autonomy is dependent on the conditions for experiences of solidarity in four-planar nature. This view makes criminal theory‘s Autonomy Assumption look deeply questionable; autonomy must be a complex, nuanced open question, not an abstract, a priori default assumption.


    Item Type: Article
    Keyword(s) / Subject(s): criminal law, criminal legal theory, critical legal theory, autonomy, subjectivity, need, responsibility, Adorno, Bhaskar
    School: School of Law > Law
    Depositing User: Sarah Hall
    Date Deposited: 21 Apr 2016 13:36
    Last Modified: 15 Feb 2022 13:56


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