Deontic reasoning, modules and innateness: a second look

Chater, N. and Oaksford, Mike (1996) Deontic reasoning, modules and innateness: a second look. Mind & Language 11 (2), pp. 191-202. ISSN 0268-1064.

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Official URL: http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0017.1996.tb00040.x

Abstract

Cummins (this issue) puts the case for an innate module for deontic reasoning. We argue that this case is not persuasive. First, we claim that Cummins’evolutionary arguments are neutral regarding whether deontic reasoning is learned or innate. Second, we argue that task differences between deontic and indicative reasoning explain many of the phenomena that Cummins takes as evidence for a deontic module. Third, we argue against the suggestion that deontic reasoning is superior to indicative reasoning, either in adults or children. Finally, we re-evaluate Cummins’interpretation of differences in children's performance on deontic and indicative versions of Wason's selection task.

Metadata

Item Type:	Article
School:	Birkbeck Faculties and Schools > Faculty of Science > School of Psychological Sciences
Depositing User:	Administrator
Date Deposited:	15 Sep 2016 16:42
Last Modified:	02 Aug 2023 17:26
URI:	https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/16065

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