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    Bounded rationality in taking risks and drawing inferences

    Oaksford, Michael and Chater, N. (1992) Bounded rationality in taking risks and drawing inferences. Theory & Psychology 2 (2), pp. 225-230. ISSN 0959-3543.

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    Abstract

    This commentary provides a discussion of the concept of `bounded rationality' as it applies to the theses advanced by Lopes (1991) and Evans (1991). Lopes's (1991) assessment of the irrationalist consequences of Tversky and Kahneman's (1974) work on heuristics and biases is premature because bounded rationality implies that people could not employ optimal strategies. Considerations of bounded rationality also provide additional criteria by which to judge the theories of deductive reasoning discussed by Evans (1991). Judged by this criterion, theories whose goal is to explain logically competent performance are inadequate (Oaksford & Chater, 1991). Thus Evans's assessment of the state of current theories of reasoning requires revision.

    Metadata

    Item Type: Article
    School: School of Science > Psychological Sciences
    Depositing User: Administrator
    Date Deposited: 19 Sep 2016 09:52
    Last Modified: 19 Sep 2016 09:52
    URI: https://eprints.bbk.ac.uk/id/eprint/16082

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