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    Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning

    Nikandrova, Arina and Pancs, R. (2017) Conjugate information disclosure in an auction with learning. Journal of Economic Theory 171 , pp. 174-212. ISSN 0022-0531.

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    We consider a single-item, independent private value auction environment with two bidders: a leader, who knows his valuation, and a follower, who privately chooses how much to learn about his valuation. We show that, under some conditions, an ex-post efficient revenue-maximizing auction—which solicits bids sequentially—partially discloses the leader's bid to the follower, to influence his learning. The disclosure rule that emerges is novel; it may reveal to the follower only a pair of bids to which the leader's actual bid belongs. The identified disclosure rule, relative to the first-best, induces the follower to learn less when the leader's valuation is low and more when the leader's valuation is high.


    Item Type: Article
    Keyword(s) / Subject(s): Information disclosure, Conjugate disclosure, Bayesian persuasion
    School: School of Business, Economics & Informatics > Economics, Mathematics and Statistics
    Depositing User: Arina Nikandrova
    Date Deposited: 21 Jun 2017 10:29
    Last Modified: 12 Jun 2021 18:28


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